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2ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
The purpose of this Thesis is to investigate whether 
there is real need for the selected anglophone African 
countries: Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, to have 
a central bank in their countries and whether they should 
be autonomous institutions or arms of governments and 
whether in their role as the apex banking institutions 
these banks as well as the applicable laws have effec­
tively promoted economic stability and growth or reverse.
The thesis, in its ten chapters, surveys the his­
torical development of money in Africa; developments in 
banking and central banking before and after the advent 
„o£ colonialism sin these*, countries*. *, *, >, * * * *, * *, >, *, *, *. *
It examined the legal structures of these banks; 
traced the sources of their organic and subsidiary laws 
and identified the objectives of legislation as seen by 
the nationalists of these countries before political 
independence. The thesis also sought to establish whether 
government representation on the boards; subordination 
of these banks to governments; political appointments 
of the governors and board members had impeded or enhanced 
economic development in the countries; and whether the 
lack of functional qualifications of board members and 
the use or lack of use of the implied powers of the boards 
had any impact on the performances of the banks. The 
service, developmental, monetary management and other 
functions of central banks and their performances in
3these functions were critically examined.
The broad conclusion is that a monetary authority 
be it an association of commercial banks as in Hong Kong, 
is necessary and desirable in an economy but the pattern 
of organisation of central banking in advanced countries 
is not well adapted to the needs and circumstances of 
the countries surveyed. Many far-reaching reforms have 
been proposed which would match the level of development 
of these countries and ultimately conduce, it is hoped, 
to progressive economic growth. The Central Bank of 
Nigeria was the model.
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CHAPTER 1
HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANKING IN AFRICA
DEFINITION AND SCOPE
"Let me first say, then, what I mean by 
a Central Bank. It is a bank which has 
the sole right of legal tender note issue; 
it is the banker for the Government and 
the commercial banks; it has the power to 
sell and to buy bills and security... it 
has the major responsibility for safe­
guarding the value of the currency . . . " 1
Mr. J.L. Fisher, an adviser to the Bank of England, 
has in these words attempted to define "central banking" 
by s ref erence K to thev at^r;Lbute$ ,k J;u$c,tiopsK, krQles, ^nd s K
practices of central banks. He sees central banking as 
an institution endowed with powers to carry out diverse 
functions. Dr. Rasaputram, governor of the Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka, has also tried to define central banking by 
stating what he thought were the functions of a central 
bank. He said, among other things:
"A central bank is a lender of the last 
resort, a banker's bank and a banker to 
the Government. Supervision of all bank­
ing institutions is a statutory responsibility 
given to all central b a n k s . "2
1 J.L. Fisher, Report on the Desirability and Practica­
bility of Establishing a Central Bank in Nigeria for 
Promoting the Economic Development of the Country, 1952 
pp. 4-5.
2 Dr. W. Rasamputram, "Relationship of the Central Banks 
with the Treasury, Planning and Development Agencies
in Government," Seanza Lectures 1980, p. 174.
1 3
In his own definition of what a central bank is, the 
Right Honourable J.G. Coates said:
"Our fore-fathers got along reasonably 
well with very primitive forms of barter 
... The Central Bank merely represents 
another stage in the evolution of monetary 
science... [it is] a national institution 
to co-ordinate and control our banking 
system."3
Mr. Ola Vincent in describing the Central Bank of Nigeria 
s ai d :
"Its position as the premier or apex fin­
ancial institution and the ultimate source 
of liquidity in the economy makes it a 
unique and delicate institution."4
Professor G.O. Nwankwo, in his own attempt at a defini­
tion, sees the central bank as a bank that is central to
the operations of a financial system:
"A central bank can be defined in more
than one way. We can say that it is an
institution called upon to keep the 
financial structure upon an even keel 
or in proper balance; the bank with a 
duty to regulate currency and credit in 
a country; or the apex of a country's 
monetary and banking structure set up to 
perform certain stipulated functions in 
the national interest. We can easily see 
the common feature of these definitions: 
each attempts to describe a central bank
3 The Right Hon. J.G. Coates, the Reserve Bank Proposal 
(Government Printer, Wellington, 1933), p. 12 quoted 
in Central Banking in the British Dominions by A.F.W. 
Plumptre, 1940, p. 163.
4 Mr. 0. Ola Vincent, former Governor of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, Address at the Dinner given in Honour 
of Participants at the Symposium to mark the 20th 
Anniversary of the Bank on the 29th June, 1979, p. 6 .
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by the tasks it performs or is expected 
to perform in the economy. From this 
we can be justified in defining it 
literally as 'the bank that is central 
to the operations of any financial 
system'. It is the heart and propel­
ling force of the financial system and 
it has an overriding obligation to steer 
the system in such a way as to promote 
'the public Good and benefit of our 
p e o p l e ', as the original charter of the 
mother of central banks, the Bank of 
England, put it."^
Most authors have attempted to define central banking 
in Western capitalist society by reference to the 
classical and modern functions of central banks. The 
statutes of practically all central banks circumscribe 
their powers and functions and the object clauses amount 
to a definition of what a central bank is and should or 
should not do. But while one may accept these defini­
tions as valid in the circumstances, one must add that 
central banking is the science or art of banking in which 
a single bank at the apex of the monetary and banking 
systems has a complete or residuary monopoly of regula­
ting credit, currency and the function of money and of 
control in the banking and financial institutions in a 
country in accordance with statute and in the national 
economic interest.
Central banks may therefore be easily differentiated 
and identified as compared with other banks through their 
unique functions and practices. For the art of central 
banking has become an entirely separate branch of banking
1 Prof. G.O. Nwankwo, Basic Economics, 1977, p. 229.
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distinct from such other branches of banking as commercial 
banking, industrial banking and agricultural banking. 
Because central banks have developed their own codes of 
rules, practices and procedures one is tempted to define 
central banking as an art; and it is also a science in 
so far as it adopts the modern scientific and technolo­
gical approach to banking and making periodical 
readjustments in the system.
For a bank to be classified as a central bank 
several factors or characteristics must be present, one 
of which is the vital role money plays in the banking 
system. The important role of note issue and that of 
lender of last resort result from the axiomatic position 
that "money" is the commodity operated upon by any bank- 
, ing ,s y s t e m  , I,f ,the,r$ is, go, "jnQney," , there,can, be, n,o , , , , 
question of having a reserve currency or of a central 
bank being lender of last resort. As the functions of 
central banks therefore centre on money, one must first 
attempt a definition of "money".
It is therefore proposed in the first two introduc­
tory chapters:-
1. First, to trace the evolution of the concept and use 
of money in the operation of an economic system;
2. Secondly, to sketch, in brief, the history of the 
emergence of banks as the custodians of money and 
providers of credit;
3. Thirdly, to indicate when and how banking systems 
and practices were introduced into Africa in the 
colonial period; and
16
4. Lastly, to identify the period when and the
mechanisms by which central banks were created for 
the benefit of anglophone African countries.
IS THE CONCEPT OF CENTRAL BANKING UNAFRICAN?
The classical or traditional concept of central 
banking as can be deduced from the structures and prac­
tices of the established central banks in Europe and 
America has been revolutionised. Central banking before 
1920 was conceived in Europe simply as performing the 
function of note issue with a responsibility to stabilise 
the currency and prevent inflation. In many of the 
European countries, one aggressive bank gradually came to 
assume more and more the position of a central bank if 
it had been the government's banker or agent and enjoyed 
the sole or the principal right of note issue. The Bank 
of France, founded in 1800 partly with the aid of State 
funds but mainly with private capital, was one such bank. 
In this kind of role such banks were not originally 
called central banks, but were generally known as 
national banks or banks of issue. Before 1914 many coun­
tries had established national banks of issue, but it 
was not until the 1920s that these banks came to be 
called central banks. The Bank of England for example, 
was established by public subscription in 1694 for the 
express purpose of advancing money raised from the rich 
merchants of London to the government, in return for the 
privilege of note issue conferred under a charter granted 
to it in an Act of Parliament. In subsequent years the
17
Bank of England has assumed its premier position as a
central bank by acquiring more and more powers as the
custodian of the cash reserves of the private banks and
the country's gold reserve, then as lender of last
resort, then as regulator of Bank Rate as an instrument
of credit policy until around 1866 when its influence
enabled it to be recognised as the central bank of Great 
6
Britain.
This classical concept of the 19th century of 
central banking was radically changed after the First 
World War, when following the advice of the International 
Financial Conference held in Brussels in 1920 under the 
auspices of the League of Nations that countries which 
had not yet established a central bank should proceed to 
do so as soon as possible to facilitate the restoration 
and maintenance of stability in monetary and banking 
systems in the interest of world co-operation. Existing 
national banks of issue were in many instances re­
organised and re-named as central banks. Where national 
banks of issue did not exist (mainly in Eastern Europe, 
Latin America and Africa) new central banks were estab­
lished as part of the internationally acceptable 1920 
plan for restoring internal and external stability of 
prices, which was seen as an essential prerequisite for 
a return to the gold standard.
Six years earlier in 1914 central banks had been
6 For a detailed account of the history of the Bank of 
England, see Dr. A. Andreades, History of the Bank 
of England 1640-1903.
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established in the United States of America in the form 
of twelve Federal Reserve Banks located in Boston, New 
York, Philadelphia, Richmond, Atlanta, Cleveland,
Chicago, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Kansas City, Dallas and 
San Francisco. This followed the financial panic of 1907 
which necessitated the appointment in 1910 of a National 
Monetary Commission which was to study banking and money 
problems and propose solutions. The commission played 
an important role in banking reforms: its report recom­
mended, among other things, the establishment of a
central banking system having a co-ordinating Federal
7
Reserve Board at Washington.
The modern concept of central banking, which is a 
development of the classical concept, is much broader, 
going beyond currency stabilisation and prevention of 
inflation to extend its influence and functions to the 
relations of central banks with the government, the pub­
lic, the financial and banking institutions. Historically 
the classical concept appears to have undergone a 
significant transformation and has clearly moved away 
from the restricted view of the functions of the central 
bank. Consequently, the modern concept can be found in 
the areas of monetary reserves, open market operation, 
developmental role and international monetary and 
economic co-operation. Monetary measures are now taken 
as part of wider economic measures which are designed to
7 For details of the banking re-arrangement see Robert 
Craig West, Banking Reform and the Federal Reserve 
1863-1923, 1977.
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promote a variety of macro-economic aims. The more 
important aims are: facilitating a faster rate of growth 
in the economy consistent with price stability, promoting 
a high level of employment and greater equity in income 
distribution, and maintaining a relatively stable 
external value of the national currency.
This new and now general concept of central banking 
is a product of financial evolution in the advanced 
countries and is largely un-African, having emerged in 
mature, industrially advanced, countries with diversified 
economic structures and sophisticated money and capital 
markets. in - Africa until the 1 890s there were no
banking systems nor were there any money or capital 
markets. Central banks established in Africa from the 
1950s operated in a less than fully developed financial 
system and therefore could not meet the conditions 
required for the effective use of techniques for main­
taining monetary stability. Sophisticated money and 
capital markets are still to be developed or at the early 
stages of their development. Developing countries have 
had to face problems that are special to them. However, 
with the disappearance of colonial regimes in Africa and 
the achievement of political and therefore economic 
independence, African'governments seized the opportunity 
of self-government to establish banking systems on the 
lines of European central banks. Each country had to 
adopt its own policies formulated in such a manner as to 
cope with its special problems to achieve set objectives 
and needs avoiding sophistry in the application of
20
monetary instruments noticeable in the advanced economies
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MONEY
Before the present degree of sophistication in the 
techniques of banking was achieved there was a time in 
the history of man when there was no practice of banking, 
at least as we know it today. In the subsistence 
economy, before the monetization of economies, trade was 
by barter. Before Portuguese and Arab traders arrived 
in Nigeria and other African countries in the 15th 
century, trade in the region was carried on by barter. 
Goods were exchanged for goods. Under such a system a 
man with carcases of surplus meat can seek out the man 
with spare calico and they can trade their goods between 
themselves. To be successful, barter requires a double 
coincidence of needs for the man with cloth must want 
meat. In a close-knit society where goods are simple 
and few, it is possible to trade on this basis. It is 
a fact of history that before and after the Stone Age 
people were organised in small social groups called 
bands. These bands were self-sufficient in goods and 
other material needs because in the subsistence economy 
under which they lived hunting and nature provided all 
the food they required, and as a result the need to 
exchange articles between various bands or individuals 
did not arise.
Prehistoric man lived at first chiefly on wild 
berries, nuts, roots and herbs. As his implements 
improved and his skill increased, he became hunter,
21
trapper, and fisher. A tribe of hunters, however requires 
an extensive territory and a constant supply of game.
When the wild animals are all killed or seriously 
reduced in number, privation and hardship result. It was 
a forward step when man began to tame animals as well as 
to kill them. The domestication of animals therefore 
made possible an advance from the hunting and fishing 
stage to the pastoral stage. The domestication of plants 
marked almost as remarkable an advance as the domestica­
tion of animals. The consequence of all this was that 
Stone Age man graduated from the life of a wandering 
hunter or shepherd to the life of a settled farmer. 
Populous communities grew and man had enough leisure 
which was essential for the development of the arts of 
life.
As human society settled and early man started to 
live together in large numbers, the society became more 
and more complex. With the complexities grew his diverse 
needs in variety, value, number and quality. As he 
settled down in communities, and had more time to himself, 
man started to develop his specialised skills in 
production and functions. One man or group or village 
developed the skill of pottery-making, another the skill 
of cattle rearing while yet another became adept at tool 
making. As a result of this development in man's 
economic and social history, the need for interchange of 
commodities and products within members of the same 
nomadic group, for instance, and between contiguous bands 
and individuals inevitably arose. It is this development
22
of trade involving the exchange o;>f goods that is usually
| referred to as "barter". It is tthe earliest trade known
tI
I to man and even in the complex ec:onomie s of the world
throughout the ages and to this dlav trade goes on by 
| barter. Today, the two greatest world powers in appro­
priate circumstances resort to baarter. The Soviet Union 
for example adopts in its international trade the system 
of exchanging goods for grains frrom other countries, 
notably the United States. In Nilgeria, exchange of goods 
for goods is still practised to aa limited extent; accor­
ding to Mr. Gamaliel Onosode, the2 then Special Adviser 
to the Nigerian President on Budgjet Affairs:
"On trade by barter, on crude oil, Mr. 
Onosode noted that it wais not possible 
to do that because 'this? is against .OPEC 
agreement'. Barter is o m e  of the 
strategiqsv to kipcrqagek qpl.1 vppovductiph v 
and export, and thereforre to embark on 
this, the country will fzirst of all 
decide whether to r e m a i m  in OPEC or not.
He explained that thea purpose of 
setting production limit: by OPEC is to 
dry (sic) the quantity oaf surplus oil 
in the market which caus$ed the oil glut, 
and therefore trade by baarter on oil 
will increase the oil gliut, and worsen 
the economic situation. ri,8
The second type of barter idlentified is gift 
exchange, which was in the form oaf gifts to a relation or 
friend which did not involve any trade. The most cele­
brated gift exchange in Oceania (in the Pacific Islands), 
the Kula system, was recorded by JMalinowski:
1 Nigerian Daily Times, November* 30, 1983, p. 32.
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"In the Trobriand Islands,, for example, 
trade items like volcanic rocks, pots 
and baskets were exchanged! between the 
various islands, but as a secondary 
activity to Kula exchanges which take 
place simultaneously. T h e  Kula objects 
consist of shell necklaces and armshells. 
Periodically, some inhabitants of one 
island would decide to saiil the dangerous 
seas to another island to receive arm­
shells of necklaces from ttheir known Kula 
partners. After they had kept these 
items for a while, they would hand them 
over to inhabitants of another island who 
would also have made the seatrip to collect 
them. The system is so organised that 
the necklaces travel in ome direction and 
the armshells in the otherr. The rule is 
such that Kula partners d o  not carry out 
trade exchanges between tfriemselves, in 
order not to jeopardise tltieir friendship. 
Furthermore, it is most prestigious to be 
in possession of a Kula olbject, albeit 
temporarily. In this way a network or 
web of friendship and prestige is built 
up, while at the same time economic 
activities which are necessary for the 
survival of the Islands axre undertaken.
The silent "of dumb trade" was t:He" third kind of barter 
identified in many parts of the world. The great Greek 
historian Herodotus (490 B.C. - 4244 B.C.) gave a detailed 
account of this trade in West Africa when he wrote:
" merchant ship cast anchor on a strange 
shore, the merchants went on land, laid 
out their presents and rettreated to show 
their friendly intentions.. After some time 
the natives appeared, set out their exchange 
presents and disappeared so as not to scare 
away the other party. Then the merchants 
returned and examined the goods laid out.
If they approved, they took them away and 
left their own ones behincd. If not, they 
took some of their presentts away and thus 
made new offer. This game went on until
9 B. Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific. The 
primitive economy of the Trobriand Islanders, 
Economic Journal, March 1921.
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the offers of both sidess were balanced 
and everyone was satisfiied, and thus 
transaction was c o n c l u d e d . " ^
And Mary Kingsley in 1897 i m  her Travels in West 
Africa wrote:
"I have often seen on maarket roads a 
little space cleared by the wayside, 
and neatly laid with plaaintain leaves, 
whereon were very tidilyy arranged various 
little articles for sales - a few kola 
nuts, leaves of tobacco,, cakes of salt, 
a few heads of maize, orr a pile of yams 
or sweet potatoes. Agaiinst each class 
of articles so many cowrrie shells or beans 
are placed, and, always hanging from a 
branch above or sedatelyy sitting in the 
middle of the shop, a liittle fetish. The 
number of cowrie shells or beans indicate 
the price of the indivicdual articles in 
the various heaps and tHie little fetish 
is there to see that anyyone who does not 
place in the stead of tHne articles their 
proper price or who medcdles with the till 
shall swell up and burstt."^
On the silent trade in Ghanea E.W.Bovill wrote as 
follows:
"The merchants beat gresat drums to summon 
the local natives, who w e r e  naked and 
lived in holes in the grround. From these 
holes, which were doubtlless the pits from 
which they dug the gold,, they refused to 
emerge in the presence cof the foreign 
merchants. The latter, therefore, used 
to arrange their trade cgoods in piles on 
the river bank and retirre out of sight.
The local natives then ocame and placed a 
heap of gold beside eaclh pile and with­
drew. If the merchants were satisifed 
they took the gold and nretreated, beating 
their drums to signify tthat the market 
was o v e r . " 1 2
10 A . H . Quiggin, A Survey of Prinmitive Money, 1 949, p. 11.
11 Kingsley, Travels in West Afriica, 1897, p. 248.
12 Quoted in: Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped 
Africa, p . 6 8 .
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Along London streets and in Tube Stations, the 
silent trade goes on undisguised. The news-vendors lay 
the daily newspapers on road kerbs and in the Tube 
Stations; readers pick up copies of newspapers of their 
choice and drop the equivalent in money. The vendor need 
not be present.
THE PROBLEMS OF BARTER
Trade by barter with items of production usually 
referred to as commodity money in any community is 
bedevilled with problems and difficulties. The inherent 
difficulties in the use of commodity money make their 
acceptability an up-and-down affair. The value of the 
commodity, say a goat's skin, may change with changing 
tastes, values and times. In Nigeria for instance, the 
amount or quantity of goat's skin available in Kano 
markets may diminish with time and be insufficient as 
trade and demands expand. Apart from their bulk and 
storage problems, the system of physical transfer of 
goods and exchanges is cumbersome and unreliable, and no 
party is sure that at the end of the day a successful 
transfer will emerge. The position changed however in the 
1940s when transport systems began to be developed in 
Africa.- Markets, where available at all, were imperfect 
and besides there were no market places and no specific 
times for the exchange of goods. Demands for commodities 
were as impromptu as the supplies were erratic. The 
method of the silent or dumb trade described above is 
particularly tedious.
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From the account of a typical trade by barter given 
by Herodotus in the preceding paracgraphs the problem of 
having an acceptable measure of eqiuivalents is a signifi­
cant handicap which can impede tracde. There were also 
the problems of durability of commcodities, and of 
divisibility of some materials or ^products. As we have 
seen above the problems associated with barter during the 
era of pre-monetary societies were enormous, but that 
system of trade served the societies' needs which were 
not demanding. Barter would be inc'appropriate and unsuit­
able in today's world, although it must be admitted that 
this early form of trade was the mcost suitable during the 
period given the prevailing charactter of their subsistence 
economy.
THE SEARCH FOR A STANDARD OF VALUE::
THE EMERGENCE OF MONEY
We saw in the preceding paragraphs that trade by 
barter has four main problems. A successful bargaining 
in the exchange of goods and servicces which one produces 
for the goods and services which otthers produce and which 
one needs depends on a double coincidence of wants. Much 
patience, luck and scouting for soimeone who wants one's 
goods is required for this synchromisation of wants to 
take place. There is also the difjficulty of the two 
parties not being able to settle h o w  much of one commodity 
can be exchanged for another commocdity or service.
Closely tied to this difficulty of not being able to find 
a common unit of measure is the problem of inability to
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determine a unit of account for thes goods and services 
for purposes of accounting. And fimally, because there 
is no satisfactory unit (like Nairai, Dollars) in terms of 
which to express contracts requirinog future payments, 
such as rents, trade by barter is aan unsatisfactory 
medium of trade.
It was in an effort by some imgenious traders or
merchants to overcome these drawbactks that money was
invented to fill the gaps barter le^ft in its trail.
For money to be useful as a meedium of exchange and
to serve as a standard of value, it- has to remove, or
minimise the effect of, the drawbacrks and satisfy the 
condition in which it can be used ais a standard for 
deferred payment or as a store of w a l u e  or indeed used to 
serve as a unit of account and so ODn. In Africa, during 
the Bronze Age, some 5,000 years aggo, tools, ornaments, 
metal bars and other products came tco be accepted as yard­
sticks for measuring values. In thne result, a commodity 
could be measured in so many parts . and the values of 
goods and products reduced to a coirmmon measure. It is 
this COMMON MEASURE that man calls I MONEY.
Money thus performs the functiion of being the accept­
able MEDIUM for a community to exporess the value of 
goods and services it produces, and! it enables buying to 
be separated from selling. For monney to discharge the 
functions of a medium of exchange, a unit of account, a 
standard for deferred payments, or a store of value, it 
has to perform one or more of theses traditional roles as 
a common measure of goods and serviices. No medium of
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exchange can serve as money if itt is not accepted by a 
given community. Japan, for instaance, accepts the Yen as 
money, and, in Nigeria,the Naira,, and Zambia has the 
Kwacha while the position is diffferent in Ghana where the 
Cedi has lost its function as a store of value or medium 
of exchange because of the gross depreciation in value.
In such a period of "funny money'"' the citizenry is 
obliged to resort to barter and ttrade goods and services.
Today, money is such a famiUiar object that the fact 
that we live in a monetary econonmy is taken for granted; 
for that reason we hardly ever a s k  what money really is, 
how it originated, and what its ffrunctions and characteris­
tics are.
From time immemorial when tHie use of money was
introduced as a measure of value,, money has meant different
things and has appeared in differrent shapes, sizes,
1 3values and uses. To some economnsts money is any 
object used as a medium of exchamge which is acceptable 
to the community at large. This definition is too sim­
plistic. There are many transacttions which can take 
place on a credit basis or on hirre-purchase terms.
Although such credit facilities nmay represent a medium of 
exchange and be expressed in a cuirrency yet they are not 
a means of payment even if they vwere acceptable to the 
society. An acceptable definiticon of money should there­
fore reflect the various characteeristics of money which
13 F.A. Adekanye, The Elements cof Banking, 1983, p. 5, 
defines money as a medium of exchange that is 
generally not universally, b\ut commonly accepted by 
people in exchange of goods £and services.
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are - acceptability, scarcity, durability, homogeneity, 
divisibility and portability.
The first characteristic of money, as we said earlier 
is that it must be generally acceptable to the community. 
It has been said that this is the major characteristic 
of money and that all others are merely superfluous. 
Acceptability can only result from usage or custom of 
the people or by legislation. The Tanzania currency was 
given legal status by an Act of Parliament which says:
"The unit of currency in Tanzania shall 
be the shilling, each shilling being 
divided into one hundred cents.
The par or other value of the shilling 
shall be determined by the President on 
the advice of the Bank and in accordance 
with any international agreement in that 
behalf to which Tanzania is a party.
Notice of such determination shall be 
published forthwith in the Gazette.
The Bank shall have the sole right to 
issue bank notes and coins in and for 
Tanzania and, subject to section 33, 
only bank notes and coins issued by the 
Bank shall be legal tender in Tanzania.
Money must be scarce. This implies that money should
not be created to be so plentiful in supply as to s a t i s f y
the needs of everybody who wants it; and if there is too
much money available in an economy and it chases too few
goods its value will fall. it need not be as free as air
/
nor does it have to be as scarce as gold which to get you 
must dig deep. Money supply must maintain an equilibrium 
between scarcity and plenty to achieve relative 
stability in its value.
14 Bank of Tanzania Act, 1 966, S . 24.
l
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Another characteristic of m o ney is that it must be 
durable and stable if it is to serv/e the store-of-value 
function. Money must generate conffidence in its use if 
a society is to accept it as a mediium of exchange. If 
people believe that money will be accepted in payment of 
the goods and services which others provide and that its 
value will not sharply fluctuate buit be reasonably stable 
they will be prepared to accept m o ney as a medium of 
exchange. That type of faith Ghanaians do not have today 
in their Cedi.
On the other hand, if there is the likelihood of a 
sharp fall in the value of money between the time of 
earning and the time of spending itt, people's confidence 
will be eroded and secondly they w o u l d  not want to store 
their value in money but they would rather spend it as 
fast as they got it and Professor G.O. Nwankwo is of the 
view that:
"If the process continues for a long time 
and is not checked, confidence in the 
acceptability of the m one^ will break 
down and the monetary unitt will have to 
be replaced. This has happened many times 
in history. It happened -tto the 'greenbacks' 
during the American Civil War; Germany and 
Austria in 1923; and it happened to the 
'Biafran' currency during the Nigerian 
Civil War. However, although other measures 
of quantity, such as yards, inches, gallons, 
pounds and tons, do not clnange in value 
and are therefore absolutely stable, money 
rarely retains its value o v e r  long periods. 
People have therefore reconciled themselves 
to relative stability, simce they cannot 
achieve absolute stability in the value 
of m o n e y ."15
15 G.O. Nwankwo, Basic Economics, 19)77, p. 189.
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Yet another characteristic of money is that it must 
also be homogeneous. This also implies that each unit of 
money must be as like as possible to every other unit.
If there is no homogeneity, money cannot serve as a unit 
of account and it would be impossible for a standard 
price to emerge.
Divisibility is yet another desirable characteristic 
of money. Unless money is easily divisible, it will be 
very difficult to undertake small transactions.
Finally, money must be portable so that when buyers 
and sellers come together, they would not find it dif­
ficult to carry money to the exchange location.
In trying to find an answer to the definition of
money, we have to take into account the characteristics
of money we have just considered and we should bear in
mind that the "test of what is money is independent of
matters of form and substance; it turns on nothing more
than whether or not the commodity in question customarily
performs what are regarded as the essential functions of
money. Nor is it necessary, in order to qualify as
money, that it performs all of these functions; a single
one of them - as in the case of demand deposits and the
medium of exchange function of gold certificates and the
1 6reserve function - may be enough .." . Thus money is a 
unit of account or the measure of exchange value which 
is acceptable to a given community at a given time 
because it is durable, homogeneous, divisible, portable
16 C.R.Whittlesy, Principles and Practices of Money and 
Banking,1968, p. 17.
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and scarce and we cannot agree more with R.G. Hawtrey, 
when he said:
"Money is one of those comcepts which, 
like a teaspoon or an umbrrella, but 
unlike an earthquake or a buttercup, 
are definable primarily by' the use or 
purpose which they s e r v e .
AFRICA AND MONEY
It is not known what influenced the choice of early
man of some rather than other objeots as money. It is
probable that barter objects acquirred their importance
through their use in social or rituial ceremonies. Some
objects have been known to be used as bridal presents
while others were used in appealing^ to the gods and
deities for their benevolence. In Ibusa in the Bendel
State of Nigeria such objects as metals, cowries and
amulets made from copper or iron are to be found placed
in abundance before the carved imagjes of deities. Some of
the amulets and bangles are worn o m  the arms to prevent
escape of blood from any part of thne body through the use
of knives or cutlas on the body by an attacker, and
against evil spirits and witches. If these amulets were
worn during tribal wars and a gun w a s  aimed at the
wearer, the gun would not fire. Tbie metals were credited
with divine powers and because of tthat they were accepted
as a medium of payment. The "Economist" of London has
this to say on the role of pre-coimage money:
17 R . G .Hawtrey, Currency and Crediit, 1 928, p. 1.
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"The evidence suggests that barter - 
in its usual sense of exchange of 
commodities - was not the main factor 
in the evolution of money.. The objects 
commonly exchanged in bartter do not 
develop naturally into momey, and the 
more important objects used as money 
seldom appear in ordinary everyday barter. 
Moreover, the inconveniences of barter 
do not disturb simple societies. Money 
appears to enter the economic system, 
as it were, from the outsiide, beginning 
its career as an adjunct tto religion, 
to marriage rites, to legal and social 
procedures, serving originally as bride- 
price, as ransom, as cereimonial gift, or 
as pure means of ostentation, and only 
later, in more developed societies and 
particularly under the impact of external 
trade needs, filling its imodern role of 
universal means of exchange. Money 
meant p o w e r .and status lomg before it 
meant comfort and good l i w i n g . " 1 8
It is no wonder therefore thatt the early man in 
Africa attached great importance tco these objects, rever­
ing them and finally adopting them as money. From the 
present knowledge of the geography of the different 
regions of Africa it can now be prcobably explained that 
the choice of currencies or money cobjects depended to a 
large extent on the ecology of the area in Africa. Thus 
in the grasslands of North, East, (Central and Southern 
Africa animal husbandry prevailed £and the currencies 
adopted were cattle and grain, and implements used in the 
production of grains; while in Westt and Central Africa 
agriculture was the main preoccupattion of the inhabitants 
and the choices of currencies fell on farming and hunting
18 August 27, 1949 pp. 450-451 gucoted in Principles and 
Practices of Money and Banking by Charles R. 
Whittlesey, 1968, p. 6.
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implements and the raw materials fcor manufacturing them.
There were two groups of pre-<coinage currencies used 
in Africa and in Nigeria in particular. The first group 
consists of local materials which were used for internal 
trade. Examples were such items ais iron, farm products, 
textiles, feathers, seeds of plants. The other group 
consists of imported items used fcor external trade when 
Europeans established trade contacts with West Africa in 
the 15th century. These items include Manillas, beads, 
gin, tobacco.
Generally, however, the following objects were used
1 9
as indigenous pre-coinage currencii.es in Africa.
Cattle
Among the pastoral and semi-ipastoral peoples of 
Africa wealth was measured by the number of cattle owned. 
The lobola (marriage) system of tlhe Zulus is widely known 
and expressed in terms of a prove.rb which says that 
"where the cattle are the woman i:s not" to mean that a 
woman of high status and beauty would realise for her 
family so many heads of cattle o m  marriage.
Both words "capital" and "chiattels" derive from the 
same root word, as does "cattle",, while "pecuniary" means 
invested in p e c u s , the Latin for cows.
19 For a fuller account see (i) A.H. Quiggin, A Survey 
of Primitive Money ( 1 949) ; (iii) Mary Kingsley Travels 
in West Africa 1 897 ; (iii) M.. Posnansky, The Origins 
of West African T r a d e , Accra,, 1971.
We are deeply indebted to the work Money by Ekpo, 
1979, for details concerning the objects used as 
currency in Africa.
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Iron
The so-called Ogoja pennies kmown as the "iyayaw" 
or "efufy", the Y-shaped iron forms the "yakaro" of the 
Tiv, the "Tyers"of the Birom, the iiron bars of the Efiks 
and Kalahari and the hoes from Gomibe (all in Nigeria) 
were the most famous.
Copper
History had it that from the writings of El Bakri 
in the 11th century copper was beimg exported to the 
Guinea coast where there was great demand for it.
20
Another Moroccan Berber, Ibn Batuta, a Muslim writer, 
described the copper mines of Tekecdda when he visited 
West Africa in 1353. As early as tthe 3rd century A.D., 
copper was being mined in Kansanshii (Zambia) . In 
Nigeria, the earliest known civilisation which made 
extensive use of copper alloys was the Igbo Ukwu culture, 
which has been dated to the 9th cemtury A.D.
Gold
Gold was, and still is, universally accepted as a 
symbol of wealth and power all ove r  the world because of 
its inherent qualities. In West Aifrica, particularly 
among the Akans and the inhabitants of the present-day 
Ghana, gold was adopted as the currency of the areas in 
the form of dust and grain, the dust permitting easy
20 Travels in Asia and Africa (132 5-54), 1929.
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division. Posnansky calculated that the output of gold in 
the Akan area in pre-colonial times was around nine tons 
per annum with 44% of this coming from Boure in Guinea 
and the hinterland of present-day Ghana and Ivory Coast. 
Gold was one of the last commodities to serve as currency 
when it was formally abolished on the introduction of 
coins into West Africa by the West African Currency Board 
in 1912.
Salt
It is not known when man discovered and began to use 
salt in his diet. However the earliest recorded incidence 
of the importance of salt in West Africa is contained in 
Ibn Batuta's 14th century account, which describes the 
salt mines of Tagharza which produced the salt which was 
traded over the whole of the Sudan. The salt slabs 
quarried in the Ethiopian (Abyssinian) mountains were 
legal tender until 1933. In East Africa, the most impor­
tant salt centre was Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika where, in 
1907, it was observed that between two to three thousand 
people usually assembled on the banks of River Ruguvu for 
the sole purpose of converting the saline water into salt 
which was then traded about in cylindrical leaf packages. 
Before the arrival of the Royal Niger Company in Nigeria 
at the close of the 19th century the salt cones from 
Bornu State of Nigeria were famous. The Royal Niger 
Company, now the United Africa Company (Nigeria) Limited, 
dominated trade in the whole of West Africa. It supplied, 
among other commodities, salt to the region in exchange
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for palm oil and other local produccts.
In Roman times soldiers were cgiven salt for their 
wages instead of their traditional "salt money", or 
salarium ("salary").
The Cowrie
Cowrie shells were the most umiversal of all pre­
coinage currencies. They were foumd to be used in China, 
America, Europe, India, the Pacifisc Islands and Africa, 
and the very name Cowrie is believfed to have been
derived from the Hindu Kauri.
21
Ibn Batuta again records thiat he observed cowries
being sold in the northern part of: the area now known as
22
Nigeria. Hiskett was of the vie^w that the Malian
cowries seen in the 11th century miust have found their
2 3
way to Benin in Nigeria by 1450. .Also Polanyi recorded 
that cowries were being traded dow;n the Persian Gulf to 
Niger by Venetian merchants. The massive importation of 
cowries by profiteering German traiders residing in East 
Africa in 1850 destroyed the markeBt-value of the cowries 
causing inflation. These shells brought for a pittance 
and shipped to West Africa resulted in profits of up to 
55%. Other traders soon followed.. In England, the firm 
of Messrs Stuart and Douglas b e g a m  dealing in cowries
21 Batuta, Travels in Asia and Affrica, 1929, p. 37.
22 Hiskett, Materials Relating tcp the Cowrie Currency 
of the Western Sudan, Bulletim of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, xxix, pp. 339-365,
1 966 .
2 3 Ekpo Eyo, M o n e y , 1977, pp. 43— 44.
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and soon the West African market w a s  inundated with the 
ring cowries. At one point 27,00(0 tons of cowries were 
shipped to West Africa alone. Bacdagry, the notorious 
slave depot, was also a cowrie mairket. The result was 
inevitable: cowries became uselesis as a medium of exchange 
and, by the time coin currency wa;s introduced, 2,000 of 
them were worth only 6d. whereas :formerly, two only of 
the Monetaria were enough to procure a wife. In Togoland 
in 1896, 4,000 shells were worth <only one German mark.
It was therefore not surprising wihen their use as 
currency was banned in Uganda in 1901 and in Nigeria in 
1 923.
In spite of the misfortune w/hich befell the cowrie
currency, legends were woven arouind them. Among the
Ewe, it was believed that they descended from heaven.
24The Yoruba historian, Samuel Johnison, records that when
Oduduwa, the claimed ancestor of the Yoruba, died, the
Oba (King) of Benin inherited all. his cowries.
25Kirk-Greene also reported that King Dosumu in 
1861 ceded the territory of Lagos; to the British Govern­
ment for an annuity of 1,200 bars; of cowries, an equiva­
lent of about N2,000.00.
The importance of cowries laiy not only in their use 
as a medium of exchange, but in that these tiny shells 
were believed to be endowed with magical attributes.
24 S. Johnson, History of the Yojruba, Lagos, 1921.
25 A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, "The major currencies in Nigerian 
history", Journal of the Historical Society of 
Nigeria, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 132-150.
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Even today, they are believed to promote fertility and 
longevity, and it is not an unusual sight to see women 
wearing girdles of cowries at their marriage as an 
insurance against sterility. This combining of beauty, 
indestructability and the difficulty of counterfeiting, 
as well as their alleged magical powers, makes cowries 
the most widespread, the most accepted and the longest- 
used pre-coinage currency throughout the world.
OTHER PRE-COINAGE CURRENCIES
It is worthy of note that in Southern Nigeria the
use of cowries was abolished in 1903 and that in 1902,
the High Commission for Southern Nigeria prohibited the
2 6
importatation of manillas except under licence, and by
271911 they ceased to be legal tender. In 1919 foreign 
traders were also prohibited from using manillas in 
local trade in Nigeria. In 1948, the Eastern Regional 
House of Assembly passed a law to abolish the use of 
manilla currency and a big campaign was launched to 
redeem all existing manillas. The exercise cost the 
Government about £436,000 to redeem about 32^ million
26 The latin origin of the word "manilla", a dimunitive 
of manus, a hand, has probably come down through the 
Portuguese. The origin of the manilla has not been 
clearly established but the most vivid description 
of this quaint currency is found in a letter written 
by Consul Hutchinson to the Foreign Office in bondon 
in 1858: "They are pieces of copper of a horseshoe 
form, about four inches in the measurement of the 
circumference of their circle and about half an inch 
in that of their density, being terminated by two 
lozenge shaped ends facing one another." See Kirk- 
Greene, op. cit., p. 145.
27 Manilla Currency Ordinance of 1919.
40
m anillas.
THE COMING OF COINS AND NOTES - HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The Coins
In Babylon there are two famous rivers, the Tigris
and Euphrates, whose valley the Greeks called
Mesopotamia, the land between the rivers. The fertile
2 8
valley was the granary of the early civilsation and it 
played a crucial role in the development of urban c u l ­
tures of the ancient world. It became the centre of 
economic activities in the known world and the first 
known empire. The development of it he arts and crafts 
brought a new industrial clan into existence. There was 
now need of merchants and shop-keepers from far and near 
to collect manufactured products from producers from 
India, and all Europe. The need for a medium of exchange 
arose and so metallic money first circulated in the form of 
rings and bars. The Egyptians had small pieces of gold 
- 'cow gold' - each of which was simply the value, of a 
full-grown cow. It was necessary to weigh the metal 
whenever a purchase took place. Then the practice arose 
of stamping each piece of money with its true value and 
weight. The next step was coinage proper, where the
28 We can understand, therefore, why from pre-historic 
times, men have been attracted to this region, and 
why it is here that we must look for one of the 
earliest seats of civilization. It is interesting 
to note that the Old Testament, Genesis, 11:8-15 
places Paradise, the Garden of God and original home 
of man, in Southern Babylonia and the ancient name 
for the district was Eden.
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government guarantees, not only the weight, but also the
genuineness of the metal.
The honour of the invention of coinage is generally
given to the Lydians, whose country was well supplied
with the precious metals. As early as the 6th century
B.C. the Lydian monarchs began to strike coins of elec-
trum, a natural alloy of gold and silver. The famous
King Croesus, whose name is still a synonym for riches,
was the first to issue the first official coins of pure
gold and silver in about 550 B.C.
The Greek neighbours of Lydia quickly adopted the
29
art of coinage and so introduced it into Europe. The
next coins to appear were the drachma issued in Greece
in Athens and the Roman dinarius. Thereafter the issue
of coins spread to other world powers. In the former
British African territories, the coins of the colonial
masters were used supplemented by the Austrian Maria
Theresa dollar struck in Austria in 1780 at the death of
Empress Maria Theresa.
The immediate factor that quickened the emergence of
coins was the invention of the art of sound writing (by
alphabets) which was probably invented by the Babylonians
(Phoenicians) in the 10th century B.C. and spread by
their sailors and traders first to the Greeks, then the
30
Romans from whom other European peoples borrowed them.
29 H. Webster, Early European History Part I Ancient 
Times, 1926, pp. 46-47.
30 The Code of Hammurabi (The Babylonian King) enacted 
some two thousand years before Christ, readily comes 
to mind as the first-ever recorded legislation in 
man's legal history.
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Notes
The literate Babylonians keppt records of their 
economic transactions on clay takblets called cuneiform. 
They would record the commoditiess bought or sold and 
their prices were denominated in silver and copper. 
Because these metal currencies orr coins were heavy to 
carry around and from places as ffar as India, the mer­
chants began to deposit the metalls in the temples with
33 1the priests who issued r e c e i p t s . O n  presentation of
32
these receipts to another recogniised temple the 
receipts were honoured and in retturn the merchants were 
provided with the currency, thereeby obviating the dif­
ficulty of carrying heavy loads cof metal.
KINDS OF POST-COINAGE MONEY USED IN AFRICA
We saw above that money was invented by the 
Phoenician merchants and sailors and it was left to the 
Lydian King Croesus to produce thhe first official coin 
in the 6th century before Christ.. With the widespread 
minting of coins that followed tthe invention, commodity 
money, for example, copper and siilver, ceased to be
31 R. Nitsche, M o n e y , 1 970, Colllins, bondon, p. 25.
32 John 2:13-6 confirms this histtorical fact: Now the 
Passover of the Jews was near,, and Jesus went up to 
Jerusalem. And he found in t\he temple those selling 
cattle and sheep and doves ancd the money brokers in 
their seats. So, after makincg a whip of ropes, he 
drove all those with the sheejrp and cattle out of the 
temple, and he poured out the' coins of the money­
changers and overturned their tables. And he said to 
those selling the doves: ' Takce these things away from
here! Stop making the house cof my Father a house of 
merchandise!'
43
important. However, in spite of t:his fact manillas were 
extensively used in Nigeria until around 1948 (see above, 
p. 39) . in addition to its value as money, commodity 
money has a commodity value and ex<amples of such commodity 
money are bangles and cowrie shellLs, which were used 
extensively in Nigeria. These items had value in them­
selves as ornaments which was diffferent from their value 
as money.
Apart from commodity money a n d  minted coin mentioned 
above, there is token m o n e y . Thi s  type of money has 
little or no commodity content ancd its use as money is 
based on its acceptability by sociiety. The pound and 
naira notes and coins are examples. These notes and 
coins are also referred to as c u r r e n c y .
Bank deposits, which are als o  referred to as "cus­
tomary m o n e y " , are money because tthey are acceptable as a 
means of final payment since by tlhe deposit money has been 
created which can be drawn upon siubsequently.
Quasi - or near money is yett another type of money 
which arises from the deposits macde with non-bank 
financial intermediaries. Government securities, treasury 
bills and certificates, developmemt bonds and savings 
bonds are examples.
Money can be created througlh legislation by confer­
ring legal tender status. The atttribute of acceptability
is not a pre-requisite, but it foUlows naturally after
33
acquiring the status as money by ssome enactment.
33 For a full discussion on typess of money please see
Principles and practices of mconey and banking, Charles 
R. Whittlesey.
\
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THE EMERGENCE OF BANKING
In the preceding paragraphs we found that the use of 
precious metals, silver, gold, copper and so on as money 
greatly aided the exchange of commodities between 
different countries of the known world. The 
cities around the Tigris and Euphrates enjoyed a central 
position between eastern and western Asia and all the 
known routes terminated in Babylonia. We found also that 
the use of coins was introduced by the Babylonians and 
King Croesus of Lydia minted the first coin.
The art of banking also developed in this cradle of 
civilization for four principal reasons. First was the 
emergence of money out of the complexity of external 
trade in Babylonia as a commercial nerve centre of the 
world and of the herculean task merchants had of carrying 
about heavy metals, silver and copper, for the purpose of 
making payments for goods. Second was the invention of 
the art of writing by the Babylonians which made it pos­
sible to record events and business transactions. Thirdly, 
there existed in Babylonia priests who served in the 
temples and were very much relied upon and upon whom the 
merchants entrusted their currencies. Probably the art 
of banking would not have emerged at the time it did if 
the priests did not offer their services and issued 
receipts which later on became known as letters of credit.
When these receipts issued by the priests were ten­
dered to other recognised temples engaged in similar trade 
they were honoured and the bearer was provided with the 
currency required. This transaction was the precursor of
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the modern banking institution and paper money. Hutton 
Webster confirms this position when he said:
"The use of money as a medium of exchange 
led naturally to a system of banking. In 
Babylonia, for instance, the bankers 
formed an important and influential class. 
One of the great banking houses, established 
at Babylon before the age of S e n n a c h e r i b , 3 4  
carried on operations for several centuries. 
Hundreds of legal documents belonging to 
this firm have been discovered in the huge 
earthenware jars which served as safes.
The Babylonian temples also received money 
on deposit and loaned it out again, as do 
our modern banks. Knowledge of .the prin­
ciples of banking passed from Babylonia 
to Greece and thence the ancient Italy 
and R o m e ."35
Another of the important factors that encouraged the 
establishment of banking was the use of gold as a store 
of value. Gold has been a sort of god to mankind. 
Throughout the ages man has shown profound admiration and 
affection for gold and anything highly valued is equated 
with gold. The Portuguese Marco Polo, the Spaniard 
Christopher Columbus and other pirates plundered vessels 
and searched, in their adventures, for gold in foreign 
lands. The Englishman, Sir Francis Drake, was famous 
because of his outstanding success in piracy of gold-laden 
Spanish ships returning from South America. You will 
recall that King Croesus of Lydia in the 6th century minted
34 He was an Assyrian King 705-682 B.C. He was mentioned
in the Old Testament, 2 Kings 19:35.
35 Early European History, op. cit., p. 47. Also see
Money by Nitsche, p. 25 for an account of two such 
banking institutions existing at the time, one at 
Igibi in Sippar and another at Muraschu in Nippur.
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and issued gold coin; so did King Darius of Persia (558- 
486 B.C. and Alexander the Great. The importance and 
value attached to gold all over thie world was incredible.
Like in the Babylonian days gold was used as 
currency to make payments to a merrchant who deposited gold 
bars with a goldsmith in one locallity and obtained a 
letter of credit which another golLdsmith in another city 
would honour. In Babylonia the baanker was the temple 
priest but during the medieval age the goldsmith played 
the role of a bank. Speaking abouit this role and the 
evolution of banking method and thie exchange and deposit 
bankers, Ekpo Eyo stated as follow/s:
"By adopting this systerm the Florentine 
merchants could import wool from England.
All that was needed for money to be 
deposited, in this case,, with the Roman 
Catholic Church in Florence, and because 
England was also at that time C a t h o l i c , ^ 6  
and the English had to send offerings and 
legacies to Rome, they crould do so by 
supplying the equivalent in wool to the 
merchants of Florence whio had made the 
deposit. This method waas so successful 
that it developed into am international 
clearing business, debts being settled 
against credits, leaving? only balances to 
be settled by physical transfer of gold 
or silver.
During this period o f  multifarious coins 
some agency needed to ev/olve if international 
trade was to be facilitated. This agency 
was the money changers who, with their 
scales, could convert ome currency into 
another. The money changer was usually 
a goldsmith. With the iincrease in inter­
national trade, he becaime an exchange 
banker and, later, a deposit banker as 
well. So, along with thae religious 
institutions acting as c&eposit bankers,
36 The 500 Anniversary Celebration of the Rebellion of
Martin Luther against the Cathnolic Faith was celebrated 
in June 1983.
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the goldsmith deposit banker also issued 
handwritten notes (letters of credit) to 
depositors. The significance of such 
notes was that the goldsmith would pay 
out the amount deposited on the authority 
of the depositor. The letter of credit 
also entitled the holder to receive the 
amount deposited from another banker in 
a different city upon surrendering his 
letter of credit. These letters of credit 
were of course backed by gold or silver 
securely put away in a vault. Furthermore, 
the depositor could transfer his letter 
of credit to another person by issuing 
that person with a note known as 'an 
order to pay' and bearing the depositor's 
signature. The 'order to pay' would be 
honoured by another banker goldsmith and 
was the beginning of our modern cheque 
system."^7
While these events were taking place in Florence 
around the 15th century A.D., English goldsmiths were 
also on the approaches to the art of banking for according 
to Macleod:
"Banking in the modern sense of the word, 
had no existence in England before the 
year 1 640."38
Indeed this may be so, but 200 years earlier, in Venice 
two Jews had in 1400 obtained the authority of the Senate 
to found a bank in the strict sense of the word. Accord­
ing to Andreades, it was reported that as a result of the
remarkable success of this bank, many Venetian nobles
39
established rival banks. It was thought that the
37 Nigeria and the Evolution of M o n e y , op. cit., pp. 86-87.
38 A. Andreades, op. cit., p. 14.
39 The word "bank" probably comes from the Gothic "bank" 
which means "hill" or "mountain"; or in Italian 
"Banco" which means formation of a common capital by 
contribution from more than one person; or "Banca" in 
Italian means a bench from which money changers did 
business in the street; hence the word "bank".
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success of these institutions inspired Jews to return to 
England after three centuries of e?xpulsion and after the 
death of Charles I in 1 660 to estaiblish* banking business.
There was an incident generailly thought to have 
precipitated the appearance or establishment of banking 
in England. Charles I ascended thie throne of England 
believing in the theory of divine right of Kings and hence 
of absolute monarchy. To sustain the absolute monarchy 
he needed a standing army and so hie required money to 
maintain the army but the Commons were not prepared to 
release such money. Negotiations for the Commons release 
of money were dead-locked and Charrles I reigned for 11 
years under such a system of absoliute monarchy.
Faced with such odds, Charles contrived all means to 
expropriate money from every avenuie possible including 
illegal levying of tax for emergemcies called Ship Money. 
He next requested loans from the KCing of Spain, the Pope 
and the City of London, but no loam was forthcoming. In 
desperation he seized £130,000 in bullion which had been 
deposited in the Tower by the City/ merchants. It is 
generally thought that this assaulit on the City merchants 
led to the rise o f .banking and in a way delayed the foun­
dation of a national bank.
The experience was too much for the merchants to 
swallow and so they stopped entrusting their money to the 
Tower. Consequently, they resorted to a new practice of 
lending money to the goldsmiths a t  the rate of 4d per day. 
According to Andreades:
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"The goldsmiths inspired universal 
confidence. And consequently it soon 
occurred to the merchants that since 
their cashiers had treateed them no 
better than the King, it would be both 
safer and more profitable to deposit 
their money strictly witlh these gold­
smiths. The country genitlemen very soon 
followed the example of ithe merchants, 
and, seeing their homes (exposed to all 
the dangers of civil war , were only too 
glad to entrust their remts to the gold­
smiths even without receiving interest. 
Thus rapidly and with buit little trouble 
the goldsmiths found theimselves in 
possession of considerable sums. A 
new field of business opened to them, 
and they anticipated the; functions of 
a modern bank."^^
THE TRANSACTIONS OF THE GOLDSMITHS?
From this time on the goldsimiths had a field day 
and they carried on different typers of what one may now 
call banking business. They carri.ed on the business of 
exchanging coins which gave them t:he opportunity of making 
very large profits.
The profits made from these transactions encouraged 
the goldsmiths to venture into other but similar areas of 
business. It will be recalled thaat during the civil war 
of the first half of the 17th century the city merchants 
resorted to keeping their money wiith cashiers and clerks 
who secretly lent out the money emtrusted to them to the 
goldsmiths at the rate of 4d. a daay. Through this method 
the goldsmiths built up a sizeable capital which they re­
lent at higher interest. With t h e  confidence the
40 A. Andreades, History of the B a n k  of England, 1 909,
p . 21.
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goldsmiths had already built up the habit grew of people 
depositing their spare money with the goldsmiths at good 
interest. Depositors were allowed to withdraw their 
money without notice. Earlier in the year 2,000 B.C., 
the Temples of Babylon lent gold and silver - entrusted to 
them by the citizens for safekeeping - at an interest of 
20% per month, while the depositors were charged a commis­
sion as safekeeping fee. These quasi-banking activities 
of the Temple had become so common that they were included 
in the famous Code of Hammurabi, promulgated in about 
2 ,000 B.C.
1,500 years later, the Greek Temples accepted the 
wealth of the communities as deposit, as the Babylonians 
had done. In Greece, too, the Temples lent against 
interest and received likewise safekeeping fees. So 
widespread were these activities, that there existed a 
special room in the temples to store the objects deposi­
ted .
Though the custody in temples was considered to 
confer security from robbers and invaders, conquerors and 
tyrants failed to respect them. Xerxes thus despoiled 
the great Temple at Delphi, and Dionysius pillaged the 
Temples of Syracuse in 430 B.C.
Through these safekeeping transactions therefore 
goldsmiths introduced banking into England and therefore 
the Commonwealth African Countries and Andreades confirms 
it all when he w r o t e :
"This policy succeeded beyond all
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expectations, and in the course of a 
few years the citizens hacd generally 
adopted the habit of depositing their 
savings with the goldsmiths.
Receipts were given foir these deposits, 
which, under the title of goldsmiths’ 
notes, soon circulated better than the 
actual coins whose scarcity they often 
supplied. Nor was this usage a temporary 
one, for even in 1 696 , duiring the crisis 
due to the restoration of the coinage, 
Davenant tells us that in the absence 
of coins, 'All great dealings were trans­
acted by tallies, banks bills and gold­
smiths ' notes 1 .
Goldsmiths notes must thus be regarded 
as the earliest form of bank-notes issued 
in England.
It is not surprising, in view of these 
profitable transactions that the goldsmiths 
grew rich with prodigious speed. Five or 
six of them, Clarendon reimarks, gained 
such a reputation on the ILondon markets, 
that people would have triusted them with 
all the money in the Kingdom. 'And they 
then first came to be calied Bankers'.
41 A. Andreades, op. c i t . , p p . 2 3-.'24 .
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CHAPTER 2
CENTRAL BANKING IN ANGLOPHONE AFRICA:
AN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
THE EMERGENCE OF CENTRAL BANKING
In this Chapter we are concerned to show when and 
how banking systems were introduced into anglophone Africa 
and the mechanisms by which central banks were created.
We saw in Chapter 1 that the success and prosperity 
of the goldsmiths in England in the 17th century were so 
outstanding that the goldsmiths soon became the envy of 
many people and through their transactions the art of 
banking emerged in its rudimentary form. It was not sur­
prising therefore that the goldsmiths were vehemently 
criticised by the Lombards and the public at large for one 
alleged offence or other. They were accused of charging 
high interest rates for loans granted, of granting 
advances and of undermining genuine borrowers in prefe­
rence to dubious borrowers. They were finally accused of 
ignoring the safety of the investment they made and of 
paying more attention to anticipated profits. Andreades, 
quoted Dr. Lewis' accusation against the Bank of Venice, 
said in his History of the Bank of England:
"It [interest] had its first rise from 
the dishonesty of the Bankers. The Bankers
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at Venice did just as our Bankers have 
done h e r e , they got m e n 1s money into 
their hands at interest, and use it (as 
was necessary) to their best advantage, 
that they might make a better profit of 
their money than the interest they paid. 
They lent it out to insolvent persons, 
or laid out in desperate cases, as our 
bankers did. This behaviour obliged the 
Venetian Government to interfere in the 
m a t t e r .
These accusations apparently contained 
elements of truth, and all this serves 
to explain why although the goldsmiths 
introduced banking into England, they did 
not succeed in adequately fulfilling the 
functions of a genuine bank and had later 
on to give place to the Bank of England; 
this institution, supported as it was by 
the State, was able to avoid the mistakes 
of its predecessors.
The evolution of central banking in Europe came 
gradually. The classical concept of central banking, as 
described in Chapter 1, is now taken to consist in the 
right of the issue of notes and acting as the government 
banker and agent.
The national banks, as they were called in Europe in 
the 19th century, had the responsibility of regulating
2
the note issue and of preventing and controlling inflation.
As time went by and towards the close of the 19th 
century, national banks assumed more and more responsi­
bilities. They accepted deposits from governments and 
private banks and became the custodians of cash reserves 
and the lender of last resort. Subsequently, these 
national banks assumed the role of regulating the instruments
1 A. Andreades, History of the Bank of England, p. 25.
2 See M.H. de Kock, Central Banking, 1973
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of credit policy through the use of the bank rate. The 
Bank of England in particular performed all these func­
tions at various stages since 1694 and the famous Bank 
of England Act of 1844 gave it more powers thus streng­
thened its controlling position in the economy. The Act, 
for instance, gave power to the Bank of England to main­
tain a minimum gold reserve against its note issue and a 
power and a duty to redeem its notes on demand in gold 
coin. Until the Act was promulgated, the Bank of England 
did not possess the monopoly of issuing bank notes, 
because from 1697 on there had existed many banks including 
those in Scotland, issuing their own notes.
In some other countries during the same period, the 
19th century, the governments named particular banks to 
assume the role of national banks and they issued notes 
and performed other central bank functions. In countries 
like France the government used state funds to found the 
Bank of France in 1800. It will be recalled that the 
Bank of England was established by an Act of Parliament 
and a Royal Charter on July 27, 1694, under the name of 
"The Governor and Company of the Bank of England", its 
immediate purpose being to raise money for the government 
from the rich merchants of London (Lombards). William 
and Mary, who were now on the throne, needed this money 
badly for the prosecution of a war against France in 
order to secure the Protestant succession to the throne. 
£1,200,000 was said to have been subscribed in six days
3
and the proceeds lent to the Government. The shares
3 In connection with this historical survey of the
c o n t d ...
55
continued to be in private hands mntil 1946 when the Bank 
was nationalised and the shares tsaken over by the 
Treas u r y .
Since 1694 the Bank of England has been playing the 
role of a national bank and it is probably the first bank 
in the world to assume this positiion, although it is 
claimed that the Riksbank of Sweden, reputed to be the 
oldest central bank sprang up froim a privately-owned bank 
founded in 1656, and was recognised as a state bank in 
1668. It enjoyed a monopoly of ncote issue and like the 
Bank of England evolved into a cemtral bank. Between 1800 
and 1900 many such national banks were established among 
which were: the Bank of Netherlands in 1814, the National 
Bank of Austria in 1817, the Bank of Norway in 1817, the 
National Bank of Denmark in 1818, and the National Bank 
of Belgium in 1830, the Bank of Spain in 1856, the Bank 
of Russia in 1860, the Reichsbank of Germany in 1875, the 
Bank of Japan in 1882. Thus by thie turn of the twentieth 
century almost every country in Euirope had established a 
national bank with sole rights of note issue. Gradually 
they took on added responsibilities as bankers to govern­
ment, agents, lender of last resorrt and other essential 
functions now associated with central banks.
In the United States, similaar developments took 
place almost contemporaneously. I n  1914 twelve Federal
c ontd...
evolution of central banking thie author wishes to ack­
nowledge his indebtedness, in particular to the follow­
ing works: M.H. de K o c k , Centraal Banking, A. Andreades, 
History of the Bank of England..
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Reserve Banks had been established in different strategic 
locations, all co-ordinated at the centre in Washington 
D.C. by the Federal Reserve Board. As these central bank­
ing developments were taking place in Europe and America 
most parts of the world were still in the subsistence 
economy.
Up to the beginning of the 20th century no third-
world or developing country as we know them today had a
national bank, nor even some of the old world territories
like India and China.
However, the International Finance Conferences, held
under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1920 and
1922 in Brussels and Genoa respectively, revolutionised
central banking; and as a sequel to those conferences
4
many more central banks were established especially in 
the countries now known as the developing world and 
national banks for the first time came to be known as 
central banks.
CENTRAL BANKING IN THE COLONIAL ERA
Virtually all countries of Africa have been sub­
jugated under one form or another of colonial administra­
tion since the infamous conference that sat in Berlin 
from 15th November, 1844 to 26th November 1885, to 
consider the partitioning of Africa, by the Western 
European powers.
4 See in this connection Resolution 111, proposed by the Commission 
on Currency and Exchange and adopted by the Brussels Conference 
1920, "Banks, and especially banks of Issue, should be freed from 
political pressure and should be conducted solely on the lines of 
prudent finance" ±n International Financial Conference, 1920 
(Brussels, 1920) , p. 18. A list of such banks is given in Chapter 
4 of this work.
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Ethiopia, whose independence (Sates to antiquity 
and which for a short spell in the imid-1930s was under the 
tutelage of Italy, and also Liberia which more than a 
century ago became the new home of imany thousands of 
descendants of Negro slaves in America, gained her inde­
pendence in 1847 and ever since has governed herself, all 
other African countries have been under some form of 
colonialism. The following table shiows the independent 
countries of Africa, dates when they/ attained independence 
and the last colonial power:
Table 1 Independent States in Afirica______________________
Country Date of 
Independence
Last colonial 
power
Afars and Issas
Algeria
Angola
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde Islands
Central African 
Republic
Chad
Comoro Archipelago 
Congo
3 July 1962 
11 Nov. 1975 
30 Sept. 1966 
1 July 1962 
1 Jan. 1960
13 A u g . 19 60 
11 A u g . 19 60
15 Aug. 1960
France
France
Portugal
United Kingdom
Belgium
France UK
Portugal
France
France
France
France
The Kingdom of Ethiopia has been in existence since 
the years before Christ. II Kincjs 19:9 of the Holy 
Bible tells us that "He heard it said respecting Tir- 
ha-kah the King of Ethiopia: "Heire he has come out to 
fight against you. Therefore he sent messengers again 
to Hez-e-Kiah saying" Also see Daniel 11:4 3.
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Country Date of Last colonial
Independence power
Dahomey (Benin) 1 A u g . 1960 France
Egypt 1 922 United Kingdom
Equatorial Guinea 12 O c t . 1968 Spain
Ethiopia Immemorial but 19 35 Italy
Gabon 17 A u g . 1960 France
Gambia 18 F e b . 1965 United Kingdom
Ghana 6 March 1957 United Kingdom
Guinea 2 O c t . 1958 France
Guinea Bissau - Portugal
Ivory Coast 7 A u g . 1960 France
Kenya 12 Dec . 1963 United Kingdom
Lesotho 4 Oct 1966 United Kingdom
Liberia 24 D e c . 1951 Italy
Madagascar 26 June 1960 France
Malawi 6 July 1964 United Kingdom
Mali 22 S e p t . 1960 France
Mauritania 28 N o v . 1 960 France
Mauritius 12 March 1968 United Kingdom
Morocco 28 March 1956 France - Spain
Mozambique 1974 Portugal
Niger 3 Aug 1960 France
Nigeria 1 Oct 1960 United Kingdom
Rwanda 1 July 1962 Belgium
St. Helena - United Kingdom
Sao-Tome and 
Principe Islands _ Portugal
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Country Date of Last colonial
Independence power
Senegal 11 Sept. 1960 France
Sierra Leone 2 7 April 1961 United Kingdom
Somalia 1 July 1960 Italy-UK-France
South Africa 1910 United Kingdom
Sudan 1 Jan. 1956 UK - Egypt
Swaziland 6 Sept. 1968 United Kingdom
Tanzania 25 April 1964 United Kingdom
The Seychelles - United Kingdom
Togo 2 7 April 1964 France
Tunisia 20 March 1956 France
Uganda 9 Oct 1962 United Kingdom
Upper Volta 5 Aug 1960 France
Zaire 30 June 1960 Belgium
Zambia 24 Oct 1964 United Kingdom
Zimbabwe 12 April 1980 United Kingdom
Although colonialism has been (displaced in most of
Africa, it has been replaced in man^y countries in Africa
by another equally detestable systerm, neo-colonialism,
which is a form of alliance of localL upper and middle
classes with foreign capitalist interests which according 
to one writer is the "latest means o f  bending the economic 
fortunes of a dominated country to ft he interests of a 
dominant one.
6 Sergio Botolami, Central Banking in A f r i c a ,pp. cit., p. 
1 1 .
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"Colonialism" is a system of rule which assumes the
right of one people to impose their will upon another.
The imposition implies political, economic and social
dependency and systematic subordination of those governed
by it to the imported culture in social, economic and 
7
political life. The imposition, so far as western colo­
nization in Africa was concerned, was made possible 
because of the apparatus of Western culture, which was 
infinitely superior to that of Africa in subjecting others 
to the will of their colonizers. The system's control 
over the scientific revolution and its products in the 
fields of warfare,in the form of cannon and magazine 
rifles, in the growing knowledge and awareness in Europe 
of Africa's resources and of its political strength and 
weakness, enabled the Western European powers to "disco­
ver" the world and explore its bounds beyond their own. 
Thus the powers conquered Africa and divided it up among 
the leading European nations.
In the face of such overwhelming odds African opposi­
tion was quickly overcome and unequal relations between 
the two forces emerged and were regularised or subdued 
through coercion and diplomacy.
The view was always held by colonial administrators 
like Lord Luggard that the colonised people were not 
capable of governing themselves under the strenuous con­
ditions of the modern world; and that the relationship
7 But many other forms of colonialism exist, cf. Arab
colonialism in North and East Africa, Chinese colonia­
lism in Mongolia.
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between the interests of the colonised and those of the 
colonizer was an essentially reciprocal and creative, 
rather than an exploitative and contradictory one. The 
African Kegro, in L u g a r d 's view expressed in 1922, lacks 
power of organisation and is conspicuously deficient in
g
the management and control alike of men or of business. 
L.S. Amerv, in stating why imperialism should continue, 
said in 1920:
"I think we have never realised sufficiently 
the immense economic possibilities of 
those Colonies, and the immense wealth 
that could be created by science, energy, 
and organisation in those parts of the 
world. The prime object, of course, of 
that development must be welfare of the 
inhabitants of those regions. Our first 
duty is to them; our object is not to exploit 
them, but to enable them miaterially, as 
well as in every other respect, to rise to 
a high plane of living ancd civilization.
But I am as sure as I stand here that we 
cannot develop them and hel p  them without 
an overspill of wealth anc2 prosperity that 
would be an immense help tto this country 
in the difficult times that lie ahead.
He went on to say:
"Our goal in the administration of the 
dependencies is to enable every part of 
the Empire to obtain in thne fullness of 
time, and when conditions make it possible, 
full power of controlling its own affairs 
and developing its own d e s t i n i e s . " ^
8 Sir F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandatte in British Tropical 
A f r i c a , 1922, p. 132.
9 Lord Amery, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
in 1920, House of Commons Debates, 11 VII 20, V. 133,
C.490 .
10 Ibid II, VII 20, V. 133, C.496..
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On the other hand it must be pointed out that there 
was also the dark side of colonialism. It was a notorious 
fact that British attitudes to the development of her 
overseas territories were conditioned by her needs as a 
major manufacturing and capital-exporting developed nation. 
The consequent demand for overseas markets and cheap 
sources of raw materials had always influenced British 
Government economic policy. The colonies had almost no 
indigenous capital, and they had narrow internal markets 
and technically backward populations. The colonial 
masters controlled all aspects of the economy, and since 
they controlled also the political power the colonial 
governments would not introduce policies that would pro­
tect the economies of the colonized peoples against 
colonial exploitation. All these factors explain why the 
development of banking was for a long time left in the 
hands of the colonial masters and British nationals. This 
basic view of the economic strangulation of the colonized 
peoples was accurately put at a meeting in 1923 of the 
Empire Cotton-Growing Corporation:
"I believe we shall in the future see the 
whole of our cotton coming from our own 
Dominions (i.e. Empire). I believe that 
we shall thus secure cheaper cotton, 
cheaper raw materials for the use of our 
British manufacturers. I also believe 
that in doing that we will be supplying a 
market for our own people beyond the seas, 
and that the money that they obtain for 
their cotton may to a great extent be spent 
in making purchases from the mother country. 
It is an ideal for which we all ought to 
work, that the money obtained from us 
should in a different form come back to 
this country. When we are able to do that
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we are really, though separated by 
thousands of miles, an Empire united 
and strong."^
For the reasons advanced above especially the views 
held by Lord Amery the imperialists felt justified that 
they were being called upon to clear the Augean stable, 
tame and redeem the Africans and so save them from the 
clutches of ignorance, perfidy and poverty. Various 
weapons were employed to achieve their objectives, and 
these included coercion, diplomacy and effective adminis­
trative machines. Probably the most successful method 
adopted was through legislation and the rule of law.
The links which united every British possession to 
the mother country, and indeed to the rest of the British 
dominions, were two - the legislative link of the imperial 
Parliament, consisting of the Crown, Lords and Commons, 
and the executive and judicial link with the Crown.
THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE LINKS
The United Kingdom Parliament had power to legislate on 
any subject, and is not subordinated to any superior power 
or legislature (if we exclude the controversial issue of 
its relationship to the E E C ) , and its legislative supre­
macy extended to all the British dominions and possessions. 
This legislative supremacy is limited by its own self- 
imposed limitations, Commonwealth relationships, 
constitutional practice, efficacy and comity. In practice
11 Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, Report of the 
Second Annual General Meeting, 1923, p. 8 .
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however, it has never legislated for the internal govern­
ment of a British colonial territory except where imperial 
policy is affected or imperial subjects are concerned, or 
where there is a need for a law to have extra-territorial 
application to more than one colony or in matters of 
extradition. The Imperial Parliament in granting indepen­
dence to the colonies always discharges the constitutional 
responsibility of enacting the Independence Constitution. 
The Nigerian Independence Constitution, 1960, is an 
example.
The Crown was the other link between the British Power and 
the Colonies. The Crown has the supreme executive power 
in every British possession, it appoints the Governor and 
all administrative and judicial acts are done by its name 
or in the name of the Governor as its representative.
Apart from these functions the Crown has other legislative 
p o wers:
"The Home Government, apart from what 
may be done by the Imperial Parliament, 
acts in different ways, either by order 
of the King in Council, by Letters Patent 
under the Great Seal, by a document passed 
under the Royal Sign Manual, or by orders 
or directions of a Secretary of State.
Acts of a legislative character are 
usually done by the King in Council, that 
is, by an order made by the King sitting 
in Council. Such a council is attended, 
not by all the members of the Privy Council, 
but only by those who are summoned. The 
present practice is to summon very few, 
usually from among the cabinet ministers 
of the d a y . " 1 2
12 Sir Henry Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction 
Beyond the Sea s , 1902, p. 13.
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However, in spite of all thes^e legislative and 
executive powers of the British Parliament and Crown, the 
colonies have some competence:
"But the powers of a collonial legislature 
are plenary and not deleagated powers; 
such a legislature is nODt a delegate or 
agent of the Imperial Pairliament. There­
fore the principle of delegatus delegare 
non potest does not applLy and although
the limits of legislature are prescribed,
yet within these limits the right of 
legislation is absolute,, and the colonial 
legislature is supreme, and has the same 
authority as the Imperiaal Parliament to 
confer powers on other baodies and persons, 
as for instance to give a municipal body 
power to make by-laws. "11 3
As James S. Reed remarked, "dlebates on colonial 
legislation, conducted for the mosst part through the 
medium of despatches, maintained aa leisurely pace in many 
cases. Yet they bear the charactearistics of debates, 
although the striking contrast w i t h  the legislative proce­
dure of the British Parliaments, boy open and public
discussion, was presumably unnoticed. Indeed, as Slinn
observes below, the process of collonial law-making was
1 4
primarily a secret, bureaucratic ooperation." He went 
further to remark that it is hardily necessary to point 
out that, "in the debates which a r e  the subjects of these 
studies, one group of persons was scarcely consulted at 
all in the process of colonial law/-making discussed here: 
these were the colonial subjects themselves, the
13 Ibid, p . 16.
14 James S. Reed, Studies in the Making of Colonal Laws: 
An Introduction. See 1979 23 JAL. 3.
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inhabitants of the territories, to whom the laws under
1 5discussion were to apply."
From 1860, the Imperial British Government sought to 
establish and maintain a colonial state in Nigeria.
Towards this goal a succession of British officials used 
coercion and diplomacy in Nigeria and other British posses­
sions in Africa to reduce African opposition to a minimum. 
For administrative convenience, security, and to secure 
central direction of policy and pool economic resources, 
the British Government from 1898 adopted the policy of 
gradually amalgamating its various administrative units 
in Nigeria. In May, 1906, Lagos Colony and Protectorate 
were amalgamated with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria 
to form the new Colony and Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria, which in 1914 was amalgamated with the Protecto­
rate of Northern Nigeria to form Nigeria.
Unlike in Nigeria the East African territories of 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika after 1918 were administered 
as separate administrative and political units, although, 
as with the Protectorates in Nigeria, they were geographi­
cally contiguous and part of the same colonial empire.
These units, although large by pre-colonial African 
standards, were each considerably very small in relation 
to the needs of modern economic organisation with regard 
to the size and accessibility of markets. This economic 
consideration led to the suggestion that long-term economic 
growth would only be possible if economic boundaries were
15 Ibid, p . 6 .
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widened. It was this belief that sparked off major
political debates in British and East African politics
and the issue was finally settled in 1931 with the report
of the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East 
1 6
Africa, which concluded that unification should not be 
considered but that East African Common Services should 
be established and regulated through the machinery of the 
Governors' conference of Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika 
(now known as Tanzania).
Thus unlike the arrangement in Nigeria, the different 
territorial units were not unified as a political entity 
but through the common services like Nigeria and 
Commonwealth West Africa, the whole East African Zone 
operated its common services as a single economic unit.
The result of this was the emergence of a large-scale 
organisation in West Africa and East Africa which provided 
economic and social services to the two sub-regions.
There were Common Services in Posts and Telegraphs, Air­
ways, Railways, Ports and Currency. One of the most 
successful unifying forces was the system of the unified 
currencies for each of the two sub-regions which remained 
in existence until the end of colonial rule in each 
territory. In the West African Region we had the West 
African Currency Board; and in East Africa, the East 
African Currency Board.
16 House of Lords, 29 of 1930 and 184 of 1931. For a 
brief account see D. Austin and H.N. Weiler, Inter- 
State Relations in A frica, London Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, 1965.
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THE CURRENCY BOARDS -
THE PRECURSORS OF CENTRAL BANKS
The need for the services of a central bank in the 
.West and East African British colonies had long been 
realised before the advent of commercial banking. At the 
time the West African Currency Board was established in 
1912 there were in existence only the Bank of British West 
Africa (now First Bank of Nigeria Limited), founded in 
1894 and the Bank of Nigeria Limited (founded 1900); the 
African Banking Corporation founded in 1892 having 
discontinued operations in 1893.
The British began establishing political and economic 
control of Nigeria in 1861 when Lagos was ceded to her.
The process of integrating the various parts and 
protectorates of Nigeria continued until 1914, as we saw 
at page 6 6 supra; when the geographical expression 
"Nigeria" was born. During the whole of this period the 
British colonial administration in Nigeria attempted to 
replace the existing currencies of the countries with 
British currency. Long before British currency was 
imposed on Lagos on May 21, 1880, Mexican, Peruvian, 
Brazilian and Chilean dollars; Spanish and South American 
gold doubloons, American eagles, French francs, gold dust 
and nuggets and Mozambique cowries circulated freely 
alongside British gold, silver and copper coins. Other 
currencies that were in use in Nigeria and other British 
colonial territories were the Maria Theresa dollars, 
cowries, manillas, brass rods, iron rods and copper wires.
The attempt in 1880 by Governor Ussher to withdraw
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these pre-colonial currencies from circulation was resisted 
vehemently by the local population , because the British 
currency was of large denominations for which the 
majority of the population had litble or no use in commer­
cial transactions. The reason was that the then standard 
of living was so low for Nigerians that they could not 
afford foreign luxury goods and were used to purchasing 
most of their daily needs rather inexpensively for only a 
couple of cowries. Wages ranged from 6d. a day in most 
hinterland locations to 9d. a day in Lagos, a rate which
in some districts exceeded four times the cost of a
1 8labourer's daily food as late as 1914. The non­
redemption of African currencies resulted in the non­
availability of smaller denominations of currency and this 
was a serious threat to the circulation of British money 
for as J.B. Loynes found the lack of very small coinage 
units encouraged the continuing use by the Africans of 
their own tokens. "A government official questioned in 
1912 said 'the ordinary native lives on 1 1/4d. a d a y 1.
He thought that even the one-tenth penny (a Gold Coast
nickel bronze coin) was too large a unit and expressed
1 9concern at the disappearance of cowrie shells." These 
small-denomination pre-colonial currencies suited the 
needs of the peasant population and were tailored to the
17 Eyo Ekpo, M o n e y .
18 Sir Fredrick Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British 
Tropical A f r i c a , 1922, p. 405.
19 J.B. Loynes, West African Currency B o a r d , 1912-1962, 
p. 7.
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price levels of contemporary Nigerian and African markets.
Conversely, Britain was an advanced industrial country in
which complex financial transactions and relatively higher
price levels ruled in economic transactions and therefore
the British currency system was specially adopted to suit
the British economy.
For these reasons, cowries, manillas, brass rods,
iron rods, copper wires were preferred to the denominations
of British money in Nigeria, West Africa and indeed in
the whole of Commonwealth Africa. In spite of this
historical and economic fact, Sir David Barbour's
Committee recommended in 1900 the continued use of United
20Kingdom coinage for West Africa.
Faced with this predicament and determined to demone­
tise the traditional currencies, the British administration 
started to take measures to replace the pre-colonial 
currencies, for:
"The government was in the process of 
extraverting [sic] the indigenous 
economies of Southern Nigeria. Commer­
cially, the country was rapidly being 
converted into an appendage of the 
British economy, an area in which the 
trade with Britain (and other foreign 
nations permitted to trade in the 
colony) was increasingly affecting the 
lives of more and more Southern Nigerians. 
The extension of the British monetary 
system into this under-developed region 
was essential to that extraversion.
20 Ibid, p. 11.
21 Walter I. Ofonagoro, The Journal of Economic History, 
Vol. xxxix No. 3, Sept. 1979, p. 640.
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As Griffiths, Lieutenant Governor of Lagos Colony, 
submitted to his Governor for consideration in 1880:
"It is better to look this loss in the 
face at once, for if we procrastinate 
it may be greater.... If Messrs Gaiser 
and other wealthy firms can make a profit 
of not less than eight per cent b y .importing 
dollars - a gain sufficient to pay their 
duties and still leave a handsome margin 
of advantage - they will do so, and the 
local treasury will overgrow with coins 
of less intrinsic than nominal value, 
which we shall be unable to get rid of 
on the spot, and will be compelled sooner 
or later to ex p o r t . "22
Thereafter, several legislative steps were taken to 
effect and hasten the withdrawal from circulation of all 
currencies that were not British. On May 11, 1880, 
Governor Ussher at Accra passed an ordinance giving ten 
days' notice for the withdrawal of dollars from circula­
tion. By the Native Courts Proclamation No. 25 of 1901 
and the Native Market Proclamation native courts were 
empowered to make rules for regulating trade, while the 
native councils were used as the agency through which the 
rates of exchange were fixed. The Native Currency 
Proclamation, No. 4 of 1902, attempted by legislation to 
prohibit the importation of manillas, brass rods and 
copper wires. This Proclamation was repealed by a new one 
in 1911 which forbade the use of manillas as currency even 
in the "native markets". The Nigeria Coinage Ordinance, 
1906, provided for the minting of subsidiary coins capable
22 Ibid, p. 641 citing Minute CO/147/41, Griffiths to 
Ussher, April 29, 1880.
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of competing with the cowrie, whicch was a very low- 
denomination currency and which i m  spite of the resort 
to compulsion in the Cowries ProcILamation of June 1 , 1904 
was still preferred to British coiins.
Up to the year 1912 the colomial government in West 
Africa had assumed the responsibillity of the issue of notes 
and currencies which was a major classical function of 
the older central banks. Intermitttently however, the 
government attempted to divest itsself of this responsibi­
lity. In 1 892 , when the African bank i n g  Corporation of 
England opened a branch in Lagos, it had undertaken to 
repatriate redundant silver coin ffrom Lagos and was given 
the monopoly of obtaining United K<ingdom silver locally 
against pre-payment in London. Thiis delegation of powers 
was shortlived, for in 1 893 the baank ceased operations 
in Lagos and government was compeUled to resume direct 
control of issue of silver coins. To a limited extent the 
Bank of Nigeria Limited (founded iin 1899 by a group of 
trading companies as "Anglo Africaa Bank"), in 1900 was 
also given powers to supply silverr coins to merchants.
However, it was to the Bank oaf British West Africa, 
established in 1 894 , that a monopoaly was given to issue 
the silver coin. And "as the Bank< extended its operations 
to the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone a m d  the Gambia, similar 
special arrangements followed. So3me elements of the 
future system (i.e. Currency BoardI as a precursor of the 
central bank) had therefore alreadiy begun to take the
2 3shape before the 1912 Committee (Emmott's was appointed."
23 J.B.Loynes, The West African Currency Board 1912-1962, 
p. 9.
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Indeed, it can be seen from tthe foregoing that before 
the West African Currency Board w a s  established in 1912 
the colonial governments of West /African colonies and the 
Bank of British West Africa played! the role of a central 
bank. The Bank of British West Affrica was issuing and 
redeeming currencies and was banker and agent to the West 
African Colonial governments and tthe West African Currency 
Board in-London. It also maintaimed accounts for those 
governments.
Concerning the banking activities of the BBWA Fry
tells us that the colonial governiments were pleased to
have this business off their handss. The Lagos Government
Report for 1 896 says: This Bank hsas benefited the Colony
in many ways and supplies a want w h i c h  was much felt in
the past. And the Report for 1 8977 adds: "The Bank of
British West Africa is of the greaitest assistance to the 
24Government."
The use of cheques was rapidiy spreading. They were 
soon almost universally used for payment of customs duties 
and other revenue, and for the regjular remittance of 
Government funds. Most (but not aall) of the trading firms 
took full advantage of the Bank tOD open accounts, to 
obtain cash when needed, and to dispose of surplus coin.
By the close of the century the Baink was safely estab­
lished in West Africa and its home? base was strong and 
25
stable."
2 4 Fry, Bankers in West Africa, Ljondon, 1 976 , p. 29.
25 Ibi d , p . 29 .
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THE WEST AFRICAN CURRENCY BOARD
This was the nature of the currency in use and 
circulation and the management of the banking system when 
E mmott's Parliamentary Committee, a follow-up of Sir David 
Barbour's enquiry of 1900, was set up in 1912 to enquire 
into matters affecting the currency of British West 
African colonies and protectorates. The Committee had 
seven members. The Chairman was Eord Emmott, the then 
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, with John 
Anderson, who was later to become Chancellor of the. 
Exchequer, as Secretary.
The Committee also examined the question whether 
profits should be shared between the home government and 
the colonial governments; a question examined earlier in 
1900 by the Barbour Enquiry. Under the existing arrange­
ment the United Kingdom Government retained the seigniorage 
profit (i.e. a percentage on minted bullion) on the silver 
coins which were bought by the colonies at a higher price 
than their intrinsic value without any assurance of the 
colonies getting back their money. Among other things 
the Committee also examined the question whether the Royal 
Mint was under any obligation to redeem the currency, for 
although United Kingdom silver coinage was issuable against 
sterling it was not automatically redeemable in sterling.
2 g
After five months of sitting the Committee reported 
on 5th June, 1912, and made the following recommendations:
(a) To mint a new silver coin in West Africa. This
26 Emmott Report, C d . 6426, June 5, 1912.
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sparked off a debate which centred chiefly on the 
design: whether the Africans would object to a 
design which had on it the image of a King, a palm 
tree, arabesques or drawings of plants and animals 
and whether the coin should have a hole at the middle 
which would enable the natives to arrange their coin 
holdings in strings tied round their waists.
(b) that the supply of coin and management of the reserve 
should be entrusted to a currency board;
(c) that the Currency Board should at the outset be placed 
in funds by means of advances from the governments 
concerned.
(d) that the Currency Board should have its headquarters 
in London with official representatives at appointed 
centres in West Africa.
(e) to hold a reserve in the United Kingdom partly in 
gold and partly in readily realisable securities; and 
holders of coins of the new currency to have a legal 
right to tender them in British West Africa for con­
version into sterling money to be issued in London at 
a specified rate of exchange. It was also proposed 
that not less than 75% of the reserve should be 
backed by coin;
(f) that the resources and credit of the governments of 
British West Africa should be the final security for 
the discharge by the Currency Board of its obligations;
(g) for the issue of a West African paper currency on 
the same principles of those of the coinage. It was 
proposed that the currency notes should first be
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issued at one office in each colony under the autho­
rity of a central Currency Board in London, which 
should be responsible for the distribution and 
management of the reserve as a whole;
(h) that the new notes when issued should not have legal 
tender status, except in payment of dues to the 
Government of the colony of issue. It is to be noted 
that this aspect of the recommendation was rejected 
by the Currency Board as far as it applied to 
N igeria.
In November 1912 the West African Currency Board was 
appointed. It held its first meeting in that month. In 
a memorandum dated 6 th December, 1912, signed by the 
Colonial Secretary, Lewis Harcourt, the first constitution 
of the West African Currency Board was introduced and the 
Board was charged, inter alia, with the duties and 
responsibilities:
"to hold against the silver coinage a 
reserve of gold and securities, hereafter 27 
referred to as the 'gold standard reserve'",
and the Colonial Secretary, under Regulation 9, was given 
the power to fix the minimum proportion of gold in this 
reserve from time to time. This constitution was revised 
in 1915 and 1924 and in an amendment in 1949 the Board 
was given more powers. Its functions included:
"1. The West African Currency Board has 
been constituted for and to control
27 J.B. Loynes, op. c i t , p. 17. Also see W.T. Newlyn and
D.C.Rowan, Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa 
p p . 40-41.
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the Protectorates and Trust Territories 
(hereinafter referred to as the consti­
tuent Territories) to ensuire that the 
currency is maintained in satisfactory 
condition and generally tco watch over 
the interests of the constituent 
Territories so far as curirency is 
concerned.
"5. The Board will have to make all necessary 
arrangements for the mintiing of any special 
coins authorised for circulation in the 
constituent Territories amd to comply with 
applications for the supply of coins at 
the time being legally cuirrent in those 
Territories. Subject to ithe provisions 
of these Regulations and ifor any legis­
lation from time to time jin force in the 
constituent Territories tlhe Board may 
provide and may issue and re-issue therein 
notes hereinafter referrecd to as currency 
notes.
"9. The Board shall issue at zlts main centres 
at Accra, Bathurst, Freetown and Lagos, in 
the constituent Territories to any person 
who makes demand in that Ibehalf coin or 
currency notes equivalent to the value 
(at the rate of Twenty shillings West 
African currency to One pcound sterling) 
sums in sterling lodges w i t h  the Board
in London."28
On 21st November, 1912, the Bo£ard hagj its first 
meeting in Whitehall Gardens; on 26+th June, 1913, the 
Board issued its first coinage and £also in June, 1916, the 
first consignment of West African notes was despatched to 
Nigeria. The Emmott Committee had ^envisaged that the West 
African Government would finance thee Board in minting of 
coin and other initial expenditure, but it was to London 
Joint Stock Bank, now the Midland B;ank, the Board turned.
28 Ss. 1, 5, 9 of the Regulations Defining the Constitu­
tion, Duties and Powers of the iWest African Currency 
Board and the East African Currency Board, see the 
Appendix.
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During the next 50 years or so the Board faithfully 
carried out its obligations to the satisfaction of the 
West African countries. The Board issued what were des­
cribed as West African Currency Board notes and coins and 
on its recommendation they were accorded full legal tender 
status. It also appointed the Bank of British West 
Africa as its agent and in 1948 opened a sub-centre man­
aged by Barclays Bank D.C. & 0. in the Southern Cameroons 
(which was a trust territory administered with Nigeria 
until 1960). Apart from this traditional central bank 
function the Board also maintained a coin reserve up to. 
the full amount of the notes. The currency was convertible 
and so the notes and coins could be readily used to buy 
sterling drafts from the Board.
The Board had also in 1948-49 to perform the central 
bank duty of redeeming in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria 
the old manillas whose circulation had persisted in spite 
of the wide and long use of the Board's notes and coins. 
After the Central Bank of Nigeria had been established 
and it issued its own currency, the legal tender status 
of West African Currency Board in Nigeria was withdrawn 
on 1st July, 1962, and the Board was obliged to redeem its 
currency, which process it started on 1st July 1959.
Similar redemption exercises were carried on in Ghana, 
where the Board received the withdrawn currency from the 
Bank of Ghana for redemption and paid out sterling cash, 
pound for pound, against it without the customary commis­
sion charge.
With the departure of Nigeria and Ghana, the West
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African Currency Board operated only in Sierra Leone and
The Gambia. After an enquiry into the currency issue
problem facing the two nations, the independent Government
in Freetown decided to create a national issuing authority
and national currency. The Gambia was now in a sort of
political union amalgamated with Senegal to form Senegambia.
One will watch with interest to see what new currency
issue arrangements would be made. Now that the Nunc
Dimittis of the Board has been sung one cannot but agree
29
with J.B. Loynes, that:
"A word should be said here about policy. 
Over the formative years many decisions 
of importance had been made and a firmer 
pattern to the Board's operations had 
become discernible. Early on the Board 
had decided that its function was not to 
compete with commercial banking in West 
Africa on remittance rates: it had fixed 
its charges in relation to the cost of 
moving specie and these were the limits 
beyond which the minimum charges to the 
public need not go; it had arrived at and 
achieved a uniform currency, from subsidiary 
coinage of one tenth penny to currency notes 
of £5, throughout British West Africa: it 
had facilitated transfers between the 
different territories though still charging 
the banks for the service (it was to 
abolish such charges in October 1945); 
and it had steadily pursued a policy of 
enlarging its sterling investments and 
had begun to distribute a part of the 
profits.
The Board had also concentrated its 
reserves in sterling. From 1916 onwards 
sterling investments were the largest 
assets item."
We will now turn our attention to East Africa in order to 
trace the establishment and the performance of a sister
29 J.B. Loynes, op. c i t , pp. 24-25.
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board, the East African Currency Board.
THE EAST AFRICAN CURRENCY BOARD
The East African Currency Board was established in 
December 1919 for three principal reasons. The first was 
to organise the change from a rupee-based currency to a 
shilling-based currency in East Africa by buying up all 
the rupees in circulation. One may recall that in 
Nigeria the manilla, Maria Theresa and copper wires con­
tinued to circulate in some parts of Nigeria some 50 years 
after British currency was introduced into Nigeria and 
successive colonial governments had difficulties in 
redeeming them. The second objective in setting up the 
East African Currency Board was to issue East African notes 
and coins against sterling at the rate of 20 East African 
shillings to £1 sterling. The third function of the 
Board was to obtain British and colonial government 
securities for the sterling which it collected from the 
exchange.
The Board was therefore set up to supervise the mone­
tary system in East Africa in the same way as the West 
African Currency Board tried to do in West Africa or the 
Central African Currency Board attempted to do in the 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Currency board had its head­
quarters in London with a government advisory board in 
Nairobi, Kenya, which consisted of the bank mangers of 
the three main commercial banks operating in East Africa, 
viz: National Bank of India, the Standard Bank of South 
Africa and Barclays DCO (originally called the National
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Bank of South Africa). In 1960 the head office was moved
4- M  ■ U -  30to Nairobi.
Initially, only Kenya and Uganda were members of the 
Board; but later in 1920 Tanganyika joined; Zanzibar in 
1936, Somaliland, Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1942-43, and 
Aden in 1951. One country after another left the Board 
on the attainment of independence until finally in June 
1965, the three East African Governments of Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda declared their intention to establish 
their own separate central banks and to issue their own 
currencies.
It will be recalled that before 1914 the beginning 
of the First World War, the gold standard was the basis 
of financial dealing and systems throughout the world.
In  B r i t a i n ,  f o r  in s ta n c e ,  a l l  Bank o f  England paper money 
was exchangeab le  i n t o  g o ld  w h ich  was v a lu e d  a t  £3. 17. 10$ 
p e r s ta n d a rd  ounce. In  o rd e r  t o  be a b le  t o  f in a n c e  th e  
1914-18 war e f f o r t ,  B r i t a i n  had, as had C h a r le s  I  i n  the  
17th c e n tu ry  (as we saw in  C hapter 1 ) ,  t o  p r i n t  more 
n o tes  tha n  i t  had g o ld  s to c k s  in  th e  v a u l t s  o f  th e  Bank 
o f  Eng land .
Printing more paper money without expanding the 
supply of goods generally leads to inflation, and as a 
consequence of the world inflation the purchasing power 
of sterling declined during this period. Parallel to 
this exchange rate variation in Britain was the falling
30 The headquarters were later moved from London to
Nairobi in 1960, and Central Bank of Kenya had agreed 
to take over and preserve the records.
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rate of the Indian rupee, which since 1898 or thereabouts 
had been the standard coin in East Africa. This state of 
affairs where the exchange rates of the two currencies 
had each altered, brought much confusion into the economic 
life of the area. Sterling was not tied to the gold 
standard, nor was the rupee. It was then left to the 
Currency Board to harmonise the conflicting situation by 
pegging the rupee to sterling in East Africa by law. For 
instance, the Kenya Currency Interpretation Ordinance No.
1 of 1922 provided that:
"where in any Act applied to the Colony 
in force on the first day of January 1922, 
the word 'rupee' is used, such applied Act 
shall have effect as if the word 'two 
shillings' had been used in place of the 
word 'rupee' which was made a legal tender 
currency by a proclamation dated the 
fifteenth day of March 1907, under the 
East Africa Uganda Currency Order in 
Council 1905.^1
The colonial governments in February, 1921, divested 
the rupee of its legal tender status, substituting in its 
stead two East African shillings for one rupee. In Kenya 
and Uganda, in 1923 and 1926 respectively, the demonetised 
rupees were withdrawn by the Board and replaced by 
shillings. The shilling is still the nominal unit of 
currency in these countries.
In many ways the operation of the East African 
Currency Board during the period 1919-1965 followed the 
same pattern as that followed by the West African Currency
31 S . 2.
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Board. The Board was responsible for the issuing of the 
local currency, which occurred when the Board replaced 
the Indian rupee and sterling with the East African shil- 
ing. Like its counterpart, the West African Currency 
Board, the Board was prepared to redeem the cowries, 
rupees and all pre-colonial money circulating in the 
region. It also maintained 100% backing in sterling 
against currency on demand against an eguivalent amount of 
sterling.
The Board, in addition to its reserves in London,
strove hard to build up an additional sterling reserve
from the proceeds of its investments. The aim was to be
in a position to meet unforeseen exigencies. The Board
also opened and maintained accounts for the commercial
banks in order to facilitate banking operations; and, in
order to improve currency distribution it opened new
32
currency centres and sub-centres in remote places.
THE IMPACT OF CURRENCY BOARDS LEGISLATION ON THE ECONOMIES
As has been remarked above, the year 1920 marked a 
turning point in the affairs and concepts of central 
banking. It was the time when the central banks began to 
a:ssume roles different from those conceived in 19th 
century Europe, and moved from the classical to the modern
3.2 E A C B , Report of the year ended June 30, 19 63, pi. The 
five currency centres were located at Aden, Dar-es- 
Salaam, Jinja, Nairobi and Zanzibar, while the 
currency sub-centres were Gulu, Kampala and Mbale in 
Uganda; Kisumu and Mombasa in Kenya, Moshi, Mwanza 
and Tanga in Tanganyika; Mukalla in Aden; and Wete in 
Zanzibar.
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concepts of central banking. The classical or traditional 
concept of central banking involved no more than the 
maintenance of currency stability amd the avoidance and 
controlling of inflation. It was diuring this decade 
(1910-1920) that the currency boards were born. Not 
surprisingly, their functions were ttailored to these 
contemporary classical concepts of central banking.
From a close examination of the laws governing the 
operations of the East African Currency Board and the 
West African Currency Board, it can be seen that the Boards 
were hamstrung by inflexible provisions that did not give 
them any elbow-room to operate. Foir instance, section 11 
of the Board's constitution gave the West African Currency 
Board the power to invest the Board"s funds in sterling 
securities of the government of any part of His Majesty's 
dominions, but subject to the Secrettary of State's 
approval. The Board thus had no free hand in the invest­
ment of its funds in sterling securities. The case was 
also true of the East African Curremcy Board for:
"With the coming of independence to the 
three East African countries the Secretary 
of State relinquished his powers over the 
Board and with this withdrawal of the over­
riding powers of the Secretary of State 
a regulation was made to tthe effect that 
actions of the Board must have the unanimous 
support of its members. This regulation was 
later to cause considerable difficulty, during 
the period when Aden was cclaiming a larger 
share of the Board's distributions than the 
East African countries wer e  prepared to
concede.
33 A.C.C. Roberts, The Final Reporl of the East African 
Currency Board, p. 8 .
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The Board therefore had no opportunity to exercise any 
discretion.
Similarly, apart from sections 1, 11 and 17 all of 
the constitution of the West African Currency Board 
provide for the machinery of administration of the system. 
Currency Boards were therefore operating as mere adminis­
trators of the monetary system and were not in a position 
to formulate a national monetary or credit policy.
The West African Currency Board derived its powers 
of operation mainly from section 1 of the law:
"The West African Currency Board has 
been constituted to provide for and to 
control the supply of currency to the 
British West African Colonies and 
Protectorates and Trust Territories 
(hereinafter referred to as the consti­
tuent Territories), to ensure that the 
currency is maintained in satisfactory 
condition and generally to watch over 
the interests of the constituent 
Territories so far as currency is 
concerned."34
There was a similar provision in the East African 
Currency Board Constitution:
"The Board was constituted and the 
Members appointed by the United Kingdom 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in 
December 1919. Its first Regulation 
stated that its purpose was to provide 
for, and to control the supply of, currency 
to the East African Protectorate, the 
Uganda Protectorate and any other Depen­
dencies in East Africa which might be 
added by the Secretary of State; to 
ensure that the currency was maintained 
in satisfactory condition; and generally
34 West African Currency Board Constitution, p. 1. 
See Appendix
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to watch over the interests of the 
said Dependencies so far as currency was 
concerned. The name of the 'East African 
Protectorate 1 was shortly afterwards 
changed to Kenya and the Secretary of 
State added Tanganyika to the Dependencies 
in which the Board was to operate. There­
fore, at the outset, the area in which 
the Board operated comprised of [sic]
Kenya, Uganda and the mainland of Tanzania
but not Zanzibar."35
Handicapped by inadequate provisions in the laws, the 
Boards could not regulate the banking system so as to 
foster economic growth and they were in no position to 
realise the aspirations of Africans to provide a symbol 
of financial independence associated with political free­
dom, nor an environment for indigenous banks to establish 
and grow. The system was not geared towards achieving a 
rapid rate of economic growth in an under-developed 
economy for the system lacked money and capital markets 
and there were no open market operations. Monetary 
instruments were not available at that time to these 
dependent territories, so emerging countries could not 
reach the goal of economic development. Although the 
Boards had quite substantial amounts in reserve at the 
Midland Bank in London, they could not, at the earlier 
stages of their existence, make any investments in the 
bonds and other domestic government securities. Call 
money, Treasury bills and certificates of deposit facili­
ties could have been established and developed and the 
proceeds used by government to finance development
35 A.C.C. Roberts, op. c i t , p. 3.
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projects. This was not done. As we saw at pages 78 and 
80 the Boards were expected to maintain an equal cover in 
sterling for the currency they issued. In the case of 
the East African Currency Board theatre was the difficulty 
of providing 1 0 0 % sterling cover four its currency issue 
by reason of the difficulties encountered in replacing the 
rupees.
Currency Boards were by no means substitutes for 
central banks. They did not act, in strict sense, as 
banker to the governments nor were they bankers of last 
resort to the banking system. The existing banking system 
was not supervised and controlled in the way that contem­
porary central banks are now accustomed to do. A remote 
reference to supervision can be seen in section 3 of the 
Board's constitution, which lamely provided that "the 
Board will have power to appoint officers for the discharge
of such duties in connection with ciurrency in the United
3 6
Kingdom or in British West Africa."
The Boards could not provide a national currency 
which was the aspiration of every African country strug­
gling to shake off the shackles of colonialism. There was 
a sense of humiliation and disgust among the nationalists. 
They were also incensed by the fact that the entire 
reserves held in London had to be held in cash or foreign 
securities at a time when a greater proportion of these 
holdings should be invested in local securities. The 
policy of maintaining 100% sterling cover for the Board's
36 A.C.C. Roberts, op. c i t , p. 7.
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currency issue prevented the Board from influencing
economic conditions in the areas of their jurisdictions.
This was yet another source of criticism of the Boards,
especially from the emerging nationalists. The East
African Currency Board, for example, declared the first
surplus of £EA577,000 only in June 1952 and this was
shared among the three component countries of Kenya,
37
Uganda and Tanzania. The Boards lost the opportunity of 
employing the excess liquidity that was in the banking 
system to advantage; and this was particularly true for 
"during the years from 1939 the East African Currency 
Board financial position had so greatly improved that 
this decrease (caused by the exit of Ethiopia and Somali­
land from the Board) caused no worry and on the 30th 
June, 1948, the readily available assets still amounted 
to £22.8 million; 96% of the c i rculation."^
Again, Africans would have been delighted to see a 
progressive master-plan for the development of commercial 
banking in those African countries over which the Boards 
exercised their influence. Unfortunately, the Boards had 
neither the will nor the power to encourage the develop­
ment of commercial banking. The few banks that were in 
operation during the period were foreign-owned and 
directed. Because Africans lacked the financial capacity 
to establish their own banks they had hoped that the 
colonial governments through the currency boards should
37 Ibid, p . 6.
38 Ibid, p . 3.
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have encouraged the establishment of an indigenous banking 
system and foster development of ffinancial institutions.
Thus the Currency Boards could not engage in normal 
banking business such as central banks engage in as a 
matter of routine not only because they lacked the capa­
city to do so in the absence of enabling legislation, but 
also because there was little or m o  financial infrastructure 
and the economy was only beginning to be demonetised.
On the other hand, it must b e  admitted that the East 
African Currency Board from 1960 began to provide a 
limited degree of seasonal credits for export crops, with 
the dual aim of promoting exports and acting as a banker 
of last resort to the commercial banks. It is also true 
that it was only in 1955, when t h e  Secretary of State 
amended the East African Currency Board's regulations, 
that the Board was permitted to siubscribe to local secu­
rities up to £10 million (£20 milllion in 1962). It was 
only then that it became possible for the Board to become 
an agent of domestic monetary expension, which was a step 
in the assumption of orthodox centtral banking functions.
In the following pages we w i l l  attempt to trace the 
history of the founding of some off the central banks which 
succeeded the Currency Boards.
THE COMING OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS IN AFRICA 
THE TRADITIONAL BANKS
39
Elsewhere in Chapter 1 we cdealt with commodity
39 Pp. 32-40 .
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money which was in use before the colonisation of Africa.
We tried to establish that the traditional currencies then 
in use effectively discharged the functions of money and 
were ideally suited for the type of economy which Nigeria 
(and indeed Africans generally) had in the pre-colonial 
setting. Although the economy was a subsistence one, 
economic activities on moderate scale were going on in 
the different countries in Africa. In the lush vegetation 
of tropical rain forests and the savannah as well as in 
the deciduous forest areas, the bulk of the people were 
engaged in hoe agriculture, in producing handicraft and 
textiles. Others were engaged in producing tools, fish, 
livestocks and other goods. Groups living on the coast 
of Southern Nigeria were engaged in international trade 
with Europeans who came into early contact with them. On 
the eastern coast of Africa the local population came in 
early contact with the Arabs, Portuguese, Germans and the 
Indians. The result of this early contact and trade was 
that some natives became quite affluent and were therefore 
in a position of saving money. This they saved by 
hoarding. The few well-to-do were thus able to constitute 
themselves into money-lenders, as traditional sources of 
credit. There were many such wealthy traders in Onitsha, 
Port-Harcourt and Warri in Nigeria even before the 
colonisation of what is now Nigeria.
From these rich merchants, the poor would borrow, 
pledging their farmlands or the person of their kinsman 
as collateral. The obligations of the debtor would come 
to an end only when the debt was fully repaid, the usufruct
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40of the land or the labour of the pawn merely satisfying 
the interest element of the deal. With the home-coming 
of the demobilised soldiers from the World Wars more 
capital became available to the natives. Large numbers of 
these soldiers who fought for the British cause particu­
larly during the Second World War received their 
entitlements as lump-sum payments in British currency. 
These people were now in a position of surplus. An 
indigenous capital market had thus taken deep root in the 
African society.
Some of the demobilised soldiers who had surplus 
funds now operated as money-lenders charging exhorbitant 
interest and accepting security in the form of parcels of 
land, sometimes with cash crops on them which the creditor 
harvested. Other traditional institutions which acted 
like bankers were:
(a) The Isusu, ajo (Yoruba), Igbe oha (Ibo)
4 1
Under the African traditional credit institutions 
the promoter visits the houses or offices of members in
40 The traditional finance system by which a Yoruba 
borrower sends his daughter or son or wife to work on 
the farms or household for the money-lender until the 
debt is paid.
41 See M.O. Ijere, "Credit development in Nigeria agri­
culture", Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social 
Studies vol. 5, No. 2, July 1963, p. 211 for classifi­
cation and further reading. Also Cf. W.R. Bascon,
"The Esusu. A credit institution of the Yoruba",
in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 
vol. LXXXII, New York, 1949, p. 63; S.F. Nadel, A_ 
Black Byzantium, London, 1951, p. 371ff. 9.1; Jones, 
"Dual organisation in Ibo social structure", 1951.
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turn collecting their daily, weekly or monthly savings, 
each member in turn contributing the same amount each time. 
A member collects his turn of the group's proceeds of the 
contributions on the fortnightly or monthly meeting and 
the fund that revolves to a member each time is usually 
several times greater than his contributions.
(b) Social Clubs, Women's Unions, Family Funds, Town
Unions
One of the objectives of setting up Union funds is to 
pool resources of members together to finance projects, 
for example, children's education, naming of a child 
ceremony, building a h o u s e ,constructing an access road and 
so on.
Although not all the usual characteristics of banking 
(e.g. chequeing ) are present, the functions of these 
traditional financial institutions are akin to those of 
modern banking. They include savings, credit discounting 
with interest when, for instance, a member in dire need 
of funds may wish to buy the right of another member 
whose turn it was to receive the revolving fund. In the 
field of development financing we observe that the unions 
or associations carry out projects which they execute as 
a body either by the use of manual labour for the selected 
projects or by the use of the money in the fund. Hopkins 
divides indigenous credit into two main classes: There
are the small credit association, organised by kinsmen or 
by groups of friends, devoted to such social purposes as 
raising money for funerals and weddings. Hopkins gives
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the Yoruba esusu and Igbe oha (community chest) as
examples. The second instrument h e  classified as the
commercial capital m a r k e t , a tradiitional credit institution
which served economic needs at local and inter-regional
levels, by providing finance for ^institutional and local 
42
trade. Professional traders of then needed to finance 
their ventures by seeking credit. Because of the high 
initial investment and slow returms involved, wealthy 
merchants, specialised bankers, a m d  money-lenders, usually
operating out of the larger trade entrepots, provided
... . 43this service.
From the foregoing it would hbe obvious that the isusu 
system and its variants have co n t r i b u t e d , as they still 
do today, to the economic growth o f  the Nigerian economy. 
The system has provided an avenue for the supply of funds, 
as opposed to hoarding for rural (development. In spite 
of the many disadvantages of this system including the 
fact of it not being regulated by statute, it has provi­
ded scarce funds and credit to thee Nigerian economy. And 
as we shall see in Chapter 3, the system has in addition
44
provided a basic source of Nigeri£an banking legislation. 
These formed the necessary base olf the "banking" industry 
when Africa was colonized in the '19th century, and not­
withstanding the benefits of modern banking and the
42 Anthony G. Hopkins, An Econom:ic History of West Africa, 
New York, 1973, p. 71.
4 3 Ibid, p . 7 0. 
44 At p p . 132.
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securities provided, the traditional banks still subsist.
THE COMMERCIAL BANKS
The African Banking Corporation
By the time the West African Currency Board was
established in 1912 there had been only three commercial
banks which had at one time or the other been in existence
45and operating in Nigeria. The first was the African 
Banking Corporation of England which began operations in 
Lagos in 1891. On 28th January 1892 the Crown Agents 
concluded the arrangements which permitted the bank to 
import into Lagos Colony for the first time new United 
Kingdom silver coins from the Royal Mint. The bank had 
earlier opened for business in South Africa in 1891. When 
it was felt by the European traders in the territory that 
banking facilities were urgently required in West Africa 
and especially in Lagos the bank was approached and 
induced to establish a branch in the Colony. Consequently
"A letter of instructions to Mr.
(George) Neville was approved by the 
board (of the African Banking Corporation) 
on August 13, 1891, and the Lagos branch 
was opened soon afterwards. On October 
8 , the board decided to send an inspector 
Mr. McKenzie, to Lagos to see that the 
machinery of the branch is in proper 
working order, and if possible to 
visit other ports and send full reports 
to the directors on the banking possi­
bilities of the West Coast."
For several reasons the bank could not survive. One
45 Fry, op. c i t , p. 20.
95
reason was the outbreak in Februarry of 1892 of serious 
unrest among the Ijebus and the Ecgbas which disrupted 
road communications between Lagos and Abeokuta and halted 
trade. The second reason was the complaint to the 
Colonial Secretary by prominent Lagos traders alleging 
that Elder Dempster, their captaims and officers, had 
taken over the trade of Lagos. Th e  directors of the African 
Banking Corporation thereupon deciided to close up the 
bank and concentrate their attentiion on their South 
African operations. Elder Dempster then negotiated to 
take over the branch which they haad earlier taken the 
initiative to establish.
Bank of British West Africa
When the African Banking Corporation ceased to operate 
in Lagos, the firm of Elder Dempster took over the inter­
ests and the securities of the bamk in May, 1893, and the 
formation of the Bank of British Wes t  Africa - though 
little more than a department of Elder Dempster and Co. - 
was announced. It was not until Mlarch 31, 1894 that the 
bank was registered in London as a  limited liability 
company.
Before its incorporation, an agreement had been 
reached on March 14, 1894, grantimg the bank the sole 
right to-import silver coin free o f  charge from the Royal 
Mint, with permission to charge a commission of 1% for 
supplying the coin in the Colony o f  Lagos, and allowing it 
to continue to act as government hoanker. Until the 
inauguration of the West African central banks in the '50s
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the Bank of British West Africa had faithfully played the 
roles of bankers and agents of the West African Currency 
Board. It successfully administered the West African 
Currency Board for an agency fee of only £4,000 a year 
which had been fixed in 1927.
The Anglo-African Bank (later the Bank of Nigeria)
As a result of a joint venture, the Niger Company,
the African Association and Alexander Miller-Brothers &
Co. founded in 1899 the Anglo-African Bank with branches
in Old Calabar in 1900, Burutu, L o k o j a  and Jebba, the
main outposts of the Niger Company. In reaction to the
activities of this newcomer on the banking scene, the
Bank of British West Africa quickly established a branch
in Calabar too. By 1905 the bank had changed its name to
the Bank of Nigeria. The bank closed down its business
when in 1912 the monopoly to issue silver a share of which
was granted to it - was abolished. It then sold out to
46
the Bank of British West Africa on June 30, 1912, at 
the time of the takeover having 10 branches.
The Colonial Bank
The Colonial Bank, a bank which had been in existence 
in the West Indies since 1836, opened for business in 
Nigeria in 1916. From 1912 to 1917 - when the Colonial
46 The Bank of Nigeria operated until 1913. It would 
not be absolutely correct to state, as C.V. Brown 
in his book the Nigerian Banking System, did at p. 1 
that in 1912 only the Bank of British West Africa 
was in existence.
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Bank first appeared on the scene to offer some competition, 
the Bank of British West Africa had had the field to 
itself and was once more the only bank in the entire West 
African region. Within three years of its formation the 
Colonial Bank had spread its tentacles to 9 cities in 
Nigeria, 6 branches in Ghana, and one each in Sierra Leone 
and The Gambia. It later merged with other banks 
(Barclays Bank, Anglo-Egyptian Bank and National Bank of 
South Africa) in 1925 to become Barclays Bank D.C.O. 
(Dominion, Colonial and Overseas).
THE COMING OF INDIGENOUS BANKS
Between 1925 and 1952 no more expatriate banks were 
established. However, from 1959 to January 1983 7 
expatriate, inclusive of wholly foreign-owned and majority 
foreign share holding (that is, mixed, 60 per cent to 40 
per cent Nigerian-Foreign ratio) banks were issued with 
licences to operate as banks. This period, i.e. 1925 to 
1952, witnessed a rush to establish indigenous banks, a 
great many of which failed. The Industrial and Commercial 
Bank, established in 1929, went into liquidation a year 
later; the Nigerian Mercantile Bank was established in 
1931 but due to lack of patronage closed down in 1936; the 
Nigerian Farmers and Commercial Bank, established in 1947 
with over 30 branches in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, 
was liquidated in 1952; the Merchant Bank, set up on 
January 25, 1952, had its licence revoked in 1960 because 
it had misused government funds. Of the 18 indigenous 
banks registered between February 1951 and May 1952, only
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three survived liquidation.
These early attempts to establish indigenous banks 
matched the rapidly growing political awareness of 
Africans and Nigerians in particular. There were several 
other reasons which impelled Nigerians to establish 
indigenous banks. The first was the profit motive. In 
order to make as much money as was possible, the Nigerian 
as well as other West African traders worked hard as was 
confirmed by Elspeth Huxley when he wrote:
"The markets of Accra are remarkable for 
the size, vigour and astuteness of the 
women traders, who hold a position unique,
I should think, in Africa. Strong as 
buffalos, large-boned, strident, gaily 
dressed in patterned clothes with little 
jackets, either plump and soft fleshed as 
marshmallows or else lean as old leather, 
their faces look imperious and uncompliant, 
like the faces of cattle dealers in English 
country towns.
Their God is money and they adore him 
constantly.... They are down at their stalls 
by six in the morning and stay there till 
dark.... Somewhere a husband is working, 
idling or trading too. These husbands are, 
in a sense, adjuncts, like male spiders - 
it is the market women who make the money 
and call the t u n e . . . "47
With the earnings from their labour, the proceeds of 
trade in primary products, the traders were able to 
provide some collateral to their bankers for the grant 
of credits. The refusal or reluctance to grant such 
requests had caused Nigerians, particularly Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe, Chief Dr. Akinola Maja, Chief Akintunde 
Adeshingbin, Chief Theophilus Adebayo Doherty, Mr. Alfred
47 Elspeth Huxley, Four Guineas published by Chatto and 
Windus Ltd, 1954, quoted by Fry, op. c i t , at p. 108.
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Olatunde Johnson and Chief Okupe, to found such banks as 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank in 1929, the Nigerian 
Mercantile Bank in 1931, the National Bank in 1933, the 
African Continental Bank in 1947, and the Agbonmagbe Bank 
in 1 945 to name a few. Noting these grievances, Fry- 
said :
"The real grievances of the African traders 
were not concerned with the British bank 
or banks as such but with two aspects of 
the financial system. First, African savings, 
private and public, were already substantial 
in the inter-war period, but the greater 
part was held or invested in London rather 
than converted into lending in West Africa. 
This was true of private deposits in the 
banks as much as- of the reserves built up 
by the West African Currency Board, and 
after the war of the surplus funds of the 
produce boards. Secondly, the great bulk 
of the lending activity in West Africa was 
carried on not by the banks but by the 
European trading companies, which naturally 
lent to their produce buyers and distribu­
tors rather than to independent African 
competitors. In any case lending was largely 
done on the security of produce in store 
or in transit; the problem of obtaining 
collateral security from African traders 
for general credit was a real obstacle to 
change.
It was for these broader reasons that 
Africans found it difficult to finance 
their business, and their intense commer­
cial zeal was frustrated as the volume of 
trade expanded. A demand for new African 
banks sprang u p . "48
The monopoly by the Bank of British West Africa of 
the West African business was another determining factor. 
The Niger Company and other firms operating on the West 
Coast early in the century fought hard as a group to break
48 Fry, op. c i t , p. 216.
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the monopoly. They had therefore welcomed the arrival of
the Bank of Nigeria in 18 99 and the Colonial Bank in 1916.
The result of all the indigenous efforts was that
commercial banks were set up by Nigerians to satisfy
their yearnings and aspirations for banks that they could
call their own. Between February 1951 and May 1952 (when
the Banking Ordinance was promulgated) 18 indigenous banks
were registered. All except three foundered. The rush
to establish them was to pre-empt the Report of G.D.
Paton, who, it was speculated, had recommended in his 
49Report that a banking ordinance should be issued to 
regulate banking practices and protect depositors. The 
law “^  was in fact enacted vin 19 52.
No sooner were these indigenous banks established 
than they began to crumble like a pack of cards; they went 
into oblivion as fast as they were established. Only the 
National Bank, the African Continental Bank and the 
Agbonmagbe Bank survived the spate of liquidation, mainly 
as a result of government funding and the deposits made 
to them by the Marketing Boards and the parastatals. This 
patronage was motivated by the belief that the expatriate 
banks operating in Nigeria were deliberately and unreason­
ably discriminating against Nigerian businessmen. With
51
the enactment of the 1952 Ordinance as an instrument
4 9 For the background to the Paton Report, see Newlyn and 
Rowan, p. 230-241.
50 An Ordinance for the Regulation of the Business of 
Banking of May 22, 1952.
51 For details of these see Charles V. Brown, the Nigerian 
Banking System, p . 32.
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for regulating banking activities and with the establish­
ment of the Central Bank of Nigeria, at the apex of the 
banking system as supervisor, a preponderant number of 
indigenous banks set up after 1952 have survived and are 
still in operation. In some cases the Central Bank as a 
lender of last resort has bailed some of these banks from
mis-management and illiquidity that would have led to 
52
total collapse.
The following table shows the expatriate, mixed and 
indigenous banks that have ever operated or are still in 
business in Nigeria and their dates of registration or 
of grant of licence in chronological order:
Table 2 Banks that Operated in Nigeria Since 1891 
Bank
1. African Banking Corporation
2. Bank of British West Africa (now the 
First Bank of Nigeria L i m i t e d ) *53
3. Anglo-African Bank
4. Bank of Nigeria
5. The Colonial Bank
6 . Barclays Bank DCO (now Union Bank of 
Nigeria L t d .)*
7. Industrial and Commercial Bank 
(incorporated in U.K. in May 1914)
8 . Nigerian Mercantile Bank
9. National Bank of Nigeria*
10. Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd.
(now Wema Bank Ltd.)*
Date
1891
1894
1899
1905
1916
1925
1929 
March 1931 
February 1933
1945
52 For further discussion on this theme see Chapter 3, p.
53 The asterisks indicate the banks that were operating 
in Nigeria up to 31st December, 1983.
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Bank Date
11. Nigerian Farmers & Commercial Bank 1947
12. African Continental Bank*
(formerly Tinubu Properties Ltd. and in
January 1947, Tinubu Bank Ltd.) Nov. 1947
13. Banque del'Afrique Occidental 1948
14. Pan Nigeria Bank 1951
15. Standard Bank of Nigeria 1951
16. Premier Bank 1951
17. Nigerian Trust Bank 1951
18 Afroseas Credit Bank 1951
19. Onward Bank 1951
20. Central Bank of Nigeria 1951
21. Provincial Bank of Nigeria 1952
22. Metropolitan Bank of Nigeria 1952
23. Merchant Bank 1952
24. Union Bank of British Africa 1952
25. United Commercial (Credit) Bank 1952
26. Cosmopolitan Credit Bank 1952
27. Mainland Bank 1952
28. Group Credit Bank 1952
29. Industrial Bank 1952
30. West African Bank 1952
31. Co-operative Bank Limited 1954
32. Muslim Bank 1958
33. Bank of Lagos Ltd. 1959
34. Berini Riyyad Bank 1959
35. British and French Bank (now United
Bank for Africa)* May 1959
36. International Bank for West Africa Ltd.* 1959
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37. Bank of the North Limited* 7th July '960
38 . Bank of America (now Savannah Bank Ltd.)* 960
39. Chase Manhattan 961
40. Arab Bank (now Nigeria-Arab Bank Ltd .)*2nd N o v . '962
41 . Bank of India (now Allied Bank 
(Nigeria) Limited)* 10th Sept 962
42 . Co-operative Bank of Eastern Nigeria 
(now Co-operatibe and Commerce Bank Ltd.)* 962
43 . New Nigeria Bank Limited* 8th Feb. 971
44 . Pan African Bank Limited* 19th May '971
45. Mercantile Bank of Nigeria Ltd.* 1st July 971
46 . Nigerian Merchant Bank Limited 23rd June '973
47 . NAL Merchant Bank Limited* 3rd June '974
48 . International Merchant Bank Ltd.* Sept 974
49 . ICON Ltd. (Merchant Bankers)* O c t . '974
50 . Kaduna Co-operative Bank Ltd.* 25th Nov. '974
51 . Kano Co-operative Bank Limited* 1st April 976
52 . Chase Merchant Bank Limited* 10th April 976
53 . Societe Generale Bank (Nigeria)* Sept 977
54 . Nigerian-American Merchant Bank Ltd 17th Sept 979
55 . Bank of Credit & Commerce International 
(Nigeria) Limited* 20th Nov 979
56 . Owena Bank Nigeria Limited* 8th Feb 982
57. Progress Bank of Nigeria Limited* 21st Oct 982
58 . Indo-Nigerian Merchant Bank Ltd.* 3rd Feb 983
59 . Merchant Banking Corporation Ltd.* 3rd Feb 983
60 . Lobi Bank (Nigeria) Ltd.* 27th April 983
61 . Merchant Bank of Africa (Nig.) Ltd.* 1st Aug 983
62 . Habib Nigeria Bank L i m i t e d * ^ 16th May 983
54 Sources: Private, Banking Supervision 
Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos, and C 
c i t , p . 2 5.
Department, 
.V. Brown, op
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THE COMING OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN EAST AFRICA
The so-called Big Three banks dominated the banking 
scene in East Africa: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The 
big three banks were the National Grindlays, the Standard 
and the Barclays Banks and they were all branches of 
British banks. Between 1951 and 1965 seven other banks 
set up business in East Africa:
Other Banks Established in East Africa
Bank
Nederlandsche Handel-Martschappii 
Bank of India 
Bank of Baroda 
Habib Bank (Overseas)
Ottoman Bank
Commercial Bank of Africa 
Uganda Commercial Bank
In Kenya, for example, the National Bank of India, 
which later became the National and Grindlays Bank, was 
first to open an office in Mombasa in 1896, 16 years 
later in 1910 the Standard Bank of South Africa, which 
later became the Standard Bank, opened a branch. The 
third bank was the National Bank of South Africa, which 
was established in 1916. It was incorporated in South 
Africa and in 1925 was amalgamated with the Colonial 
Bank and the Anglo - Egyptian Bank Limited, to form 
Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas). The 
African Banking Corporation, a subsidiary of the Standard 
Bank, was granted a banking licence in 196 3 but it did
Date
1951
1953
1953
1956
1958
1962
1965
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not carry out any banking business.
In Zambia, the banking system, apart from the 
Central Bank, comprises 5 commercial banks. Three of them, 
viz: Barclays Bank of Zambia Limited, Standard Bank Zambia 
Limited and the Grindlays Bank International (Zambia) 
Limited are subsidiaries of foreign banks. The other two 
commercial banks are the National Commercial Bank Limited, 
established August 21 1969, and wholly owned by the
government, and the Commercial Bank Zambia Limited, in 
which government owns 60 per cent of the shares, was 
established on May 1, 1965. The Standard Bank of South 
Africa Limited started business in Zambia in 1906 when 
its first branch was opened in Kalomo. It was locally 
incorporated in November, 1971 under its present name, 
Standard Bank Zambia Limited. The second bank to commence 
business in Zambia was the Barclays Bank DCO, which was 
incorporated in London and opened its first branch in 
Zambia, then Northern Rhodesia, in 1918. It was locally 
incorporated in 1971 under the name of Barclays Bank of 
Zambia Limited.
The third bank to be established in Zambia was the 
National and Grindlays Bank Limited which was first 
established in Zambia in 1965. It was locally incorporated 
in 1971 .
55 The main source of this section is Clara Caselli, 
The Banking System of Tanzania, Milan, 1975.
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INDIGENOUS BANKS IN EAST AFRICA
Indigenisation of banks in East Africa took a shape 
different from that in West Africa. Entrepreneurs in 
Nigeria like Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Dr. A. Doherty, Chief 
Okupe and so on took the private initiative to found the 
banks, some of which survive today. Although it is true 
that but for the funds from regional governments and 
marketing boards these banks would have foundered, yet 
their establishment, management, control and survival 
should be credited to the ingenuity and determination of 
these nationalists. In East Africa it was the governments 
that took the initiative to establish commercial banks.
In Zambia (see above p.foS ) there are only two indigenous 
banks: The National Commercial Bank Limited, a state- 
owned bank incorporated on August 21, 1969 and the 
Commercial Bank Zambia Limited, the first locally incor­
porated bank. It was incorporated on May 1, 1965 to take 
over the banking business of the Netherlands Bank of 
South Africa Limited.
In Kenya, the first locally owned bank was the 
Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited. It was first 
registered on June 19, 196 5 under the Co-operative 
Societies Act but later registered under the Banking Act 
1968 which came into force on June 3, 1969. The second 
indigenous bank, the National Bank of Kenya Limited, 
fully owned by the Government of Kenya, was established on 
June 19, 1968, while the third locally-owned bank, the 
Kenya Commercial Bank Limited with 60 per cent government 
participation and 4 0 per cent for National and Grindlays
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Bank, assumed operations in December 1971.
The only indigenous banks in Tanzania were the 
National Co-operative Bank founded in 1964, the Tanzania 
Bank of Commerce, established in 1965 with 60 per cent 
equity holding by government, and the People's Bank of 
Zanzibar founded in 1966. It was about this time that 
important political changes were taking place in Tanzania.
On February 6, 1967, President Nyerere announced the 
decision to nationalize the country's commercial banks in 
accordance with the Arusha Declaration, which says that:
"to build and maintain socialism it is 
essential that all the major means of 
production and exchange in the nation 
(including banks) are controlled and 
owned by the peasants through the 
machinery of their government...
By nationalization, the government hoped that the 
following benefits would accrue:
"(a) more efficient mobilization and redis­
tribution of savings, geared to the 
requirements of economic development;
(b) speed up the rate of the formation of 
household savings both in urban and 
rural areas;
(c) a banking system which, while not 
oblivious of the need to earn profits, 
would give priority to the aspect of 
service to the community;
(d) a denser network of banking facilities 
throughout the country;
57(e) equitable remuneration of deposits."
56 Julius K. Nyerere, in Arusha Declaration: Freedom and 
Socialism, Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press 1968
57 National Bank of Commerce, Annual Report and Accounts 
for the Year ended June 30, 1971, p. 16.
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On February 15, 1967, the National Assembly passed
the National Bank of Commerce (Establishment and Vesting
of Assets and Liabilities) Act, 1967 (No. 1 of 1 967) , by
which all foreign-owned banks except the Jetha Lila 
5 8
Bankers were nationalized and their assets and liabil­
ities vested in the National Bank of Commerce. The 
nationalization of the banking system left Tanzania with 
three commercial banks: the National Bank of Commerce, 
the National Co-operative Bank and the People's Bank of 
Zanzibar. In 1970 the National Co-operative Bank was 
taken over by the National Bank of Commerce to leave 
Tanzania with only two commercial banks, viz: the National 
Bank of Commerce and the People's Bank of Zanzibar.
FEATURES OF THE BANKING SYSTEM BEFORE 
THE COMING OF CENTRAL BANKS
Undoubtedly, the banking sector of the economies of 
the African territories surveyed was dominated by foreign 
commercial banks, which were largely left to run their 
business according to the dictates of external economic 
conditions. Due to lack of appropriate legislation the 
banks did not come under the proper control of Currency 
Boards. Because the Boards had very little or no regula­
tory power over the banks credit flows and other activities 
were left in the hands of the banks to direct. Their 
lending policy was determined by their overseas head 
offices. The trend was for banks to provide export finance
58 The Jetha Lila Bankers discontinued business in 1968.
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and short, medium and long-term credits only to the 
expatriate commercial farmers, while the local farmers and 
businessmen found it difficult to take advantage of the 
loan facilities due to the banks' traditional orthodox 
demand for collateral security. The range of the banks' 
operations was thus very much circumscribed; they financed 
mainly commerce rather than agriculture and industry, 
the import of consumer goods rather than capital goods 
for development. As we have seen above, there was never 
an efficiently organised money market or security market.
Because Africans were not used to the art of banking 
in the classical sense, there was a dearth of trained 
personnel to man the banks. The indigenous people were 
therefore employed to do menial jobs and this trend con­
tinued until conscious training efforts were made to 
arrange courses for staff immediately before and soon after 
national central banks were established. Another of the 
distinctive features of the banking system during this 
period was the absence of well developed central banks in 
the two sub-regions. The existence of central banks would 
have facilitated the development and maintenance of a 
sound monetary policy to stimulate credit expansion or 
contraction. Above all, the habit of banking among the 
Africans had not yet been cultivated. All these iden­
tified short-comings have now to a large extent been 
corrected or removed with the establishment of central 
banks in the Commonwealth African countries surveyed.
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ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL BANKS IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA
As political independence of Commonwealth African 
countries was approaching in answer to the former United 
Kingdom Prime Minister McMillan's call for political wind 
of change, African governments, politicians, the IMF, 
economists and parliamentarians were busy debating the 
post-independence form of the monetary and credit system
in the African countries.
59
Elsewhere in this chapter it was concluded that 
the Currency Boards which were operating in the pre­
independence African Commonwealth countries did not do 
banking business in the same way as contemporary central 
banks do not only because they were incapacitated by lack 
of adequate legislation but because there was no financial 
infrastructure and the economy was only beginning to be 
demonetised. We also saw that towards the end of the 
lives of the West African Currency Board and the East 
African Currency Board they had started to perform, to a 
limited degree, the orthodox functions of central banks.
At this point in the economic and banking development 
of these countries political consciousness had simulta­
neously grown and politicians had started to whip up 
agitation for political and economic independence. The 
debates, discussions, and agitations assumed greater 
proportions in the declining years of the colonial regimes. 
In answer to nationalists' demands for economic indepen­
dence the respective colonial governments set up panels to 
study the financial arrangements best suited to these
59 See page 8 9 .
countries.
In East Africa, the question was first seriously 
discussed as far back as 1953 by W.T. Newlyn and D.C.
Rowan in their book Money and Banking in British Colonial 
Africa wherein the two authors concluded that there was no 
case, in the short run, for central banking in East 
Africa. However, there was the rider that the position 
as it was in 1951 might change in the future with the 
development of the use of bank credit, with the increasing 
complexity resulting from local borrowing by East African 
governments, and thirdly with the emergence of indigenous 
b a n k s .
Some seven years later the Uganda Government commis­
sioned its former Economic Adviser, W.T. Newlyn, to advise
6 0
on the banking situation. In his report Mr. Newlyn 
seemed to have changed his position as expressed in 1953. 
He pointed out that conditions in East Africa had changed 
since 1953 and so saw a strong case for the establishment 
of a central b a n k :
"It is my opinion that if East Africa 
were a single political unit there would 
be no doubt whatever but that a central 
bank should be set up with minimum delay, 
with the intention of adopting an indepen­
dent monetary system based on sterling.
But East Africa is not a single political 
u n i t . 1
In 1960 there was yet another commission. A German
6 0 W.T. Newlyn, Economic Policy in U ganda. Report of the 
Economic Adviser, Entebbe, Ministry of Finance, 1959.
61 W.T. Newlyn, ibid, p. 68.
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banker, Erwin Blumenthal, was requested to report on the 
following matters:
" (a) the steps necessary to safeguard 
Tanganyika's interests under the 
existing system, pending the time 
when a new East African currency and 
an^ East African Central Bank could 
be brought into being;
(b) the steps and measures needed to estab­
lish a Tanganyika currency and Central 
Bank and the terms on which the 
separation from the East African 
Currency Board should take place;
(c) the possibility of establishing an 
East African Central Bank now, the 
steps and measures necessary to estab­
lish that bank with an independent 
Tanganyika in a position to safeguard 
its interests, and the steps and 
measures necessary to establish, if 
possible now, a new East Africa 
currency."63
He reported in 1963.
Blumenthal strongly warned the Tanganyika government
against any attempt to establish an independent currency
64
and central bank. However, he suggested a two-tier 
system consisting of a central bank for East Africa and of 
state banks performing a number of central bank functions 
in each country. He put forward his two-tier system plan 
as under:
"80. The top of the System will be formed 
by a Central Bank established on a 
regional basis by agreement of the 
participating Governments. This bank
6 2 Erwin Blumenthal, The Present Monetary System and its
F uture: Report to the Government of Tanganyika, Dar es
Salaam 1963, p. 59.
6 3 Ibid, p . 59 .
64 See W.T. Newlyn, The significance of separate monetary
Systems in East Africa, in East Africa Institute of 
Social Research Conference Papers, January 1966 papers, 
where the subject was fully examined.
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would by virtue of pertinent arrange­
ments take over the assets and 
liabilities of the Currency Board.
The Central Bank will have the sole 
right to issue legal tender currency 
in East Africa.
81. In each of the four countries at the
same time a State Bank would be estab­
lished to assume territorial functions 
within the System. Although these 
State Banks form part of, and be 
incorporated in, the Central Bank System, 
they would be allowed a certain measure 
of independence and freedom of decision 
on a territorial basis, which would 
serve to safeguard the special interests 
of the country concerned in co-ordination 
with its financial and economic policy.65
An elaborate system of management was envisaged to 
bring about the co-ordination of policy between the State 
Bank and the Central Bank. In particular, it was recommen­
ded in paragraphs 83 to 88 of the Report that the Central 
Bank should have a Board of 11 Directors including, apart 
from its own Governor, a Deputy Governor, the Finance 
Ministers of the member countries and the Presidents of the 
State Banks; and that it should perform the functions 
listed therein.
The governments of Ug a n d a , Kenya and Tanganyika 
considered the Report, which became the focal point for 
discussion and counter-proposals. In a confused atmosphere 
the three governments invited the IMF to send a Mission to 
East Africa to make a further study of the situation and 
advise them on the future organisation of banking and 
monetary matters and how best to proceed. But, on the eve 
of the arrival of the IMF Mission headed by Jan M l a d e k , the
65 Erwin Blumenthal, op. cit, p. 34, paras. 80 and 81.
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Ugandan Government soft-pedalled and on February 2, 1965, 
announced its own intention to set up the Bank of Uganda 
and to endow it with central bank functions. The Mladek 
Mission was therefore doomed to failure. It concluded 
its assignment on February 12, 1965 without achieving its 
objectives. The pious hopes of preserving the common 
currency was thus dashed to the ground. No wonder then 
that on June 10, 1965, the three Finance Ministers of 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania announced simultaneously their 
intention to establish their national central banks.
All that was left for the three countries was to enact 
laws to establish each its own central bank. Tanzania did 
so in January 1966, Kenya in March and Uganda in May. The 
three Central Banks officially started business on June 14, 
September 14 and August 15, 1966, respectively with the 
following Acts as the organic laws:
The Bank of Tanzania Act 1965 
The Central Bank of Kenya Act 1966 
The Bank of Uganda Act 1966
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA
The position in Nigeria was somewhat similar to the 
pre-central banking system in East Africa. There was a 
common currency which served the whole of the West African 
region and the system was administered by the West African 
Currency Board with the Bank of British West Africa as 
its agents. But with the arrival of independence disinte­
gration of the ubiquitous Board set in. First it was the 
Gold Coast, now Ghana, which when it became independent in
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1957 set up the first central bank in the region. This 
it did by splitting into two the Bank of the Gold Coast 
which had been set up by the Government in 1953. One part 
became the Bank of Ghana and was a bank of issue, which 
later grew into a complete central bank. The other part 
became the Ghana Commercial Bank, a government commercial 
instrument. Sir Cecil Trevor had earlier in 1952 inquired 
into the banking situation in the Gold Coast and recommen­
ded the immediate setting up of a central bank in these 
w o r d s :
"For the reasons given earlier in the 
Report, I do not consider the time is 
ripe for the formation of a full-fledged 
Central Bank of Issue, but I recommend 
the formation of a semi-Government Bank 
to be conducted on commercial lines to 
meet the present needs of the country 
as a whole and to provide a nucleus from 
which a more powerful and comprehensive 
institution may develop for the future 
advancement of the country."66
As a natural follow-up the Bank of Ghana took control 
of the management of the currency in 1958 and issued a 
separate national currency, thereby parting company with 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone and The Gambia, now in political 
union with Senegal and forming part of "Senegambia".
In Nigeria the development in Ghana had influenced the 
reasoning of government and the nationalists compelling 
them to assess their banking policies and objectives.
66 Sir Cecil Trevor, C.I.E., Report on Banking Conditions 
in the Gold Coast and on the Question of Setting up a 
National B a n k , para. 153 and para. 169 for details of 
the Proposals.
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Other influencing factors were the rash of bank failures
in the 1950s and the self-governing status that was soon
to be achieved in Nigeria regionally. The departing
Colonial Government felt so much concerned particularly
about the indigenous bank failures that Mr. G.D. Paton, an
officer of the Bank of England, was requested to enquire
into banking management in order to safeguard the interests
of customers who used the indigenous banks. Paton's 
6 7Report paved the way for the enactment of "An Ordinance
for the Regulation of the Business of Banking" on May 22,
6 8
1952. The Ordinance provided that banking may be
carried out only by a company, which in order to be
registered must have a nominal capital of at least £25,000
and that banks incorporated outside Nigeria to have a paid-
up capital of £100,000. All banks were required to have
a licence and existing banks were given 3 months to
regularise their position by applying to the Financial
Secretary for a licence and they were allowed three years
within which to obtain such a licence.
However the debate continued whether to be or not
to be, whether a central bank should be set up or not.
Government was compelled to set up studies to determine
whether Nigeria was ripe to have a central bank following
69
Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe's motion in the House of Representatives
67 Report on Banking in Nigeria, Lagos, 1948.
68 Banking Ordinance, 1952, sub-section 3.6.
69 Mbadiwe, K.O., House of Representatives Debates, First 
Session, 11 to 31 March and 1 to 9 April 1952, vol.
2, pp. 1172-1183.
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praying the House to establish a central bank.
After much debate, the House passed a motion calling
for a feasibility study, Mr. J.L. Fisher of the Bank of
England was requested to investigate the matter. He
70
reported in 1952 and suggested that a central bank for 
Nigeria should be built up in three stages: first, the 
West African Currency Board should transfer its operations 
to Africa; secondly, there should be a Nigerian Currency 
Board. In its third stage a bank of issue should be set 
up and develop gradually into a fully fledged central bank.
The next study was undertaken in 1953 by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, other­
wise called the World Bank, which considered also the 
Fisher's Report. It recommended the establishment of a 
state bank for Nigeria which could have the statutory power 
of issuing Nigerian currency and assuming control of the 
b a n k s .
During this period Nigerians had attained a reason­
able measure of self-government and were in a position 
better placed to realise their aspiration which in this 
case was a central bank with more far-ranging scope and 
operational freedom than a state bank recommended by the
IBRD. Mr. J.B. de Loynes, another adviser to the Bank of
71England, who like Mr. J.L. Fisher was a member of the
70 J.L. Fisher, Report on the Desirability and Practicab­
ility of establishing a central bank in Nigeria for 
promoting the economic development of the country,
L a g o s , 19 53.
71 Richard Fry, op. c i t , p. 220.
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erstwhile West African Currency Board, was in 1957 
commissioned to undertake another study. He recommended 
the immediate establishment of a central bank. His Report 
according to Fry:
"became the basic text for new central 
banks in the developing world. It con­
tained the drafts of a banking bill and 
a Central Bank bill."72
These bills were debated and subsequently adopted by the 
House of Representatives in March, 1958. The Central Bank 
of Nigeria was as a result founded and the first Nigerian 
members of staff assumed duty on 6th June, 1958, Governor 
Roy P. Fenton on 24th July, 1958 and the present writer on 
February 2, 1959. Roy Fenton, R.K.C. Giddings and Peter 
Edgley, Governor, General Manager and Currency Officer, 
respectively, from the Bank of England and Mr. G.W. Keep 
from the Reserve Bank of Australia worked assiduously to 
set up the Bank in temporary offices at the Mosaic 
Building, Federal Ministry of Finance, Tinubu Square,
Lagos. (The table below gives the list of top expatriate 
and Nigerian personnel who served the Bank during the first 
decade of its existence.) The Central Bank of Nigeria 
was formally inaugurated on July 1, 1959 and started 
operations in accordance with the provisions of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958.
In his speech that day, the Federal Minister of 
Finance, Chief Festus S. Okotie-Eboh said:
72 J.B. Loynes, op. c i t , p. 30.
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"During my Budget speech last February,
I said that it was hoped that on the 
1st July the Central Bank would assume 
its functions as the Bank of Issue and 
that the issue of Nigeria currency would 
commence on that same d a y . Today that 
prophecy is fulfilled."73
In place of prophecy we will now examine the func­
tions of the Central Bank, the objectives of the legislation 
setting it up and the impact the laws have made on the 
economic growth of Nigeria and to a lesser extent of other
Commonwealth East African countries.
Table 3
THE EXPATRIATE PERSONNEL WHO SERVED THE CBN IN ITS 
FORMATIVE YEARS
R.P. Fenton, C.M.G. Governor 
Bank of England
W. Keep,
Reserve Bank of Australia
Deputy Governor
24th
24th
27th
26th
July
July
Jan
Jan
1958
1963
1959 
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R.K.C. Gi d d i n g s , M.C. General Manager 
Bank of England
23rd
22nd
Aug
Aug
1958
1961
W.A. Tibbies, 
Bank of England
General Manager
Adviser to the 
Governors
11th May 1961 
31st March 1963
1st April 1963 
3rd March 1964
J. Beach, 
Reserve Bank of 
Australia
Deputy General 
Manager
6 th 
5 th
Oct
Oct
1959
1960
J .W. A x t e n ,
Bank of England
J.P. Gore,
Bank of England
Chief Accountant 
Chief Accountant
5th April 1959 
4th Oct 1960
26th May 196 0 
25th Sept 1962
73 Chief F.S. Okotie-Eboh, An address by the Federal
Minister of Finance, Chief the Honourable F.S. Okotie- 
Eboh M.H.R., At the opening of the Central Bank Build­
ing on the 1st July, 1959, p. 2.
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P.F . Maug h a m , Auditor 7th June 1960
Bank of England 3rd Aug 196 4
P.E. Ed g l e y , Currency Officer 2 2nd Aug 1958
Bank of England 7th Jan 1961
F.E. Roycroft, Currency Officer 15th Sept 1960
Bank of England 30th June 1962
Assistant to 1st July 1962
General Manager 14th Jan 1963
R.K. B a r t o n , Agent, Kano B'.ranch 3rd Aug 1962
Bank of England Agent, P. Harcourt 2nd March 1965
C.L. M o b b s , Exchange 13th Nov 1961
Reserve Bank of Controller 15th Dec 1963
Australia
*M.H. Rice, Research Advi.ser 24th Nov 1960
Federal Reserve Bank, 5th Dec 196 3
Dallas
*F.R. Dahl, Balance of Payments 18th April 1962
Federal Reserve Board, Adviser 18th May 1964
Washington
*E.J. Rice, Research Adviser 17th Nov 1962
Federal Reserve Bank, 28th April 1964
New York
*W .R . Belmont, 
Federal Reserve Bank 
Minneapolis
Miss S.G. Stoney, 
Bank of England
Miss J.H. Taylor, 
Bank of England
Miss J. Bogardue, 
Federal Reserve Bank 
New York
Research Adviser
G o v e r n o r 's 
Secretary
G o v e r n o r 's 
Secretary
Librarian
19th Aug 196 4 
22nd July 1966
30th July, 1958 
1st Jan 1961
12th Sept 1960 
1st Sept 1963
4th April 1961 
9th Dec 1961
CBN BOARD OF DIRECTORS 19 59-1979
N o . Governors Name Perriod
1. Mr. Roy Pentelow Fenton CMG 24 July 1958-24 July 1963
2. Alhaji Aliyu Mai-Bornu 25 July 1963-31 July 1967
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N o . Governors Name Period
3. Dr. Clement Nyong Isong 15 Aug 1967-22 Sept 1975
4. Mallam Adamu Ciroma 23 Sept 1975-27 June 1977
5. Mr. 0. Olabode Vincent Since 28 June 1977.
Deputy Governors
1. Mr. Grahame William Keep 27 Jan 1959-26 Jan 1962
2. Alhaji Aliyu Mai-Bornu 27 Jan 1962-24 June 1963 •
3. Dr. Abai Njoku Abai 25 July 1963-26 Jan 1967
4. Mallam Ahmed Talib 1 Aug 1968-5 Nov 1969
5. Mr. Samuel 0. Asabia 2 March 1970-1 March 1975
6 . Mr. 0. Olabode Vincent 1 April 1975-27 June 1977
7. Alhaji Abdulkadir Ahmed Since 28 June 1977
Executive Directors
1. Alhaji Amusa O.G. Otiti Since 21 Sept 1977
2. Professor Green 0.
Nwankwo Since 28 Sept 19 78
3. Mr. Paul R.V. Belabo 10 April 1978-25 Jan,
1979
Directors
1. Malam Yakubu Wanka O.O.N., 
M.B.E.
2. Chief Jabin A. Obahor
3. Mr. Richard 0. Nzimiro
4. Chief Festus 0. Awosika
5. M r . Laban N . Namme
6 . Mr. Chuba Ikpeazu Q.C.
7. Alhaji Abdu Gusau M.B.E.
1 July 1958-30 June 1967
1 July 1958-30 June 1967
1 July 1958-1 March 1959
1 July 1958-20 June 1961
1 July 1958-21 Nov 1960
2 March 1959-31 Aug 1964 
22 Nov 1960-30 June 1968
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W o . Name Period
8 . Mr. E .A . Iyanda
9. Chief Daniel Nwandu
10. Chief T. Adeola Odutola
11. Dr. W.O. Uzoaga
12. Mallam Adamu Ciroma
13. Mr. David O. Dafinone
14. Mr. Aliyi Ekineh
15. Professor Iya Abubakar
16. Professor Herbert M .A . 
Onitiri
17. Dr. Samuel Etim Andem
Ewa Since
18. Dr. Suleiman Kumo Since
19. Dr. Sylvester U. Ugoh Since
20. Mr. Hamza Zayyad Since
21. Alhaji Ibrahim Argungu Since
22. Chief Samuel M. Amoye Since
23. Mr. L u c a s J  . S . Longpuan Since
24. Professor Christopher
S. Ola Since
July 1963-30 June 1966 
Feb 1965-30 June 1966 
July 1966-30 June 1972 
July 1966-30 June 1969 
July 1970-22 Sept 1975 
July 1970-15 Oct 1975 
Nov 1970-15 Oct 1075 
July 1972-15 Oct 1975
Sept 1972-16 Oct 1978
6 Oct 1975 
6 Oct 1975 
6 Oct 1975 
6 Oct 1975 
April 1978 
0 April 1978 
2 April 1978
6 Oct 1978
CBN HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS 1959-19 79
Name Department Period
Mr. R.C.K. Giddings MC General Manager Aug 23 1959-Jan 26
1962
Dr. C.N. Ij^ong (Secretary 19 59 - Aug 31 1961
(Director of Sept 1 1961-1963
(Research
Mr. W.A. Tibbies General Manager May 11 1961-March 31
Dr. A.N. Abai Secretary Dec 1 1962-July 24,
1963
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Name
Mr. O. Ola Vincent 
Mr. M .A . Adejoro
Mr. F .A . Ijewere
Mr. E.A. Ekukinam
Mr. E.N. Ukochio
Mr. F.O. Sogunro 
Alhaji A .0. Otiti
Mr. C.E. Okobi 
Mr. A.B. Obilana
Alhaji Usman Nagogo
Chief J .A . Ogedegbe
Dr. J.O. Adekunle 
Mr. R .A . Lawal
Department Period
(Secretary 
(Chief of Banking 
Operations
Director of 
Research
Internal
Auditor
Bank Examiner
Exchange
Controller
Bank Examiner
(Chief Security 
(Of f icer 
(Exchange 
(Controller 
(Director 
(Domestic 
(Operations
(Chief Personnel
(Officer
(later retitled
(Director of
(Personnel
(Director of
(Administration
Director of 
Research
Chief
Accountant
1 1 96 3-Oct
1966-Jan 11 
1969-Jan 11
1966-Jan 7 
1971-Dec 10
1966-April
31
31 
31
1971-July 1 
1974-Dec 31 
1976-Dec 30 
Jan 1 1978
1974-Dec 31
Jan 1 1978-Oct 13 
Since Oct 16 1978
Jan 1 1974-Dec 31 
1976-Dec 31 
1978
Apr 1 1974-Aug 1 
Jan 1 1975-Mar 1
General Manager April
(General Manager Nov 
(Chief of Banking Jan 
Operations
Jan 
Jan
Jan
Jan
Jan 
Apr
Jan 
Jan 
Jan 
Since
Jan
1 966-Nov
1 967-Mar 
1970-Dec
Chief of 
Administration 
Chief Internal Jan 
Auditor
Director Foreign Jan 
Operations
31 1966
1971
1971
1971
1975
1 1972
1975
1968
1975
1973
1975
1977
1977
1978
1975
1977
1975
1975
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Name Department Period
Mr. 0. Olashore
Chief S.B. Falegan 
Mr. A.O. Durojaiye 
Mr. C.N. Nwangwu
Mr. B .I . Semowo
Chief Bank Jan 1 1975-Dec 31
Examiner (later 
retitled 
Director of 
Banking 
Supervision)
Director of 
Research
Director of 
Administration
Since Jan 1 1978 
Jan 1 1976-Jun 30
Jan 1 1976-Oct 2
(Chief Security Jan 1 1976-Dec 31
(Officer
(Director,
(Financial Systems
(and Control Since Jan 1 1978
Director,
Agricultural
Finance
Since Jan 1 19 78
Alhaji S.A. Okponobi Director, Since Jan 1 1978
Exchange Control
Mr. S. Chuks (Director, Jan 1 1978-Oct 15
Ezeugoh (Governor's Office
(Director,
(Personnel Since Oct 16 1978
1977
1979
1978
1977
1978
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CHAPTER 3
OBJECTIVES OF CENTRAL BANKING LEGISLATION
SCOPE AND SOURCES OF LEGISLATION
Apart from the Bank of England which was established 
in 1694 and which is governed not by a single organic 
law but by a series of statutes and a charter, most 
of the world's central banks are established by virtue 
of law and their p o w e r s , authorities and functions are 
derived from specific legal rules. These rules are 
designed to give central banks wide powers of operation 
in order to be able to cope with the tremendously 
diversified type of jobs and functions they have to 
perform. These functions as can be seen in Chapters 
4-10 cover a very wide spectrum of activities. These 
activities include the issuing of currency, the manage­
ment of public debt, acting as banker and adviser to the 
government, the supervision of the banking system the 
direction of open-market operations and the money and 
capital markets, the preservation of the purchasing power 
of reserves, and so o n .
All transactions of central bnks, therefore whether 
with government or with banks are governed by law, usage 
or practice. Furthermore, the relations between a central 
bank and international financial institutions, such as 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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(I.£.$.D.) (otherwise called the World Bank), International 
Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements are gov­
erned by special rules which require the central banks to 
act in a certain manner to achieve set targets. The IMF, 
for instance, requires the central banks to maintain 
exchange stability.
The wording of central bank and monetary laws is of 
more than purely legal interest; it reflects the thinking of 
governments and the political leaders, their goals on the 
desired scope of the legal regulation ofnoney, banking, 
social and economic activities. The differences that exist 
in the structure and functions of central banks can in most 
cases be traced back to differences in the phraseology of 
the organic laws governing the institutions and the declared 
objectives. Thus some central banks may only be an exten­
sion of the Ministry of Finance or Treasury while others 
may be a parastatal or semi-autonomous body. However, ins­
tances have been known where differences in function may 
obtain even where the organic laws of 2 or more central banks 
are virtually identical. These differences can be traced to, 
for example, the use central banks make of their discre­
tionary and mandatory powers; for one central bank may choose 
to exercise its discretionary powers while the other may 
not. Differences of wording and definition of the same 
operative factors could therefore point to different 
legal consequences and to different sources of legislation. 
Furthermore, some basic concepts of techniques of 
central banking, such as the monetary unit, discount rate, 
minimum reserve ratio are differently defined and 
interpreted or implemented in different systems.
127
We observe that some of these concepts or techniques
of central banking are determined by domestic law embodied
in parliamentary statutes or in rules of sub-delegated
legislation or even determined by custom or usage. There
are those central banks who operate without enabling
laws, for example those that are part and parcel of the
Treasury. Before the establishment of the Bank of Sudan,
for example, some of the traditional functions of central
banking were shared between the Ministry of Finance and
Economics, which administered the foreign reserve, the
Sudan Currency Board which managed the currency and the
National Bank of Egypt, which acted as banker to the
1
Sudanese Government.
Another example is Brazil, which was the last of 
the earlier independent countries to establish a central 
bank, namely, the Central Bank of Brazil in 1965. Before 
the establishment of the Central Bank of Brazil, the Bank 
of Brazil performed some central banking functions, such 
as holding deposits of the other banks and rediscounting 
for them, and acting as the government's banker and 
agent, but it did not have the right of note issue which was 
vested in the Treasury. The control of the money and 
exchange markets and bank reserve requirements was also 
exercised by the Treasury through its superintendence of 
money and credit. With the establishment of the central 
bank these functions have been entrusted to the Central 
Bank of Brazil.
There are also some central banks that operate with
1 Bank of Sudan, Report of the Year Ending 31st December, 
1960, p p . 1 -2 .
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specific central bank laws, with banking laws as supple­
mentary legislation, as in the case of the Bank of Zambia. 
On the other hand, the rules of international law as a 
source of law apply fairly uniformly to all the different 
central banks whose countries are signatories to the 
multilateral or bilateral agreements or through member­
ship of such world bodies as the I.M.F. and I.B.R.D.
SOURCES
Literally, the term "Source of Law" means source of
authoritative statement of the law, such as is to be
found in the law reports and the statute book. In
strict legal phraseology, it means any source from which
the substance of the law is derived. Salmond classified
sources of law into "formal" and "material". The former
he gave as the source of the validity of law, that is,
the source from which a rule derives its legal force,
and this source is nothing other than "the will and
power of statute" which is manifested in the Court of 
2
Justice. Material sources are those sources from which 
the substance of the law, as opposed to its validity, 
is derived (that is, the historical sources); and legal 
sources are those sources which are recognised as such 
by the law itself and they comprise legislation, precedent 
and custom. For our purpose we shall be concerned with 
the material and legal sources from which the substance 
of law is drawn.
2 Salmond, Sir John, On Jurisprudence, 11th Ed by
Glanville Williams (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1957) .
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The sources of central banking law in Commonwealth 
Africa usually comprise domestic law, and subsidiary 
domestic law sources, basic international law and 
subsidiary international law sources and received law 
which includes the English Common Law, the Doctrines 
of Equity; and the statutes of general application.
It will be shown also that customary law in some countries 
like Nigeria is a source of banking law.
BASIC DOMESTIC LAW
The basic domestic law sources are varied and can be 
grouped into various heads:
(a) Specific central bank l a w , which deals with the rules
that affect the structure, functions and power of 
the central bank. In the Commonwealth African 
central banks surveyed, this type of law is usually 
in the form of an Act of Parliament, and is the 
organic law of the central bank. Here the law 
specifically defines the powers, duties and obli­
gations of the central bank. The Central Bank of 
Nigeria Act 1958, the Bank of Zambia Act 1964, the 
Central Bank of Kenya Act 1967 and the Bank of 
Tanzania Act 1965 are examples.
(b) Monetary laws that govern domestic payments for
instance Article 1 of the Monetary Act, 1875 of the
Kingdom of Norway designates the Krone as the Monetary 
Unit of the Kingdom. Another example is the Kenyan 
Currency Interpretation Ordinance No. 1 of 1922, which 
stipulated in sections 2 and 4 that where in any
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Act applied to the Colony in force on the first day
of January 1922, the word "rupee" is used, such
applied Act shall be deemed to have had effect from
the said date and shall have effect as if the words
"two shillings" had been used in place of the word
"rupee" which was made a legal tender currency by
a proclamation dated the fifteenth day of March,
1907, under the East Africa and Uganda Currency Order
in Council, 1905.
(c) Clauses or Articles conferring special powers on
central b a n k s : the third category of basic domestic
law sources includes provisions or Articles in the
banking or other domestic laws that confer special
power on the central banks in relation t o .such other
institutions or for other set objective. The
Nigerian Constitution 1979, the fundamental law of
Nigeria provides that the Central Bank of Nigeria
should have the inherent power to be a member of
the National Economic Council and to advise the
President concerning the economic affairs of the
Federation, and in particular on measures necessary
for the co-ordination of the economic planning efforts
or economic programmes of the various governments of
3
the Federation of Nigeria. A further example is 
to be found in section 19(1) of the Kenya Banking Act 
1969, which empowers the central bank to cause an
3 S. 140, item ii(c) of the 3rd Schedule of the Consti­
tution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
S.4(2), items 6,12, and 24 of the 2nd Schedule place 
banks and banking, capital issues, currency, and exchange 
control matters in the Exclusive Legislative List.
inspection to be made of any licensed bank; while
the Minister shall consult with the central bank in
4
the exercise of his functions under the Act. In
like manner section 5(1) of the Pre-shipment 
Inspection of Imports Act, 1978, confers on the 
Central Bank of Nigeria the power to administer 
generally the provision of the Act; this stipulates 
that "no goods to which this Decree applies shall 
be imported into Nigeria unless a clean Report of 
Findings has been issued in respect of such goods to 
the overseas sellers of the goods by the inspecting 
authority ..." and that any person intending to 
import any goods shall before shipment of such goods 
to Nigeria furnish the Central Bank the particulars 
specified in the schedule to the Act. The Nigerian 
Banking Act, 1969, is another example. The Act, 
among other things, confers very wide powers on 
the Central Bank of Nigeria to supervise the banking 
system and carry out periodic examinations of the 
b a n k s .^
SUBSIDIARY DOMESTIC LAW SOURCES
Subsidiary domestic sources of central bank law can 
be found in rules issued by them under the authority of
g
the organic law. Such sub-delegation include by-laws
4 See S24 the Banking Act, .1969 , Kenya.
5 See s.20 of the Nigerian Banking Act, 1969 .
6 See for example Central Bank of Nigeria Bye-Laws, 1959.
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of the bank or general rules governing credit controls
or rules issued by the central bank independent of its 
7
organic law under the authority of special laws con­
ferring power on the bank to act in a particular field, 
such as foreign exchange control regulations in manuals.
CUSTOMARY LAW
As a subsidiary domestic law source, the indigenous 
laws, otherwise known as customary laws, would at first 
sight appear not to be applicable to the banking industry. 
Although the courts of Nigeria and other African countries 
are by law enjoined to observe and enforce the observance 
of every customary law which is applicable and not repug­
nant to natural justice, equity and good conscience (or 
words to that effect), customary law is inapplicable "if it 
appears either from express contract or from the nature 
of the transaction out of which any suit or question has
arisen, that such transaction should be exclusively regu-
9
lated otherwise than by native law and custom."
7 E.g., Monetary Circulars issued by Central Bank of
Nigeria at the Annual and Supplementary Budgets.
8 See Appendix below for the principal sources of Central 
Banking Legislation in Nigeria,
9 See High Court of Lagos Act (Cap. 80) s.27, High Court 
Law, Cap. 44 (Western State); High Court Law, No. 27 of 
1955 (Eastern States); High Court Law No. 8 of 1955 
(Northern States) s.13, High Court Law, No. 9 of 1964 
(Midwestern States). By virtue of the Designation of 
Ordinance Act, 1961, any enactments, e.g. ordinances, 
deemed enacted or enacted by the Federal Legislatures 
are to be called Acts. State enactments are termed 
laws. Under the Military regime, Federal Laws are 
called decrees and state Laws, edicts - see s.4, 
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree, 1966.
c ontd.
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1 0Similarly, the Evidence Act in Nigeria provides that
"any custom relied upon in any judicial proceeding shall
not be enforced as law if it is contrary to public policy"
11Lord Wright in Laoye v. Oyetunde was of the opinion
that the effect of this phrase was to invalidate customs
1 2which were barbarous, and in Edet v. Essien, where Edet 
relied on a native law and custom to claim custody of 
Essien's two children because Essien did not refund the 
dowry when E d e t 1s former wife left him and married 
Essien by whom she had two issues; it was held by the 
Divisional Court in Calabar that "it was contrary to natu­
ral justice, equity and good conscience to allow the 
appellant to claim the children of another man merely 
because the other man had deprived the appellant of his 
wife without paying dowry for her."
co n t d ...
S.3(2) of the Judicature Act of Kenya, Act 16 of 1967 
provides that the "High Court and all subordinate 
courts shall be guided by African Customary Law in 
civil cases in which one or more of the parties is 
subject to it or affected by it, so far as it is 
applicable and is not repugnant to justice and moral­
ity or inconsistent with any written law, and shall 
decide all such cases according to substantial justice 
without undue regard to technicalities of procedure 
and without undue delay".
10 S . 14(3) Evidence Act (Cap. 62).
11 Q 9 4 4 J  A.C.170.
12 (1932) 11 NLR/47.
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In other words, customary law does not apply to 
transactions that are unknown to customary law or are 
contrary to public policy. The banking industry as 
we know it today in its sophistication was to a very 
large extent unknown to native law and custom.
In Chapter 2 , page 89 we attempted to establish that 
some traditional credit institutions from time immemorial 
performed functions similar to those of the banks. In 
this section we will submit that the regulations of the 
institutions and their practices are complementary to 
the Nigerian banking law and therefore a source of 
Nigerian banking law.
Section 4 1 (i)(e) of the Nigerian Banking Act 1969 
defines "banking business" to mean "the business of 
receiving monies from outside sources as deposits irres­
pective of the payment of interest and the granting of
money loans and acceptance of credits or the purchase
13
of Bills and Cheques."
In Nigeria before banks were established and before, 
during and after the colonial regimes there were, as now, 
traditional financial institutions which served the Nigerian
13 Contrast with s.2 of the Kenya Banking Act, 1969, where 
"Banking Business" is defined to mean any business 
which includes the accepting of deposits of money from 
the public repayable on demand or after a fixed period 
or after notice, the employing of those deposits in 
whole or in part by lending or any other means for the 
account and at the risk of the person accepting the 
deposits and the paying and collecting of cheques; while 
s.3 of the Bank of Tanzania Act, 1965 defines "Banking 
Business" as the business of receiving money on current 
account subject to withdrawal by cheque.
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communities and performed the functions of modern banks in 
towns, the rural areas and even in the cities. These 
types of traditional institutions in their various forms 
proliferate all over Nigeria and they vary from locality 
to locality in function, objectives and methods.
In local parlance these traditional financial units 
or institutions are popularly known as Isusu, Esusu,
Igbe O h a , Iwofa and other variants. Their activities 
are not nationally standardised or regulated by statute 
but they operate loans, savings, deposits and mutual aid 
scheme as in "banking business". However, they operate 
under rules and every member understands the mechanics 
of their operations. And as Lloyd has remarked,
"Customary Law needs no Lawyers since all know the law; 
and since it has no lawyers it does not develop into an 
esoteric science - until, of course, it is written down
1 4and one can begin to quibble over the meaning of w o r d s ."
Hopkins suggested two broad classifications for
indigenous credit institutions in the pre-colonial setting.
There were the small credit associations, organised by
kinsmen or by groups of friends, devoted to such social
purposes as raising money for funerals, and weddings.
The Yoruba Esusu, and the Igbe Oha were examples of
this he said. On the other hand, there was the commercial
capital market which served economic needs at local and
1 5inter-regional levels.
14 P.C. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, Oxford, 1962.
15 Anthony G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa 
New York, 1 973 , pp. 21-71 . " ' ~
Professional traders often needed to finance their 
ventures by seeking credit, because cpf the high initial 
investment and slow returns involved. Wealthy merchants, 
specialised bankers, and money lenders, usually operating 
out of the target trade entrepots, provided this service.
Although methods of organising and managing these 
financial units are simple, differing from locality to 
locality, the pattern of administration is an unsophisti­
cated version of the modern methods of banking management 
or administration. There are no written laws, rules or 
regulations to guide the operators of these institutions 
and their customers. However, every member has an 
impeccable knowledge of the conventions and they keep to 
them and respect them like any written laws for there are 
regulations governing the appointment of Chairman, the 
itinerant collecting Secretary, frequency of meetings, 
the day, time and place as well as the amount to be paid 
by each member. The system also regulates the regularity 
and question of payment of contribution, which can also 
be paid in multiples and in advance.
The promoter or manager of an Esusu institution 
manages the daily or weekly or monthly contributions of 
members, he can invest them in a business with a rapid 
turn-over to advantage and can call for collaterals or 
securities like beads, calico cloths, cassava plantations 
cooking pots, etc. for loans given to members or to non­
members .
16 Ibid, p. 70: See 3.2 (1976) Journal of African Studie 
p. 147.
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A recent investigation by the present writer amply 
i shows the functions of these traditional financial
institutions to include savings, credit, discounting and 
development finance and the acceptance of deposits. To 
the extent that they accept deposits, lend money and do 
"crude" banking it can be said that they come within 
the definition and meaning of banking as defined by Section 41, 
Nigerian Banking Act 1969. The Banking Ordinance 1952 
as we have seen above did not define banking nor did it 
exclude traditional financial institutions. The Esusu 
institution should therefore have been controlled by 
the provisions of the Ordinance if the colonial governments 
had wanted to harness the available capital.
From the foregoing it would therefore not be perfectly 
correct to say that the act of banking, or banking 
business as operated by our ancestors was a transaction 
unknown to customary law. Because it is unwritten, a rule 
of customary law derives its force and authority from the 
assent of the community. Lord Atkin summarised the 
effect of this trend in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government of 
Nigeria, when he said:
"Their Lordships entertain no doubt that the 
more barbarous customs of earlier days may 
under the influence of civilization become 
milder without losing their essential 
character as custom. It would however, appear 
to be necessary to show that in their milder 
form they are still recognised in the native 
community as custom, so as in that form to 
regulate the relations of the native community 
inter ... It is the assent of the native 
community that gives a custom its validity, 
and therefore, barbarous or mild, it must be
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shown to be recognised by the native community 
whose conduct it is supposed to r e g u l a t e . " ^
If a dispute were to arise between members of the
Esusu financial units as to their rights and obligation
inter se under the arrangement, it is probable that the
courts would have exercised jurisdiction as they did in
1 8
Re Effiong Okon Ata when the Courts rejected a rule of
customary law that laid down that a former owner of an
emancipated slave was entitled to administer the deceased
slave's personal estate as repugnant to natural justice,
equity and good conscience and nugatory to the provisions
1 9of the Slavery Abolition Ordinance.
A court of law cannot by itself create customary law. 
Thus the true position seems to be that the nature of a 
custom remains in doubt until ascertained by judicial 
enquiry.
Since 'Isusu' cannot be said to be repugnant to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience, or incom­
patible directly or by implication with any law, the 
rules governing the 'Isusu' system are complementary to 
the Banking Act and can by necessary implication be said 
to be our first and fundamental source of domestic law on 
traditional financing and therefore matters connected with 
it could be justiciable.
RECEIVED ENGLISH STATUTES
The received English Law is another source of law in
17 See alsoA.N. Allott New Essays in African L a w , p. 63.
18 ( 1 930) 10 NLR 65.
19 No. 35 of 1916.
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anglophone Africa and it consists of the common law, 
doctrines of equity,statutes and subsidiary legislation.
Before the partitioning of the African continent by the 
British, the French, the Germans and other European 
colonisers there were, as we saw above, customary legal 
systems. The distinguishing characteristics of the customary 
laws was that they were not written. With the annexation 
of each anglophone country, the British colonialists 
through the force of arms or legislation backed up with 
coercion extended their legal system to Africa thus 
supplanting in some cases the indigenous or customary 
legal institutions. According to [Professor] A.N. Allott, 
it was the arrival of the European colonial powers which 
had the most far-reaching impact upon African legal systems 
when he said:
"The arrival of European colonial powers 
wrought a fundamental revolution in African 
legal arrangements, the results of which are 
with us to this day. The nature of the 
revolution varied somewhat with different 
colonial powers, but in general each power 
first introduced its own legal system or some 
variant of it as the fundamental and general 
law of its territories, and, second, permitted 
the regulated c o n t i n u a n c e  of traditional 
African law and judicial institutions except 
they ran counter to the demands of colonial 
administration or were thought repugnant to 
'civilised' ideas of justice and humanity."2^
Before the African Commonwealth countries attained their 
national political independence, both the British 
Parliament and the power of the Crown derived from the
20 A.N. Allott, The future of African law quoted in New 
Essays in African Law, 1970, p. 11.
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Foreign Jurisdiction Acts 1890-1913. In the case of
Nigeria A.E.W. Park expressed the view that "Acts of
Parliament and Orders-in-Council passed pursuant to those
powers constituted the highest source of Nigerian law;
they prevailed over inconsistent rules derived from other
sources, and any Nigerian statute that was repugnant to
2 1
them was pro tanto void."
The technigue of the reception by these countries
of English Law was by enacting local statutes which
incorporated the laws by reference. Examples of Nigerian
enactments that have received English Law include the
22
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act in force as federal
law throuqhtout the country; the Law (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Law Cap 65 of Lagos State, and the Law of
23
England (Application) Law in force in Bendel State.
The effect of the provisions is that where there is 
no local statute on a particular subject the provisions 
of pre-1900 statutes of general application and in force 
in England will be the relevant law. Thus in the
24Ghanaian case of Inspector-General of Police v. Kamara
21 A.E.W. Park, The Source of Nigerian Law 1963, p. 14.
For further reading on the subject of received English 
Law, see Anthony Allott, Essays in African L a w , and 
1.0. Nwabueze, Machinery of Justice in Nige r i a .
22 See Interpretation Act 1964 (no. 1 of 1 964 ) S.28.
23 See also art 15 of the East Africa Protectorate Order 
in Council, 1902, where it was provided that the "said 
Common Law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general 
application shall be in force in the territory ... subject 
to such qualifications as local circumstances may render 
necessary. "
24 (19 34) 2 WACA 185.
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which dealt with the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848,
a statute which in England governed only Magistrates'
Courts, the West African Court of Appeal held that the
Act was of general application in England, but, because
the field was covered by local legislation, ruled that
the Act was not in force in the Gold Coast.
25
The activities of money lenders have been regulated
in Nigeria since 1939 but before then it would seem
probable that they were governed by the appropriate
English statutes. A similar Act, the Infants Relief Act,
2 6
1874, was held in Labinjoh v. Abeke by the Full Court 
to apply to Nigeria. In that case, a girl of seventeen 
years of age was sued for certain trade debts and the 
Court held that the effect of the Infants Relief Act,
1874, on which she relied was to make such debts unen­
forceable against an infant.
Similarly, before the Banking Ordinance was promulgated
in 1952 in Nigeria for instance, the applicable law in
27
this regard was the Companies Ordinance 1906. In that 
Ordinance the only remote references to banking were the 
provisions that the Governor-in-Council may (after
25 See Money Lenders Ordinance, 1939.
26 (1 924) 5 NLR 33.
27 The received English Law as a source of African 
Commonwealth Law excludes English Law received by being 
enacted or re-enacted as the countries legislation.
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consultation with his Advisory Committee) call for books,
accounts and documents, and may order the bank to refrain
from banking or business and/or cancel its licence.
Licensed banks were required to pay an annual fee of
£5,000 and provision was made for the publication of
balance sheets. The issue of notes was prohibited except
by the chartered note-issuing banks.
It was under that law that the "Bank of British
West Africa" operated even though it was registered in
London as a limited liability company on March 31 1874.
It would therefore seem that the applicable banking law
up to 1906 was the received English law on Companies Act
2 8applicable on 1st January, 1900.
Received English law also includes the doctrines of
common law and the principles of equity. Since sources
of law in the African countries include these doctrines,
it is obvious therefore that Central Banks derive their
law from these. Thus case law and the common law doctrine
of precedent apply. The Central Bank would therefore be
guided by the common law system of stare decisis or binding
judicial precedent and compelled to act in compliance with
judicial decision as in the case of Etablissement Esefka
29International Anstalt v. Central Bank of Nigeria.
The Plaintiffs brought an action against the Central 
Bank of Nigeria.
28 The history of the reception dates back to 1863 when 
Ordinance No. 3 of that year introduced English Law 
into the Colony of Lagos.
29 1979 1 Lloyds Rep. 445.
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This was the "Cement Armada" case in which the 
Ministry of Defence in Nigeria ordered vast quantities of 
cement from all over the world and the Central Bank issued 
Letters of Credit to pay for all the claims. As a 
result of uncontrollable congestion of the ports (there 
were 300 to 400 ships waiting to discharge cement), 
immense demurrage was built up. Shipping documents were 
forged and as a result the Central Bank refused to pay.
It was held by Lord Denning,
"That the MAREVA INJUNCTION was only to be 
granted where there was a danger of the 
money being taken out of jurisdiction so 
that if .the plaintiffs succeeded they were 
not likely to get their claims and that where 
there are many doubts in the plaintiff's claim 
and there was so much defence to be raised 
against it that it could not be a case where 
the plaintiffs had a novel point of law did 
arise [sic] in regard to the effect of the 
fraudulent conduct of the beneficiary, under 
a Letter of Credit."30
And in a case with facts identical in all material respects
Hispano Americana Mercantil S.A. v . Central Bank of 
31Nigeria, it was held that the Central Bank of Nigeria 
was not a mere alter ego or organ of the state of Nigeria; 
and for that reason alone would not qualify for sovereign 
immunity.
The law of negligence in Commonwealth African 
countries, like the law of agency and contracts, is based 
on the common law of England. A banker's duty to his
30 I b i d , p . 4 4 5.
31 (1979) 2 Lloyds Rep. 277. Also on this subject see 
Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria, (1976) 3 ALL ER 4 37.
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customer under the banking contract is to carry out its 
functions with a reasonable standard of professional care 
and skill. If a banker is careless in dealing with the 
affairs of his customer, he will be liable, because he 
is in breach of his contractual duty. Under sections 60 
and 80 of the Bills of Exchange Act of Kenya, for example, 
the banker is only entitled to the protection of those 
sections if he has acted "in the ordinary course of
32business" or "without negligence." The law in Kenya as
33well as other Commonwealth African countries in this
regard is similar to the English law.
Perhaps one of the most interesting applications of
the law of negligence to the functions of bankins is
that laid down in the case of Hedley Byrne v. Heller and 
34Partners by Lord Devlin. The facts were that the 
appellants, Hedley Byrne, were advertising agents and 
they were anxious to discover the credit-worthiness of 
Easipower Limited, who had instructed the appellants to 
arrange substantial advertising contracts on their behalf. 
Hedley Byrne asked their bank, National Provincial, to 
make these enquiries of Heller and Partners, a firm of 
merchant bankers, who were financing Easipower. The 
enquiry asked whether Easipower was trustworthy in the 
way of business to the extent of £ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  per annum and
32 Bills of Exchange Act of Kenya, s.60.
33 Bills of Exchange Act of Kenya, s.80.
34 (j 964] A.C. 465 . For the facts of this case, we are
grateful to Margaret Rogers, "An Outline of the law 
covering the relationship between banker and customer 
in Kenya," (1975) 19 JAL 52.
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received the answer that Easipower was a "respectably 
constituted company, considered good for its ordinary 
business engagements. Your figures are larger than we 
are accustomed to see". The statement was headed by 
the words "without responsibility on the part of the 
bank or its officials". The reference was passed to 
Hedley Byrne, who relied upon it and suffered a loss of 
£17,000 on credit extended to Easipower when the company 
went into liquidation a short time later. In the subsequent 
action for damages, Heller and Partners admitted negli­
gence but argued that they owed no duty of care because 
they did not know the precise purpose of the enquiries 
made by them and did not even know of Hedley B y r n e 's 
existence. This argument was rejected and the general
interpretation of the judgements of the Law Lords in 
35Hedley Byrne appears to be that there is a duty of care 
owed and liability for negligent misstatments will arise 
where a person belongs to a profession, or has a superior 
skill and knowledge and is asked a question in circumstances 
where his enquirer might reasonably trust him to give the 
reply with gravity and seriousness and the person replying 
knows that he is being so trusted.
The House of Lords in Hedley Byrne reached the 
conclusion that the disclaimer of responsibility in the 
letter of reference from Heller and Partners exempted them
35 (1964) A.C. 465. For other decisions on the tort of
negligence, see for example, Barclays Bank Ltd. v.
CBN - The Nigerian Commercial Law Report 1976, 288. 
National Bank Ltd. v. C B N , Ibi d , 1976, 199.
CBN v. Odaro - The Nigerian Common Law Reports 1974, 200. 
CBN v. Barclays Bank L t d . , ibi d . 19 7 6 , 288.
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from liability for damages in this particular case. This 
has, of course, had the effect of making bankers ensure 
that they always include such an exemption clause in any 
reference in regard to credit worthiness.
The decision of the House of Lords in these cases will
have persuasive authority in Nigerian Courts and such
case law and the common law of negligence will form sources
of Central Bank Laws. In Kenya, for example, the courts
have approved the principles laid down in Hedley Byrne
in regard to the existence of a duty of care in the case
3 6of Winter v. Langrish Southern Limited.
Thus, to summarise, the BBWA was originally registered 
as a limited liability company on 31st March 1874, it 
operated in Nigeria in the colonial period under the 
Companies Ordinance, 1906. Before that date the BBWA 
could only operate in Nigeria under the applied English 
law. At that date there was no English statute on 
banking or on central banking eligible to be received 
into Nigeria. The gap in the law had to be filled by 
recourse to the doctrines of equity and rules of common 
law which thus formed original sources of Nigerian Banking 
law.
BASIC INTERNATIONAL LAW SOURCES
In addition to the basic domestic organic laws there
36 (1966) E .A . 292.
For the law which is applicable to banks in Kenya see 
'Sargaret Rogers, o p . c i t . , 52. Where there is a lacuna 
she is of the view that "in any relevant areas of law 
where there is no legislation, the law will be the 
common law of Kenya as set out in the cases decided 
by the Kenya Courts . "
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are various other rules and norms of international law 
which affect the powers and duties of central banks, and
consequently the organic laws of some central banks
expressly require the central banks to act in conformity 
with the international monetary and banking agreements to 
which the country concerned is a party and also to comply 
with and implement the requirements of the laws relating 
to these arrangements.
Where it is required by the law of the land to 
incorporate all or specific provisions of a Convention 
as 'internal law' such laws confer special powers on 
central banks to act in a certain manner to achieve a 
stated objective. Sections 57(2) and 58 of the Bank of
Tanzania Act 1965 attempted to do this:
"57(2) The Bank shall act as a depository 
for the Tanzania currency holdings of inter­
national financial organisations or insti­
tutions of which Tanzania is a member."
a n d ,
"58 The Bank may open accounts, for, accept 
deposit from, and collect money and other 
monetary claims for and on account of foreign 
central banks, foreign banks and foreign 
financial institution, and may generally act 
as banker to such banks and institutions."
An example of where a country adopts legislation to make 
the provisions in a Convention effective as internal law 
is the 1931 Geneva Convention which provides for a uniform 
law for bills of exchange and promissory notes. Decree 
Law No. 4334 1 of November 22, 1960 of the Banking Legis­
lation of Portugal on the Bretton Woods Agreement 
Measures is a case in point:
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"The Government shall be authorized to parti- 
pate in the International Monetary Fund with 
a quota of sixty million U.S. dollars of the 
weight and fineness in effect on July 1,
1944, and in the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development with eight 
hundred shares to a total amount of eighty 
million U.S. dollars of the same weight 
and f ineness .
In conformity with Article V, Section 1, 
of the Fund Agreement, it shall be the duty
of the Bank of Portugal, on behalf of Portugal
to deal with the Fund, carrying out the 
necessary exchange operations specifically 
as provided in the said Article.
The Bank of Portugal shall also discharge
the obligations arising from Article VII,
Section 5, of the Fund Agreement, for which 
purpose it shall request the necessary inform­
ation direct from any public and private 
organizations.
The Bank of Portugal shall further, exercise 
the functions of depository referred to in 
Article X I I I , Section 2, of the Fund Agreement.
By act of the Minister of Finance, the 
Governor of the Bank of Portugal shall be 
appointed as Governor to represent the State 
in the International Monetary Fund. The 
Alternate Governor shall be similarly appointed, 
on the proposal of the Bank of Portugal."37
That the Bretton Woods Agreements constitute a 
subsidiary source of international law is succinctly 
illustrated in the case of:
Mansouri v. Singh LTR July 21, 1984. In that case 
the plaintiff was an Iranian who had considerable wealth 
in Iran, following the revolution, he had been unable to 
remove from there. His wife had gone to England and 
arranged with defendant, a travel agent, that the plaintiff 
would pay Iranian currency to a travel agency in Iran, 
which would buy airline tickets with it and send them to 
the defendant.
37 The emphasis is mine
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The defendant would then obtain a refund on the 
tickets and make sterling payments to her, at about double 
the official exchange rate. A number of such transactions 
had taken place, and the money duly paid by the defendant 
but a post-dated cheque issued by the defendant in respect 
of one such transaction had been countermanded before 
presentation.
At a later stage the defendant raised the further 
defence that the contract was unenforceable under the 
Bretton Woods Agreements Order in Council (SR & 0 1946 
No. 36), and that the plaintiff could not therefore 
enforce payment of the cheque.
His Lordship, Mr Justice Beldam was satisfied, 
following Sharif v. A z a d ■(1967 IQB 605), that the agree­
ment was an exchange contract for the purposes of the 
Fund Agreement, and, on the balance of probabilities, that 
it was contrary to Iranian exchange control regulations; 
it did not matter that the court did not know the precise 
terms or form of those regulations.
Iran was a member of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and a signatory of the Agreement, there was 
therefore a presumption that its exchange control regulations 
were consistent with the Fund Agreement, and there was no 
evidence to rebut that presumption. The contract was 
accordingly unenforceable in England by virtue of article 
VIII of the Fund Agreement.
The plaintiff had argued that as he was surfing on a
cheque he did not need to rely on the contract, and that
in allowing him to recover on the cheque the court would
1 50
not be enforcing the contract. That, he had contended, 
was the true ratio, or a further ratio, of Sharif's case.
Having considered the judgements in that case, and 
what Mr. Justice Kerr had said in Wilson, Smithett and 
Cope Ltd. v. Terrazzi £l9 76jQB 683, 694-5), his Lordship 
was satisfied that that was not a ratio in Sharif's case.
Indeed the House of Lords had rejected such an 
argument in United City Merchant's (Investments) Ltd v.
Royal Bank of Canada (1983 IAC 168). To allow the plaintiff 
to recover on the cheque would be in effect to enforce 
the defendant's obligations under the exchange contract, 
and that amounted to enforcing the contract. If that 
were permissible, the provisions of the Bretton Woods 
Fund Agreement would be ineffective. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff could not recover the sum claimed.
The courts in Nigeria would in all probability follow 
the judgement in this case and in consequence confirming 
our view that Subsidiary International Law is a source 
of domestic banking law.
The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund (Fund Agreement) are a basic source of international
law. The provisions of the Fund Agreement on the monetary
units of Fund members, on exchange stability, on currency
convertibility, and on members' drawing rights and purchase
3 8obligations as provided in the Fund Agreement, are of 
direct concern to the Central Banks of Fund Members.
38 Art XIII, Sec 2, of the Fund Agreement.
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Thus, the Fund Agreement prescribes that, wherever there 
is a central bank, that bank shall be the depository for 
all the Fund's holdings of the member's currency. The 
Agreement provides that:
"Each member shall designate its central bank 
as a depository for all the Fund's holdings 
of its currency, or if it has no central bank 
it shall designate such other institutions as 
may be acceptable to the F u n d . "39
Other rules and multilateral international agreements
which have bearing on the domestic organic laws of
central banks include agreements such as the Articles of
Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction
4 0and Development (IBRD), and the Convention respecting
4 1
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the 
European Monetary Agreement, which are of particular 
significance because of the policies and activities of 
the central banks of the countries that are parties to 
these agreements.
Another basic source of international law which 
empowers central banks specifically to carry out certain 
functions is the United Nations Charter, which provides 
that all members pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in co-operation with the Organization 
for the achievement of the purpose set forth in Article 55,
39 Art XIII, Sec. 2, of the IMF (Fund Agreement). 
4 0 Article V, Section II,IBRD.
41 Article 19, BIS.
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that is of creating conditions of stability and well­
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
42
relations among nations. Central banks are the tools 
or instruments used by governments to achieve these 
objectives.
The West African Clearing Banks is an association 
of Central Banks for the whole West African region. The 
members of this Association undertake by their Articles 
of Agreements to establish machinery for the multilateral 
settlement of payments among Central Banks of the West 
African sub-region with the following objectives:
(a) to promote the use of members' currencies for sub­
regional trade and other transactions;
(b) to effect economies in the use of foreign exchange;
(c) to encourage participating member countries to
liberalize trade among themselves;
(d) to promote monetary co-operation and consultation
among participating Central Banks and Monetary 
Authorities.
Membership is open to all centra] banks in the West
African Sub-region as defined by the Association of
4 3
African Central Banks' Constitution.
As a result of these developments in international 
law and the establishment of such international financial 
institutions as the IMF, IBRD, W A C B , A D B , BIS, as we
42 Sections 55 and 57 of the U.N. Charter.
43 Sections 55 and 57.
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have seen above, central banks have assumed the role of 
agents, depositories, or correspondents of these insti­
tutions, and these functions are re-affirmed in several 
of their organic l a w s .
SUBSIDIARY INTERNATIONAL LAW SOURCES
International agreements or international institutions 
that are not concerned primarily with money and banking 
on the domestic or international level may nevertheless 
touch central banking through their indirect effect on 
currency, foreign exchange, and banking and monetary 
policies and activities generally.
Thus the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) have jurisdiction over 
trade measures, while the International iMonetary Fund 
has jurisdiction over exchange measures and the financial 
aspects of trade measures. To the extent that GATT 
trade measures have repercussions on the foreign exchange 
situation of a country, the attitude of the Contracting 
Parties toward these trade measures may materially 
affect the domestic and international financial position 
of that country.
In the same way, it may be reasonably justifiable to 
regard such international agreements as the Constitution 
of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the 
various international commodity control agreements as 
subsidiary international law provisions which indirectly 
affect central banking.
From the foregoing we have seen that the distinction
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between basic and subsidiary sources is reflected in 
clauses which provide that the central bank shall be 
governed by the organic law of the Central Bank, by 
its by-laws, and by other pertinent legislation. 
Subsidiary sources of Central banking law are laws which 
are not addressed exclusively to the central bank or 
to the special relationship of the Central bank to 
other persons or institutions, but which are of general 
applicability like the law of negotiable instruments and 
the law governing securities and the securities market 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades.
THE GENERAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES SET 
BY GOVERNMENT
Immediate Matters that Influenced the 
Setting of the Objectives
We saw in Chapter 2 that the economies of the 
countries surveyed were merely appendages of the British 
economy and the financial and banking arrangements were 
no more than an integral part of the British financial 
system. The colonial experience in these countries was 
one in which private transnational commercial banks 
dominated the banking scene.
In Kenya before the establishment of the Central 
Bank on 23rd May, 1956, the National Bank of India (1896), 
the Standard Bank of South Africa (1910) , the National 
Bank of South Africa (1916) which amalgamated with the 
Colonial Bank and the Anglo-Egyptian Bank Limited in 1926 
to form Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas)
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dominated banking until 1951 when an influx of other 
expatriate banks came into the country and the first 
locally-owned bank, the Co-operative Bank of Kenya 
Limited, was registered on 19th June 1965. In Tanzania, 
three major expatriate banks also dominated the banking 
scene. The first to open was the Deutsch-Ostafrikanisches 
Bank in 1905 and was followed in 1911 by the Handelsbank 
ftir Ostafrika. After the First World War the assets 
of these German banks were auctioned off and British 
banks replaced them and opened offices in the Territory. 
These were the National Bank of India (later National 
and Grindlays), the Standard Bank of South Africa and 
the National Bank of South Africa. As in Kenya, the big 
three expatriate banks dominated banking in Tanzania 
until they were nationalised in 1967. It was only after 
the attainment of independence in 1961 that three 
indigenous banks were established. The trend was the 
same in all the Commonwealth African countries: the 
position was aptly illustrated in a Kenyan Central Bank 
publication thus:
"These banks were vital links with Europe,
South Africa and Indian business. The effects 
of their operations opened new opportunities 
for the traders and settlers who had come 
to Kenya. This growing community provided 
initial sources of deposits for the banks 
not only with funds which they had brought 
with them but also in the proceeds from the 
country's growing trade in primary commodities. 
The banks were largely left to run their 
business according to dictates of external 
conditions. The outstanding characteristics 
of this phase of their development was that 
they soon became able to collect deposits 
locally in excess of what they reckoned they 
were able to utilise in Kenya and these surplus 
funds were invested in London. This was
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partly because there were few investment 
opportunities in the economy and partly 
because there was a communication gap between 
the bankers and the prospective borrowers.
The result was that, for a long period of 
their history, these banks were actually 
involved in a process of exporting capital 
from Kenya, which is an underdeveloped country, 
for use in a developed country. Furthermore, 
the domination of the local banking system 
by supra-territorial commercial banks based 
upon London using the London money market 
meant that the conditions prevailing in the 
London money market were directly reflected 
in the Kenyan e c o n o m y . " ^
The first indigenous banks sprang up at a much later 
date. In Nigeria it was the National Bank of Nigeria 
in 1933, the Agbonmagbe Bank in 194 5 and the African 
Continental Bank Limited in 1947 and a host of other 
indigenous b a n k s .
45Before the Banking Ordinance was promulgated in 
1 952 in Nigeria for instance, we observed at p. 141 that 
the applicable law in this regard was the Companies 
Ordinance 1906 and in that Ordinance the only references 
to banking as we had remarked earlier were the provisions 
that the Governor-in-Council might (after consultation 
with his Advisory Committee) call for books, accounts 
and documents, and might order the bank to refrain from 
banking or business and/or cancel its licence. The 
issue of notes was the responsibility of several note- 
issuing banks instead of a national bank. The number 
of banks in Nigeria was too few and the standard of
44 The First Ten Years of the Central Bank of K enya, p. 7.
45 See The Nigeria Banking Ordinance, 1952.
157
commercial banking was in its infancy and therefore below 
standard.
Regarding the standard required by the Companies 
Ordinance in Nigeria, as well as the Gold Coast, Mr. Paton 
makes the following comments in his Report in regard 
to the British West Africa Bank:
"The standard is archaic in form and the 
required data would be of little value in 
any attempt to.assess the financial condition 
of the Bank."
The nominal capital of the bank was £100,000 in
shares of £10 each, £4 paid. As £3,000 shares were
issued, the paid-up capital was £12,000.00. The head
office of the Bank was in Liverpool (with a staff of
two) and it had one branch at Lagos with a staff of
three Europeans and three Africans. A modest beginning,
sufficient to satisfy the Colonial Office and Crown 
47Agents, but not the native population.
As David Patterson of the British Bank of West Africa 
said in 1912:
"The Bank of British West Africa has aimed 
at being and in reality is the National 
Bank in British West Africa colonies. It has 
been supported by the Colonial Office and 
the different West African Governments, and 
now holds the confidence of the populations 
European and Native. It is in daily touch 
with trade and traders to whom it has intro­
duced the existing currency. It is known 
to be the custodian of Government funds, 
and has played an important part in the
46 The Paton Report, o p . c i t . , p. 6.
4 7 Richard Fry, Bankers in West Africa. The story of the 
Bank of British West Africa Limited, Hutchinson Benham, 
1 976 .
158
development of business methods and the 
growing prosperity of the West Africa <■ 
colonies.
The prosperity was indeed in the hands of European 
traders for, as the Bank of Kenya stated above (p.155 ) r 
the banks were largely left to run their business according 
to dictates of external conditions and so African enter­
prises could not for various reasons from their own resources 
generate finance for their growth, nor could they, 
standing alone, secure adequate financial assistance 
from expatriate banks. This was because in most Cases 
they could not provide adequate collateral which would 
have enabled them to secure the much needed loans for 
their operations. Furthermore, the amounts of loans 
required were too small for the administrative effort 
and price involved. The result was that there was 
stagnation in business growth. The banks that borrowed 
short and lent long soon discovered their folly and this 
was one of the causes of bank failures in Nigeria before 
1952, and of the failure in East Africa in 194 9 of the 
Exchange Bank of India and Africa Limited (incorporated 
in Bombay in 1942). However, the position in East Africa 
was slightly different. Before the advent of independence 
there were no indigenous banks, and the established 
expatriate banks had it as their policy that no loan would 
be granted without security. As a consequence all the 
banks except the Exchange Bank of India survived.
48 Op. cit., p. 73.
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While the indigenous banks tried to provide capital 
necessary for economic growth through the small African 
business man the expatriate banks confined their lending 
transactions to the aliens. They were essentially 
concerned with the financing of trade and looked upon the 
encouragement of savings among Africans and the financing 
of African enterprises as an ancillary activity.
The presence of multi-national London companies like 
the U A C , the GBO, John Holts in Nigeria from around 1860 
helped to boost trade and generate economic activities 
in the whole of the West Coast. These supra-territorial 
enterprises were however primarily interested in financing 
the export-import transactions of expatriate trading 
firms, in providing for the short-term financial needs 
of the colonial administration and seasonal loans for 
collection of primary export products. The financial 
needs of the nationals of the countries were neglected by 
these transnational firms thereby stifling their businesses 
One of the criticisms of colonial administration by 
African nationalists related to the institution and 
management of the West African Currency Board and the 
East African Currency Board from 1912 and 1919 respectively 
The criticism stems more from the fact that these currency 
boards issued and redeemed the currency and invested 
resources in sterling securities, the profits going to 
the Colonial Office, for indeed:
"In 1900 the Barbour Committee had concluded 
that some of these profits ought to be used 
to contribute to the cost of colonial 
administration, and the balance to build up
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a West African gold reserve, but the 
Imperial Treasury had brushed that advice 
a s i d e . "49
In 1912 the U.K. Colonial Office appointed Lord 
50E m m o t t 1s Committee, with its terms of reference as 
being to give an expert opinion on what would, in all 
the circumstances, be the best currency policy for the 
West African colonies and to enquire into the whole 
question of the issue of currency notes. Emm o t t 1s 
Report, dated 5th June, 1912, noted:
"That the special arrangement with the 
Bank of British West Africa had been 
criticised for giving the Bank a monopoly 
of the supply of silver coin to merchants; 
and that the position of the Bank of 
Nigeria Limited, established in 1900, was 
prejudiced as a result. In fact the special 
arrangement was suspended at the end of 1911, 
pending the Committee's findings. The Report 
went on to examine two important criticisms 
of the existing currency system. First, 
all profits on the coinage accrued to the 
home Government. An earlier enquiry under 
Sir David Barbour, sitting in 1900, had 
recommended the continued use of United 
Kingdom coinage for West Africa but only 
on the assumption that a share of the profits 
would be made available to the Colonial 
Governments concerned. The 1912 committee 
fully accepted the argument, made previously 
in the case of Australia, that any division 
of profits, however logical and equitable, 
was impracticable. The second criticism was 
that although United Kingdom silver coinage 
was issuable against sterling it was not 
automatically redeemable in sterling. Neither 
the British Government nor the Royal Mint was 
under any redemption obligation."51
4 9 Richard Fry, o p . c i t . , p. 69.
50 Lord Emmot was then the Under-Secretary of State for 
the Colonies.
51 J.B. Loynes, The West African Currency Board, 1912- 
1962, p. 11.
161
Another source of irritation to Africans particularly 
from the 1940s when the agitation for independence 
gathered momentum was the method of operation of the 
Post Office Savings Bank. The Nigeria Post Office Savings 
Bank (now the Federal Savings Bank) was a financial 
institution during the colonial era that mobilise^/ small 
savings through its network of branches through Nigeria.
The World Bank Mission had this to say on the 
expansion of the currency circulation as a result of the 
growth of the Post Office Savings Bank deposits:
"This has increased eightfold since 1939, 
partly because of higher prices but largely 
because of the growing use of money as a 
medium of exchange and larger cash holdings 
in the hands of Nigerians. The growth of 
the Post Office Savings Bank deposits ... 
represents a significant change in the 
habits of the population as a whole."52
The liabilities of the Post Office Savings Bank were 
guaranteed by the Colonial Government, the bank being 
required by the Post Office Savings Bank Ordinance 1939 
to ensure that "no more than one third" of its funds 
should at any time be or remain invested in securities 
of the government of the colony.
The effect of this was that not less than two-thirds 
of its funds should be remitted to London for investment 
by the Secretary of State. This practice which persisted 
until the grant of regional self-government in 1951 was 
a negation of the aim of setting up savings institutions
52 Richard Fry, o p . c i t ., p. 198.
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i to mobilise capital for local investment in an under-
i
| developed economy.
| Again, as in commercial banking and commerce,
indigenous insurance companies were still in their 
| rudimentary stages of development. The Royal Exchange
Assurance and other expatriate insurance companies 
dominated the scene. The close connection with London 
firms or Head Offices meant that the premium collected 
by these companies and agencies in Nigeria were repatriated 
to London for investment to help in sustaining the 
metropolitan country's economy.
This type of financial arrangement in the pre- 
| independence era did not find favour with the nationalist
\ leaders who had become disenchanted with colonial
financial administration. These leaders looked forward 
to the day when a financial system that was not open 
; to these criticisms could be created.
| It can be seen therefore from the foregoing that
in Nigeria in the colonial period, as well as other 
African countries, government intervention in the 
management of economic and social growth took place for 
political, economic and social reasons, but primarily 
in response to the colonial monetary policy which 
ensured that the financial and transnational firms in 
the colonies geared their efforts and resources towards 
the achievement of Britain's national jeconomic objectives. 
This is as it should be, for self-interest is the first 
law in international relations. One should however, 
not lose sight of the fact of the sacrifices the colonialists
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made in human and material resources. They built the 
roads, schools, hospitals, bridges and broke down the 
barrier and communication gap, physical and mental between 
the 'dark continent' and the developed world. Mungo Park, 
Clapperton, Cecil Rhodes and so on died in their efforts 
to develop these countries.
In the latter days of colonial rule, the Imperial 
government contributed substantially to the economic and 
social well-being of the Commonwealth African countries.
The Colonial Development Corporation (CDC), which operated 
along commercial lines with funds provided by the British 
Treasury, participated actively in the promotion of a wide 
range of projects in these countries. This continues 
to the present day. Thus in Tanzania the CDC had an 
interest in Hallways Overseas Limited of London, which 
in turn has an interest in Hallmark Hotels (Tanzania) 
Limited; the latter, through its associate, the Tanzania 
Tourist Corporation, manages most of Tanzanian hotels.
One should also not lose sight of the fact that it 
was the imperial government that gave protection against 
external aggression and provided internal securities, 
provided Commonwealth scholarship programmes and above 
all offered grants and aids which were used to turn the 
first "sods" of our development.
However, British colonial administrations often 
sought to protect the interests of their own territories, 
even when these conflicted with imperial policy as generated 
in Whitehall. The question therefore would seem to be 
to what degree did exploitation surpass economic and
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social development.
It was therefore not surprising that, on the attain­
ment of independence, those now in charge of the former 
colonial territories should aspire to establish their 
own Central Banks as an answer to the humiliation which 
they thought they had suffered. Consequently, central 
banks were established to give direction towards the 
achievement of national political, economic and social 
obj e ctives.
THE OBJECTIVES SET BY GOVERNMENT FOR ESTABLISHING CENTRAL BANKS
On attainment of political independence nationalist 
governments have generally identified and set out some 
objectives which they have tried to adopt in their 
intervention in the financial system in the countries 
surveyed.
It did not take long for the young nationals to 
discover that the formulation of objectives of government 
economic policy was not an easy task and it was no simple 
task to match them to political and economic realities.
They soon discovered that simultaneous promotion of major 
economic and social objectives was not always feasible.
Thus rapid economic development may prove to be incom­
patible with exchange or monetary stability or full 
employment, while in some countries it may promote or 
maintain high levels of employment and real income. Where 
simultaneous pursuit of these objectives would hinder 
rather than ensure their attainment or realisation, 
the domestic authorities concerned may in their wisdom 
have to establish priorities favouring one objective of
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say exchange stability, over and above another of, say 
full employment.
The chances of realising shortly, or in the near 
future, these major economic and social objectives, of 
course, vary greatly from country to country and depend 
on many factors, including natural resources, population, 
technical training, management skills, capital equipment, 
and institutional setting and political ideologies. In 
the real world, once one puts aside fantasies and the 
comfortable static reality of the textbook, the practitioner 
finds the role of central banking rather complex because 
the role of a given central bank in a given country is 
a function of a number of constraints. These constraints 
are institutional, structural and human. J.B. Zulu, a 
former Governor in referring to the technical provisions 
in the Central Banking Acts as a constraint in the 
efficient performance of the functions of central banks 
had this to say:
"But it will be readily appreciated that 
the technical provisions do not come from 
out of the blue. They >are the product 
of some political authority, and reflect 
that authority's conception of the develop­
ment and business needs of the country.
It is, therefore, proper to add another 
set of critical constraints: that the role 
of central banking is also a function of 
the Government in power, the stage of economic 
development reached, the level of business 
activity, and the capacity of the existing 
capital market. The fact that these imper­
atives are never static, and that situations 
without precedent are constantly occuring, 
do not render the task of the central bank 
any easier; nor do they define that task
more precisely."53
53 "Central Banking and its role in the national economy", 
an address by J.B. Zulu to the Chartered Institution of 
Secretaries in Lusaka on 22nd February, 1968, published 
in Money Banking and Economic Development in Zambia, p. 19.
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Despite the difficulties just mentioned, nationalist 
governments have been obliged to define their priorities 
in the light of their own special circumstances. Their 
starting point must be the identifiable economic and 
social problems (and in appropriate cases the overriding 
ideological perspectives) of their country. Methods of 
resolving these problems must be incorporated in planning 
and policy objectives, which have been given public 
expression by various means: presidential addresses and 
statements, development plans, budget speeches and so on.
The next step is to translate these more general 
objectives into specific policy prescriptions addressed 
to central banks which have been founded everywhere as 
the focal point of the national financial system. 
Accordingly, governments have issued guidelines or blue­
prints to central banks, which give them an overall 
direction for their operations as they affect economic and 
social development. They have done this in the realisation 
that banking legislation can provide the framework for 
facilitating development plans and objectives, if appro­
priately and comprehensively drafted.
On the eve of Nigerian independence, those responsible 
were already seised of the problems and the solutions. On 
the objectives of government in establishing the Central 
Bank of Nigeria the Federal Minister of Finance on 1st July 
1959 had this to say:
"As banker to the Federal Government, the* 
Central Bank >/ill provide general banking 
and agency services for the Government and 
it is permitted to make temporary advances to
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Government, during those periods v/ber the 
Government's resources are depressed 
prior to collecting taxes or other revenues. 
Such advances must, I repeat, be of a 
temporary nature and their extent and terms 
are strictly limited by the Ordinance. The 
Central Bank is about to start taking over 
the banking accounts of the Federal 
Government. It will then perform for 
Government similar functions to those a 
commercial bank does for its customers."
And he went on to say:
"The Central Bank has an important role to 
play in raising both in Nigeria and overseas 
the funds necessary for development purposes 
and in fostering the growth of those insti­
tutions which will be needed to assist in 
the expansion of our economy. But we must 
avoid any action which would lay our economy 
open to the dangers of inflation and would 
result in a loss of confidence in our 
currency."
Earlier in a parliamentary debate in the House of 
Representatives, an Honourable Member, Hon. K.O. Mbadiwe, 
had advocated the creation of a Central Bank for Nigeria 
which would, as its primary objectives, perform similar 
functions which he enumerates as follows:
"(i) undertake currency production;
(ii) act as a monetary authority to determine 
economic stability;
(iii) act as a lender of "idle resources" to
banks for whom the Bank would also maintain 
reserves and undertake clearing;
54 An address by the Federal Minister of Finance, Chief
the Honourable F.S. Okotie-Eboh, M.H.R. at the Opening 
of the Central Bank of Nigeria Building on July 1,
1 959 .
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(iv) float, buy and sell government bonds and 
also paper; and
55(v) act as financial agent for the government."
In the Nigeria third National Development Plan 1975-
1980 Volume One, the broad long-term national objectives 
were set as follows:
"(i) increase in per capita income;
(ii) more even distribution of income;
(iii) reduction in the level of unemployment;
(iv) increase in the supply of high level
manpower;
(v) diversification of the economy;
(vi) balanced development; and
(vii) indigenisation of economic activity.
A look at the proposals of various governments in 
57Nigeria would show the main policy objectives to be 
the following:
"(i) efficient utilisation of limited resources 
through the re-ordering of government 
priorities;
(ii) reduced government expenditure:
(iii) re-engagement of the traditional resource 
base neglected because of the rich oil 
sector; 1
(iv) fight against inflationary pressure;
55 House of Representatives Debates, First Session, 11th
to 31st March and 1st to April 9, 1952, Vol. 2.
56 Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic
Development, Lagos, p. 29.
57 e.g. The Six Budget Speeches by Honourable Minister of 
Finance, Chief Festus Sam Okotie Eboh 1958-1963.
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(v) income re-distribhtion ;
(vi) self-sufficiency in food through agricultural 
production;
(vii) greater incentives to local industries;
(viii) an increase in the export of traditional
produce in order to influence the balance
of payments position and release pressure on
the dwindling external reserve level;
(ix) facilitation of vigorous and relentless
implementation of government's priority
programmes in the areas of agriculture,
housing, industrialisation, etc; and
(x) encouraging the manufacturing sector to
increase the use of local raw materials and
5 8thereby local value added."
Domestic concerns and factors are not the only source 
policy objectives in this area for African states; the 
formulation of governmental policies and objectives is 
also influenced by external factors and notably by inter­
national law.
As previously indicated, domestic law provisions on 
social or economic policy have in recent years been 
supplemented by corresponding clauses in international 
agreements, and in particular in the constitutional law 
of the major international organisations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Bank for
58 Honourable Federal Minister of Finance, Prof. Sunday 
M. Essang - Statement on the 198 0 Budget.
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International Settlements (BIS),the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) and the United Nations (UN), the overwhelming 
majority of the countries of the world have pledged to 
take joint or separate action to promote higher standards 
of living, full employment and conditions of economic and 
social progress and development.
By joining the IMF, members like Nigeria and other 
Commonwealth African countries subscribe to the purpose 
and objectives of the Fund, which include:
"(i) promoting exchange stability (Article 
1 (iii));
(ii) establishing a multilateral system of
payments in respect of current transactions 
between members and eliminating foreign 
exchange restrictions which hamper the 
growth of world trade (Article 1 (iv); and
(iii) facilitating the expansion and balanced
growth of international trade with a view 
to contributing to the promotion and 
maintenance of higher levels of employment 
and real income and to the development of 
the productive resources of all members 
(Article 1 (ii)) .
Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter states 
that:
"With a view to the creation of conditions of 
stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights
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and self-determination of peoples, the United 
Nations shall promote:
(a) high standards of living, full employment 
conditions of economic and social progress 
and development;
(b) solution of international economic, social 
health, and related problems; and inter­
national cultural and educational co­
operation:
and
:;(c) universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion ...
"Article 56: All members pledge themselves to 
take joint and separate action in co-operation 
with the organization for the achievement of 
the purpose set forth in Article 55."
The Association of African Central Banks, West African 
Regional Convention provides in Articles 1 and 2 that:
"The Association of African Central Banks 
(hereinafter called the "Association") is hereby 
established and shall operate and be governed 
according to the following provisions:
(a) to promote co-operation in the monetary, 
banking and financial sphere in the African 
region;
(b) to assist in the formulation of guidelines 
along which agreements among African countries
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in the monetary and financial fields shall 
proceed;
(c) to help strengthen all efforts aimed at 
bringing about and maintaining monetary and 
financial stability in the African region;
(d) to examine the effectiveness of international 
economic and financial institutions in 
which African countries have an interest and 
suggest ways of possible improvement."
Article# 2 of the Charter of the Organisation of 
African Unity provides that:
"2(1) The Organisation shall have the following 
purposes:
(a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the 
African and Malagasy states;
(b) to co-ordinate and intensify their collabor­
ation and efforts to achieve a better life 
for the peoples of Africa;
(c) to defend their sovereignty, their territo­
rial integrity and independence;
(d) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from 
the continent of Africa; and
(e) to promote international co-operation, 
having due regard to the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.
2(2) To these ends, the Member States shall co­
ordinate and harmonize their general policies, 
especially in the following fields:
173
(a) political and diplomatic co-operation;
(b) economic co-operation, including trans­
port and communications;
(c) educational and cultural co-operation;
(d) health, sanitation and nutritional 
co-operation;
(e) scientific and technical co-operation;
(f) co-operation for defence and security.”
African governments have enunciated their policy 
objectives by way of synthesis of these various provisions 
and these objectives are now harmonised, summarised and 
reflected in the domestic organic laws controlling central 
banks. We see for example, that the Central Bank of 
Nigeria legislation was made to achieve the following 
stated objectives, which are to a large measure represen­
tative of the general format of the objectives found in 
the organic laws of the Central B anks:
"The principal objects of the Bank shall be
(i) to issue legal tender currency in Nigeria;
(ii) to maintain external reserves;
(iii) to safeguard the international value of
that currency;
(iv) to promote monetary stability and a sound 
financial system in Nigeria; and
(v) to act as a banker and financial adviser
59
to the Federal Government."
59 C f . Report of Committee on the Working of the Monetary 
System (otherwise called the Radcliffe Report) 1959, 
p p .17-23.
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SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF CENTRAL BANK LAW
In the foregoing paragraphs we have tried to state the 
general legislative policy objectives of the governments 
in setting up central banks and now we shall focus atten­
tion on specific objectives as can be deduced from the 
material sources already considered.
TO CURB THE MONOPOLY OF BANKS THROUGH LEGISLATION
Before Central Banks were established in Nigeria and 
other Commonwealth African countries many expatriate banks 
had completely and fully entrenched themselves in these 
territories.
They monopolised all the banking services, they were 
banks of issue of currency and in all financial fields 
they dominated the operations. Central Bank legislation 
in those countries attempted to remove the inequities, 
defects and shortcomings and the monopolies enjoyed by 
these banks and particularly their freedom of operation 
without responsibility to any supervising authority. One 
of the first banks ever established in Nigeria (1894) was 
the Bank of British West Africa. "The very name 'Bank of 
British West Africa' was anathema to some Africans; the 
Bank itself was aware of this as Fry has told us in 
Bankers for West A f r i c a . By 1956 the name of the Bank was 
becoming a liability. 'Bank of British West Africa' 
reflected the colonial relationship which was clearly 
ending. The Bank had made its historic decision a few 
years earlier to remain in West Africa after the establish­
ment of independent African States and to expand its 
banking business in the whole area with all possible speed.
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"British West Africa was not only an outdated concept but
6 0the term itself had begun to arouse political resentment."
As at January 1964 the financial institutions 
registered under the Banking Act in Zambia comprised four 
commercial banks, one merchant bank and one hire purchase 
finance company. Of the commercial banks, three had their 
head offices in the United Kingdom while one was incor­
porated in Zambia with capital subscribed by banks in
6 1South Africa, Holland and the United States of America.
As was observed in the previous Chapter since early
colonial days the field of banking in the African countries
surveyed has been the scene of jealous competition between
indigenous banks and other banks, the British banks
financed and directed from London, and referring to one
of these banks J.B. Loynes pointed out that the British
Bank For West Africa had a special position in the West
African colonies as government banker. It was appointed
the Currency Board's agent and except in the Southern
Caraeroons where, in 1948, the Board opened a sub-centre
managed by Barclays D.C.O. the special position had up to
that time not changed and even the Chairman and the
'Banking' member were then, appointees of the Colonial 
6 2
Secretary. To the expatriate banks establishing a
60 Fry, op. c i t , p. 207.
61 Bank of Zambia, Report and Statement of Accounts for 
the period August 7th, 1964 to December 31st, 1965, 
p . 9 .
62 J.B. Loynes, The West African Currency Board 1912— 
1962, pp. 17-18.
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central bank was synonymous with the loss of government 
business to the central bank and to the more favoured 
indigenous banks. It was the fear of expatriate banks 
that their favoured position in the banking system would 
be reversed after 1951 when political power would virtually 
leave the Colonial Office on the introduction of the 
McPherson Constitution which granted internal self 
government to the Regions in Nigeria and according to 
Richard Fry:
"The Bank of British West Africa was fully 
aware of the changes. Up to that time its 
resources had consisted largely of official 
deposits, and the great bulk of its loans 
were made to the European trading firms, 
though some long term commitments to African 
development had begun as early as 1947. It 
was obvious that the Government account 
could before long go to new African Banks, 
and that the care of the currency would be 
taken over by national central banks. These 
matters were then the subject of intensive 
study and argument. Experts from the Bank 
of England and other official bodies were 
visiting West Africa to advise on the 
regulation of the banking system and the 
setting up of central banks. At first 
their reports were still tentative. The 
Report on Banking in Nigeria by G.D. Paton 
of the Bank of England which was published 
at Lagos in 1948 (see page 217) dealt mainly 
with protecting the public from irregular 
banking practices."63
To the expatriate banks therefore a sort of unified 
and intelligent monetary control of the economy could be 
introduced as a first choice and the establishment of a 
central bank as the second.
What African nationalist governments did was to see to
6 3 Richard Fry, op. cit, p. 182.
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the introduction of central banking by the state as a 
means whereby the bankers' monopoly might be broken. They 
regarded the operations of the British banks as broadly 
anti-social, predatory and against the interests of the 
Africans. They believed that banks' control of credit, 
refusal to grant credit to private manufacturers and 
primary producers were detrimental to the Africans. The 
attitudes of civil and public servants towards banks in 
general was again one strong factor that also helped to 
mar the progress of private banks. These classes of 
people could not forget easily their dissatisfaction with 
the treatment that the banks had accorded them. They saw 
the attainment of independence as an opportunity for 
vendetta and to regulate the activities of the banks by 
legislation.
POLITICAL ADVANTAGES
The establishment of Central Banking was attractive 
to political leaders because its institution would be an 
eloquent testimony of their states having arrived, as it 
were, and also as a passport for joining the club of other 
countries who had already established their own central 
bahts. It was argued further that a central bank law 
could establish the framework for the creation and manage­
ment of a national currency, as in the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America have the sterling and 
the dollar respectively. A central bank law establishing 
a national currency could be an escape route out of the 
inferiority complex syndrome that some third world nations
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experience in the international economic scene.
Chief the Honourable F.S. Okotie-Eboh confirmed these 
views when at the opening of the Central Bank of Nigeria Building 
said:
"When I was moving the Second Reading of 
the Bill to establish the Central Bank of 
Nigeria in the House of Representatives 
on the 17th March, 1958, I said that the 
Central Bank would be a cornerstone of 
the financial structure which we intended 
to build in an independent Nigeria. Today 
therefore we are witnesses of a further 
stage in Nigeria's triumphant march towards 
independence. The Central Bank of Nigeria 
forms an integral part of our programme 
for independence which, God willing, Nigeria 
will achieve in October 1960. By the 
foundation of the Central Bank we have met 
the criticism of those who have said that, 
close as Nigeria is to independence, she 
still lacks that degree of monetary autonomy 
essential to the working of an independent 
modern state."64
Central banks were therefore necessary for economic 
development and as a matter of prestige to countries who 
wished to sever their formal connection with the monetary 
systems of one or other of the colonial powers.
TO FACILITATE INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
One of the objectives in central banking legislation 
is to provide an avenue for the international interaction 
of member nations. Today, no nation could be considered 
to have attained maturity in the international scene until
64 An Address by the then Federal Minister of Finance, 
Chief, the Honourable F.S. Okotie-Eboh, M.H.R., at 
the Opening of the Central Bank of Nigeria Building 
in July 1 959 , p . 2.
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it had "given birth" to a central bank which could repre­
sent it at international financial gatherings like the 
West African Clearing Association, the International 
Monetary Fund Meetings and at the Bank for International 
Settlements. Moreover, it is now an established custom 
that central banks abroad, and particularly the Bank of 
England, prefer to deal with others like themselves.
UNSATISFACTORY SYSTEM OF NOTE ISSUE
In East and West Africa before the establishment of 
central banks, all paper money was supplied by the commer­
cial banks. These notes, in some cases, were not legal 
tender and had to be redeemed in gold. We saw in Chapter 
2 that the currency in circulation in Nigeria and Ghana 
before and soon after political independence was the West 
African Currency Board currency. The notes and coins 
were respectively printed and minted in England. In East 
Africa, the East African Currency Board issued East 
African shilling notes and coins based on the sterling 
exchange standard, it issued local currency against ster­
ling and redeemed local currency into sterling.
On the attainment of independence the new nations 
thought it was infra dig for them to use notes and coins 
printed and minted in England and bearing the Queen's 
effigy. They clamoured for a replacement of the currency 
for national pride and as a symbol of political indepen­
dence, not necessarily economic independence.
In Nigeria, the Nigerian pound was in 1965 issued in 
replacement of the West African Currency Board currency
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on a one-to-one parity with the pound sterling. The 
objective of Government was to ensure that the local 
currency commanded at least the same respect and confidence 
at home and abroad as the West African Currency Board 
currency. Further, to ensure that the Central Bank of 
Nigeria was able to issue the local currency on the basis 
of their parity, the Bank was enjoined to maintain substan­
tial sterling balances and other assets abroad as backing 
for the local currency.
These expectations of government were given effect to 
in sections 16-21 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act 
1958, whereby the Bank was given the sole right to issue 
of notes and coins and the parity of the Nigerian currency 
registered with the International Monetary Fund was 
stated to be the equivalent of 2.48828 grams fine gold.
This section of the Central Bank Act was in 1971 amended 
by the Decimal Currency Act No. 21 of 1971, creating the 
Naira divided into 100 kobo as the unit of currency in 
Nigeria, and setting the parity of the Naira as equivalent 
to 1.24414 grams fine gold. The Act established a 
Decimal Currency Board and declared the notes to be legal 
tender in Nigeria. It is worthy of note that in the 
parallel Kenya and Tanzanian Act sections 19 and 25 of the 
respective Acts confer on the President the power to 
determine the par value of the shilling in terms of gold.
By interesting contrast, however, the Bank of Zambia Act 
does not provide for the parity of the Kwacha and nowhere 
was the name of its currency mentioned in the Act.
In both government and political circles before
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independence argument for a central bank was supported by 
the fact of this unsatisfactory system of note issue 
whereby currencies were produced in England and balances 
maintained in sterling and the provision in the existing 
statute, the Nigerian Banking Ordinance 1952, which sought 
to perpetuate the existence and functions of the West 
African Currency Board. Kenya had a similar reason to 
justify the clamour for a central bank. There the Banks 
Ordinance of 29th April 1910 prohibited the issue of 
notes, but section 22 of the Kenya Central Bank Act 1966 
gave full meaning to the provisions in the Act and gave 
wider powers to the Central Bank to have the sole right 
of issue of notes and coins in K e n y a .
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONFERENCE 1920
The International Financial Conference, which was 
held in Brussels in 1920 under the auspices of the League 
of Nations, passed a resolution to the effect that all 
countries which had not yet established a central bank 
should proceed to do so as soon as possible, not only with 
a view to facilitating the restoration and maintenance of 
stability in their monetary and banking systems but also 
in the interest of world co-operation.
Since that time, commencing with the South African 
Reserve Bank in 1921, central banks have been established 
not only in the existing independent or self-governing 
countries which did not yet have a central bank, but also 
in the many new independent states which have been created 
during the past sixty years as shown in the following
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table culled from "Central Banking" by M.H. de Kock, pages 10-12 
Table 4 Central Banks in Independent Countries
1921 South African Reserve Bank
1922 Reserve Bank of Peru (reconstituted as Central
Reserve Bank of Peru in 1931)
Bank of Latvia
Bank of Lithuania
1923 Bank of the Republic of Colombia
1924 National Bank of Hungary 
Bank of Poland
Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Bank of 
the Republic of Uruguay converted into central 
banks
1925 National Bank of Albania
1926 National Bank of Czechoslovakia 
Central Bank of Chile
Central Bank of Guatemala (reconstituted as Bank
of Guatemala in 1946)
1927 Central Bank of Ecuador
Bank of Estonia converted into a central bank
1928 Central Bank of China 
National Bank of Iran 
Central Bank of Bolivia
Bank of Greece (in place of National Bank of 
Greece)
National Bank of Iceland converted into a central 
bank
1929 National Bank of Yugoslavia (in place of former 
National Bank of Serbia)
1931 Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
1932 Bank of Mexico converted into a central bank 
T934 Reserve Bank of New Zealand
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Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador 
193 5 Bank of Canada
Reserve Bank of India
Central Bank of the Argentine Republic
1936 Bank of the Republic of Paraguay (reconstituted 
as Bank of Paraguay in 1944)
1937 National Bank of Costa Rica
1939 Bank of Afghanistan
1940 Central Bank of Venezuela
1941 National Bank of Nicaragua converted to a central 
bank
1942 Central Bank of Ireland
Bank of Thailand
State Bank of Ethiopia
1945 National Bank of Poland (in place of Bank of 
Poland)
1947 Central Bank of the Dominican Republic
1948 State Bank of Pakistan
Bank of the German States - Bank Deutscher 
Lander (in place of Reichsbank in West Germany)
Central Bank of the Philippines
1949 National Bank of Iraq
1950 Central Bank of Ceylon 
National Bank of Cuba 
Bank of Korea
Central Bank of Honduras
Central Bank of Costa Rica (in place of National 
Bank of Costa Rica)
German Bank of Issue - Deutsche Notenbank (in 
place of Reichsbank in East Germany)
1952 Central Bank of Belgian Congo (replaced by
Monetary Council in 1960 and by National Bank 
of Congo in 1964)
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Union Bank of Burma converted into central bank
Central Bank of Paraguay (in place of Bank of 
Paraguay)
Bank of Issue of Associated States of Indo-China 
(split into the National Banks of Cambodia,
Laos and Vietnam in 1955)
1953 Bank of Indonesia (in place of Bank of Java)
1954 Bank of Israel
1955 National Bank of Libya (renamed Bank of Libya 
in 1963)
1956 Central Bank of Syria
Central Bank of Iraq (in place of National Bank
of Iraq)
Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (split into 
Reserve Bank of Rhodesia, Bank of Zambia and
Reserve Bank of Malawi in 1964)
Central Bank of Nepal
1957 German Federal Bank - Deutsche Bundesbank (in 
place of Bank Deutscher Lander)
Bank of Ghana
Central Bank of Surinam
1958 Central Bank of Nigeria
Central Bank of Malaya (renamed Central Bank of
Malaysia in 1963)
Central Bank of Tunisia
1959 Bank of Morocco
Reserve Bank of Australia (Commonwealth Bank 
split into Reserve Bank and Commonwealth Banking 
Corporation)
Central Bank of Equatorial Africa and Cameroon
1960 Bank of Republic of Guinea 
Bank of Sudan
Bank of Jamaica
National Bank of Somalia converted into a central 
bank
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1961 Central Bank of Egypt (in place of National Bank 
of Egypt)
Central Bank of Nicaragua (in place of National 
Bank of Nicaragua)
Central Bank of Iran (in place of National Bank 
of Iran)
Central Bank of Iceland (in place of National 
Bank of Iceland)
1962 Central Bank of Algeria (in place of Bank of 
Algeria)
Bank of Republic of Mali
Bank of the Netherlands Antilles
1963 Central Bank of Cyprus
National Bank of Ethiopia (in place of State 
Bank of Ethiopia)
Central Bank of Jordan
Bank of Sierra Leone
1964 Bank of Lebanon
Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago 
Bank of Burundi 
National Bank of Rwanda
1965 Central Bank of Brazil 
Bank of Guyana
1966 Central Bank of Kenya 
Bank of Tanzania 
Bank of Uganda
1967 Central Bank of Uruguay (in place of Bank of 
Republic of Uruguay)
1968 Central Bank of Malta
Central Bank of Mali (in place of Bank of
Republic of Mali)
1969 Central Bank of Kuwait
Central Bank of Republic of Equatorial Guinea
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1971 Central Bank of The Gambia
This Conference decision of 1920 has favourably 
influenced African countries to establish central banks 
from 1957 when Ghana established its central bank and in 
the parliamentary debate in Nigeria on the question of 
establishing the central bank Honourable K.O. Mbadiwe 
invited attention to this Brussels Conference 
recommendation . ^
INDIGENISATION OF THE BANKS
In the preceding paragraphs we have seen that the 
African businessman, trader, civil servant and the public 
did not take kindly to the monopoly of the expatriate 
banks nor did they forget the alleged discriminations in 
the services they provided. The African dissatisfaction 
rests upon allegations that the banks acted in combination 
regarding charges and, at the same time, adopted a 
racially discriminatory policy. The validity of these 
allegations is contestable in view of the very obvious 
weak financial positions of the African entrepreneur who 
lacked credit worthiness, managerial skill, and acceptable 
collateral. Sir Cecil Trevor mentioned this in his Report 
of 1951 when he said:
"Generally speaking, the European, Levantine 
and Asiatic communities report that the 
facilities available meet their requirements 
and have no criticisms to make nor con­
structive suggestions to offer. It is from
65 House of Representatives Debate, op. c i t .
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the indigenous population that all the 
complaints regarding the existing system 
and proposals for its improvement emanate, 
though some of these may be deemed to be 
unfounded and showing lack of knowledge 
of the basic principles of sound banking, 
there is a considerable weight of public 
opinion which appears to have some justi­
fication for feeling that conditions could 
be improved and a more progressive policy 
adop t e d .
The criticisms and suggestions may 
conveniently be grouped under different 
interests."
and went on in paragraph 4 6 to say that:
"The feeling was prevalent that the existing 
banking system favours the European, Levantine 
and Asiatic communities to the detriment
of the African . " 66
The National Bank of Nigeria advertisement in Tribune 
says it all:
"By a concerted and well planned process 
of discrimination the African Merchants 
were gradually eliminated from the position 
of middlemen between the big European 
firms and the African Consumer and in their 
place was substituted the alien immigrants. 
The Africans, according to plan became small 
retail traders and Civil Servants. This 
economic strangulation could not have been 
possible if the African had had a strong 
financial institution of his own.
PATRONISE THE NATIONAL BANK OF NIGERIA 
and retrieve your lost birthright."67
No sooner therefore was independence granted than these 
nationalists clamoured for indigenisation of the banks.
6 6 Report by Sir Cecil Trevor, C.I.E. on Banking
conditions in the Gold Coast and on the Question of
Setting up a National B a n k , paragraphs 45, 46. 
67 Tribune (Nigeria, 20 February, 1 952) .
188
At political meetings and in the gallery of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria for example appeals were made to establish 
indigenous banks. In order to be able to do this an 
enabling legislation was necessary and this they found in 
the enacting of the Central Bank and banking acts as soon 
as they had the legal capacity to do so. Through legis­
lation therefore the art of banking has been introduced 
and brought home to African countries where the industry 
is now growing and flourishing. Indigenisation should 
therefore be seen as a natural consequence of th,e yearn­
ings of Africans to control their economies and it would 
now seem that every Commonwealth African country has to 
a large extent indigenised its banking industry "in the 
national interest.
By their own definitions of indigenisation the 
nationalists meant that they wanted banks that they could 
own, control and manage.
Various methods were adopted in trying to achieve the 
objective of indigenisation. Firstly, the expatriate, 
banks had a premonition that sooner rather than later the 
nationalist governments would clamp on them either to 
control them effectively, stifle them out of business or 
have them nationalised. It turned out that their fears 
were well-founded for in 1967 the Government of Tanzania 
nationalised all banks in Tanzania and in countries like 
Nigeria, Zambia and Kenya the governments took controlling 
shares in the banks and in some cases appointed Chairmen
68 S.39(ii) Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958.
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and Board Members.
In order to avert such takeovers which they had fore­
seen the banks have of their own motion started to take 
initiatives for which see Richard Fry's comments in 
Bankers in West Africa:
"By 1956 the name of the Bank was becoming 
a liability. 'Bank of British West Africa' 
reflected the colonial relationship which 
was clearly ending. The Bank had made its 
historic decision a few years earlier to 
remain in West Africa after the establish­
ment of independent African states and to 
expand its banking business in the whole 
area with all possible speed. 'British 
West A f r i c a ' was not only an outdated con­
cept but the term itself had begun to 
arouse political resentment. The question 
of a new name for the Bank was not settled 
easily as the final solution suggests. 
Leading African politicians were consulted 
in the course of 1956. The board set up 
a committee to study the problem. In 
February 1957 the committee recommended 
that the name should be changed to Bank 
of West Africa Limited, and this proposal 
was approved by an Extraordinary General 
Meeting in June 1957.
Oddly enough, the same proposal had 
been made, and almost accepted, as long ago 
as 1909. At that time the Bank wanted to 
spread its branch network into the French 
African colonies and found that the word 
'British' in its name was a handicap. A 
formal decision was in fact taken then to 
make the change but the matter was dropped.
The first reaction of the Bank of British West Africa 
therefore was to effect changes in names that made the 
banks appear to be colonial institutions. The banks took 
steps to show that although the wine was still the same 
the bottles had changed. There was a spate of name
69 Richard Fry, op. c i t , p. 207. See also p. 60.
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changes affecting practially all the expatriate banks.
In Nigeria the Bank of British West Africa after several 
metamorphoses emerged as First Bank of Nigeria Limited, 
the Barclays Bank Dominion, Colonial and Overseas as Union 
Bank of Nigeria Limited, the British and French Bank 
founded on 31st January, 1957 as United Bank for Africa 
Limited. The National Bank of India and the Standard Bank 
of South Africa operating in Kenya and Tanzania changed 
their names to National Grindlays Bank and Standard Bank 
respectively.
Secondly, co-operative movements took the initiative 
of developing indigenous banks by establishing banks 
which provided a specialised banking service for members 
of the co-operative movements. Thus the Co-operative 
Bank of Kenya Limited opened for business in January 1968; 
while in Nigeria the Co-operative Bank of Western Nigeria, 
the Co-operative Bank for Eastern Nigeria, and the Kano 
Co-operative Bank were some of such banks established in 
the indigenisation process with a special aim of providing 
agricultural credit.
Thirdly, national governments have also sponsored the 
founding of commercial banks, co-operative banks and 
other credit institutions to provide for needs unsatisfied 
over the years by inadequate banking and credit facilities 
for which expatriate banks were blamed. Because the 
expatriate banks saw their primary role as the financing 
of imports of manufactured goods and capital goods into 
the African countries and the export of raw materials to 
Europe they tended to concentrate their banking activities
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in the urban centres. As a counter measure some Nigerian
state governments have, as another way of indigenising
the banking system, established state banks with branches
in rural areas. The Pan-African Bank Limited in the
Rivers State, the Mercantile Bank in Cross River State and
the New Nigerian Bank in Bendel State are examples.
The statement by the then Premier of the then Western 
70
Nigeria in a debate in the Western House of Assembly on 
21st December, 1956, elucidates the position. He said:
"I believe that it is generally known that 
one of the cardinal policies of this 
Government is the studied encouragement 
of indigenous banking institutions.... In 
the course of my speech on a Motion calling 
upon this Honourable House to approve the 
proposals in the Sessional Paper just 
mentioned, I said, The Government intends 
to pursue vigorously its policy of giving 
financial assistance to indigenous banks 
so that they may be better able to provide 
credit facilities to Nigerian businessmen 
and women and others who have profitable 
projects on which to invest the funds 
thus provided them.
Guided by this principle, therefore, 
this Government always insists that the 
indigenous banks seeking assistance:
1. Must be one that is run on lines of 
sound and efficient arrangmeent.
2. Must show satisfactory evidence of 
stability and good reputation.
3. Must be licensed under the Banking 
Ordinance.
... So far three indigenous banks have 
passed the tests in different degrees and 
have been given one form of assistance or 
anot h e r ...
The three banks in question are the 
National Bank, the Merchants Bank and the 
Agbonmagbe B a n k ."
70 The Western Region has been broken up into O n d o , O g u n , 
Oyo and Lagos States.
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Fourthly, the Federal Government of Nigeria has tried 
to indigenisethe banking system through equity participa­
tion by Federal and state governments.
As at the end of May 1983 there were 24 commercial 
banks with among them, 1,023 bank offices in the country, 
seven of the banks originally expatriate but now mixed, 
that is, banks which are jointly owned and managed by 
Nigerian and foreign interests, 583 branches; other banks 
are indigenous and had between them 44 0 bank offices or 
4 3% of total bank offices or branches in the country.
Of the authorised and paid up capital of all the 
banks in Nigeria of N 4 31,646,354.00, the mixed banks 
accounted for N220 ,067,731 or 50 .98%.71
The Federal and State governments determined to change 
the imbalances between the foreign or mixed and indigenous 
banks in their number and strength and value of equity 
interests as a matter of policy stepped in aggressively 
to grab controlling positions in the industry. The result 
was that the state governments now own practically all 
the indigenous banks and where the Federal Government 
has intervened it has acquired 60% participation in the 
expatriate banks. This was in furtherance of the objec­
tives which the Federal Government set out in the Budget 
Broadcast for 1972/73 wherein it recorded a "decision to 
negotiate with the commercial banks the extent of 
government participation in their ownership and to
71 Figures from the Banking Supervision of Central Bank 
of Nigeria. The figure for Habib Nigeria Limited is 
not available.
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establish Industrial and Commercial Credit Banks to give 
medium and long-term loans to investors so as to facili­
tate the indigenisation policy" and continuing the 
broadcast went on to emphasize that
"The Federal Government has decided to 
start negotiation with the commercial 
banks for Government share participation 
in their operations in Nigeria. I 
sincerely expect that these negotiations 
will be conducted in the spirit of give 
and take and in the interest of all con­
cerned. The Federal Government expects 
all the Commercial Banks to co-operate 
with the Central Bank by strictly complying 
with the Central Bank credit guidelines 
which are designed to extend credit facili­
ties to indigenous businessmen and women.
This is very important in view of the ^
government's new indigenisation programme."
The Government thus shares with the banks the inherent 
risks involved in the rapid expansion of banking activities 
and the proceeds of a booming industry and above all 
exercises some measure of control over commercial banking 
activities; thus unwittingly, Nigerianising the industry. 
The Government of Kenya took similar steps and acquired 
a 6 0% equity shareholding in the Kenya Commercial Bank 
Limited and 4 0% in the National and Grindlays Bank 
International (Kenya) Limited.
The 1968 Mulungushi Presidential announcement on 
economic reforms in Zambia transferred the general economic 
structure of Zambia from complete expatriate domination
72 Budget Broadcast - 1972-73 by His Excellency General
Yakubu G o w o n , Head of the Federal Military Government,
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on March 31,
1 9 7 2 , pp. 521-523.
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to majority participation by Government. To implement the 
economic reforms, the National Commercial Bank was estab­
lished in 1969 as the first indigenous bank and wholly 
state-owned commercial bank.
Fifthly, some Nigerians on their own initiative have 
taken the hazardous steps of attempting to found 
indigenous banks. A foremost nationalist leader and later 
Governor-General of Nigeria in the person of Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe founded the African Continental Bank Limited in 
1947 in order to call the bluff of the Bank of British 
West Africa Limited which had refused to grant him £2,000 
overdraft facilities in order to be able to finance ,his 
chain of businesses. And as a Commission of Enquiry 
stated:
"We believe that Dr. Azikiwe's primary 
motive was to make avaliable an indigenous 
bank with the object of liberalising credit 
for the people of this country, but we 
are satisfied that he was attracted by the 
financial power his interest in the bank 
gave him."
The Commission went on to report that:
"The policy formulated by the Government 
of the Eastern Region is stated to be 
based on the following principles:
(1 ) to discourage monopoly of monetary 
transactions by any one bank;
(2 ) to liberalize credit facilities for 
Nigerian entrepreneurs;
(3) to encourage the development of 
indigenous Nigerian banking;
(4) to plan for the eventual establish­
ment of a State b a n k ,
and in their Manifesto for the Federal election of 1954
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the policy is further amplified by the following passages 
appearing therein :
"Banking. Although the NCNC believes in 
the development and expansion of Nigerian 
banking, yet it is uncomprisingly opposed 
to the use of such banks for the furtherance 
of party interest particularly where public 
funds form part of its res o u r c e s . " ^
The African Continental Bank Limited started as a private 
company under the name of Tinubu Properties Limited in 
1937. In January 1947 it became Tinubu Bank Limited. 
Towards the end of the same year (in November) the Tinubu 
Bank Limited was registered as the African Continental 
Bank Limited with an authorised capital of N20,000.00.
The Dohertys, the Majas and the Subairs had earlier in 
1933 entered the venture and founded the National Bank of 
Nigeria Limited in 1933 and Chief Okupe established the 
Agbonmagbe Bank as early as 1945. Before these periods, 
however, there had been two other pioneering efforts in 
Nigeria to establish indigenous banks which ended in 
liquidation.
The first was the Industrial Commercial Bank which was 
originally incorporated in England in May 1914, but by 
1929 was entirely owned and managed by Africans before it 
went into compulsory liquidation in 1930. The second 
African bank to be formed was the Nigerian Mercantile 
Bank. It was registered in March 1931 and had previously 
been registered as the Nigerian Industrial Co-operative
73 Foster-Sutton Tribunal of Inquiry (1962), p. 11.
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In Zambia the first indigenous bank, the National 
Commercial Bank, was established as late as 1969, as the 
first indigenous and wholly state-owned commercial bank. 
And in Tanzania there were three indigenous banks - the 
National Co-operative Bank had been founded by the C o ­
operative movement in 1962 as the Co-operative Bank of 
Tanganyika, the Tanzania Bank of Commerce was established 
in 1965 when it took over the majority share-holding of 
the Ottoman Bank, and the People's Bank of Zanzibar 
established in 1966 to transact commercial banking 
operations for the Zanzibar government outside mainland 
Tanzania. In spite of the early establishment of a com­
mercial banking system in Kenya, the first locally owned 
bank was established after half a century of banking on 
19th June, 1968 and on the 30th September, 1968, opened 
for business. The bank, the National Bank of Kenya 
Limited, is fully owned by the Government of Kenya.
Sixthly, some Commonwealth African nations used 
nationalisation as a tool for Africanising the banking 
industry. The Government of Tanzania considered bank 
nationalisation as a logical and necessary move in its 
efforts to control the economy. Under the National Bank 
of Commerce (Establishment and Vesting of Assets and 
Liabilities) Act, 1967, all commercial banks except Jetha
74 The following indigenous mushroom banks in Nigeria 
collapsed: The Nigerian Farmers and Commercial Bank, 
Pan Nigerian Bank, Premier Bank, Onward Nigerian Bank, 
Berini Nigeria Bank (Beyrut Ruyad, Lebanese-Nigerian), 
Bank of Lagos (Swiss-Nigerian), etc.
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Lila Bankers in Zanzibar, were nationalised and closed for 
business on 6 th February, 1968.
Seventhly, the foreign owned banks had been manned 
predominantly by expatriate personnel with only a few 
indigenous people mainly employed to carry out menial 
jobs. In Zambia, for example, of the 100 employees in the 
Bank of Zambia only 6 clerks and 9 auxiliary subordinate 
staff were Zambians. After the exodus of banking person­
nel as a result of severance of banking connections with 
the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1965 
following the political independence of Zambia the Bank of 
Zambia had only a few hands to run the Bank. However, 
full Zambianisation of the Bank was achieved in 1972.
To be able to have Africans to take over from the 
expatriate bankers the banks engaged in full-time training 
of staff at home and abroad. To this end the Bank of 
England, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Inter­
national Monetary Fund and other overseas banks have 
assisted in a very large measure to train thousands of 
African bankers for the eventual take-over of the African 
banking scene from expatriates.
To what extent these measures and initiatives and the 
various governments' interventions have enabled the 
countries to achieve the objectives of Africanisation,
control, management and participation will make interesting 
75
case study. However, one thing is certain and that is,
7 5 For an appraisal see Financial System Review Committee 
and the Federal Military Government views on it. 
(Federal Ministry of Information, 1977) see also G.O. 
Nwankwo, the Nigerian Financial System, Chapter 11.
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that the indigenous African Banks have to a very great 
measure successfully forced a dramatic change of banking 
policy, procedure and system among the expatriate banks 
and but for them indigenisation after political indepen­
dence would have been very painful and expensive as in 
Tanzania.
LICENSING OF BANKS
One of the objectives of central banking legislation 
is to protect the customer and the general public at large 
so that public money entrusted to bankers should be safe 
and thus avoid the pitfalls of banks "going bubble". 
Central bank legislation tries to give this protection. 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Banking Act 1969 of Nigeria, inter 
alia, stipulate that no banking business shall be trans­
acted in Nigeria except by a company duly incorporated in 
Nigeria and which has been licensed.
By incorporating a company the advantages of a 
limited liability company and of possessing different 
legal personality from that of the shareholder will be
enjoyed both by the company and the shareholder as enun-
7 6ciated in the well-known cases of Foss v. Harbottle and
77Salomon v. Salomon and Company Limi t e d , the facts of 
which are well known to all lawyers.
Furthermore, by the grant of a licence a bank has 
undertaken to comply with the provisions of the Banking
76 (1843) 2 Ha. 461.
77 (1897) A .C . 22.
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Act 1969. Such provisions include the requirement:
"To compel banks maintain a minimum 
holding of cash reserves, specified 
liquid assets, special deposits and 
stabilization securities.
To restrict licensed banks from 
undertaking certain activities, e.g. 
granting loans above 33 1/3 of paid-up 
capital, engaging in import and 
export trade, purchase, lease real 
estate.
To exercise the powers of examin­
ation, control and winding-up of 
licensed banks, revoking their licences 
and assuming, control of their business.
To restrict persons from the use of 
the word 'bank' for carrying on business 
and
To protect Government, CBN and officers 
against adverse claims for things done 
or omitted to be done.
All these provisions make for the protection of the 
interest of the customers and are insurances against 
insecurity of their deposits and they are meant to pro­
mote mutual confidence between banker and customer which 
is very essential for a healthy banking system.
OBLIGATIONS BY THE CENTRAL BANK
In the preceding paragraphs we considered the objec­
tives which governments intended to achieve through 
central banks which in summary was that the banks shall 
issue legal tender currency in their countries, to main­
tain external reserves in order to safeguard the 
international value of that currency, to promote monetary 
stability a sound financial structure in the economy and
to act as banker and financial adviser to the Federal 
77Government.
77 The preamble to the Bank of Zambia Act provides for
c o n t d ...
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In order to be able to achieve these objectives 
central banking Acts have been enacted to facilitate the 
attainment of the objectives by central banks. The Acts 
therefore provide, inter alia:
"To use legislation to achieve economic 
growth through Open Market Operations, 
Banking Supervision Provisions e.g. S.29 
of the Banking Act and Credit Guideline.
To control Bank Lending generally.
To open accounts for and accept deposits 
from the Federal Government, State Govern­
ments, the funds, Institutions, Corporations 
and Banks.
To undertake the issue and management 
of loans publicly issued.
To promote the establishment of banking 
systems.
To compel banks to maintain cash reserve 
and hold a minimum amount of specified 
liquidity assets.
To compel banks to prepare and deliver 
true and correct statement of deposit 
liabilities.
For the purposes of maintaining monetary 
stability of the economy to issue, sell 
or redeem stabilization securities and 
impose sanctions on banks.
To facilitate the clearing of cheques 
and other credit instruments for banks 
carrying on business in the country.
To restrict the sale or disposal of 
banking business by amalgamation.
To prescribe the minimum ratio which 
banks shall maintain between their res­
pective paid-up capital and statutory 
reserves on the one hand and their loans 
and advances on the other.
To compel directors to disclose their 
interests when they are in any manner 
interested in an advance, loan or credit 
facility from the bank.
c o n t d ...
similar objectives. No objectives are specified in 
the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia Act, and the objectives 
for the Ugandan and Zambian banks are specified only 
in the preamble.
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POWER OF REFORM
The respectable profession of banking has been 
ashamedly debased by bad eggs in the profession. Cases 
of forgery, stealing, exchange control malpractices and 
various other frauds have been rampant. The incidence 
of exchange control malpractices and trafficking in 
foreign currencies was so high that the Federal Military 
Government in Nigeria had to promulgate the Anti-Sabotage 
Act of 1977 in order to stem the upsurge of the offences. 
Early in 1983 the President of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria launched an Ethical Revolution and appointed a 
National Committee to study the problem of moral 
decadence and corruption in Nigeria.
Some bank managers are fond of demanding 10% of the 
value of loans or overdrafts they grant to customers.
Some of them conspire with importers to infla!te invoice 
values, submit exchange control applications with forged 
papers, and grant unsecured loans.
The Nigerian Banking Act 1969 contains penalty 
provisions against abuse of office by bank officials. 
Section 29 of the Act is directed towards the Manager 
and other officials of banks with a view to eliminating 
the bad eggs in the industry and all those with propen­
sity to steal or abuse their office. The section prohi­
bits the receipts of commission or anything or value for 
the personal benefits of a director, officer or employee 
of a licensed bank, for procuring facility or for permit­
ting the customer to overdraw his account. The Section 
provides that such officer shall be liable, on
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conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three 
years, or to a fine not exceeding N 2 ,0 0 0 . 0 0  or both.
The objectives of the section are two fold. One is 
to enable the law to catch up with criminals in the 
banking industry and secondly to be a tool for central 
banks in their efforts to reform the banking system by
removing obstacles to progress and success.
7 8Section 22 of the Central Bank Act empowers it to 
undertake periodic examination of banks and if it is 
established that a bank is carrying on its business in 
a manner detrimental to the interest of depositors and 
other creditors, or where the bank has insufficient assets 
to cover its liabilities or contravening the Act, the 
Commissioner may require such a bank to rectify the matter 
and unless satisfied that the bank is taking adequate 
measures to put its affairs in order, may, on the direc­
tion of the Federal Executive Council, revoke the bank's 
licence or the Central Bank assumes control of the 
licensed bank.
In reforming the system in a defaulting bank, the 
central bank is expected to be in control until the 
finances of the commercial bank have improved. The 
above provisions show the extent of the controls exercised 
over the commercial banks under the Banking Act and there 
can be no doubt that these provisions have been beneficial 
to customers who patronise commercial banks, especially 
the indigenous ones which very often face problems of
78 Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958.
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inefficient and corrupt staff and management.
Section 3 9 (ii) of the Central Bank Act requires the 
Central Bank to "promote and maintain adequate and 
reasonable banking services for the public; to ensure 
high standard of conduct and management throughout the 
banking system; and to further such policies not incon­
sistent with the Act as shall be in the national interest.
Section 29(2) (t) of the Central Bank Act provides 
that the Bank may "subject as is expressly provided in 
this Act, generally conduct business as a bank, and do 
all such things as are incidental to or consequential 
upon the exercise of its powers or the discharge of its 
duties under this Act." The scope of this implied power 
was considered in Chapter 4, page 241.
Section 29 is loaded with power to reform the 
banking system in Nigeria. An aggressive Central Bank 
can therefore make effective use of the discretionary 
powers conferred by this section not only to correct the 
ills in the industry but also to improve it for the 
economic growth and welfare of that nation.
Similarly, section 3(c) of the Banking Act 1969 is 
highly potent with powers which the Central Bank can 
employ to advantage. The section provides that the 
Minister of Finance may, at any time on the recommendation 
of the central bank, vary or revoke any of the conditions 
of a licence or impose such conditions or additional 
conditions as he may deem necessary.
These powers to impose conditions for a licence, 
like its powers to ensure high standard of conduct and
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management throughout the banking system, described 
above, are extremely wide-ranging. Under these powers 
the Central Bank can give any conditions that are neces­
sary in order to secure the protection of the depositor 
and may require a defaulting bank to take certain steps 
or to refrain from adopting or pursuing a particular 
course of action or to restrict the scope of its business 
in a particular way.
The powers can be used where the institution's 
affairs are in a state of confusion as a result of a 
failure of its internal control systems and the Central 
Bank considers it necessary in the public interest to 
ascertain the true position.
It would seem from the foregoing that central banking 
Acts have as a legislative objective adequately provided an 
armoury for central banks to combat corruption and pitfalls 
in the banking system and to make necessary reforms.
This chapter has attempted to identify the objectives 
of central banking legislation as conceived by govern­
ments, politicians and legislatures. In doing so efforts 
were made to try to identify the scope and sources of 
law as they apply to banking for the economic and social 
development of Commonwealth African countries. It was 
found that although customary law is unwritten it is also 
a source of banking law in Nigeria. It was also submit­
ted that received English law including the doctrines of 
equity and the principles of common law are vital sources
79 Section 2 9 (ii) Central Bank Act, 1958.
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of the law of banking.
The question that now arises is: to what extent 
does the available legislation help to achieve the 
objectives set out in the identified sources of law? In 
the succeeding chapters attempts will be made to answer 
the following and other questions:
1. Section 8 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act provides 
that the Board of Directors shall be composed of 
twelve members and shall be responsible for the 
policies and general administration of the affairs 
and business of the Bank. Will the ends of Govern­
ment or the authorities of the Bank be adequately 
served by appointing, for example, a politician, a 
geographer, a librarian, an historian, a carpenter 
and a chemist or other persons who are neither econo­
mists, nor lawyers nor accountants to serve on the 
Board of the Central Bank to consider monetary and 
fiscal policy matters affecting domestic and inter­
national economies?
2. Has the system succeeded in harnessing all available 
sources of credit for capital formation necessary for 
economic and social development?
3. Why are the countries surveyed poor in spite of 
elaborate control mechanisms?
4. How can the gaps and the mischiefs, if any, in the 
existing legislation be filled?
5. Is legislation a guarantee against bank failures and 
economic growth?
6 . What reforms are necessary and what forms should they take?
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CHAPTER 4
THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL BANKS
SCOPE
The basic structure of all central banks in anglo­
phone Africa comprises a Board of Directorsand staff 
directed by the Chief Executive or General Manager at the 
apex.. The organisational structure may differ from one 
country to another but in general the functions are 
basically the same. All central bank laws provide for a 
Board of Directors, though under varying names, to act 
as the chief policy-making and directive organ of the 
central bank. Below the Chief Executive, there are other 
top executives who are placed in charge of specific areas 
of the Bank's operations. They may be referred to as or 
called executive directors, who are also members of the 
board of directors and who also supervise the work of a 
group of departments or operations placed under them.
Then there are departments of the bank such as the 
economic research, issue, banking, banking supervision, 
administration and personnel departments, each charged 
with responsibilities often defined in the organic laws 
setting up the central banks.
Sometimes there are other extraneous bodies that 
assist management in the running of the affairs of the 
bank. Trade union movements and staff joint consultative
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councils play such roles. They help, where there is 
goodwill and mutual understanding, to smooth and oil the 
machinery of management. These bodies are sometimes set 
up by Acts of Parliament or by delegated legislation or 
other instruments.
The thesis will examine in this chapter the member­
ship, terms of office and powers of the board, decisions 
and special committees of the boards (with special 
refernce to Nigeria) to see whether the provisions in the 
various Acts are conducive in these respects to economic 
growth. To further assess growth or stagnation we will 
examine the influence which the provisions relating to 
independence or autonomy of central banks have on the 
system and whether economic growth would thrive better 
in a federated central banking system.
We will also take a look at the principles laid down 
by the Nigerian courts in: Doherty v. Sir A. Tafawa 
Balewa 1 W.L.R. 94 9 and see what effects they have on 
the ability of central banks to carry out certain func­
tions that are incidental to their main objectives.
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Under the Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958, the
Bank is administered by a Board of Directors which is
responsible for "policy and general administration of the
1
affairs and business of the Bank."
1 Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958, S.8 . There are 
similar provisions in the Kenya, Tanzania and Zambian 
Acts. See Ss. 10-11 Kenya; S .6 of Tanzania; and S.5 
of Zambian Act.
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The policies of a central bank are generally formula­
ted within a distinct institutional framework. This will 
include:
the government and its departments;
the governing board of the central bank;
the central bank staff;
financial institutions (both banks and non-banks); 
and the public at large.
However, the ultimate decision-making body within 
the central bank is typically a governing board which in 
Commonwealth African Central Banks is chaired by the 
central bank's governor in accordance with the Acts estab­
lishing them. In the more advanced countries, particularly
2
in Europe and Japan, there is a separate monetary board 
(including the central bank governor) which decides broad 
policy, and an adjunct board which supervises detailed 
implementation.
In Anglophone African central banks where there are no 
monetary boards, the policy boards are advised by manage­
ment acting through the staff of the central bank. The 
staff reviews to the board the state of the economy and of 
the financial markets and provides policy recommendation.
MEMBERSHIP
The Board which determines policy may include people 
from a variety of fields including business and academic.
2 See Bank of Indonesia Act No. 13 of 1968, Articles 8 
and 9 which provide for a Monetary Council as well as 
Board of Directors (Act 15).
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The board may also include an official from one or the 
other policy branches of government - typically the Ministry 
of Finance. That official may or may not have a vote. He 
represents the Cabinet Minister who is answerable for gov­
ernment policy in Parliament and is subject to cabinet 
decisions.
In central banks, as in all statutory corporations, 
the government stands in the position of shareholders of 
a limited liability company. The arguments that follow 
relate to directors generally; surely a fortiori to central 
bank directors.
A comparison of the provisions of central bank laws 
relating to the composition, decisions, qualifications and 
meetings of the board of directors indicate that they 
frequently follow the pattern of the corresponding provi­
sions of corporations, parastatals and company law and 
memorandum of association. Thus, for example, sections 
168, 190(1) of the Nigerian Companies Act 1968 provide that:
"168 Every company registered on or after the 
commencement of this Decree shall have 
at least two directors; and every company 
registered before this date, whether or 
not a private company shall have at least 
one director.
190(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, 
it shall be the duty of a director of a 
company who is in any way, whether directly 
or indirectly, interested in a contract 
or proposed contract with the company to 
declare the nature of his interest at a 
meeting of the directors of the company."
While sections 12(2) and 18 of the Central Bank of 
Kenya Act provide that:
"12(1) The Governor, as Chairman of the Board,
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shall convene meetings of the Board not 
less than once in every two months, or 
whenever the business of the Bank so 
requires, or whenever he is so requested 
by at least two Directors, or by the 
representative of the Treasury.
14(2)The President shall terminate the appoint­
ment of a Governor, Deputy Governor or a 
Director who:
(a) becomes subject to any of the dis­
qualifications described in subsection 
(1) of this section;
(b) is adjudged bankrupt or enters into 
a composition or scheme of arrange­
ment with his creditors.
(c) is convicted of an offence involving 
dishonesty or fraud or moral turpitude; 
or
(d) becomes for any reason incapble of 
properly performing the functions of 
his office.
18 The Governor, the Deputy Governor and any 
Director shall declare his interest in any 
specific proposal being considered or to 
be considered by the Board."
Usually central bank laws provide for a fixed number 
of directors as in the case of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
Act 1958, section 8(2) of which provides that:
"the Board shall consist of a Governor, 
a Deputy Governor and five other Directors."
Some of the laws also contain provisions requiring the
chairman and other members of the board of directors to
be chosen from various disciplines or that such members
should be experienced in or represent specified fields or
areas of knowledge or possess certain qualifications. Thus
as in Canada the Chairman of the board of directors of
the Bank of Canada may be expressly required to be a person
3
of tested banking or financial experience. Back home in
3 The Bank of Canada Act, 1954, s.6(2).
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Africa, before the break-up of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
Federation, the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Ordinance 
section 6 ( 1 ) (c) provided for at least two of the nine 
members of the board of directors "to be persons who have 
been actively and primarily engaged in commerce or finance; 
at least two shall be persons equally qualified in indus­
try; and at least one shall be a person concerned with 
agriculture". A few examples of functional representation 
will illustrate the points more vividly:
The Bank of Korea Act, 1950, provides in Article 8(c) 
to (f) :
"8(c) Two titular members and two alternatives 
shall be appointed annually for a term 
of one year by the President of the Republic 
of Korea with the approval of the State 
Council from a panel of eight persons 
elected by banking institutions. For the 
election of these persons, each of the 
banking institutions shall have equal 
voting power.
(d) A titular member and an alternate shall 
be appointed for a term of four years
by the President of the Republic of Korea 
with the approval of the State Council 
from a panel of four persons submitted by 
the Korea Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
(e) A titular member and an alternate shall 
be appointed for a term of four years
by the President of the Republic of Korea 
with the approval of the State Council 
from a panel of four persons submitted by 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
(f) A titular member and an alternate shall 
be appointed for a term of four years
by the President of the Republic of Korea 
with the approval of the State Council 
from a panel of four persons submitted by 
the Economic Board of the Office of 
Planning."
Similarly, Article 23(c) of the Central Bank Law of 
Cuba where the law specifies that there shall be five
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members on the board of directors, it is stated that:
"One member shall represent the domestic 
bank and another shall represent the 
foreign banks."
Such functional representation has some advantages, 
one of which is that specialised experience or qualifica­
tions of a director or chairman enables such members to 
take competent and expert decisions on the complex matters 
that face the board very frequently. Secondly, in a 
heterogeneous society like Nigeria with diverse religions, 
cultures, values, tribes and so on, the board-room provides 
a common platform for conflicting interests among different 
and competing economic or social groups to be mutually and 
satisfactorily resolved. Thirdly, a core of experts would 
be available to provide, where necessary, counter-points 
to the views of management. Fourthly, a wide spread of 
representation will minimise influence of vested interests 
and political intimidation and manoeuvres.
Paradoxically, the Central Bank Acts of the countries 
covered by our survey (Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia) 
either do not contain such clauses, or where they are 
provided at all, the clauses are merely in vague general 
terms, as in the examples below:
"10(1) The five other directors of the Bank shall 
be appointed by the Head of the Federal 
Military Government of the Federation.
10(2) A director shall be a person of recognised 
standing and experience in affairs, but 
as a director of the Bank he shall not be 
regarded or act as a delegate on the Board 
from any Federal or, State Authority, or 
from any Commercial, Financial, Agricultural,
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Industrial, or other interests with which 
he may have been connected."4
Of the Governor and Deputy Governor the Act says that
the Governor and Deputy Governor shall be persons of
5
recognised financial experience.
Similarly, the Bank of Zambia Act, 1964 provides that:
"7(1) The six directors of the Bank, other than 
the director appointed under subsection 
(4) , shall be appointed by the Minister, 
and may be removed by the Minister for 
just cause.
(2) A director shall be a person of recognised 
standing and experience, but, as a director, 
shall not be regarded or act as a delegate 
of any interest with which is or has been 
connected, and he shall not accept direc­
tions from any such interest, save as 
provided by subsection (4)."6
The Kenya Act and the Tanzania Act made no provisions 
for functional qualifications of directors.
What this brief survey shows is that members of the 
board are appointed by Ministers or political heads from 
party members or supporters and the various central bank 
Acts provide the legal backing for the Ministers of 
Finance to so appoint the directors. The effect of this 
method of appointment is to make the offices political.
When appointments are politicised, their reasonableness 
or criteria will pass the realm of objectivity and suit­
ability to that of political convenience. Such appointments
4 S . 10(1) and (2), Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958 ,
5 Ibid/ S.9 (1) .
6 S.7(1) and (2).
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are usually made to compensate politicians who failed to 
win elective political posts. In Africa the appointees 
(sycophants and party hacks) see their appointments as 
avenues for the amassing of wealth leading to ostentatious 
living rather than as opportunities for them to serve 
their fatherland faithfully and loyally to improve the lot 
of the generality of the people.
Nigerian law, or for that matter Commonwealth African 
law, like English law, has consistently adopted the atti­
tude that directors need not have special qualifications 
at all for office; the view held is that the question of 
appointment of directors is a matter for the shareholders 
who are entitled to choose whom they like. The courts 
have taken the view that the matter of a director's quali­
fication is that if shareholders, whose province it is to 
appoint directors, choose to appoint bad directors, they 
must take the consequences. As Hatherley L.C. said in 
Turquand v . M a r s h a l l :
"It was the misfortune of the company that 
they choose such unwise directors."7
or Lindley, M.R. in Lagunas Nitrate Company v. Lagunas 
Syndicate:
"No one need join a company unless he 
likes, and if a person knows that if he 
becomes a member he will find as directors 
persons who, in his opinion, ought not to 
be directors, he should not join the com­
pany. If he does he has no right of 
redress on the ground that improper persons
7 [l869] L.R.4, Ch.App. 376 , 386 .
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were appointed trustees. Volenti non 
fit injuria applies in such a case to 
the members of the Company, and Salomon's 
Case shows that the company in its 
corporate capacity is in this respect 
in no better position."®
Chitty J. in Grimwade v. Mutual Society said:
"Directors are not bound to be wiser 
than those who have appointed them."^
Where nitwits, persons of no qualifications or talents 
are appointed, the bank and the country should expect to 
reap the whirlwind and lament, as did Lord Hatherley, L.C. 
in Turquand v. Marsh a l l , where, in relation to a loan made 
by the board, he said:
"Whatever may have been the amount lent 
to anybody however ridiculous and absurd 
their conduct might seem, it was the mi s ­
fortune of the company that they chose 
such unwise directors; but as long as they 
kept within the powers of their deed, the 
Court could not interfere with the discre­
tion exercised by them."10
Commonwealth African central banks seem to have 
adopted the practice of company law in this respect by 
appointing politicians and non-experts onto boards of 
central banks. Of the eight directors in one central bank 
one is an economist, one a politician, one a medical 
practitioner, another is a legal practitioner, one is a
8 [l899] 2 Ch. 426 .
9 (1885) 52 L.T. 409, 416.
10 [l869j| L.R. 4 Ch. A p p . at p. 386 .
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teacher, one is an accountant, one a pharmacist and a 
librarian. There are two executive directors with adequate 
financial or banking experience. It is to the credit of 
the bank that there has never been a serious disagreement 
on the board and that there has always been a spirit of 
give and take. Such a board composed of eminent members 
of the society will no doubt take rational decisions so 
far as they understand the problems facing them. If they 
take any decisions that turn out to be disadvantageous they 
will not be held liable, for as Neville J. held in 
Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Limited:
"A director is, I think not bound to bring
any special qualifications to his office.
He may undertake the management of a rubber 
company in complete ignorance of everything 
connected with rubber, without incurring 
responsibility for the mistakes which may 
result from such i g n o r a n c e 1
This is not a position that should be encouraged or suppor­
ted in an economy that desires to grow. The impact on the 
economy of such a country will be disastrous. While the 
effects arising from such a position may be tolerated or 
contained in a private company, the consequences to a 
nation's economy may be irreparable and calamitous. For 
considering such questions as whether a particular bank 
should employ a certain category of workers, or increase 
the salaries of staff generally, or award the printing of 
an annual report to a particular contractor or whether a
particular commercial bank should open a rural branch in
11 [l 9 1 ij 1 Ch . 4 2 5 .
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one place or the other, the directors will 90% of the time 
take rational decisions. They cannot reasonably be 
expected to display the same degree of competence in all 
of these matters, because they cannot be reasonably expec­
ted to possess the same degree of .knowledge and experience 
in all. Nevertheless, by reason of their position as 
board members, each must necessarily make a decision of 
his own on every matter presented to the board whatever 
his competence in it. So in our examples above the direc­
tor has to decide whether to increase the salaries of the 
workers and whether to open new rural banking branches.
But the economists among them may not see it as sound or 
economically sensible to revise salaries which may raise 
the inflationary spiral. In the same manner a commercial 
bank may argue that rural banks are generally run at a 
loss, and so it would be economically suicidal to embark 
on opening more and more branches without calculating the 
costs. When the economist argues on the economic effects 
of the decisions, the director who professes no specialised 
expertise, but who by his appointment must be taken to 
profess at least general business competence of a degree 
appropriate to his position as a director, may consider the 
social advantages of such decisions as overriding and may 
be tempted to give priority attention to them. However, 
directors who are in this category can provide useful 
expertise in matters of administrative policy in the 
internal running of the bank and they are therefore likely 
to accept hook, line and sinker the economists postulates 
without offering counter postulates.
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Our view is confirmed by M.J. Trebilock when he 
stated that:
"It is a fair comment on the attitude 
taken by English courts in most of the 
situations canvassed above that the 
standards of diligence and competence 
demanded of directors are far from high. 
It is unfortunately the case that the 
fewer a director's qualifications for 
office, the less time and attention he 
devotes to his office and the greater 
the reliance he places on others, legally 
the less responsible he is. As any sort 
of assurance of protection to investors 
against mismanagement, the present law 
on a director's liability for negligence 
is wholly inadequate."
He went on to say:
"Moreover, there is no doubt that the law 
in its present state falls far short even 
of the perhaps more limited objective of 
giving effect to the standards demanded 
by current, prudent business practice.
The reasons which emerge from the cases 
for the general attitude which the courts 
seem to have taken are mostly legacies 
of outmoded economic and social philo­
sophies from another age. It is submitted 
that the case for reform of the law on 
a director's liability for negligence is 
undeniable."12
The position would however, seem to be different if 
the board had been composed of eminent economists and 
financial experts knowledgeable in the country's financial 
and economic position. The board so composed will, in all 
probability, provide its views and variables, some agree­
ing with the management viewpoint or emphasising the 
management stand; and in appropriate circumstances such a
12 (1969) 32 MLR 308-309.
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board will offer a counter-point to the views of the in- 
house economists. What emerges from expert discussions 
and considerations and exchanges of views by the acknowl­
edged experts are more likely than not to be thorough 
and well thought-out solutions. This is not to say that 
in the final analysis the decision taken by a less expert- 
oriented board may produce a less practical solution to 
a current economic problem. On the balance of probability 
an inexperienced board or one composed of mainly lay men 
and women or in some cases, some square pegs in round 
holes., as it were, will be more incompetent in the manage­
ment of the economy of a nation than one in Japan, for 
example, where the Bank of Japan Law No. 6 7 of February 
1942 as amended by Law No. 135 of May 1957 specifies that 
two of the seven members of the board shall be persons of
superior experience in financial matters: one experienced
1 3in a country bank, the other in a large city bank. And 
as Romer put it in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company 
Limi t e d :
Our case is therefore that the absence of functional 
qualifications clauses in the various central bank Acts 
and the appointment of directors without regard to
13 Article 13.4.
"a director need not exhibit in the per­
formance of his duties a greater degree 
of skill than may reasonably be expected 
from a person of his knowledge and
experience."14
14 at p . 4 28.
220
specialised experience or functional qualification can have 
serious repercussions on the efficient management of the 
economy and promotion of economic growth in Africa. In 
Australia it was found that:
"Several hundred million dollars of 
investors' money has been lost in 
unsuccessful public companies. The 
consequences of losses of these propor­
tions, on both a personal and national 
plane, have of course been very serious.
In most of those cases where formal 
investigations have occurred, inspectors 
have attributed company failure to 
managerial incompetence. In very few 
cases has fraud been found to be a sig­
nificant factor. Moreover, these failures 
have occurred in an economic climate 
generally regarded as prosperous and 
expansionary.... It is submitted that 
part at least of the explanation for 
this fact is probably to be found in the 
present law relating to the liability of 
directors for n e g l i g e n c e . " 15
As we have seen, it is now a cardinal feature of 
central bank laws in Europe and America to provide for 
functional representation of almost all the sectoral, 
regional, and financial interests of the community in cen­
tral bank boards.
It is therefore submitted that one of the causes of 
the failure of central banks in Commonwealth Africa to 
attain optimum economic and social growth is the inadequacy 
of the representation on the board of directors. In 
Chapter 10 we will attempt to offer suggestions as to how 
to improve the legislation on this subject.
15 M.J. Trebilock, "The liability of company directors for 
negligence", (1969) 32 MLR 499.
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TERMS OF APPOINTMENT, ELIGIBILITY AND TENURE
In many countries the governors of central banks are
appointed on terms fixed by the Act or by the respective
1 6
governments or even by shareholders. In Portugal and 
1 7Greece, for example, a majority of the members of the 
boards of central banks are selected by private share­
holders while the reverse is applicable in some European 
countries like the United Kingdom, France and West Germany, 
where all the members of the managing boards of central 
banks are appointed by the respective governments, who 
also have powers to remove or re-appoint them.
In the United States, provision is made for State 
participation in the administration of the Federal Reserve 
System through the appointment of the members of the Federal 
Reserve Bank by the President of the United States, and 
then through the appointment by the Federal Reserve Board 
of three out of nine directors of each Federal Reserve 
Bank, including the Chairman. The other six directors are 
usually to be elected by those commercial banks which 
became members of the system in their respective districts, 
and while three of these could be bankers, the other three 
were to be representatives of the commercial, industrial 
and agricultural interests of the community.
A peculiar case is that of the Bank of England, where
the Governor and the Deputy Governor are appointed for
five years by the Crown on the Prime Minister's recommen­
dation; their emoluments are fixed in accordance with
16 Central Bank of Portugal, Art. 46.
17 Central Bank of Greece, Art. 21.
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the Charter of the Bank of England. The other members of 
the Board of the Bank of England are selected by the 
Government, and their remuneration is fixed by the Bank of 
England without the knowledge of the Treasury.
The appointment of the titular or non-executive 
members of the board of directors of the Commonwealth
African countries are governed by the central bank laws.
18 19In Nigeria and Zambia the Governors and the Deputy
Governors are appointed by the President (in Zambia after
consultation with the Minister), the former for a term of
205 years and the latter for 3 years. In the case of Kenya, 
with the exception of the Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, all members of the Board of Directors including 
the Governor and Deputy Governor, are appointed by the 
President to serve for terms of four years.
In Tanzania a Governor or Director-General can occupy 
his office for as long as it pleases the President.
Section 7(2) empowers the President to appoint the Governor 
and the Director-General to hold office for the period 
specified in the instrument of appointment. On the other 
hand, it is the Minister responsible for financial matters 
who appoints the directors for a term of three years.
While in Nigeria the President appoints the directors, 
in Zambia it is the Minister who can appoint and remove 
directors. He also approves the terms and conditions under
18 Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 10.
19 Bank of Zambia Act, 1964, 6.
20 Central Bank of Kenya Act, 1966, 11(2).
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which the Governor and Deputy Governor are appointed. The 
Act is silent as to which Minister exercises such important 
powers but it may be assumed from practice that the rele­
vant Minister is that of Finance.
From the brief survey, it is clear that the appoint­
ments of governors and other members of the board of 
directors of African Commonwealth central banks are highly
politicised, thereby leaving them open to party directives,
unwarranted influence and political manipulation. The 
system of appointing, dismissing and remunerating governors 
and directors can lead to the curbing of independent 
exercise of their powers as free agents in the determination 
of policy decisions. A central bank board that persists 
in delivering economic decisions that are tainted with 
politics is on the way to chaos. A warning was given by 
the Nigerian Concord on its back page issue of the 31st 
October, 1983, when it said:
"In the wake of media revelations on the 
known blemishes in the records of some 
ministerial nominees, (NPN), the party 
with the most Federal legislators, has 
discretely [sic] clamped down on its 
elected and appointed office holders.
The crack-down, according to reliable 
sources, centres on a directive that all 
political office holders should sign 
undated letters of resignation. Worst- 
hit by the directive, are the party's 
senators now engaged in battles with 
their inner selves over how not to tread 
on powerful toes within the NPN and at 
the same time, do the nation a service 
by approving only ministers the nation 
could be proud o f .
The scheme, which caught the fancy of 
NPN decision-makers as an ideal way to 
enforce party discipline, is quite common 
in the United States of America. However, 
in that country, it only applies to
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appointed office holders.
In effect, senators who sign such 
letters of resignation and refuse to toe 
party line face the risk of being shown 
the way o u t .
All that would need be done is put a 
date on such letters of resignation.
Senators spoken to on the issue were 
evasive, as none of them wished to be 
quoted on the issue.
National Concord learnt that some party 
lords have even started exploiting the 
situation to their advantage by boasting 
at informal party gatherings in Lagos that 
any erring senator would be dealt with.
The fear of the party's might had last 
week caused the withdrawal of some power­
ful motions initiated earlier in the Senate 
to guide screening of the nominees.
It was replaced by the watered-down 
package which virtually all the nominees 
would scale without effort while the two 
senators earlier associated with it, have 
backed d o w n ."21
It is submitted that this canker worm of political 
interference in central bank boards is one of the factors 
leading to poor performances of African Commonwealth central 
banks in their effort to achieve economic growth. Central 
bank Acts should therefore have entrenched in them 
procedural safeguards against removal and instability of 
tenure of governors and directors in the same way as 
judges' tenure of office is secured. Section 256(1) of 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigera, 1979 
dealing with the removal of judicial officers from office, 
stated that:
"256(1)A judicial officer shall not be removed
from his office or appointment before his 
age of retirement except in the following
21 Issue of October 31, 1983.
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circumstances - in the case of Chief 
Justice of Nigeria, by the President acting 
on an address supported by two-thirds 
majority of the senate; (ii) chief Judge 
of the High Court of a State Grand Kadi 
or a Sharia Court of Appeal of a State 
by the Governor acting on an address sup­
ported by two-thirds majority of the House 
of Assembly of the State, praying that he 
be so removed for his inability to discharge 
the functions of his office or appointment 
(whichever arising from infirmity of mind 
or of body) or for misconduct or contra­
vention of the Code of Conduct;
(8) in any case, other than those to which
paragraph (a) of this subsection applies, 
by the President or, as the case may be 
the Governor or the State Judicial Service 
Commission that the Judicial officer be so 
removed for his inability to discharge the 
functions of his office or appoint (whether 
arising from infirmity of mind or body) or 
for misconduct or contravention of the Code 
of Conduct. (2) Any person who has held 
office as a judicial officer shall not on 
ceasing to be a judicial officer for any 
reason whatsoever thereafter appear or act 
as a legal practitioner before any court 
of law or tribunal in Nigeria."
Section 16 of the Bank of Sudan Act 1959 gives a 
similar protection to the Governors and other members of 
the Board. It said:
"The power to determine whether a case of 
ineligibility as defined in Section 14, or 
of vacation of office as defined in Section 
15, has actually occurred is vested in the 
Council of Ministers."22
23 24
Other countries like Sweden and Finland have seen
the necessity of protecting directors against arbitrary
22 Bank of Sudan Act, 1 959 , S . 16.
23 Sveriges Riksbank Act, 1934, Article 28.
24 Bank of Finland, 1925, Art. 32.
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appointments and dismissals by the chief executive as a
result of his direct control over the directors. Such
appointments are made by the legislature and in the 
25
Netherlands it is the Crown that exercises such powers.
INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKS
The concept of the independence of central banks 
developed in a gradual process and evolved in three stages 
marked by four important historical landmarks, namely, the 
First World War, 1914-18; the Brussels Conference Resolu­
tions of 1920; the Great Depression of the 1930s; and the 
World War II, 1939-4 5.
Before World War I, it was fashionable for the 
statutes of central banks to provide for the control of 
state banks, as they were called, by the state. In the 
war and immediate post-war years the world witnessed hyper­
inflation which upset the economic balance of most nations. 
The shattered economies as a result of the inflation 
invoked sharp reaction of economists against state control 
and management of central banks. It used to be argued 
that the independence of the central bank was a necessary 
safeguard to prevent irresponsible governments financing 
themselves by resort to the printing press. It will be 
recalled that at page 54 of our Chapter 2 we found that 
at the end of the 19th century A.D. most countries in 
Europe had already established national banks which, except 
for the Bank of France and South African Reserve Bank, were
25 Netherlands Bank Act, 1948, Art. 23.
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wholly state-owned. Since most of the national banks were
state-owned it was not strange at that time that governments
should control state banks. The practice of state control
of central banks by these governments continued until 1920
when under the auspices of the League of Nations the
Brussels Conference Resolutions of 1920 directed that:
"banks, and especially Banks of Issue, should 
be freed from political pressure and should 
be conducted solely on the lines of prudent 
f inance. "26
The concept of independence of Banks of Issue now evolved
27
and developed, according to S.K. Basu, was the central 
feature of the reconstruction schemes initiated by the 
League of Nations and was enshrined in the statutes of most 
of the central banks established at the time, as in 
Austria, Hungary, Estonia, Greece and so on.
This new concept of independence of central banks 
continued to apply until the Great Depression of the 1930s 
when it was discovered that the concept could no longer 
provide an answer to the world's economic woes. An 
alternative concept or system had to be found and the world 
had to go back to the pre-1920 concept, under which 
central banks' monetary and fiscal policies were integral 
parts of the overall economic policy of state governments. 
T h u s ,
"the imposing facade of complete 
political independence that central
26 Resolution 111, proposed by the Commission on Currency 
and Exchange and adopted by the Brussels Conference 
1920. See also S.K. Basu, Central Banking in the 
Emerging Countries, p. 6 9 in International Financial 
Conference, 1920 (Brussels, 1920), p. 18.
27 S.K. Basu, op. c i t , p. 69.
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banks in many parts of the world had 
so assiduously built up crumbled to 
pieces by the impact of the great 
Depression."28
As a commentator had aptly observed:
"the fate of the independent central banks 
came to be sealed and the mirage that was 
fostered so carefully in the 1920s that 
finance and politics should be kept 
segregated in troubulous times was shattered 
to p i e c e s ."2 9
An example of the application of the new concept of 
subordination was to be found in New Zealand, where an 
amendment in 1939 to the Reserve Bank Act provided:
"In the exercise of their functions and 
powers under the principal Act the Governor 
and the Board of Directors shall have 
regard to any representations that may be 
made by the Minister of Finance in respect 
of any functions or business of the Reserve 
Bank, and shall give effect to any decision 
of the Government in relation thereto 
conveyed to the Governor in writing by the 
Minister of F i n a n c e .  " 2 0
This trend of state ownership and control gathered 
momentum in the post-depression years and thus was made 
manifest in the organic laws of central banks enacted 
particularly after the World War II. An example is section 
50(3) of Central Bank of Kenya which provides as follows:
28 Ibid, p . 69.
29 G.G. Johnson, The Treasury and Monetary Policy, 1 933- 
38 , p . 6 .
30 G.R. Hawke, Between Governments and Banks, A History
of Reserve Bank of New Zealand, p. 62.
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"The Minister may request the Bank to 
give its advice on any particular measures, 
situations or transactions, or on monetary, 
banking and credit conditions in or outside 
Kenya, and the Bank shall give its advice 
accordingly."
The Bank of Zambia Act also provides in Section 10(1) and 
(2) that:
"10(1)The Minister may, after consultation with 
the Governor, give directions to the Bank, 
and the Bank shall comply with such 
directions.
(2)Any direction given by the Minister under 
subsection (1) shall be in writing, and 
open to the inspection of the Board."
Similarly, Section 61(1) and (2) of the Bank of Tanzania 
state that:
"61(1) The Bank may advise the Government on 
any matter relating to its functions, 
powers and duties under this or any 
other law and shall advise the Government 
which, in the Bank's opinion, any such 
matter is likely to affect the achievement 
of the principal objectives of the Bank 
as set forth in section 5.
(2) The Government may require the Bank to 
give its advice on any matter relating 
to the functions, powers and duties of 
the Bank and credit conditions in Tanzania 
or any proposals, measures or transactions 
relating thereto, and the Bank shall give 
its advice accordingly."
Also 58(3) (1) of the Central Bank of Nigeria provides that:
"The Board shall keep the Commissioner 
informed of the monetary and banking 
policy pursued or intended to be pursued 
by the Central Bank."
The Bank of England also did not escape being infected 
by the new trend. The Bank was in effect nationalised in
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1946, soon after the end of World War II. The idea of 
nationalisation reflects the intention that a central bank 
should not pursue a policy that runs counter to the 
objectives of the national economic policy fashioned to 
achieve the targets set by governments and to ensure that 
its policies are not at variance with those of the govern­
ment. Prevailing opinion in the United Kingdom and most 
countries has generally supported Montague Norman's 
dictum, that the elected government ought to have the final
say in the implementation of policies for which it is
31politically answerable. This is the position today.
We see therefore that the modern concept recognises 
the fact that central banks should to a certain degree be 
independent in their policy formulations as well as in 
the manner in which they carry out their technical opera­
tions in implementing the policies. At the same time they 
should work in close harmony with their governments. So, 
while conceding the fact that it is desirable for central 
banks to be independent to a certain extent of government, 
we might infer from the practices of central banks and 
from the provisions in the various Acts that independence 
of the central bank should be seen as independence within 
the government rather than of the government. Concerning 
independence within the government, a former Governor of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria had this to say:
"Many advantages have been associated 
with Central Bank independence within
31 Andrew Crockett, Money: Theory, Policy and Constitutions 
1981 , p. 114.
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the Government. One of them is that 
an independent Central Bank will be able 
to operate with greater flexibility, speed 
and business efficiency. Another is the 
fact that monetary affairs are highly 
technical and deserve to be managed 
independently and objectively. However, 
the most important reason for giving 
autonomy to a Central Bank is that 
monetary management based primarily on 
political considerations carries a danger 
of hyper inflation.
If the operation of a Central Bank is 
to be in the best economic interest of the 
people, monetary and banking policy would 
have to be as unbiased and detached as 
possible but based on economic realities.
As a former Chairman of the U.S. Federal 
Reserve System (Mr. William M. Martins) 
put it, 'when the Federal Reserve System 
succumbs to the pressures of political 
expediency or the dictates of private 
interest the groundwork of sound money 
is undermined.' In other words the 
capacity of a Central Bank to maintain a 
meaningful anti-inflation posture is 
greatly enhanced when it enjoys consider­
able degree of independence."32
It is also pertinent to recall the apt description of 
the relationship between the government and the Central 
Bank provided by Montague Norman, the then Governor of the 
Bank of England. He said:
"I look upon the Bank (of England) as 
having the unique right to offer advice 
and to press such advice to the point of 
'nagging'; but always of course subject 
to the supreme authority of the Government."
Under the Monetary Law Act of Sri Lanka, where there
32 0. Ola Vincent, Address at the Dinner Given in Honour
of Participants on the Symposium to Mark the 20th 
Anniversary of the Central Bank of Nigeria on June 29, 
1979, p. 5.
33 Quoted in R.S. Sayers, Modern Banking, 5th ed., p. 65.
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is a difference of opinion between the Minister in charge 
of Finance and the Central Bank the Minister can give 
directives to the Central Bank. In the United Kingdom all 
policy measures are first discussed with the government 
and announced in consultation with the Treasury.
In trying to operate within the ambit of their 
independence, some central banks have incurred the dis­
pleasure and odium of governments. The system inherently 
generates conflicts. However, some of the Acts make 
adequate provision for resolving any possible conflicts. 
Thus Section 115(1) and (2) of the Monetary Law Act (No.
58 of 1949) of the Central Bank of Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, 
provides that
"115(1) On or before the fifteenth day of May 
in each year the Monetary Board shall 
submit to the Minister of Finance for use 
in preparation of the Budget speech a 
confidential report describing and analysing 
the monetary situation in Ceylon and the 
current monetary policy of the Board, and 
examining the effect of the current fiscal 
policy of the Government upon the ability 
of the Central Bank to achieve the objects 
specified in section 5.
(2) In the event of any difference of opinion 
between the Minister of Finance and the 
Monetary Board as to whether the monetary 
policy of the Board is directed to the 
greatest advantage of the people of Ceylon, 
the Minister of Finance and the Board shall 
endeavour to reach agreement. If the 
Minister of Finance and the Board are unable 
to reach agreement, the Minister may inform 
the Board that the Government accepts 
responsibility for the adoption by the 
Board of a policy in accordance with the 
opinion of the Government and direct that 
such a policy be adopted by the Board.
Where a direction is so given by the Minister 
of Finance, the Board shall carry out that 
direction."
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Similarly, section 10 of the Commonwealth Bank Act 
194 5-53, of the Reserve Bank of Australia states inter 
alia that:
"10(2) In the event of a difference of opinion 
between the Government and the Board as 
to whether any policy referred to in the 
last preceding subsection is directed to 
the greatest advantage of the people of 
Australia, the Treasurer and the Board 
shall endeavour to reach agreement.
(3) If the Treasurer and the Board are unable 
to reach agreement, the Board shall forth­
with furnish to the Treasurer a statement 
in relation to the matter in respect of 
which the difference of opinion has arisen.
(4) The Treasurer may then submit a
. recommendation to the Governor-General, 
and the Governor-General, acting with the 
advice of the Federal Executive Council, 
may, by order, determine the policy to be 
adopted by the Commonwealth Bank or the 
Trading Bank, as the case may be."
Section 8(3)(2)(3) of the CBN Act 1958 has almost 
identical provisions for the resolution of differences of 
opinion on questions of policy.
Thus when there is conflict or difference of opinion 
between central banks and governments, the boards have to 
submit their views in a written statement which the 
governments or parliaments have to consider and make a 
ruling. From a survey of the Commonwealth Central Banks' 
Acts we can identify the following areas of control and 
conflict.
APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNOR AND MEMBERS OF THE BOARD
The Governor and Deputy Governor and directors are
appointed by the President or the appropriate Minister for
34specific terms of years as the case may be. In the case
34 See p. 222 above.
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of the Bank of Zambia it is the Minister who determines
what stipends and allowances to pay the Governors and the 
35
directors. He who pays the piper calls the tune. The 
general effect of political appointments in Africa is that 
the incumbents become stooges and lackeys of government or 
their political masters. They become glorified megaphones 
of their political mentors only to embarrass central banks 
with outrageous decisions even in what would appear to be 
non-contentious policy matters. The effect of political 
appointments to the board is to weaken the operation of 
central banks, and as a result of political pressure reduce 
their effectiveness in their efforts to achieve economic
growth. This area of control should be relaxed.
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION ON THE BOARD
Section 11(1) (c) of the Central Bank of Kenya Act 
1967 provides that the Board of Directors shall consist 
among others, of "the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, 
or in his absence an official of the Treasury nominated by 
the Minister." Section 7 ( 1 ) (c) of the Bank of Tanzania 
Act 1966 provides for the Principal Secretary to the 
Treasury to be a member of the Board of Directors. But in
the case of Bank of Zambia Act 1964, the government
representative (the Permanent Secretary Ministry of 
Finance) so appointed under section 7(4) "shall not have a 
vote at meetings of the Board, and he shall not be counted 
for a quorom of directors. The Central Bank of Nigeria
35 Bank of Zambia Act, 1964, Ss. 6(2) and 7(3).
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Act 1958 has no provision for government representation on 
the Board.
The inclusion of competent government representatives 
on the managerial boards of central banks ensures the 
government's active participation in policy decisions.
If because of the powers and presence of the govern­
ment representative the balance of power tilts in favour 
of government, the position of the central bank to offer an 
independent, frank, objective and impartial view on policy 
matters is greatly diminished, and the bank plays the role 
of a subordinate institution. The mere presence of a 
government representative can adversely affect objective 
analysis and deliberations and frank expressions of views 
by the directors. He could be looked upon as a government 
spy good to be avoided in order not to incur any odium.
His position on the board is made more suspect if he has 
power to veto the decisions of the board. Such a power can 
be found in the Organic Law of the Bank of Mexico of June 
1960 which states that:
"... The Board shall be empowered to 
delegate others of its powers to commit­
tees composed of Directors or to the 
Director General, with the exception of 
those that under this law are subject to 
the veto of the Minister of Finance and 
Public Credit."36
In such a situation the boards cannot give accurate 
and precise decisions; the implementation of decisions is 
unduly delayed, sometimes with disastrous economic
36 Article 52.
236
consequences. The Nigerian Guardian in an editorial opinion 
sums up the position and invites the National Assembly to 
promulgate a law to give the Central Bank of Nigeria "more 
t e e t h " . It s a i d :
"In many ways, our Central Bank is not 
what it ought to be. It neither positively 
effects monetary policy nor does it 
properly address its role as the bank for 
bankers. Where it ought to be a regulatory 
power-house of the economy, it is often 
enmeshed in the contradictions of a govern­
ment that has no clear direction of where 
it is going and no stomach to follow through 
its economic policy decisions.
The bank is not necessarily at fault.
For a start, it does not have the necessary 
statutory powers to perfom its role effec­
tively. It is too closely tied to the 
apron strings of the Ministry of Finance 
with the result that policy decisions and 
their implementation get too often lost in 
the bureaucratic labyrinth.
Secondly, the bank is desperately short- 
staffed in specialist areas and the governor 
consequently takes on far too much. With 
the enormous pressures exerted on him by 
politicians and businessmen who seek to 
ride roughshod over normal processes in 
the scramble to get Form Ms and the clearance 
of letters of credit, little time is left 
for working out policies to keep the bank 
on course.
Such pressures need to be reduced.
Commercial Banks should handle several of 
the processes leading to award of Form Ms 
and letters of credit with the Central Bank 
having the final say on who gets what.
The Commercial Banks will of course be 
closely monitored to ensure they keep within 
the policy parameters laid down by government."
It went on to say:
"Its governor ought to be in a position 
to check the excesses of politicians and 
businessmen of whatever hue who have to 
do business with the bank. For instance, 
not many would have quarrelled with a 
Central Bank Governor who at a time of
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austerity put his foot down on the 
approval of foreign exchange for such a 
dubious pastime as the acquisition of 
private jets and at a time when parents 
found it nearly impossible to remit 
school fees to their wards overseas. The 
Governor of the Central Bank should be far 
more important than to be consigned to the 
role of just another civil servant taking 
o r d e r s .
With the country's sinking into unprece­
dented economic peonage, the bottom line 
for measuring the success of any adminis­
tration now and in the future is unquestionably 
how far it is able to cushion the ordinary 
citizens from the harsh economic winds brought 
about by years of rampant official corruption, 
administrative bottlenecks and plain 
inefficiency. The centrality of the Central 
Bank's role will now come increasingly to 
the f o r e ."37
This area of control should also be relaxed.
POWER OF GOVERNMENT TO ISSUE DIRECTIVES TO 
CENTRAL BANKS AND TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS
Some of the central bank laws state in unmistakable 
terms the powers of the government or minister to issue 
directives to the bank and how to resolve any conflicts 
that might arise between the central bank and government. 
Such provisions over-emphasise the superior powers of 
government and the subordinate position of the central 
banks. A few examples of such banking laws will illustrate 
the point. Section 7(1) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 
1934 provides that:
"The Central Government may from time to 
time give such directions to the bank as 
it may, after consultation with the 
Governor of the Bank, consider necessary
37 The Guardian, October 31, 1983, p. 8.
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in the public interest."
By Section 30(1) the Central Government can declare the 
Central Board to be superseded and the general superinten­
dence of the Bank entrusted to an agency.
Similarly, section 20 of the Bank of Sudan Act 1959 
stipulates that:
"The Minister, with the approval of the 
Council of Ministers, and after consulta­
tion with the Board, may from time to time 
give the Board directions of a general 
character as to the exercise by the Board 
of its functions in matters which appear 
to the Council of Ministers to affect the 
national interest; and the Board shall 
carry out such direction."
The subordinate status of the Bank of England is 
written into the 1946 Bank of England Act which states that 
the Treasury may from time to time give such directions to 
the Bank as, after consultation with the Governor of the 
bank, they think necessary in the public interest.
There are similar laws in Nigeria and Kenya: section 
8(3) 1-3 of the CBN Act, 1958 referred to above and
section 12(6) of the Central Bank of Kenya Act 1966 which 
also states that:
"The Governor and the representative of 
the Treasury shall each have the right to 
suspend a vote by the Board and refer the 
matter to the Minister for a decision, and 
the decision of the Minister as to whether 
the vote shall stand or shall not stand 
shall be binding on the Board."
Section 10(1) and (2) of the Bank of Zambia Act 1964 
provide t h a t :
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"10(1) The Minister may, after consultation with 
the Governor, give directions to the Bank, 
and the Bank shall comply with such 
directions.
(2) Any direction given by the Minister under 
subsection (1) shall be in writing, and 
open to the inspection of the Board."
The provision to issue directives to central bank 
boards has the effect of bringing the bank under the direct 
influence of the government while at the same time removing 
their "teeth". A toothless bulldog can only bark and not 
bite and so it is with a central bank that is not "a 
regulatory power-house of the economy", in the words of 
the Concord.
GOVERNMENT-ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES
Another area of possible conflict between central 
banks and governments is in the development programme of 
government. Governments are concerned and impatient over 
the slow pace of economic development, the low living 
standards, low employment rate, high rate of population 
growth. In their eagerness to combat these shortcomings, 
they have sought to achieve economic growth objectives 
within the shortest possible time even if in the process 
this will destabilise the economic development equilibrium. 
The central bank board has the overall fundamental 
responsibility for monetary management and international 
stability of the domestic currency, and therefore has a 
duty to prescribe its techniques and harmonise the intents 
of government and private sector. A harmonious relation­
ship between the board and government is not only necessary
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but essential. Open disagreement and fundamental division 
not only obstruct the development process but would act 
adversely on the environment for mobilisation of goodwill 
and support from the outside world as well. To avoid 
conflicts there should be regular dialogues and consulta­
tions between the central bank and the Treasury.
CONCURRENT POWERS OF THE BOARD AND THE GOVERNOR
A comparison of section 8(1) and section 8(4) of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria Act brings out clearly some of the 
conflicts and ambiguities in some central bank Acts:
"S8(1) There shall be a Board of Directors of 
the Bank which shall be responsible for 
the policy and general administration of 
the affairs and business, of the Bank.
(4) The Governor or, in his absence, the Deputy 
Governor shall be in charge of the day-to- 
day management of the Bank and shall be 
answerable to the Board for their acts
and decisions."38
The Acts do not make it clear what are matters of
day-to-day management, which fall within the competence of
a Governor and on what matters the Governor must obey the
directions of the board of directors. It is questionable
for instance whether the limits of the Governor's powers
will be confined within the walls of Clause 10 of the
39Central Bank of Nigeria By-Laws 1959 , which lists the
duties of Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank. It is
38 For similar provisions see S.5 and S.6 (4) of the Bank 
of Zambia Act, 1964.
39 Clause 10 lists the duties for which the Governor and 
the Deputy Governor have special responsibilities.
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equally not clear which of the responsibilities of the 
board are in the "general administration of the affairs 
and business of the bank", nor how the board can carry out 
this responsibility. The process of the board to delegate 
should be made flexible and clear to avoid ambiguities.
THE INHERENT OR IMPLIED POWERS OF THE BOARD
The statutory powers of the board of directors may 
not be completely enumerated in the organic law of a 
central bank. Some central bank laws invite the inference 
that the board not only has the enumerated powers but also 
has implied powers to take all action that appear to it 
necessary and proper to discharge its functions in an 
effective manner. The extent of the powers of the Board 
of Directors as well as the legality of their actions 
therefore can be measured and appreciated by taking into 
account the implied as well as the express powers conferred 
on the board by the applicable law.
Section 23 (s) of the Bank of Zambia Act, 1 964 is an 
example of implied powers and it provides that in addition 
to the duties and powers imposed and conferred by that 
Act, the Bank may:
"subject to the express provisions of 
this Act, generally conduct business as 
a bank, -and do all such things as are 
incidental to or consequential on the 
discharge of its duties and the exercise 
of its powers under this Act."
Section 2 9(2)(t) of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 
1958 almost in identical language provides that the Bank
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m a y :
"subject as is expressly provided in this 
Ordinance, generally conduct business as 
a bank, and do all such things as are. 
incidental to or consequential on the 
discharge of its duties and the exercise 
of its powers or the discharge of its 
duties under this Act."
The doctrine of implied powers is a principle of 
interpretation of the organic law of central banks or of 
the statutes or charters governing statutory or chartered 
corporations or companies. What the doctrine means is 
that powers expressly granted are construed to include all 
other powers reasonably incidental to them; according to
4
Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court 
the doctrine is based on the nature of a constitution which
"should not partake of the prolixity of 
a legal code. It should not attempt to 
contain an accurate detail of all the 
subdivisions of which its great powers 
will admit, and of all the means by 
which they may be carried into execution, 
Its nature requires that only its great 
outlines should be marked, its important 
objects designated, and the minor ingre­
dients which compose those objects be 
deduced from the nature of the objects 
themselves."41
The doctrine has found its way from the United States 
into the statutes of some recently established central 
banks as in the examples given above. It originated from 
an inquiry whether the establishment of a central bank in
4 0 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316 (1819) 421. 
41 (1963) 1 MLR 949, McCulloch v. Maryland, 1407.
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the United States would be compatible with the U.S. 
Constitution.
This question was answered in the affirmative in a 
famous memorandum by Alexander Hamilton. Starting from the 
propositions "that there are implied, as well as express 
powers, and that the former are as effectively delegated 
as the latter", he stated that the doctrine of implied 
power yields "a criterion of what is constitutional, and 
of what is not so" and summarised his findings as follows:
"this criterion is the end, to which the 
measure relates as a mean. If the end be 
clearly comprehended within any of the 
specified powers, and if the measures have 
an obvious relation to that end, and is not 
forbidden by any particular provision of 
the Constitution, it may safely be deemed 
to come within the compass of the national 
authority".42
In a provision in the Nigerian Constitution similar 
to section 2 9(2)(t) of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 
1958, the Constitution lists the following as an item . 
under the Exclusive Legislative List:
"Any matter incidental or supplementary 
to any matter mentioned elsewhere in this 
list."43
This phrase was examined by the Judicial Committee of
44the Privy Council in the case of Doherty v. B alewa. In
42 For the full text of Hamilton's paper, dated February 
23, 1971, see Richard B. Morris, e d . The Basic Ideas 
of Alexander Hamilton, 1957, pp. 214-219.
43 Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution, 1963 Second 
Schedule Part I, Exclusive Legislative List Item 67.
(j 9 6 3j44 <1 31 I WLR 949.
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this case a commission of inquiry appointed under the
Commissions and Tribunals of Enquiry Act, 1961, by the
Prime Minister to investigate the affairs of the National
Bank of Nigeria was stopped on an ex parte motion for an
injunction, on the ground that such an inquiry constituted
"an inquisitorial harassment" of the subject, the plaintiff
Managing Director of the Bank having been alleged to have
diverted large sums of money to his own purposes as well
as those of a political party. On appeal, the Supreme 
4 5Court held the Act in question ultra vires only to the 
extent that it purported to give wider powers to a commis­
sion than Parliament could grant under the Constitutions; 
in particular; the power to investigate certain matters 
that might possibly be outside the field of legislative 
competence of Parliament and also the power to compel 
witnesses to give evidence before a commission. On the
further appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
46Council, their Lordships made it clear in their judgement 
that much of the Act was valid and that only a few of the 
powers disallowed by the Supreme Court were in fact ultra 
vires, since the Supreme Court incorrectly held that the 
provision of compulsory powers could not be regarded as an 
incidental or supplementary matter.
As stated above the Nigerian Constitution speaks of 
"any matter incidental or supplementary to any matter
45 (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 604.
46 (1963) 1 W.L.R. 949.
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mentioned elsewhere in this list." Unlike the Nigerian 
Constitution or the Central Bank of Nigeria Act, the 
Australian Constitution speaks only of matters incidental
47to the EXECUTION of the powers of the federal government.
48
In an Australian case the High Court tried to draw 
a distinction between matters which are incidental to the 
ACTUAL EXECUTION of a power and those that are incidental 
to the ACTUAL LEGISLATION on particular subject matters.
The Court said:
"It has often been pointed out that the 
paragraph confers power to make laws with 
respect, not to matters incidental to the 
subjects which are confided, by sec. 51 or 
elsewhere, to the Parliament, but to matters 
which are incidental to the execution of 
the legislative power. The distinction 
between a matter incidental to the execution 
of a power, something which attends or 
arises in its exercise, and a matter 
incidental to a subject to which the power 
is addressed, is material."
Earlier in 1913 the Privy Council held that the word­
ing of the Australian provision referred to above required 
that there should be actual execution by means of legis­
lation before the power to discharge its duties under the 
provision can be attached as incident. It went on to say 
that "if in order to render the powers given by Royal 
Commissions Acts intra vires it is sufficient that they 
should be ancillary to possible subjects of present 
legislative capacity, as distinguished from being incidents 
in actual legislation about such subjects, it is not easy
4 7 S. 51, para. XXIX, Australian Constitution.
48 Le Mesurier v . Connor (1929) C.L.R. 481, p. 497.
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to say that the questions proposed in the present case to
be put, and the documents sought be obtained, are not
relevant as throwing light on possible legislation".
In the Nigerian case of Balewa v. Doherty it would
appear therefore that the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council no longer countenanced the distinction and it
would therefore be safe to regard the ruling in that case
as the leading authority. In that case the Privy Council
had held that in the absence of express authorisation
conferred upon Parliament to establish a tribunal of
inquiry into any matter about which it would legislate
49in the future, "there must be actual legislation in being 
or a function of the Federal Government actually being 
discharged; only then can the connection between the 
two matters be examined to see whether it is sufficiently 
cl o s e . "
This decision appears to cover all the grounds in the 
Zambian and the Nigerian provisions quoted above. The 
phrases underlined above taken together would appear to 
be interchangeable with similar phrases in the Zambian and 
Nigerian provisions which are: "discharge of its duties" 
and "exercise of its powers under this Act". The 
Australian case related only to matters which are inciden­
tal to the execution of a power.
From the foregoing it would be seen that the doctrine 
of implied powers can be invoked by central banks for the
4 9 The emphasis is mine. 
50 The emphasis is mine.
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purpose of extending the scope of legal powers provided 
in a constitutional instrument beyond those that have been 
expressly granted. Some advantages flow from the 
application of this doctrine. The courts are enabled by 
this principle to delimit the powers and functions of an 
organ and identify those that are compatible with the 
substantive law; and, further, they are thereby placed in 
a position whereby they can declare an exercise of power 
arbitrary or ultra vires because it is at variance with 
this doctrine.
As applied to banking in Nigeria the Supreme Court 
ruling would have had the effect of throwing overboard in 
Nigeria the benefits of the doctrine. By the Privy 
Council ruling the doctrine of implied powers is now deeply 
entrenched in the case law; if put into proper use by 
boards of directors the doctrine will in the words of 
Alexander Hamilton yield "a criterion of what is constitu­
tional, and of what is not so" and will be a beacon to 
guide directors in their search for constitutionality.
In assessing the central bank board system it was 
observed from the foregoing paragraphs that a central bank 
board need not be in open confrontation with the 
Government. The bank should not only be neutral and 
impartial in its operations and advice, but it should be 
seen to be detached from political machinations. It should 
provide the business community and the government with 
advice and management that are technically excellent and 
which will be capable of raising the stature of the bank, 
its standing and reputation in the community it serves.
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Long tenures of office should be given to directors so that 
the lure of frequent reappointment or fear of arbitrary 
removal may not influence their actions. Government 
should avoid the temptation of "inquisitorial harassment" 
of boards and confine their powers to investigate banks to 
the express and implied powers and no more.
In the developed world the techniques of the central 
bank board system have facilitated the achievement by 
central banks of outstanding success in the growth of the 
national economy. They have appointed members of the 
board on a functional qualification basis in order to 
harness all the expert manpower available for high produc­
tivity and for the good order and management of the 
economy.
In Commonwealth African countries political appoint­
ments are made with a view to compensating party supporters 
who failed to secure elective political offices. .These 
cronies, sycophants and other assortment of hangers-on and 
boot-lickers do not see their appointments as challenges 
to them to improve the standard of living of Africans. 
Probably it is only God or a "violent" ethical revolution 
that will redeem Africans from these maladies. So long as 
these maladies live with Africans, so long will economic 
progress elude them.
DEPARTMENTAL STRUCTURAL ORGANISATION OF CENTRAL BANKS
The structural organisation of Commonwealth African 
Central Banks has been influenced by the practice inherited 
from the colonial masters, the British. The central banks
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are therefore modelled after the Bank of England. In 
Chapter 2, page 118 it was observed that Sir Roy Fenton, 
Sir Cecil Trevor, J.B. Loynes, J.fc,. Fisher, W.T. Newlyn 
and G-D. P a t o n , who in different ways each played a part 
in the establishment of Commonwealth Central Banks as 
Governors, advisers or Report Commissioners were British- 
groomed by the Bank of England in the art of banking. It 
is no wonder then that these central banks inclined to the 
Bank of England traditions in their administrative 
arrangements.
The classification, name, number and functions of the 
departments of the Banks are generally fixed by law. 
Section 10(e) of the Central Bank of Nigeria Bye-Law 1959 
names one of such departments, the Banking Operations, and 
goes further to list some of the functions of the depart­
ment. Typical statutory departments found in Commonwealth 
African Central Banks are:
Economic Research and Statistics Department 
Banking Supervision Department 
Domestic Banking Department 
Administration Department 
Foreign Operations Department 
Exchange Control Department 
Accounts Department 
Personnel Department
51
Internal Audit Department
51 See for example the Monetary Law Act No. 58 of 1949 
of the Central Bank of Ceylon.
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These departments and their divisions are usually
grouped into directorates and as a matter of routine and
/
practice report to their respective executive directors.
It is therefore to the executive director that lie the 
responsibility to supervise and co-ordinate the work of 
the departments in each directorate. He reports to the 
management daily or as regularly as the regulations or 
convention may determine.
Economic Research Department
The Economic Research Department performs the function 
of collecting and compiling statistical information 
relating to banking and financial sectors of the economy.
It publishes comprehensive reviews and annual reports and 
helps in the formulation of monetary guidelines and credit 
policies.
Banking Supervision
The organic laws of most central banks usually
provide for the establishment of banking supervision
departments with express powers to deal with the licensing,
establishment, supervision and periodic examination of the
52
books and affairs of each and every licensed bank. There 
are also provisions which entrust banking supervision 
departments with special powers of sanction and of report­
ing on other non-bank institutions.
52 See for example, Central Bank of Nigeria Act, S.29A; 
and the Banking Act, 1969, S.20.
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Domestic Banking
The domestic operations of the central banks relate 
to the issue of currency, management of public debt, 
provision of banking services to the government, designated 
domestic financial institutions and corporations and the 
commercial banks. The Central Bank of Nigeria Bye-Laws 
1959 sums up the functions of this department in these 
w o r d s :
"the supervision of arrangements relating 
to the issue and redemption of notes and 
coins and all matters connected with the 
form, design and composition of notes and 
coins. (The Chief of Banking Operations 
shall be charged with direct responsibility 
under the Governor, for these matters)."53
Administration and Personnel Departments
These departments provide the administrative support 
services and personnel policies. The support services 
include inter alia, transport, travel arrangements, housing 
and furniture, office accommodation and equipment, 
secretarial services and security arrangements.
The personnel functions cover subjects like recruit­
ment, promotion, transfers of staff, manpower planning 
and training, industrial relations, welfare and pension 
schemes, staff performance appraisals and discipline.
Exchange Control and Foreign Operations
>
It is the function of the Exchange Control Department
53 S.10(e)
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of a central bank to be responsible for the regulation,
in accordance with the provisions of the country's
exchange control Act, of all foreign exchange transactions.
The main objectives are to ensure that foreign reserves
are used for the country's economic development by
channelling resources into productive activities and that
all foreign exchange receipts are accounted for and
surrendered to the central bank in accordance with 
54regulations.
Foreign Operations Department
The Foreign Operations Department, as the name implies, 
is responsible for the international banking transactions 
of the central bank. It therefore buys, sells and 
invests in overseas countries its earned foreign exchange 
for the government and other customers. It has the 
responsibility for the prudent management of the foreign 
reserves in order to maintain stability of the local 
currency.
Accounts and Audit Department
The accounts departments of central banks maintain 
the books of accounts of the banks and in some banks manage 
the sale and purchase of government stocks and securities. 
They also prepare the profit and loss account and the 
balance sheet of the banks.
The internal audit department is a watchdog, as it
54 Ten Years of Banking in Zambia, p.8.
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were, of the bank and ensures that every department 
complies with the rules, regulations, procedures and 
working instructions for efficient performance.
GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANISATION
Apart from the functional organisation of central 
banks just discussed there is also the aspect of geogra­
phical organisation. When the West African and East 
African Currency Boards were in existence they operated 
at the capitals of the different countries. In appropriate 
cases the Boards appointed other commercial banks as their 
agents using their offices and facilities and personnel to 
run currency centres. In Tanzania, for instance, the Bank 
of Tanzania between 1966 and 1977 opened sub-centres at 
branches of the Standard Bank Limited in Moshi, Mwanza, 
Tanga, Arusha, and M b e y a . In some of these places the 
East African Currency Board had already had such arrange­
ments. In Nigeria, every state capital of the 19 states 
has had established in it a branch of the Central Bank or 
a Currency Centre for the Central Bank of Nigeria Act 
provides in section 5 that the Bank shall have its head 
office in Lagos and may open branches in Nigeria and 
appoint agents and correspondents in accordance with 
decisions of the Board. In the case of Kenya the spread 
is extra-territorial. Section 5 provides that:
"S(5)1 The Bank shall have its head office in 
Nairobi: provided that during a time of 
national emergency the Bank may, unless 
the President otherwise directs, establish 
its head office temporarily or permanently
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in any other place within Kenya or 
elsewhere.
(2) (a) The Bank may establish or close
branches in any place within 
K e n y a .
(b) The Bank may, with the prior
approval of the Minister, open 
or close branches outside Kenya."
By geographical spread the central banks are able to 
expand the spheres of their operations and bring service 
nearer to the people. The research department and the 
agricultural finance departments of central banks use the 
branches and currency centres as collecting centres for 
statistical data and for the dissemination of information. 
These centres have proved useful in times of currency 
exchanges and redemptions. They also provide essential 
machinery for tapping savines from the rural population 
and providing necessary backing for rural development and 
industrialisation of economies.
STAFF MANAGEMENT AND WELFARE
An enlightened board of directors and an articulate 
and dynamic management are compatible partners for success­
ful and efficient performance by a central bank. Another 
important factor is industrial peace without which the 
machinery of management will grind to a halt. If labour 
in central banks is well organised and if the unions are 
in constant dialogue with management, consensus, mutual 
understanding, efficiency and high productivity may be 
expected. Unions act as a bridge or go-between between
55 Central Banking of Kenya Act, 1966.
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labour and management and are therefore vehicles for 
promoting industrial harmony and improving efficiency of 
labour. Unions therefore form an essential part in the 
structure of any central bank.
Trade unionism is an armour against discrimination,
job insecurity and exploitation by employers of labour and
it strengthens the weak bargaining power of the workers.
In Nigeria it is compulsory under the Trade Unions Act,
1973, that all trade unions are registered with the
Registrar of Trade U n i o n s . ^  The Act defines a trade
union to mean "any combination of workers or employers,
whether temporary or permanent, the purpose of which is to
regulate the terms and conditions of employment of
workers, whether the combination in question would or
would not, apart from this Decree [Act], be an unlawful
combination by means of any of its purposes being in
restraint of trade whether its purpose do or do not
* 57
include the provision of benefits for its members.
Under section 12 of the Act no person who is other­
wise eligible for membership of a particular union may be 
refused admission to that union by reason only that he is 
of a particular.community, tribe, place of origin, 
religion or political opinion.
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979 incorporates a Bill of Rights which guarantees every 
person's right freely to assemble and associate with other
56 S.2(1) .
57 Trade Unions Act, 1973 , S . 1 (1) .
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p e r s o n s :
"Every person shall be entitled to assemble 
freely and associate with other persons, 
and in particular he may form or belong to 
any political party, trade union or any 
other association for the protection of 
his interests.
Sub-sections 37(a) and (b) contain the exceptions
which derogate from the fundamental right of the individual
to join a union of his choice by excluding political
59parties and persons elected to a legislative house. The
denial of the exercise of this right as enshrined in the
1963 Constitution was examined in the case of Basorun v.
6 0Industrial Arbitration Tribunal & Q r s .
In that case the plaintiff asked for a declaration of 
the court that paragraph 1 (b) of the schedule to the Trade 
Disputes (Central Bank of Nigeria Arbitration Award) 
Confirming Order, 1971 was unconstitutional as being an 
infringement of section 26 of the 196 3 Republic Constitution.
58 S.37.
59 Cf. S s . 18-33 of the 1963 Republic Constitution which 
contain the rubric "reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society" by which the Nigerian courts can 
measure the validity or otherwise of legislation 
limiting any of the fundamental rights for certain 
specific purposes, viz:
(a) In the interest of defence, public safety, public 
order, public morality or public health;
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and 
freedom of other persons; or
(c) imposing restrictions upon persons holding office 
under the state, members of the armed forces of 
the Federation or members of a police force.
60 Suit No. LD/105/71, High Court of Lagos, Unreported.
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The plaintiff was a deputy manager with the Central Bank 
of Nigeria and was the President of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria Employees' Union, a duly registered union. A 
trade dispute arose between the Bank and the Union and 
this was referred to the Industrial Arbitration Tribunal 
under the provisions of the Trade Disputes (Emergency 
Provisions)(Amendment) (No. 2) Decree 1969. In its award 
the Tribunal recommended, inter alia, that "no member of 
the staff above the rank of supervisor may join a trade 
union of any of the junior staff or participate either 
directly or indirectly in the activities of such union.
The senior staff in their own right may form an association 
or a trade union of their own to protect their rights".
That award was confirmed by the Commissioner for Labour 
under powers conferred on him by the Decree. The Plaintiff 
a deputy manager, was above the rank of supervisor. Had 
his constitutional rights been violated? Adesanya, J., 
thought so. "The terms of the award are wide enough to 
invite the intervention of the court in normal times". But 
the times were not normal; so the learned judge refused a 
declaration. What made the times abnormal was this: as a
result of a Supreme Court decision in 1970 in Lakanmi v.
61
Attorney-General in which Decree No. 4 5 of 1968, the
Forfeiture of Assets etc., (Valuation) Decree, 1968 of the 
Federal Military Government was declared ultra vires the 
government issued the Federal Military Government 
(Supremacy)(Enforcement of Powers) Decree, No. 28 of 1970. 
It provides that:
61 Suit No. SC 58/69, Supreme Court, Unreported.
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"any decision, whether made before or 
after the commencement of this Decree by 
any court of law in the exercise o£ 
purported exercise of any powers under 
the constitution or any enactment or law 
of the Federation or of any State which 
has purported to declare or shall here­
after purport to declare the invalidity 
of any Decree or any Edict as not incon­
sistent with the provisions of a Decree 
or the incompetence of any of the 
governments in the Federation to make 
same as or shall be null and void and of 
no effect whatsoever as from the date of 
the making thereof."
Similarly, the same grounds were contested in 1960 in
6 2
Cheranci v. Alkali Cheranci in which the plaintiff was 
convicted of inciting a young boy to participate in 
politics and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. He 
challenged the validity of Part III of the Northern Nigerian 
Children and Young Persons Law, 19 58, on the ground that 
it was contrary to the provisions of the Constitution 
which guarantees freedom of expression, freedom of con­
science and freedom from discrimination. Bate, J. held 
that the provisions of the law impunged was valid and 
constitutional, since the restriction it contained was 
reasonably justifiable in the interest of public morality 
and public order.
The Trade Unions Act, 1973, prohibits outright central 
bank employees and certain other persons from joining
unions, thus restricting the individual's constitutional
6 3rights, outlined above, to form or join a union.
62 (1960) N.N.L.R. 24.
63 S.11.
The following persons employed in the following
co n t d ...
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This is in direct conflict with the Labour Decree, 
1974 which states that no contract shall:
" (a) make it a condition of employment that
a worker shall or shall not join a trade 
union or shall or shall not relinquish 
membership of a trade union, or
(b) cause the dismissal o f , or otherwise 
prejudice, a worker:
(i) by reason of trade union membership, 
or
(ii) because of trade union activities 
outside working hours or, with the 
consent of the employer, within 
working hours, or 
(iii) by reason of the fact that he has
lost or been deprived of membership 
of a trade union or has refused or 
been unable to become or for any 
other reason is not, a member of
a trade u n i o n . " 6 4
The 1973 Act also offends against section 37 of the 
1979 Nigerian Constitution as shown above. On the 
international scene the Act is inconsistent with the 
International Labour Organisation Conventions No. 98 which 
reads as follows:
c o n t d ...
establishments are prohibited from combining organising
or becoming members of a trade union:
(a) the Nigerian Army, Navy or Airforce;
(b) the Nigerian Police Force;
(c) the Prisons Department of Nigeria;
(d) the Customs Preventive Service;
(e) the Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Co. Ltd
(f) the Central Bank of Nigeria;
(g) the Nigerian External Telecommunications Ltd;
(h) Every Federal or State Government establishment 
the employees of which are authorised to bear 
arms; and
(i) Such other establishments as the Commission may 
from time to time specify by order.
64 S.9(6) .
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"Workers shall enjoy adequate protection 
against acts of anti-union discrimination 
in respect of their employment.
Such protection shall apply more 
particularly in respect of acts calculated 
t o :
(a) make the employment of a worker subject 
to the condition that he shall not 
join a union or shall relinquish 
trade union membership;
(b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise 
prejudice a worker by reason of 
union membership or because of 
participating in union activities 
outside working hours or, with the 
consent of the employer, within 
working h o u r s ."
It is submitted that section 11 of the Trade Unions 
Act, 1973, which sought to exclude central banks from trade 
union activities contrary to section 37 of the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is null and void.
Whether the restrictions in section 11 of the Trade 
Unions Act 1973 are justifiable in a democratic society is 
for the Nigerian courts to determine. A worker or any 
person who thinks his constitutional right to form or 
belong to a trade union has been violated may apply to the 
High Court for redress and the court 'may make such orders, 
issue such writs and give such directions as it may consi­
der appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing
the enforcement... of any rights to which the person who
6 5
makes the application may be entitled... The remedies 
would normally, therefore, include both the common law and 
equitable remedies of damages, injunction or declaratory 
judgements.'
65 S. 32, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1 979 .
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As stated earlier, trade unions act as liaison bodies 
between labour and management and they have the following 
identifiable functions to play in the economy:
" (a) they substitute collective bargaining
for individual bargaining with employers, 
particularly on wages and conditions of 
service, including hours, safety, health 
and welfare facilities.
(b) they provide their members with legal aid 
in cases against their employers and to 
some extent with subsistence payments in 
cases of sickness, accidents and strikes; 
they organise education courses, grants 
and scholarships for members and their 
children in appropriate cases.
(c) they aim to secure adequate representation 
and participation of labour at local, 
national and international level in the 
general formulation of policy and measures 
which may affect their members.
(d) they work for the reduction of uneconomic 
wage differentials and towards raising the 
general level of wages in the country.
(e) they intervene in disputes between labour 
and management and generally co-operate to 
secure minimum standards of safety, and 
conditions of service, which by fostering 
industrial harmony improve labour security 
and efficiency."66
From the advantages of trade unionism enumerated 
above, it would be seen that it will be a disservice to 
industrial harmony and improved productivity for central 
banks to be precluded from forming their own trade unions.
In the Central Bank of Nigeria where employees of the bank 
are statutorily denied the fundamental right to freely 
associate by banning trade union activities, the alternative 
step it has taken was to establish staff junior and senior 
consultative councils whose duty it is:
66 G.O. Nwankwo, Basic Economics, 1977, p. 50.
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"(a) To provide a regular procedure for con­
sultation between the management and 
employees on matters of mutual interest 
in order to minimise friction and 
misunderstanding, and to promote the 
objectives of the Bank.
(b) To secure the fullest measure of c o ­
operation for the prosecution of measures 
and policies undertaken in the mutual 
interest of both parties.
(c) To promote in the employees a wider interest 
and participation in the design of the 
environment in which their work is 
performed.
(d) To promote throughout the bank a spirit 
of co-operation so that performance 
efficiency may be secured, and the con­
tentment of the employees ensured.
(e) To promote the diversification of 
employees' interest in directions other 
than normal office duties so that employees 
may develop a sense of civic responsibility
and self-fulfilment."67
Apart from the pious hopes to achieve these objectives 
the constitutions of the Joint Consultative Councils 
(J.C.C.) do not in any way give protection against discri­
mination, job insecurity and exploitation of the staff by 
management. In such circumstances and in any central bank 
where such conditions prevail, the sword of Damocles would 
surely hang over an employee or joint consultative council 
staff member who steps out of line. They would be 
regarded as intransigent and are likely to invite the wrath 
of a ruthless central bank management. Although the 
Central Bank of Nigeria management and the Consultative 
Councils have worked reasonably well in close co-operation, 
there have been instances where some vocal and articulate 
members were transferred out of the head office apparently
67 Central Bank of Nigeria Senior Staff Joint Consultative 
Council Constitution, S.2.
263
to humiliate such members and weaken the council under 
veiled reasons that transfers were necessitated by 
exigencies of duties.
The experience of India, where the right to form
6 8
associations or unions is'enshrined in the Constitution
69
and in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, should be 
considered as a model and adopted by emerging central 
banks. Mr. V.G. H e g d e , the Legal Adviser to the Reserve 
Bank of India and his Deputy, Mr. R. Srinivasan, with whom 
the present writer had useful sessions of discussions 
when he visited the Reserve Bank in the course of his 
work, observed that trade unionism as practised in the 
Reserve Bank of India has been of mutual benefit to both 
employees and employers. Paragraphs 168 to 170 of the 
Reserve Bank of India Annual Report 1982-83 supports this 
observation:
"168 A meeting was held between the Bank and 
the All India Reserve Bank Workers' 
Federation in March 1983 to discuss some 
outstanding issues of the last charter 
of demands of Class IV staff of the Bank. 
Meetings were also held between the Bank 
and the All India Reserve Bank Employees' 
Association to sort out some current 
problems relating to Class III staff.
169 During the year, apart from a joint 
consultation council meeting with the 
Reserve Bank of India Officers' Association 
the annual conciliation meeting with each 
of the two Officers' Associations was 
also held when several matters affecting 
the interests of the officers and liberal­
isation of facilities for them were
68 The Constitution of India, 1949, Article 19(1)(a).
69 S .2(bb) and (j ) .
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discussed. The relations of the Bank 
with its officers continued to be cordial 
throughout the year.
170 A conference of the managers and depart­
mental heads was held in December 1982 
during which the industrial relations 
situation in various offices of the Bank, 
problems of currency management, etc., 
were discussed."
It is not therefore in the best interest of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria that the advantages and opportuni­
ties offered to workers by Section 37 of the Nigerian 
Constitution, Section 9(b) of the Labour Decree, 1974 and 
the International Labour Convention No. 98 are denied them. 
As earlier stated it will be left to an aggrieved worker 
who thinks that his constitutional rights to form or 
belong to a trade union has been violated to have recourse 
to the Nigerian Courts to test the validity of Section 11 
of Trade Union Act, 1973.
CENTRAL BANKING IN A FEDERAL STATE
Federalism is usually defined as the system of 
government under which the federal and the state legisla­
tures are supreme within their respective spheres of
competence. Because legislative powers are shared within
70a federation between the states and the federation,
70 In Texas v. White 7 Wall 700 (1869) p. 720 Chief
Justice Chase of the U.S. Supreme Court defined the 
word "State" to mean "a people or community of 
individuals united more or less closely in political 
relations, inhabiting temporarily or permanently the 
same country; often it denotes only the country or 
territorial region, inhabited by such community; not 
infrequently it is applied to the government under 
which the people live; at other times it represents' 
the combined idea of people, territory and government.
c o n t d ...
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the federal government is usually referred to as a govern­
ment of enumerated powers. India, the United States and 
Nigeria are examples of federation and in their constitutions 
powers of the federal and state legislatures are enumerated 
in a legislative list.
As in India, banking in Nigeria is a federal subject.
The Seventh Schedule of Article 246 shows the following 
items in the Indian Union List, the Exclusive Legislative 
L i s t ;
Item 36, Currency, coinage and legal tender - 
foreign exchange.
Item 38, Reserve Bank of India 
Item 45, Banking.
The Exclusive Legislative List of the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 has the following 
items on the List:
Item 6, Banks, banking, bills of exchange and 
promisory notes.
c o n t d ...
It is not difficult to see that in all these senses 
the primary conception is that of a people or community. 
The people, in whatever territory dwelling, whether 
temporarily or permanently, and whether organised 
under a regular government or united by looser or less 
definite relations, constitute the state."
In Nigeria, in three consolidated cases A-G of Qgun 
State v . A-G of the Federation, Suit No. SC53/1981 of 
5/2/83 the Supreme Court of Nigeria appears to hold 
that "State" refers to government only since it is 
not clear "how an autonomous state as a geographical 
expression could bring an action in its name against 
the whole of the Federation - a sovereign nation - 
also in the latter's name" per Udo Udoma J.
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Item 14, Currency, coinage and legal tender
Item 24, Exchange Control.
In India and Nigeria the federal government has the
same power over the establishment, licensing, supervision,
winding-up and so on of state government-owned banks as it
has over privately-owned and indigenous banks. The
position is not the same in the United States where, the
control of banks and banking is a matter exclusively for
the states. However, in one case it was held that the
American Congress has the power to charter by legislation
a bank of its own as means necessary and proper for carry-
71ing into execution the powers of the federal government.
And indeed by the International Banking Act of September 
17, 1978, the 95th Congress provides for Federal Regulation 
of participation by foreign banks in domestic financial 
m arkets:
"The Congress hereby declares that it is 
the purpose of this section to provide for 
the establishment of international banking 
and financial corporations operating under 
Federal supervision with powers sufficiently 
broad to enable them to compete effectively 
with similar foreign-owned institutions in 
the United States and abroad: to afford to 
the United States exporter and importer in 
particular, and to United States commerce, 
industry, and agriculture in general, at 
all times a means of financing international 
trade, especially United States exporters; 
to foster the participation by regional and 
smaller banks throughout the United S-tates 
in the provision of international banking 
and financing services to all segments of 
United States agriculture, commerce and
7 9industry.'
71 McCulloch v. M a r y l a n d , 4 Wheat 316 (1819) .
72 Sec. 3(b) Section 25(e) of the Federal Reserve Act.
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While the federation has exclusive power with respect to
b a n k s , banking and so on, the Indian constitution did not
make it clear whether the Union has exclusive power over
banks - the institutions where the business of banking is
transacted - with regard to their control, ownership,
incorporation, management and so on as opposed to the
regulation of transactions between banker and customer. In
Australia this problem has arisen and in Melbourne
73
Corporation v. Commonwealth the High Court of Australia 
held that the word "banking" includes the regulation of 
transactions between banker and customer as well as the 
control of the institution and went as far as to say that 
"banking" also includes central banking.
In India, as in United States, there is a Reserve Bank 
that is at the apex of the banking system whose functions 
involve the formulation of monetary policy and the regula­
tion of the operations of commercial banks. The Reserve 
system of the United States consists of 12 Reserve Banks.
India, the United states- and Nigeria in that order 
are the three largest democracies in the world. They 
command about one-third of the World population. The 
following table shows the dominating banking positions (see 
overleaf).
From a comparison of the set-up and the total number 
of banks and bank branches it will be seen that the United 
States, India and Nigeria which are federations, have each 
a central bank - the United States Board of Governors, the
73 (1947) 74 C.L.R. 69.
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Table 5 : Bank Density
Country No . of 
States
No . of 
Banks or 
Branches
Ratio Zonal Boards
per % of
population
India 18 + 5 
Union 
Terri­
tories
17 Foreign 1:52,000 14 Branches exclud­
ing Agencies, Western, 
Eastern, Northern 
and Southern Areas 
with headquarters in 
Bombay, Calcutta, 
Madras and New Delhi 
respectively.
U.S.A. 49 member 
Banks 6 00 0 
Branches
1 :6 ,000 12 Boards at New 
York, Boston, 
Philadelphia, 
Richmond, Cleveland, 
Chicago, Atlanta, 
Dallas, St. Louis, 
Minneapolis, Kansas 
City, and San 
Francisco Washington 
Board co-ordinates.
Nigeria 19 35 Banks 
1077
Branches 
as at 
31/10/83
1 :83 ,000 19 Branches. No. 
co-ordinating zonal 
b o a r d s .
Reserve Bank of India and the Central Bank of Nigeria.
The Organisation of the 3 systems are charted at pages 27Z~ Z-74- 
While the United States has twelve Federal Reserve Banks as 
regional boards India has four Local Boards. The Central 
Bank of Nigeria Board has no zonal offices or branches 
from where to co-ordinate the activities of central bank 
branches and currency centres or where to represent, as 
far as possible, territorial and economic interests and 
the interests of co-operative and indigenous banks. The 
telecommunication system in Nigeria is in no way near 
efficient. Because of the very frequent cuts in electricity 
supply to the nation communication system equipment cannot
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perform efficiently. They break down ever so often and in 
their trail expensive electronic equipment get damaged.
The transport system is very inefficiently organised and 
run. The terrains and the long winding roads hamper free
flow of traffic on the Nigerian network of roads, the
postal system is grossly mismanaged and it has been repeat­
edly reported that some postmen in different parts of the
country had formed the habit of dumping mail in the bushes.
All" these factors make regular and frequent contacts between 
Central Bank branches and head office and between branch 
and branch almost impossible. The lack of contact between 
branch and head office, a situation beyond its control, has 
contributed immensely to the failure of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria to balance its books for several years. This in 
turn creates a favourable climate for fraudulent practices 
and forgeries which could involve substantial losses of 
sums of money that could have been utilized in the country's 
development efforts.
It is submitted therefore that because of the large 
and unwieldy population of Nigeria, the poor telecommunica­
tion system, the inefficient postal system and the lack of 
a network of good roads, the Central Bank of Nigeria has 
not fully succeeded in monitoring and supervising efficiently 
the work in the branches and currency centres. To 
minimise the effects of these handicaps., zonal boards should 
be established whose functions would be to advise the 
Central Board of Directors on such matters as may be 
generally or specifically referred to them or on various 
matters of local importance, on which the members can
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contribute by virtue of their specialised knowledge of the 
region they represent. The Central Board of Directors in 
Lagos can delegate some of its powers to the zonal boards. 
The Zonal Board system has succeeded in the United States 
through the operations of the Federal Reserve Banks and in 
India through the Local Boards. Central Bank of Nigeria 
branches and currency centres could be grouped into conti­
guous zones for efficient and effective co-ordination and 
output of work as follows:
Table 6 Suggested Zonal Boards
Zone Areas Headquarters
A Kano, Bauchi, Maiduguri Kano
B Sokoto, K aduna, Niger, Abuja Kaduna
C Jos, Yola, Makurdi Jos
D A k u r e , Benin Benin
E Owerri, E n ugu, Calabar, Port Harcourt Enugu
F Ibadan, Ilorin, A beokuta, Ikeja Ibadan
Officers of sufficient authority of the level of 
departmental directors should head the zonal offices. By 
this arrangement only major matters and reports should be 
referred to the head office for their information or 
determination.
Having examined the structure of central banks parti­
cularly the Central Bank of Nigeria, we will now in the 
next chapter examine further to what extent the Bank in 
its various functions has attempted to attain the
271
objective of economic growth.
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CHAPTER 5 
SERVICE FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL BANKS
SCOPE
In this chapter we shall consider the provisions in 
the various Acts of Commonwealth African Central Banks 
dealing with the service functions of Central Banks. We 
shall examine how the banks carry out these statutory 
functions and then will attempt to determine to what 
extent these provisions have proved adequate or inappropri­
ate as instruments for the management of the various 
economies. We shall therefore consider the following 
service functions:
Issuing of Currency 
Banker to the Government 
Management of Public Debt
ISSUING OF CURRENCY
Traditionally, the Central Banks of Commonwealth 
Africa have the sole right to issue bank notes and coins 
in and for their respective countries. This power to 
issue notes and coins is regulated by central bank laws, 
and is expressed in various ways in the applicable organic 
laws. Section 18 of the Central Bank of^Nigeria Act 1958 
states that the Bank shall have the sole right of issuing
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notes and coins throughout Nigeria and neither the Federal
Government nor State Governments nor any other person shall
1
issue currency notes, bank notes or coins or any documents
or tokens payable to bearer on demand being documents or
tokens which are likely to pass as legal tender. Among
other things, the Bank shall also arrange for the printing
of notes and the minting of coins.
2
The Kenya Act provides that the Bank shall have the
sole right to issue notes and coins in Kenya and, subject
to subsection (4) of section 22, only such notes and coins
shall be legal tender in Kenya. In identical words,
section 26 of the Bank of Tanzania Act 1965 grants the Bank
the sole right of issue of the country's currency.
It is not clear why the Bank of Zambia Act 1964 does
not directly confer the right of issue of currency on the
3
Bank. Section 36 of the Act merely states that currency 
notes and coins, other than coins of denominations of 
three pence, one penny and one half penny, issued by or for 
which liability was assumed by the Bank of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, shall cease to be legal tender in December 1967. 
It is doubtful therefore whether the 'incidental clause', 
section 23(5) of the 1964 Act, confers such sole right on 
the Bank of Zambia. It may be noted however that section 
15(1) of the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act, before the
1 Currency notes here may refer to those notes supplied
by a central government as in India, Reserve Bank Act
1974, 6.22(1) and Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan, 
5.24(1) in contradistinction to bank notes.
2 Central Bank of Kenya Act 1966 s.22.
3 Legal Notice No. 59 of 1967.
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union was broken up, conferred on the Bank the sole right 
to issue notes and coins.
However there are some regimes under which the
authority to issue notes is not formulated as the sole or
exclusive right of the Central Bank. In Australia, section
4 7 of the Reserve Bank Act provides that the Commonwealth
Bank shall not issue bills or notes (other than Australian
notes) intended for circulation as money. In the United
Kingdom the Bank of England has the exclusive right of 
4
note issue only in England and Wales; but in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland certain banks also have a limited right 
to issue their own bank notes.
In Chapter 2 it was noted that, before the establish­
ment of central banks in West and East Africa, the notes 
and coins in circulation were the West African currency 
notes issued by the West African Currency Board and the 
East African Currency Board respectively, each covering 
all the British colonies in the area of jurisdiction. With 
the attainment of national political independence the 
newly independent countries' central banks issued their 
own currencies and redeemed all the Currency Boards' 
notes and coins and thereafter assumed their proper place 
in the management of the money supply.
The various Acts provide that the central banks shall 
arrange for the printing of notes and the minting of coins 
and that the denominations of notes and coins will be
4 See Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition, vol. 2, 
pp. 153-4, and Halsbury's Statues of England, 2nd 
edition, vol. 2 , pp. 261-6.
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determined in the future by action of designated organs.
In Nigeria, the authority is the Commissioner or the 
Federal Minister of Finance who approves the prescribed 
denominations on the recommendation of the Central B a n k .^ 
Further, on the recommendation of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria the Minister approves the forms and designs of 
notes and coins and also the standard weight and composi­
tion of coins issued by the bank. Similarly worded are the 
provisions in the Bank of Tanzania Act 1965, which state 
that the bank notes and coins issued by the Bank:
"(a) shall be in such denominations of the
shilling or fractions thereof expressed 
in c e nts; and
(b) shall be of such materials, forms and designs, 
shall bear such inscriptions and devices, 
and shall have such other characteristics 
as the Bank, with the approval of the Minister, 
shall determine.
(2) The Bank shall give notice in the Gazette
of the denominations and other charac­
teristics of the bank notes and coins 
which it issues."^
In the Bank of Zambia Act provisions governing the 
denominations, forms and designs are not provided.
Thus, in the central bank Acts of Commonwealth Africa the 
dimension, design and inscriptions of notes and coins are 
prescribed in the various Acts and determined by the 
appropriate Minister. The type and colour of notes, and 
the printing techniques used, are important for easy 
identification by the illiterate masses and for notes and
5 Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958 s.20(1)(a).
6 Bank of Tanzania Act 1 965 , s. 27.
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coins to be lawful money, they must be of the prescribed
weight, fineness and metallic content, not impaired,
diminished or lightened otherwise than by fair wear and 
7t e a r .
Money Supply and Currency Exchange
Every day, whether in tha market, canteen, shopping 
centre or office, people at one time or another pay money 
to a creditor or receive money from a debtor. Money 
changes hands from one person to another and in different
g
volumes and velocity. In Chapter 1, it was remarked 
that money has several important uses. It is used as a 
means of payment and as a medium of exchange. In addition 
it is used as a store of value. In order to make money 
available to fulfil these objectives central banks have the 
duty of putting money into circulation for use to meet 
obligations as they a^ise and mature.
Two elements make up the money supply, as narrowly 
conceived, viz the currency in the hands of the public 
(i.e. hand-to-hand currency outside the banks) and demand 
deposits held by the banks. Several factors affect the 
money supply, the major determinants being international 
trade balances and net borrowing and net gifts and grants 
from abroad; and to some extent money supply may be deter­
mined by the public's propensity to hold currency outside 
the banking system.
7 Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958, s.22.
8 A b o v e , p .27.
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As pressure arises from one or more of the functions 
of money, the central bank is obliged to regulate and 
control the changes in the volume of credit provided by 
the banking system to the public and to the government.
The tables below show the money supply, as defined 
above, in the banking systems of Nigeria, Tanzania 
and Zambia.
The central banks have as their function therefore the 
duty to manage the money supply. They have to estimate 
and determine how much currency (notes and coins) they 
have to issue and maintain in circulation. This control 
is crucially important for the stability of the national 
currencies and for the control of inflation. The Nigerian 
businessman carries on most of his business transactions 
with hand-to-hand currency. He keeps ready cash in his 
house or office for quick transactions that may arise at 
short notice. He blames this necessity on the inefficiency 
of banks where he would have to queue for hours on end 
before cashing his cheque, so that by the time he can 
collect his cash the business transaction would have fallen 
through. As a result Nigerians have lost confidence in 
their banks and are reluctant to trust them with their 
money on deposit.
Nigeria and other anglophone African countries basi­
cally operate a cash economy in which cheques and credit
cards are seldom used. Commmenting on this type of problem
9
an eminent economist, Dr. PNC Okigbo, said
9 N i g e r i a 1s Financial System. Structure and Growth, 1981, 
p. 240.
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Table 9; Tanzania 
Monetary Survey
Millions of Shillings
End of Currency in Demand Time Savings
period circulation deposits deposits deposits
outside banks
1969 605 .0 867 .4 230 .7 176 .4
1970 818.4 860 .5 338 .6 2 0 2  .1
1971 986 .4 1 072 .0 352 .1 213.9
1972 1 20 1 . 1 1 125.7 494 .1 268 .8
1973 1 198 .6 1 576 .1 547 .0 331.3
1974 1 517.3 1 939 .0 601 .2 404 .5
1 975 1 755.8 2 528 .0 789 .8 . 479 .1
1976 2 071 .2 3 260 .5 1 048 .3 566 .7
1977 2 379 .7 4 003 .1 1 252 .7 711.2
1978 2 915.2 3 911.7 1 724 .3 845 .1
1979 4 055.4 6 380 .0 2 308 .0 1 ,063 .2
1978 March 2 219.3 3 786 .2 1 312.3 728 .2
June 2 214 .4 3 879 .9 1 425 .7 770 .0
September 2 772 .3 3 919.4 1 540 .3 804 .3
December 2 915.2 3 911.7 1 724 .3 845 .1
1 979 January 2 782 .8 ' 4 786 .0 1 823.4 850 .6
February 2 767 .9 5 023 .9 1 851 .4 867 . 1
March 2 726 .9 5 159.4 1 742 .0 879 .0
April 2 713.9 5 087 .9 1 801 .7 891 .7
May 2 728 .6 5 333 .1 1 992 .2 908 .5
June 2 846 .7 5 614.7 2 010.9 941 .4
July 3 152.6 5 553 .5 2 015.4 955 .0
August 3 519.1 5 865.7 2 065.5 983 .2
September 3 754 .2 6 1 1 1 . 0 2 097 .8 999 .5
October 3 863 .5 6 490 .8 2 174 .6 1 ,027 .9
November 3 939 .8 6 335 .5 2 269 .2 1 ,055 .0
December 4 055 .4 6 380.0 2 308 .0 1 ,063 .2
1980 January 4 027 .3 6 556 .6 2 452.8 1 ,080 .4
February 3 968 .9 6 509 .7 2 488 .1 1 ,099 .7
March 3 981 .6 6 404 .6 2 384 .0 1 ,1 2 1 . 0
' April 4 015.2 6 403.4 2 457.7 1 ,129.5
May 4 301 .8 6 655 .3 2 467.7 1,144.2
June 4 175.5 7 174 .3 2 489 .6 1,191.2
July 4 461.1 7 258 .9 2 618.3 1,209.1
August 4 684 .5 7 424 .8 2 699 .3 1,221 .3
September 4 838 .6 7 517.4 2 532 .3 1,250.9
October 4 924 .6 7 638 .7 2 556.1 1,271.0
November 5 035 .1 8 152.4 2 591 .1 . 1 ,289 .0
December 5 245 .5 8 1 00 .5 2 872 .7 1 ,301 .2
1981 January 5 170.3 8 1 06 .2 3 025.7 1,320.2
February 5 0 1 0 . 8 8 271 . 1 2 990 .6 1,351 .6
March 4 959 .6 8 274 .6 2 865.2 ' 1,392.0
April 4 963 .7 8 190.6 2 894 .8 1 ,406 .9
May 4 986 .7 8 108.0 2 977 .2 1 ,426 .9
June 5 195.1 8 574 .7 3 047 .6 1 ,461 .5
Source: Bank of Tanzinia, Economic and Operations Report., 
1981 , p. 59.
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Table 10: Zambia 
Money and Quasi-Money
(Amount in K'000 and percentage over the corresponding 
period of the previous year)
End of 
period
Currency
outside
banks
(1 )
Demand 
deposits 
at banks 
(2 ) (b)
Money 
supply 
(3) = (1)
1970 4 2,844 143,100 185,954
1971 58 ,279 140,309 198,588
1972 61 ,350 139,991 210,341
1973 69 ,396 173,493 242,889
1974 79 ,642 186 ,031 265,673
1975 102 ,354 219,732 322 ,086
1976 121 ,107 255,645 376,752
1977 118 ,434 268 ,033 386 ,467
1978 130,859 260,823 391 ,682
1979 126 , 165 387,122 513 ,287
1 980 151 ,068 358 ,342 509 , 140
1 981 191,758 371 ,288 563,046
1 980
January 120,777 371 ,963 492,740
February 126 ,606 342,737 469,343
March 123,746 33,379 457 , 125
April 125,672 356 ,081 481 ,759
May 125,703 365,750 482,453
June 125,445 347,712 473,157
July 126 ,837 344,370 471 ,207
August 1 32 ,961 298,194 431 ,155
September 137,007 328,912 465,919
October 141,901 359,125 501,026
November 1 38 ,807 339 ,830 478,637
December 151 ,068 358,342 509,410
1 981
January 153,614 373,981 527,595
February 152,907 348 ,200 501 ,107
March 150,539 371 ,608 522,147
April 142,128 344 ,201 486 ,329
May 159 ,273 363 ,904 523 , 177
June 159,922 369,056 528,978
July 165,746 371,135 536 ,881
August 183 ,287 355,340 538,527
September 192,150 345,631 537,681
October 362,612 560 ,649 560,649
November 1 94 ,881 405,912 600,793
December 191,758 371 ,288 563,046
c o n t d .
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Money and Quasi-Money Contd
End of 
period
Currency
outside
banks
(1 )
Demand 
deposits 
at banks
(2 ) (b)
Money
supply
(3 ) = (1) (+2 )
January 184 ,
February 183,
March 173,
April 180,
May 177,
June 175,
1 30 349
912 34 1
986 364
696 389
0 2 0 373
146 410
253 533,383
114 525,026
51 1 538 ,497
145 569,842
723 550,743
575 585,721
Source: Bank of Zambia
(a) From July onwards, excludes Government and non­
resident deposits. Prior to July 1971, Government and 
non-resident deposits, based on incomplete data, have 
been excluded from demand deposits only;
(b) Including Merchant Bank up to December 1971;
See Quarterly Financial and Statistical Review, Dec. 1982, 
Vol. 12, Number iii/iv.
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"The heavy reliance of the Nigerian 
consumer and businessman on hand-to- 
hand currency for transactions tends 
to raise the ratio of currency to the 
money supply in an economy like ours 
beyond the level expected in economies 
with higher banking densities and more 
entrenched banking habits. For this 
reason currency management in Nigeria 
poses graver problems than in some other 
advanced countries".
1 0Mr. E.C. Akamobi held a similar view when he said:
"In conclusion, I will like to point out 
that the liquidity preference of our 
people is abnormally high particularly 
among sole traders and rural dwellers.
As a result of valuable time usually 
wasted in collecting money from the 
bank and lack of faith in the chequeing 
system our market men and women prefer to 
hold large quantity of cash for quick and 
easy replenishment of stock in trade."
In a recent talk, the Director of Research of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria, Mr. C.E. Enuenwosu, revealed that 
the amount of Naira outside the Nigerian territory was 
some 4 0% of the currency in circulation. Chief Cletus N. 
Nwagwu, the Director of Banking Operations of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, surprised Nigerians when in a television 
interview of 29th June, 1984, he said that the Central 
Bank of Nigeria had lost track of the amount of currency 
in circulation in Nigeria. Continuing, he said N3.6 
billion (75 per cent of N4.8 billion old notes redeemed 
during the exchange) had been put back into circulation.
He said the difficulties resulting from the exchange were 
not only due to the short fall of 25% but also to "some
10 The Nigerian Daily T i m e s , May 7, 1984, p. 7.
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unavoidable occurrences" which he attributed to payment
1 1of wages, salaries and bank overdrafts to customers.
1 2Mr. Chuma Adichie confirms this confusion when he writes:
"The change of the colours of the naira 
was long overdue. In several cities of 
the world, the naira which is not a conver­
tible currency, was being accepted from 
Nigerians and non-Nigerians for purchases 
and other illegal transactions. By this 
process more than N1 billion naira, for 
example, found its way into the United 
States of America alone.
At home the currency black market was 
booming alarmingly. Very heinous and 
machiavellian methods were being employed 
to sabotage the economy. By September last 
year it was estimated that N4.5 billion of 
N11.2 billion in circulation was floating 
outside the banking system. The Central 
Bank of Nigeria was thus unable to keep 
track of the naira. It had long lost the 
t r a i l ."
Further
"Questions were raised why the Government 
decided to release money piece-meal to 
banks. According to the Director, Domestic 
Operations, C B N , M r . Cletus Nwagwu, the CBN 
by last Monday (30 April 1984) had distributed 
N 1 . 6 billion representing half the notes 
(3.6 billion) in circulation. Lagos alone, 
he said, had got N250 m i l l i o n " . 13
That the Central Bank of Nigeria had lost track of the 
money in circulation is true from the apparent contradiction 
in figures published in the Federal Government Gazette 
No. 19, vol. 71, p. 249 of March 8 , 1984. Therein it was
11 The G u a r d i a n , 30 June 1984, p. 7.
12 Nigerian Sunday Concord, May 6 1986 , p. 7. 
1 3 Ibi d , p . 13.
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stated that N5.3 billion was in circulation as at 31 
December 1983. Explaining the reason for the Central 
Bank's handicap, Chief Nwagwu said it was because the 
Nigerian Naira had become a trading currency in the ECOWAS 
countries and because it was freely traded and quoted in 
Liverpool Street and London Banks and some banks in New 
York and everywhere in Saudi Arabia. He said the currency 
exchange of 24 April to 6 May, 1984 was designed to correct 
the disturbing position and to enable the Bank to determine 
at any given time the amount of currency in circulation.
This goal was not immediately achieved because the 
Bank later discovered that the amount of currency printed 
and delivered to it was by no means adequate to go round 
all the banks in the country in exchange for old notes 
deposited by the public and institutions in billions all 
over the country. The result was that school fees and 
workers' salaries could not be paid, business transactions 
came to a standstill and many people could not take three 
square meals a day not because they could not afford to but 
because the banks were not liquid and were not in a 
position to pay cash and honour cheques. The amount of 
damage done to the economy was incalculable and economic 
life in the country nearly came to a stop. One hopes that 
the Central Bank will in the future adopt a more realistic 
and painless method of currency redemption and exchange in 
furtherance of its control of money supply.
The hardship experienced by the public during the 
currency exchange could have the negative effect of eroding 
the already minimal confidence Nigerians have in their
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banking system. Traders and businessmen, particularly in 
the private sector, must therefore be encouraged to 
develop the banking habit and to create a structure and an 
environment in which the use of cheques becomes more 
usual and acceptable. To this end central bank laws have 
a role to play in minimising the too frequent instances of 
Central Bank cheques, issued by Governments, not being 
honoured because of insufficient funds.
The activities of unscrupulous big-time smugglers who 
unconscionably smuggle the national currency to overseas 
countries to exchange it at unbelievably low rates should 
be checked through stricter controls at air, port and 
border posts. Since the smuggled naira is sold abroad on 
the cheap in' exchange for hard currency (principally dollar 
and sterling) foreign investors are understandably more 
inclined to procure the naira they need for their daily 
economic transactions in Nigeria from abroad, instead of 
bringing hard currency into the country and exchanging it 
for the naira at the higher official rate. In effect, the 
Central Bank has been systematically denied substantial 
amounts of foreign exchange which it would otherwise have 
earned from the activities of foreigners in the economy.
One may add that the multiplier effect of the periodic 
influx of cheap naira into the country from abroad is the 
heightening of domestic inflation. Currency exchange 
exercises provide only temporary and stop-gap solutions; 
the effective solution is to take measures that will not 
allow naira to make its way abroad in large numbers.
Another group of saboteurs who must be restrained by
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law are the ECOWAS travellers, workers and ignorant and 
itinerant petty traders who do not even know the process 
of obtaining foreign exchange’ through the banks. They 
patronise mainly the professional petty 'money-changers' 
found in market places and hotels in all capitals of West 
African countries.
Smuggling and currency trafficking make mockery of 
the ECOWAS protocol relating to re-exportation, within the 
ECOWAS, of goods imported from these countries. These 
activities render useless efforts made by member states of 
ECOWAS and the West African Clearing House to monitor and 
determine trade trends and volumes within the region.
These subversive activities of smugglers and currency 
traffickers operating in West Africa could be controlled 
if there were a co-operative effort to eradicate smuggling 
and currency trafficking. Joint border patrols and 
supervision would also yield effective results. The 
Nigerian Security Organisation (NSO) should endeavour to 
monitor the activities of currency forgers, who as in the 
case of the Central Bank 1984 exercise saw the injection 
of forged notes two days after the exercise started.
Legal Tender Status
The Central Bank laws usually provide that notes and 
coins may be legal tender for the settlement of debts of
any amount in the territory of the issuing country.
1 4The Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958 provides that:
14 s.21 (1)
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"Notes issued by the Bank shall be legal 
tender in Nigeria at their face value for 
the payment of any a mount."
1 5The Kenya Act also provides that:
"The Bank shall have the sole right to 
issue notes and coins in Kenya and, 
subject to subsection (4) of this section, 
only such notes and coins shall be legal 
tender in Kenya . "
Under these Acts the creditor is obliged to accept legal 
tender money and the debtor is entitled to settle the 
debts he incurs in legal tender money unless another lawful 
method of settling debts has been prescribed or agreed by 
the debtor and creditor as provided, for example, in 
section 21 of the Kenya law:
"All monetary obligations or transactions 
entered into or made in Kenya shall be 
deemed to be expressed and recorded and 
shall be settled in Kenya currency unless 
otherwise provided for by law or agreed 
upon between the parties."
In some systems, only notes are to be of an unlimited 
amount while the coins have limited legal tender. There­
fore notes in central banks in those systems are legal 
tender for their face value without limitations as to the 
amount of the payment.
Except for the Bank of Zambia all the central banks 
surveyed have provisions prescribing territorial limita­
tions on the use of notes and coins as legal tender, 
irrespective of whether there is a limitation on the amount
15 s.22(1).
2 9 2
accorded legal tender status. Where a central bank law
expressly provides that the right to issue notes may be
exercised only within the territory of that particular
country, it is legitimate to infer that the scope of this
power is confined to that territory in which the central
bank has its seat.
Such assumption may be based on the general principle
of law that public laws of a country are normally not
intended to have extraterritorial effect. Thus notes and
coins may be legal tender throughout the country as in 
1 6Tanzania or in certain designated areas of the country,
1 7as in England and Wales. On the other hand, in places
like Australia the right to issue currency outside the
territorial boundaries is shared by the Central or Reserve
Bank and some commercial banks. In South Africa the
Reserve Bank notes were legal tender in Basutoland,
Swaziland and Bechuanaland Protectorates and also notes
issued by the Reserve Bank of India were legal tender in the
Persian Gulf. In a majority of cases therefore central
banks issue notes that are legal tender only within the
territorial boundaries of that country.
The first function assumed by the Bank of Tanzania
when it commenced operations on 14 June, 1966 was that of
a 'bank of issue', a function it took over from the East
18African Currency Board. It will be recalled that the
16 Bank of Tanzania Act 1964 , s.26.
17 See Note 4.
18 See Chapter 2, at p. so
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Board was established in 1919 to provide a new currency 
for the Kenya Colony and Protectorate and the Uganda 
Protectorate. Tanganyika was added in the following year 
after the United Kingdom was given a mandate by the League 
of Nations to administer the then territory.
The East African Currency Board ceased as the issuing 
authority in East Africa after the three independent 
central banks of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda had been 
established. The legislation establishing the three central 
banks gave each the sole right to issue legal tender 
currency in its own country. Each country adopted the 
Shilling (divided into 100 cents) at par with the East 
African Shilling which was replaced. The par value of 
each currency was fixed with the International Monetary 
Fund in terms of grams of fine gold. The notes of the 
Board ceased to be legal tender in East Africa on 14 
September, 1967 and its own coin on 10 April, 1969. Earl­
ier the Currency Board had issued in 1964 notes which bore 
East African features in place of the British monarch's 
h e a d .
The first issue of notes in the Central Bank of Kenya 
was on 14 September, 1966. The par value of the Kenya 
Shilling is determined in terms of gold and is defined as 
equivalent to 0.11459 grams of fine gold.
Bank of Zambia Issues
It will be recalled that the Bank of Zambia came into 
being after the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland and was established on 7 August, 1964 under the
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Bank of Zambia Ordinance, 1964. During the decade 
preceding independence Zambia, then Northern Rhodesia, was 
a member of a major economic and monetary union with 
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) 
known as the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland.
During the first three years of Federation the Central 
African Currency Board, first founded in 1939, was the sole 
issuing authority of notes and coins which were legal 
tender within the three federal states. In March 1956 the 
Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established to replace 
the Currency Board.
Prior to independence, notes and coins in denominations 
of £10, £5, 10s and 5s, 2s6d, 2s, 1s6d, 3d and id circula­
ted in the country as legal tender. After independence 
the Bank issued the first Zambian notes and coins in 
similar denominations, although different in design. In 
order to allow for a smooth change-over the two currencies 
circulated alongside each other until 15 December, 1965 
when the old currencies were withdrawn from circulation 
for subsequent demonetisation.
A 5s proof coin to commemorate Independence was issued 
and it was later followed by an ordinary 5s coin for 
circulation purposes.
In 1967 the Government decided in favour of decimali­
sation and designated the Kwacha as the main unit 
comprising 100 n g w e e . The Kwacha was equivalent to the old 
shilling. On the promulgation of the Currency Act 1967 
the legal tender status on the Zambia £sd currency was
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withdrawn and the new Kwacha note and Ngwee coin introduced 
and put into circulation. On 16 January, 1968 the £5 note 
became K10, the £1 note K 2 , the ten shilling note became 
K 1 note and a new 50 ngwee note introduced to correspond 
to the old 5s, 2s became 20 ngwee, one shilling coin 
became 10 ngwee and 6 d became 5 ngwee. A change-over 
period was allowed to complete the withdrawal of Zambian 
£sd notes and coins from circulation, and these ceased to 
be legal tender on 31 January, 1974.
In commemoration of the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation Day (FAO) the Bank issued a 50 ngwee FAO proof 
coin for numismatic collection. Later as the need arose 
to bridge the gap between 20 ngwee and K1 note, an ordinary 
50 ngweeFAO coinand 50 ngwee coin of new design were simul­
taneously put into circulation in the middle of 1971. A 
K20 note was also introduced during the same period.
With the advent of the 'One Party Participatory 
Democracy' the Bank issued a comemorative K1 note to join 
the rest of the nation in celebrating the birth of the 
second Republic on 13 December, 1973.
Finally the Bank changed the colour of the 50 ngwee 
note in order to eliminate the confusion which appeared to 
exist between the 50 ngwee and the new K5 note, thus the 
multi-coloured 50 ngwee note making its first appearance 
in April 1 974 . ^
19 Ten Years of Banking in Zambia, p. 10.
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Central Bank of Nigeria Note Issues
The Central Bank of Nigeria has between 1959 and 
1984 issued five legal tender currencies, in 1959, 1965, 
1968, 1973 and 1984. One of the first functions of the 
Central Bank when it commenced business on 1 July, 1959 
was to issue the first Nigerian currency. This issue 
replaced the West African Currency Board notes and coins 
then circulating in the country.
The change-over was completed in December 1962 and a 
total of £65.0 million (N130.0 million) notes and coins 
of the West African Currency Board was redeemed and the 
equivalent in sterling was subsequently paid at par by West
African Currency Board to the Central Bank of Nigeria.
When Nigeria became a Republic in 196 3 the decision 
was taken to replace the existing Federation of Nigeria 
notes. The exchange exercise began on 1 July, 1965; when 
it ended in June 1966 a total of £68.5 million (N137.0 
million) was redeemed.
By the Central Bank (Currency Conversion) Decree No. 
51, 30 December, 1967, the Bank was empowered to undertake 
another currency exchange exercise during the war years 
with the aim of achieving the following objectives:
(a) ensuring the success of the trade embargo
20imposed on the 'still-born' Biafran Republic 
which was at war with Nigeria;
(b) forestalling the use of unissued currency notes
20 The Biafran Republic consisted of the 4 eastern states 
of Imo, Anambra, Rivers and Cross River states wThich 
made up the former Eastern Region of Nigeria.
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that were burgled from the Central Bank vaults 
in E n u g u , Port Harcourt and Benin City;
(c) frustrating the flourishing illegal trafficking 
in the Nigerian currency known to be going on in 
some foreign countries.
A total of £86.5 million (N173.0 million) was redeemed, 
£ 2 0 . 0  million of which was paid out as ex-gratia awards to 
depositors in the Biafran states.
The fourth issue of notes was the second to be provi­
ded for under an enactment. The issue took the form of a 
conversion to decimal currency and this took place on 2 
January, 1973. Before this date a decree had been promul­
gated in 1971 under which a 15-member Decimal Currency 
Board was constituted to work out the modalities for the 
introduction of decimal currency. On 20 December, 1972 all 
banks were closed to the public to enable them to balance 
their books and convert balances to the new units in 
readiness for 1 January, 1973.
The exchange of new for old currency notes which came 
in four denominations - 50K, N 1 , N5 and N10 respectively - 
began on 2 January, 1973. At the end of the exchange 
exercise an estimated N349.4 million or 95.2% of all coins 
had been exchanged. In February 1976 a fifth denomination 
of the Nigerian currency was issued, a 20 Naira note.
The fifth issue of notes took place on 25 April, 1984. 
In announcing the change of Nigeria's currency in a tele­
vision broadcast, the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters,
21
Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, said
21 The Nigerian Guardian, 25 April, 1984.
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"Fellow Nigerians, you are aware that one 
of the main objectives of this administration 
is to revive the battered economy of this 
great nation.
The head of the Federal Military Govern­
ment and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces, Major General Muhammadu Buhari and 
the Minister of Finance have informed you 
recently of the stark realities of the 
financial predicament in which we have found 
ourselves as a result of the mismanagement 
of the economy by the defunct civilian 
administration.
After painstaking analysis of the factors 
which have contributed to the present state 
of affairs, this administration has come 
to the conclusion that drastic measures 
must be applied. It has been established 
beyond any doubt that one of the major causes 
of our economic malaise is the deliberate 
sabotage of the economy through large scale 
illegal trafficking of the Naira notes across 
our borders within and beyond our beloved 
country. This administration has, therefore, 
decided in the interest of our beloved nation 
to effect a change in our currency immediately.
As from Wednesday 25 April, 1984 the 
existing Nigerian currency notes of N20, N10,
N5 and N1 denominations will be issued in 
exchange." (sic)
The Impact on the Economy of the Changes in the Legal 
Tender Status of the Issues
In Nigeria the five currency exchanges, viz. those of 
1959, 1965, 1968, 1973 and 1976, differ significantly 
from the 1984 exercise. The 1984 exercise resembled that 
of 1967 in the desired result and in the fact that both 
exercises were backed by enactments.
As explained by the Chief of Staff, the motivating 
reason for the 1984 currency change was to stem the blatant 
sabotage of the economy by currency traffickers within and 
outside the country.
Another reason for the change was that many unpatriotic
29 y
Nigerians with the active connivance of some foreign 
collaborators had printed millions of naira notes and 
successfully integrated them into the spending network.
The third reason was that some people had actually 
amassed naira far beyond their legitimate source of liveli­
hood. They feared exposure if they were to deposit such 
large amounts with their bankers.
Finally the Federal Military Government convinced 
itself that if it were to re-establish a strong economy for 
the nation, it should do so on a clean slate by knowing 
exactly how much money it had in circulation. Having done 
this it could then steer the economy in the desired direc­
tion. If it wanted to pump more money into circulation 
it could embark on the purchase of securities, while if it 
wanted to reduce the quantity of money in circulation it 
could, among other things, embark on sale of securities 
and floating of loans.
One cannot recall within living memory, when the 
dollar, the yen, the sterling or the Deutsch mark was 
withdrawn from circulation and old issues exchanged for 
new. Even in the developing countries examples are hard to 
find of frequent and complete withdrawal of legal tender 
currencies for new issues. However, the Reichmark was 
exchanged during the Depression in Germany and after World 
War II. Withdrawal of currency from circulation is a very 
expensive and time consuming exercise to contemplate, and 
it is wasteful of resources.
On the other hand it is a frequent practice in Nigeria 
to withdraw legal tender status in the country's currency
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and in a manner contrary to the provisions of the relevant
Act. The Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958 provides, for 
22
example, that
"Notwithstanding the provisions of sub­
section (1) and (2) the Bank shall have 
power, on giving not less than three 
months' notice in the Gazette, to call 
in any of the notes and coins on payment 
of the face value thereof and any such 
notes or coins with respect to which a 
notice has been given under this clause 
shall, on the expiration of the notice, 
cease to be legal tender, but subject to 
the provisions of section 23 shall be 
redeemed by the Bank on demand."
23In Tanzania, the Bank of Tanzania Act 1965 provides:
"The Bank shall have the power, on giving 
reasonable notice in the Gazette, to call 
in any notes or coins issued by it on 
payment (subject to the provisions of section 
29) of the face value thereof; and any
notes or coins with respect to which a
notice shall have been given under this sub­
section shall, on the expiration of such 
notice, cease to be legal tender."
The Central Bank of Kenya Act 1966 has a similar provision 
in section 22 and in s. 22(3) (c) which states that the 
period of notice 'shall be of reasonable duration.' The
Bank of Zambia Act 1964 does not provide for withdrawals
nor for giving of notice.
The rationale for giving reasonable notice to citizens 
of the intention of central banks to withdraw the legal 
tender status of a currency is to ensure, among other 
things, that every holder of the country's notes had the
22 s. 21 (3) .
23 s.28 (2) .
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opportunity of exchanging them at their face value without 
incurring financial loss in the process.
In Nigeria, of all the five withdrawals of legal 
tender status from currency, only two have had the force 
of law behind them. The Central Bank (Currency Conversion) 
Decree, No. 51 of 30 December, 1957, was an instrument of 
strategy for prosecuting the Nigerian-Biafran War of 1967- 
70 which enabled Nigeria to impose a trade embargo on the 
secessionist Biafra. Ample notice was also given of the 
1973 exchange which was aimed at giving effect to decimal­
isation. The Decimal Currency Decree was promulgated in 
May 1971 and the advance action was undertaken to provide 
a practical public education in the new system. All 
other currency exchange exercises have taken Nigerians by 
surprise.
Surprise keeps an opponent off-guard leaving him 
unprepared for defence or counter-attack. In the same way 
the world was indeed confounded at the announcement on 23 
April, 1984 that the exchange of the currency would com­
mence the following day and last for 12 days. The 
announcement caused much panic among citizens, international 
finance institutions, and currency hoarders and traffic­
kers. As a result the outside world will not have 
confidence in the naira and the way in which the country 
runs its economy. Flight of capital can ensue as investors 
seek a safe environment for their money. Investors can 
also be frightened off and be reluctant to finance the 
establishment of trade or industry in such a country.
While it may be admitted that a sudden change of any
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currency may be a powerful weapon against trafficking and 
hoarding of currency, the long term effect of an economic 
exercise of this nature should not be overlooked and needs 
serious consideration. The strength of this argument is 
buttressed by the fact that a few days after the announce­
ment of the exchange exercise forged new currencies were 
discovered and it was reported that the culprits were 
arrested by security agents. Besides, an Indian shopowner 
in Liverpool Street market of London was widely reported 
to have said that within a few weeks of the exchange of 
currency the naira would certainly find its way to London, 
New York, Saudi Arabia and the ECOWAS countries. So it was 
for
"About four days (sic) to the end of the 
exercise, black markets for the new naira 
had sprung up in Lagos. According to reports, 
N3 new notes exchanged for $1 (US) as against 
N3.70 old notes, while N4.50 new notes 
exchanged for £1 against N5.50 old notes.
The traffickers were said to be capable of 
exchanging up to N 1 5,000 on the spot and 
up to N50 ,000 if given two hours' notice
It was not clear why the Government had decided to 
release money to the banks piece-meal. According to the 
Director, Domestic Operations of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria, Mr. Cletus N w a g w u , the Central Bank of Nigeria 
had by 30 April, 1984 distributed H1.6 billion representing 
half the notes (N3.5 billion) in circulation. It is 
however difficult to understand the inconsistencies in the 
figures of money in circulation. In Government Gazette
24 Sunday C o n c o r d , 6 May 1984, p. 13.
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No. 19, vol. 71, p. 24 9 of 8 March, 1984 it was stated 
that N5.3 billion was in circulation as at 31 December, 
1983. By releasing only N1.6 billion of 5.3 billion, there 
was bound to be not enough money to go round.
Section 21 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act and 
section 22 of the Kenya Act as well as s.28 of the Bank of 
Tanzania Act all provide for the calling in of any notes 
and coins on payment of the face value thereof and in 
respect of notes, for any amount. In compliance with
these provisions the Central Banks of Zambia and Kenya
exchanged new notes for old at par. In Nigeria the con­
trary was the case.
When the Biafran and Nigerian notes were exchanged
after the war £25 was paid to every depositor irrespective
of whatever higher sum deposited. This is clearly a
breach of section 21 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act
which as stated above stipulates that notes should be
exchanged at their face value. When the Nigerian Chief of
Staff made his announcement in April 1984, he said that
"individuals can exchange up to a maximum of N5000 over
the counter. Any amount in excess of N5000 will have to
be deposited with the bank, which will issue the depositor
25
with a proper acknowledgement to that effect." Once 
again, section 21 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act had 
been breached.
25 The Guardian, 15 April, 1984.
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Appraisal of the Note Issuing Function
From the foregoing it would be seen that the function 
of the central banks in issuing bank notes is vital to the 
economy. If the function is carried out properly and 
efficiently business will flourish and the economy will 
ultimately grow. We have observed that economically 
advanced countries do not withdraw legal tender status in 
their currency because the exercise is not worth the 
trouble. It is an expensive and wasteful exercise that 
offers only short-term solutions to economic woes. There 
is a well-known theory that, by reducing the amount of cur­
rency in circulation, prices may be depressed. This 
argument is defective because the problem is manifestly on 
the supply side. There is no scientific basis for this 
approach to deflation, which was put forward as one of the 
reasons for currency exchanges. It can be counter-produc­
tive. A realistic way to bring down prices is to flood the 
market with essential commodities and work harder at 
correcting the inflation-fuelling defects in distribution 
channels which one finds in the Nigerian economy.
As noted above, in Nigeria there have been far too 
many incidents of central bank cheques returned unpaid by 
banks. Certainly this does not give cause for encourage­
ment to the public particularly those who have had to do 
business for the government or its agencies. In order to 
bolster confidence the ultimate aim of central banks should 
be to encourage development of an atmosphere and structure 
in which the use of cheques becomes more prevalent and 
acceptable. Governments themselves must show a good
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example. The National Concord of 2 June, 1984 supports 
this view:
"An economist in Calabar, Dr. John E Udoh 
Ndebbio, told the National Concord that 
the Federal Government should make enough 
money available to commercial banks to 
restore people's confidence in our banking 
system, otherwise they would resort to the 
primitive way of banking.
Dr. Ndebbio, who is a lecturer at the 
University of Calabar, said that from what 
he had learned so far in his profession he 
had never come across the kind of 'primitive' 
monetary control currently being imposed on 
Nigerians."
Continuing on the objective of the 1984 Currency Exchange 
exercise it said:
"A top management staff of a commercial 
bank in the city told me that the Central 
Bank was releasing money piece-meal. In 
fact we requested for a total of N 8 million 
and the Central Bank of Nigeria doles out 
N20,000 today, N50,000 tomorrow and nothing 
the following day, he said.
He also said the Central Bank's tactics 
were eroding the confidence of Nigerians 
in the banking system and crippling banking 
operations in the country."
The Nigerian experience of the currency exchange which 
lasted 12 days (25 April - 6 May) highlighted several 
problems in the management of money supply. The Federal 
Military Government decision was designed to restore con­
fidence in the naira, determine accurately the actual 
quantity of currency in circulation, put an end to the 
illegal trafficking in naira and block the naira in circu­
lation outside Nigeria. The exercise has underlined the 
need for the authority to streamline the laws, design 
appropriate measures in order to minimise the use of cash
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in the Nigerian economy. In addition to reforming the 
existing relevant laws the following proposal would promote 
a more buoyant economy.
1. All bank transactions beyond a certain specified 
amount should be done by cheques, bank drafts or 
certified cheques.
2. The payment of wages, pensions and other forms 
of income should be made into bank accounts 
rather than by cash. Payment to manual workers 
may continue to be in cash in the same way as the 
1960 Payment of Wages Act operates in the UK 
under which payment by cheque of manual workers' 
wages requires their individual consent, which 
can be withdrawn at 4 weeks' notice. It will be 
recalled that the Act was the descendant of the 
1931 Truck Act which was aimed at protecting 
workers from the attempt by employers to pay 
workers in kind. The change in payments behaviour 
could bring benefit to account holding institu­
tions in the form of deposits and increased sales 
of other services.
3. Payment for utilities such as telephone, electri­
city, gas and water should be made by cheque.
This system could benefit employers and other 
income payment bodies in facilitating the effici­
ent and economical execution of such payments;
it should bring benefits to consumers in the form 
of convenience in handling their financial 
affairs; and it could benefit all those bodies in
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receipts of payments - local authorities, bill 
collectors and retailers.
4. The Central Bank and the commercial banks should
f
evolve an efficient cheque clearing system
through the creation of zonal clearing centres -
2 6as propounded in Chapter 4 - to minimise delays
identified and inherent in cheque clearing 
procedures.
5. Banks should undertake to honour cheques up to a 
certain specified amount drawn on them, depending 
on the credit-worthiness of the customer.
6 . Appropriate steps should be taken to protect the 
Nigerian borders against traffickers in smuggled 
goods and illegal currencies.
7. Appropriate legislation should be enacted to 
regulate these proposals.
MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT
In the management of public debt anglophone African 
countries usually adopt three categories of debt instru­
ments which constitute the mechanism by which the 
countries' central banks mobilise financial resources on 
behalf of governments. The three instruments are:
The Treasury Bill 
The Treasury Certificate 
The Development Stocks 
In Nigeria the management of these instruments is regulated
26 See p. 270.
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by:
1. The Treasury Bills Ordinance of 1959
2. The Treasury Certificate Decree No. 40 1968
3. The Finance Decree No. 32 of 196 9
In Nigeria before the Central Bank was established in 1959, 
the Accountant-General of the Federation was charged with 
the responsibility for public debt management. Subse­
quently when the Central Bank was established it was vested 
with authority to float the country's internal debt in 
consultation with the Ministry of Finance or the Treasury. 
This power was provided for in section 35 of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria Act:
"The bank shall be entrusted with the 
issue and management of Federal Government 
loans publicly issued in Nigeria upon such 
terms and conditions as may be agreed 
between the Federal Government and the 
B a n k ."
Similarly section 10 of the Treasury Bills Act 1959 
provides that the Minister of Finance, after consultation 
with the Central Bank, may make regulations to prescribe or 
provide for:
(a) the preparation, form, mode of issue, mode of 
payment and cancellation of Treasury Bills;
(b) the issue of a new Bill in lieu of one defaced, 
lost or destroyed;
(c) such other matters as may seem to him necessary 
for the purpose of carrying this Ordinance into 
eff e c t .
In Kenya the Central Bank Act provides that the Bank may
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purchase, hold or sell negotiable securities of any 
maturity issued by the Government or issued by any other 
public entity and guaranteed by the Government.
Similarly the Tanzania Act 1965 provides that the 
Bank, in its capacity as banker and fiscal agent of the 
Government or of any public authority, may act as agent of 
the government for servicing the public debt, including the 
issuance of, payment of interest on, and the redemption of, 
bonds and other securities of the Government.
"1) Subject to the provisions of the section 
the Bank may -
a) purchase, hold and sell negotiable 
securities issued by the Government which 
mature not later than twelve months from 
the date of acquisition by the Bank;
b) purchase, hold and sell negotiable 
securities issued by the Government or with 
the guarantee of the Government, by a 
public authority which mature later than 
twelve months from the date of acquisition
by the B a n k . "2V
In Zambia the Bank of Zambia Act 1964 provides inter alia 
that in addition to the duties and powers imposed and con­
ferred by that Act the Bank may
" (d) buy, sell, discount and rediscount: 
i) inland bills of exchange and promis­
sory notes drawn for commercial purposes 
or for financing the movement marketing 
or processing of agricultural produce or 
minerals and in all cases bearing two or 
more good signatures; and 
ii) treasury bills of the Government;
(e) buy and sell securities of the Government
maturing in not more than twenty-five years 
at the time of dealing which have been 
publicly offered for s a l e .  "28
27 Section 40.
28 Section 23.
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The various Acts have each created an avenue for 
investment of short and long-term funds. From the way the 
sections are worded it is clear that the Ministries of 
Finance and the Central Banks are partners in debt manage­
ment in the broadest sense. The ultimate responsibility for 
public debt management would appear to reside in the 
Treasury, which uses the central bank as the instrument for 
administering government debt policy.
In their management of the public debt the Commonwealth 
African central banks carry out the following functions:
(a) advising the government as to the timing of 
flotation of the debt instruments and the terms 
of issue;
(b) advertising for public subscriptions to the 
issues ?
(c) collecting the proceeds of issues on behalf of the
government; supervising the issue of certificates
and accounts and maintaining proper books of 
accounts in respect of receipts and disbursements;
(d) payment of interest and principal on due dates
and managing the sinking fund set up to facili­
tate the redemption issue.
Treasury Bills
Treasury Bills are the main instruments of short-term 
borrowing by the government and serve as a convenient gilt- 
edged security for the money market. The qualities of 
high liquidity, absence of risk of default and negligible 
capital depreciation in case of sale before maturity make
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them an ideal form of short-term investment for banks and 
other financial institutions.
In certain countries, unlike in India for example, 
treasury bills are an important tool for the Central Bank 
in influencing the level of liquidity in the money market 
through market operations. Sale of treasury bills helps to 
absorb any excess liquidity in the money market and, 
conversely, their purchase by the central bank has the 
effect of relieving stringency. Since neither the govern­
ment nor the money market wishes to hold surplus cash, the 
central bank steps in and restores the equilibrium by 
selling or purchasing from the money market treasury bills 
(and similar other securities) according as the government 
payments are larger than its receipts or vice versa. In 
this way, the government is able to borrow cheaply to meet 
its immediate needs and to use its temporary surplus to buy 
back some of its outstanding debt before maturity.
In Nigeria the Act provides that treasury bills will be 
issued in multiples of N2000 for 91 days and at a fixed 
discount; that subscription will be accepted from the 
general public but only through licensed banks in Lagos; 
that the issue will be monthly and that the total outstand­
ing at any time shall not exceed 10% of the Federal 
Government's estimated revenue for the financial year.
These were the conditions under which the first issue of 
N 8 m was made in April 1960 at a discount of 4£%. These 
issues constituted the first major step in establishing a 
money market in Nigeria. Subsequent issues have broadly 
followed the same basis but their sizes and frequencies
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have been extended. Thus, although the bills were 
initially issued monthly, fortnightly issues were introduced 
with effect from 19 April, 1962 and weekly issues from 
January 1963; the minimum unit of issue being later 
reduced from N2000 to N1000 in order to expand the coverage 
of holders.
In order to give effect to Nigerian federal government 
policies, several amendments to the Treasury Bills Act 
1959 have taken place:
(a) the Treasury Bills (Amendment) Act, 1961 
increased the upper limit of issue to 30% of 
government revenue;
(b) the Treasury Bills (Amendment No. 2) Act 1961 
gave the Minister the right to loan the proceeds 
from treasury bills to regional governments;
(c) the Treasury Bills (Amendment) Act 1962 repealed
the Treasury Bills (Amendment) Act 1961, and
increased the upper limit of treasury bills to 
40% of expected government revenue;
(d) the Treasury Bills (Amendment) Decree 1967 inc­
reased this limit further to 50%;
(e) the Treasury Bills (Amendment) Decree 1968
repealed the above and extended the limit to 85%/
(f) the Finance Decree 1969 made the outstandable 
amount of treasury bills equal to the estimated 
revenue of the Federal Government in the year 
current but not exceeding it; i.e. 1 0 0 % of it.
This decree repealed the 1968 Decree;
(g) the Treasury Bills (Amendment) Decree 1970
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amended this provision further by substituting 
150% of the estimated revenue retained by the 
Federal Government and gross revenues of the 
states.
The Central Bank holdings of treasury bills increased 
rapidly throughout the 1960s and part of the 1970s. In 
the early sixties the increase in size of the Central Bank 
of Nigeria holdings was partly due to the repatriation of 
overseas assets and partly to Central Bank of Nigeria 
persuasion of government to issue an increasing volume of 
bills as an impetus to the development of the money market, 
even if this meant that Central Bank of Nigeria had to take 
up the unsubscribed issues. In the early seventies (1971 —
3) the increase in the size of Central Bank of Nigeria 
holdings of treasury bills was due to government financial 
requirements occasioned by the need for post-war reconstruc­
tion and development. The yearly average of holdings of 
treasury bills by the Central Bank of Nigeria in that 
period represented about 1 0 % of the total in conformity with 
the statutory limit for that period. However in the period 
of the oil boom, 1974-6, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
holdings fell drastically as government had the least need 
to borrow. The proportion of Central Bank holdings stood 
at 0.8% in 1975 and 1976. The re-emergence of financial 
pressure on the government, and consequently the increase 
in volume of bills issued, raised the Central Bank of 
Nigeria's proportion of bills outstanding to 5.4% in' 1977 
and 4.5% in November 1978. The main investor in treasury 
bills is the commercial banking system and this is partly
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related to the fact that these bills form part of the
29assets s t a t u t o r i l y  specified for liquidity ratio purposes.
The following table gives details of treasury bill 
issues for the years 1961 to 1977. A casual appraisal of 
the statistics would show that an unprecedented amount of 
money has been injected into the economy and thus no doubt 
has had disastrous consequences to the economy by way of 
inflation. It can also be seen that in the more recent 
years the public have not been buying many of the bills.
This is due to very hard times, poor interest rate struc­
tures and poor performance of the economy.
Table 11
holdings of Outstanding Treasury Bills (%)
OthersYear Total
outstanding
(thousand
Naira)
Central
Bank
CMF Commercial
banks
Federal and
Regional
Government
1961 308000 15.8 - 52.1 - 32.0
1962 518000 20.8 - 36.0 - 43.2
1963 564000 2 1 .7 9.4 18.8 9.3 40.3
1964 754000 12.9 6.0 24.1 23.2 33.8
1965 882000 18.4 6.3 28.1 15.3 31.7
1966 1130000 23.7 2.4 26.5 14 33.4
1967 1736000 42.7 2.2 26.9 12.7 15.5
1968 2372000 7.2 2.4 76.1 2.8 11 .5
1969 3346000 4.4 2.0 70.0 3.5 20.0
1970 5314000 11 .4 2.9 56.4 6.2 23.0
1971 7336000 24.5 1 .7 32.4 22.1 19.4
1972 7392000 6.9 1 .8 27.8 46.8 16.6
1973 7392000 11 .5 2.2 38.9 30.9 17.2
1974 7392000 2.5 2.6 62.2 16.3 16.5
1975 7392000 0.8 - 81 .4 3.0 13.3
1976 7392000 0.8 - 80.3 1.9 15.1
1977 9073000 5.4 - 71 .4 2.0 19.4
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria
29 Twenty Years of Central Banking in Nigeria, 1979, p. 82.
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Treasury Bills and Securities Instruments in Tanzania
As in Nigeria the Bank of Tanzania is by law endowed 
with all these functions. The Government of Tanganyika 
first obtained financing from the East African Currency 
Board in 1957, when the latter took up 20 million shillings 1 
worth of medium and long-term public securities. The first 
subscription of treasury bills followed in 1960. The bills 
were held by the Board, until June 1966 when the Bank of 
Tanzania took over. Between 1964 and 1967 the position in 
Tanzania was in most respects similar to Nigerian experi­
ence. After the February 1967 Arusha Declaration the 
Government of Tanzania felt it was incompatible for a 
socialist country to encourage dealings in such borrowing 
p astimes.
This is in consonance with the arguments of Lenin that 
the road to socialism begins with the destruction of the 
existing institutions. In spite of this policy however the
borrowing continued as can be seen in the tables below.
30As stated in Chapter 10, President Nyerere was reported 
to have said that Tanzania was making use of capitalist 
firms to build a socialist state. Although under the 
Bank of Tanzania Act 1965 the Central Bank "may with the 
approval of the Minister [of Finance] promote, and sub­
scribe to, hold, and sell shares in any corporation 
established by, or with the approval or under the authority 
of the Government for the purposes of promoting the 
development of a money market, a securities market in 
Tanzania or of improving the financial machinery for the
30 B e l o w , p .589.
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31financing of economic development in Tanzania", all in 
all, the Bank of Tanzania has done little to help develop 
a money and stock market.
In a capitalist state the main borrower in the money 
market is government whereas in the capital market 
specialised financial institutions like investment trusts 
and investment banks act as intermediaries between 
individuals whose savings they mobilise and government, 
industry and business in whose securities they invest them 
for medium or long-term.
In a socialist economy most of the medium and big 
industries are in the public sector. When the government 
is the sole owner of the financial institution, there is 
no scope for others to contribute to their equity capital. 
Money markets therefore do not exist in socialist countries 
because all enterprises in the productive and distributive 
sectors have to deposit only with the central banking 
institutions.
"Capital markets also do not exist because 
all productive and distributive sectors 
being in the socialist sectors individuals 
cannot own a debenture which is a financial 
claim on enterprises on this sector or a 
preference or ordinary share in their capital. 
Individuals can own real assets like house 
or durable consumer goods for their own 
use. As to financial assets they are limited 
to bank deposits and currency only."32
So after the Arusha Declaration of February 1967 Tanzania
31 s.59.
32 Bank of Tanzania, Central Banking in Socialist 
Transformation of Tanzania, 1976, pp. 23-6.
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adopted the socialist system of controlling money and 
credit. The three instruments generally employed are: 
the banking system 
state budget
foreign trade and exchange control system. 
According to the system these three instruments
"work in harmony with the socialist prices 
and incomes policy for the development of 
the country. Thus banks influence production, 
sales, consumption, investment and foreign 
trade through credit policy. The state, 
through the budgetary policy - running the 
administration, making investments, and 
for expenditure in connection with social 
benefits like maternity and other assis­
tance, refund and subsidies. The foreign 
trade and exchange control system enables 
the country to realise the advantages of 
international division of labour... In 
the socialist countries the instruments 
are used in a planned manner with the 
definite object of the development of the 
country along socialist p r i n c i p l e s . " 3 3
In Tan^zania therefore the Bank of Tanzania is required 
like all socialist banks (see Table below) to collect all 
information necessary for the preparation of the annual 
Finance and Credit Plan, the Foreign Exchange Plan and 
other monetary plans and to participate in their preparation, 
implementation and monitoring. It has
"to submit at least one report every three 
months to the Minister on the implementation 
of these plans and/or general developments 
in the economy. Furthermore, if the bank 
finds that in actual practice there are 
significant deviations from the targets 
set in the plans, it must recommend to the
33 Ibid, p . 23.
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Government such measures to remedy the 
situation as it (the Bank) considers 
desirable."34
In Tanzania, in place of the money market and capital
market there are four financial plans:
the Annual Budget of the Government
the Capital Programme for the Ministries and 
Parastatals
the Finance and Credit Plan 
the Foreign Exchange Plan 
To mobilise deposits therefore Tanzania has two sets of 
financial institutions: one to meet essentially the short­
term credit needs and the other the medium and long-term 
credit to industry, commerce and agriculture. The Tanzania 
Investment Bank (TIB) specialises in meeting the medium 
and long-term credit needs of industry.
As stated above therefore Tanzania's attitude is of 
course, in line with the economic philosophy of the country 
since the Arusha Declaration in 1967: an economic system 
in transition towards socialism has no need to develop a 
capital market in the traditional sense, for example a stock 
exchange. Its chief problem is the mobilisation and 
allocation of available financial resources through appro­
priate institutions and planning machinery.
Treasury Certificates
The Treasury Certificate is a medium-term government 
security which matures after a period of one to two years
34 Bank of Tanzania, its Role and Functions, 1979, p. 46.
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and is intended to bridge the gap between Treasury Bill and 
long-term government securities. It was introduced into 
Nigeria during the civil war to facilitate prosecution of 
the war. It was created by Treasury Certificates Act 1968 
(Decree No. 40) which provides inter alia:
"The Commissioner is hereby authorised to 
borrow by the issue in Nigeria of Federal 
Government Treasury Certificates, and the 
Central Bank of Nigeria, when authorised 
in writing by the authority and subject 
to any direction given by him, such Federal 
Government Treasury Certificates together 
with such further Treasury Certificates 
as shall be required to pay off at maturity 
Treasury Certificates already lawfully 
issued."35
The Finance Act 1969 amended the provisions of s . 1(2) of 
the Treasury Certificates Decree 1968 by substituting the 
word 'sixty' for 'fifty' with effect from 16 March, 1969. 
There were no other amendments to the Decree until 1975 
when the Federal Government decided to phase out the 
treasury certificates outstanding in the market. Conse­
quently from April 1975 there have been no more issues.
As a result of the over-liquidity which this policy 
and other similar policies (such as keeping the issue of 
the treasury bills fixed at N2 , 464,000 per annum and the 
abolition of the call-money scheme on 1 July, 1974) caused 
among commercial banks and other investors in the market 
as wsll as the fall in oil revenues in 1976, treasury 
certificates were reintroduced in 1976 to help solve the 
problem of idle cash in the hands of investors.
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Development Stocks
In 1946 the Colonial Government of Nigeria issued the
first Nigerian Government Registered Stock 1956/6 1 amounting
to £300,000 (N600,000) 3?% discount, the management of
which rested with the Accountant-General. When the Central
Bank of Nigeria took over the function of debt management
from the Accountant-General the first major assignment in
this connection was the flotation on behalf of the Federal
Government of the Federation of Nigeria First Development
Loan of £2 million (N4 million) in May 1959. Since 1961
the issue of Federal Government stocks has become an
annual event. The Central Bank has the obligation or the
undertaking to underwrite the issues of all development
stocks. The unsubscribed proportion of any issues is
automatically absorbed into its portfolio of government
securities from which sales are made to meet the subsequent
35demand of investors.
Private demand for government stocks comes mainly from 
institutional investors - pension and provident funds, 
commercial banks, insurance companies and other inter­
mediary institutions. The Central Bank has persistently 
remained the major investor in stocks.
There are various reasons for the establishment of 
Treasury Bills, Treasury Certificates and Development Stocks 
which form part of the country's financial market. We 
will examine further in Chapter 6 to what extent the 
objectives have been attained.
35 20 Years of Central Banking in Nigeria, o p . c i t ., p. 83.
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Financial Adviser to Government
The special function of the central bank as 'financial 
a dviser 1 to the government is expressly provided for in 
several central bank laws. Some of these provisions refer 
in general terms to the role of the central bank in this 
field; others indicate in some detail the subject-matter 
on which the Central Bank is expected to render advice.
Thus, in Zambia the Minister of Finance must request the 
opinion of the Central Bank whenever the Government intends 
to engage in any foreign borrowing operation; and the 
Government or its agencies must seek the advice of the 
Monetary Board whenever they intend to contract loans 
within the country. In Nigeria the Government seeks the 
advice of the Central Bank on its current and contemplated 
financial operations. It is the duty of the Central Bank 
to advise the Government particularly on the monetary 
implications of fiscal developments and of internal or 
external borrowing by the Government, and to suggest reme­
dial measures if there is an unfavourable development in 
the country's international reserves.
The board of directors of a central bank may, from 
time to time, make recommendations to the Minister of 
Finance or to the Treasury acting on behalf of the govern­
ment on the measures or policies to be adopted with a view 
to co-ordinating its policy within the policies of the bank. 
Also the Minister of Finance, or the agency concerned, if 
in agreement with the recommendation, may adopt the measures 
necessary to give effect to the bank's recommendations, 
provided such measures are lawful.
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As financial advisers the central banks co-operate 
with the government in co-ordinating the government's 
economic and fiscal policy with the monetary policy of the
central bank as one of the primary functions of the bank
when it is acting as adviser to the government; for example, 
the bank may render advice on domestic and foreign opera­
tions to the state, the municipalities and public
enterprises or public utilities.
The central banks manage the public debt on behalf of 
their governments and they are in addition entrusted with 
a wide range of statutory functions such as buying and 
selling of foreign exchange, administration of exchange 
control and provision of rural credit. The central banks 
also maintain close co-ordination with the government at 
all levels, especially with ~he Ministry of Finance both 
in the day-to-day affairs an., through participation in the 
official committees.
The fiscal operations of the government exercise a 
direct and significant impact on the monetary and credit 
system which the banks are required to regulate. It follows 
that the monetary and credit policies can be implemented 
more effectively if there is co-ordination between them 
and the economic policies of the government. Hence the 
central banks take an active interest in the formulation of 
fiscal and other policies of the government and tender 
advice calculated to promote the attainment of the national 
economic goals.
Daily operations in the gilt-edged and foreign 
exchange markets and close contacts with the commercial
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banks and other financial institutions and with the 
business world in general have equipped the central banks 
with the technical knowledge of and practical experience 
in these spheres which contributed greatly to the bank's 
competence to give financial advice to government. The 
banks act as advisers to government not only on policies 
concerning banking and financial matters but also on a wide 
range of economic issues including those in the field of 
planning and resource mobilisation. The Central Bank of 
Nigeria, for example, has a special responsibility in 
respect of policies and measures concerning new loans, 
agricultural finance, industrial finance and legislation 
affecting banking and credit. The Bank's advice is sought 
on certain aspects of formulation of the country's Develop­
ment Plans, such as the financing pattern, mobilisation of 
resources and institutional arrangements with regard to 
banking and credit m a t t e r s .
As the agency for administration of exchange control, 
the Bank's intimate knowledge of the exchange markets and 
the trade and balance of payments position places it in an 
advantageous position to offer sound technical advice to 
government in evolving policies on international finance 
and regulations regarding foreign trade and exchange.
The central banks are the main channel of communica­
tion between the government on the one hand and the banks 
and financial institutions on the other. The central banks 
also keep the governments informed of developments in the 
financial markets from time to time.
For the effective discharge of this advisory role the
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central banks have built up research and statistical 
organisations through which they periodically publish 
reviews of the financial and economic scene. It is a matter 
for regret that central bank authorities in anglophone 
Africa have not realised how potent their powers are with 
particular regard to their power to give advice and 
formulate policies.
BANKER TO GOVERNMENT
Central banks of Commonwealth Africa usually act as 
fiscal agents and bankers to the government. The laws of 
these banks usually expressly provide that the central 
bank shall act in the capacity of fiscal agent or banker 
for the government or both. In some cases where these 
functions are not expressly stated the law often implicitly 
confers such powers on the bank by specifically authorising 
transactions or operations of the type which central banks 
usually carry out in their capacity as fiscal agent or 
banker for the government, e.g. the Kenya Central Bank Act 
provides:
"the Bank shall be the fiscal agent for 
all of the Government's transactions with 
international financial institutions of 
which Kenya is a member or with which Kenya
is associated."36
Traditionally three functions in the domestic sphere are 
recognised as 'fiscal agent' functions:
1) administrator of F e d e r a l , State governments and
3 6 Section 32.
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parastatals' accounts;
2 ) depository for government funds; and
3) manager of the public debt.
The Central Banks of Commonwealth Africa handle cash 
transactions on behalf not only of the central governments 
and the ministries, but also by arrangement of any other 
public authority. To this end they hold public deposits 
as, for instance, those deposits originally taken over by 
the Bank of Tanzania from the Standard Bank. The central 
banks likewise act as the government's official agents in 
transactions with international organisations such as the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the African 
Development Bank.
The role as administrator of certain government 
accounts is clearly marked out, for example, where the 
central bank is required to open a general cash account for 
the Treasurer of the country in which the liquid funds of 
the government shall be deposited. Transfers of funds 
from this account may be made only upon order of the 
Treasury.
The function of the central bank as depositor for 
government funds is expressly prescribed in a considerable 
number of central bank laws. In a unitary state the 
central bank may expressly be required to be the official 
depository of the government and its political subdivision 
and instrumentalities; in federal states, the central bank 
may be expected to act as depository both for the federal 
government and the constitutent units of the federation 
as in Nigeria. The Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958
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authorises the Bank to act as banker to any fund, institu­
tion or corporation of the Federal Government or of a State 
3 7Government. Under several laws the board of directors
may authorise one or more commercial banks to accept
3 8government deposits and central bank laws declare the
central banks free from obligation to pay interest to the
39
government deposits.
Before the establishment of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria and other East African central banks, the financial 
transactions of these governments were handled by nominated 
commercial banks. In Nigeria it was the then Bank of 
British West Africa. The Commonwealth African central 
banks when they were each established became automatically 
bankers to their governments statutorily.
Sections 4 and 29 of Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 
sections 44 and 4 5 of the Kenya Central Bank Act, sections 
37-40 of the Bank of Tanzania Act and sections 23-4 of the 
Bank of Zambia Act form the statutory basis for these 
functions. Section 4(1) of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
Act for example provides that
"The principal objects of the Bank shall 
be to issue legal tender currency in Nigeria 
to maintain external reserves to safeguard 
the international value of that currency, 
to promote monetary stability and a sound 
financial structure in Nigeria and to act 
as banker and financial adviser to the 
Federal Government."
37 Section 36 CBN Act 1958.
38 Section 32(3) CBN Act 1958.
39 Section 30(h) CBN Act 1958.
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The central banks also provide banking services for state
governments as well as the various quasi-government
institutions. Another important banking service which the
central banks are required by law to render to their
central governments is the granting of 'ways and means'
40
advances to meet temporary budgetary deficits.
The central banks are not entitled to any remuneration
for the conduct of the ordinary banking business of central
governments, other than the advantage accruing to it from
4 1
holding the government's cash balance free of interest.
40 See e.g. s.34(1) of CBN Act.
41 Section 3 2(3).
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CHAPTER 6
DEVELOPMENTAL FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL BANKS
We shall examine in this chapter how the Commonwealth 
African Central Banks (using Central Bank of Nigeria as 
a model) promote economic development through the 
operations of financial markets, the operations of 
government-sponsored financial institutions and the roles 
the central banks play in these activities. We shall 
also consider the effects which political expediency and 
social, economic and cultural factors have on the 
developmental functions of these banks in their efforts to 
enhance the growth of savings and investments.
The Financial Markets
In the complex economic and financial relations of 
the modern world, financial markets exist to facilitate 
the intermediation of funds between savers and investors 
in financial institutions.
A financial market can be defined as simply a place 
or mechanism for the exchange of financial assets. These 
financial assets are sold for or bought with money. In 
contrast with goods and services, financial assets are 
not consumed. They are simply claims which the holders 
can use at a future date to obtain consumable goods and 
services; but the holders must first of all dispose of 
them for money, before or at maturity of the financial
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1
assets, in order to finance consumable goods.
A financial institution may be defined as any 
institution whose portfolio of assets consists largely 
of claims rather than inventory and plant and equipment. 
Financial institutions serve as intermediaries in the 
financial markets. They provide borrowers with loanable 
funds in exchange for bonds, promissory notes and other 
financial assets.
The price paid by the borrower for loanable funds 
is the interest rate which also represents income or 
inducement for the supplier of such funds. The rate 
of interest attracted by any loan is determined by 
several factors such as the duration of the loan, the 
risk of default and the size of the loan. The rate of 
interest is the rate charged to obtain present funds in 
exchange for future funds. It can be alternatively 
stated as the rate of discount on future funds required 
in order to obtain them now. Interest rate is usually 
expressed as an annual rate which may be simple or 
compound. In the case of compound interest rate, the 
interest payment is added to the principal amount and 
both continue to earn interest. The compounding is done 
at regular intervals which may be annually, quarterly, 
monthly or even continously.
Financial markets can be classified in many different 
ways. The classification schemes presented below are
rjo.Uu7*
1 ?he Central Bank of Nigeria v. 7, no. 3, July/September
1982, p. 22. n
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analytically useful but it should be noted that no fine 
dividing line can be drawn among them. One broad classi­
fication of the financial markets involves the separation 
of the markets into the new issues or primary markets 
and the secondary markets. When the borrowers offer new 
securities for subscription, the initial trading or 
exchange is carried out in the primary market. When 
outstanding securities are offered for sale by any of 
the holders and bought by other securities holders who 
want to replenish their stock of financial assets, a 
secondary market activity is said to have taken place.
A well functioning secondary market gives liquidity to 
financial assets.
The commonest classification of financial markets 
draws a distinction between a money market and a capital 
market. The market for short-term loans and securities, 
that is those maturing in one year or less, is called 
the money market. The capital market deals in long-term 
debt instruments or equity shares. It should be emphasized 
that there is no fine dividing line between these two 
markets. When the financial market is efficient, funds 
flow freely and rapidly among its various markets and 
uses. We shall now consider these two broad classifications 
the money market and the capital market.
The Money Market
The money market is a place or mechanism for obtaining 
short-term funds or exchanging financial assets representing 
short-term claims. Individuals as well as institutions
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lend and borrow money in the market. The primary sector 
of the market makes funds available while the secondary 
sector provides liquidity for the lenders and thus 
induces them to lend at lower rates than otherwise they 
would have done in the absence of secondary markets. 
Although not all money market assets have secondary 
markets, the secondary market sector plays a very impor­
tant role. In the primary market, short-term funds are 
offered at varying rates of interest depending on the 
sources of funds, the credit standing of borrowers and 
the maturity of the loan. The rates at which short- 
tern claims are traded in the secondary markets also 
vary and depend upon the demand for and the supply of 
short-term financial assets, assuming that government 
intervention in the market is negligible.
The secondary sector of the money market is largely 
an over-the-telephone market. In the USA the core of 
the market machinery consists of a selected number of 
comnercial banks, which trade heavily in money market 
instruments; a number of government security dealers, some 
of vhom are banks; a few commercial paper dealers and 
brokers who specialise in assisting borrowers to obtain 
fun*is and lenders to place funds; and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, which intervenes in the market 
to Implement monetary policy. Although the market has 
no ^>ecific location its ready accessibility by telephone 
makes it possible for lenders and borrowers in all parts 
of the country to lend and borrow funds promptly. The 
principal money market instruments, using America again
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as an example, include Treasury Bills, Federal Funds 
(i.e. a member-bank excess reserves on deposit at the 
Federal Reserve system), negotiable certificates of 
deposits (CDS), bankers acceptances, commercial paper 
and Eurodollars or Eurocurrency. Most of these instruments 
are liabilities of banks and the government and consequently 
have a very low risk of default.
The principal borrowers in the money market in the 
countries surveyed are the Treasury, Commercial banks, 
Securities Dealers and some non-bank financial insti­
tutions and business firms. The major lenders include 
commercial banks, corporations and other firms, non-bank 
financial institutions, state and local governments, 
foreign governments, central banks, private institutions 
and the governments.
In Chapter 5 we dealt with some of the instruments 
of the anglophone African money markets which were 
identified as Treasury Bills, call money funds, Treasury 
certificates and government stocks. It was noted that 
governments employ '-Treasury Bills and other instruments 
to borrow money from the public and the banking system 
for short periods of three months to two years; and further 
that, through the use of these instruments, central banks 
have pumped more money into circulation than is ideal for 
the systems.
Objectives of Setting Up of Money Markets
Before the political independence of Nigeria, Kenya, 
Zambia and Tanzania there were no money markets available
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to governments for use for the purpose of mopping up 
idle funds in the banking system and in the hands of 
the public and for mobilising and channeling them into 
more productive investment. Institutions and persons 
who had funds surplus to their needs had no market for 
them in these countries. Such surplus funds were there­
fore invested in London markets as the answer to the 
lack of effective machinery for mobilising resources.
As the countries' independence drew near, it was only 
natural that nationalist governments should want to 
establish markets for mobilising short and long-term 
capital in these countries. However, in East Africa 
prior to the break-up of the East African Currency Board 
the Government of Tanganyika first obtaine d financing 
from the East African Currency Board in 1957 when the 
latter took up 20 million shillings' worth of medium and 
long-term public securities. The first subscription of 
Treasury Bills followed in 1960.
The development of the money market in Tanzania and
other anglophone African countries was on an extremely 
small scale because of the scarce supply of Treasury
Bills and commercial bills of exchange, and because there
were hardly any instutitional investors or financial 
intermediaries (e.g. insurance companies, building 
societies and Post Office Savings Bank) whose business 
rested on the circulation of short-term credits instruments. 
Furthermore, inter-bank relations within the countries 
were infrequent and weak since the expatriate banks had 
few dealings with each other and preferred to turn instead
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to their London head offices.
One may thus see that one of the main reasons for 
the establishment of these African money markets was the 
Africanisation of the credit base. By creating a credit 
base the governments would be able to stem the outflow 
of surplus funds into investment outlets in the London 
money and capital markets. Another vital reason for 
setting up money markets has been the desire of nationalist 
governments to provide the machinery necessary for govern­
ment short-term financing requirements. As practically 
all the governments indulge in deficit financing/ the 
development of a money market provided the avenue for 
financing contracts and development projects.
Thirdly, setting up money markets was seen as one 
of the essential steps which any new nation should take 
to express nationhood. African countries consider the 
money markets as part of a financial and monetary system 
which "will enable them to establish the monetary autonomy
which is part and parcel of the workings of an independent, 
2
modern state".
Fourthly, in most banking systems the commercial
banks are required to maintain a cash ratio which is the
percentage of total deposits that is held in cash. In
some countries the central banks' organic laws statutorily
3
stipulate the ratio. In Nigeria, no cash ratio was 
prescribed until 1976, following the Report of the Anti-
2 F.S.Okotio-Eboh, The Six Budget Speeches, 1 958-63 , 
p. 4 8.
3 See s.47 (2) Bank of Tanzania Act, 1965.
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Inflation Task Force, when it was fixed at 5% and 12.5% 
depending on the size of deposits. The call money scheme, 
treasury bills, commercial bills and so on are used to 
support banks when they run short of cash. In other 
words, if banks are short of cash and then need cash to 
balance their books at the end of clearing or close of 
business, their first reaction is to draw on money at 
call and if need be to discount other bills. The same 
process is follwed when the liquidity ratio or the pro­
portion of deposits held in cash or near cash assets 
against depositors' demands for cash payments is threatened. 
In order to provide these services to the commercial 
banks the mechanism of money market was established.
The fifth objective of establishing money markets 
in Africa is that money markets should perform for the 
countries all the usual functions which a money market 
performs in developed countries.
The following policy statement brings out very clearly 
the typical objectives of establishing a money market in 
an African setting:
"The issue of Treasury Bills will enable 
the Government to even out seasonal variations 
in the normal flow of revenue. They should 
also enable us to release for capital expendi­
ture some of the funds now deployed as working 
capital. Furthermore they will enable us to 
finance expenditure in anticipation of the 
receipt of loan monies. These are the imme­
diate advantages of Government. For the 
country at large they provide one means of 
hastening the establishment of a local money 
market. Hitherto there has been no opportunity 
for the banks, commercial houses, and other 
institutions to employ within Nigeria funds 
which are temporarily surplus to their require­
ments. Because of the lack of facilities in 
Nigeria it has been necessary for them to
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remit such funds overseas for investment in 
London. The issue of Nigerian Treasury Bills 
should make these remittances unnecessary.
Such surplus funds can henceforth be invested 
locally to the undoubted benefit of the ^
Government and indeed of the whole country."
The Money Market in Nigeria
In Chapter 5 we considered the instruments we identi­
fied to be in common use in African money markets as 
treasury bills, treasury certificates and development 
stocks. Each of these constitutes a market within the 
overall umbrella of the money market. The fifth instrument 
in use in money markets which we did not deal with is the 
commercial bill-of-exchange.
In Nigeria the most important commercial bills were 
the Marketing Board Bills. These originated with the 
inception of the Bill Market Scheme in 1962. The back­
ground to the scheme derived from the need for the Central 
Bank of Nigeria to be prepared to provide the seasonal 
expansion of credit required to fill any gap between 
credit which the banks could provide and the larger amount 
usually required to finance the major export crops. As 
a result of discussions with the banks, the marketing boards 
and the Minister of Finance, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
sponsored a bill market scheme late in 1961. The scheme 
came into effect at the onset of the 1962-3 season. It 
involved the Northern Nigeria Marketing Board and a 
consortium of banks and acceptance houses in an arrange­
ment for financing the export of produce by means of inland 
bills of exchange which were eligible within defined limits
4 Ibid. p. 48.
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for refinancing or rediscounting at the Central Bank. 
Similar arrangements for financing the needs of other 
marketing boards were introduced as from the 1963-4 
season for the Mid-Western Nigeria Marketing Board. Under 
the scheme the Marketing Board met its requirement for 
cash by drawing a 90-day commercial bill of exchange 
supported by sales contract on the Nigerian Produce 
Marketing Company Limited, the sole exporter for all the 
Markerting Boards. Upon acceptance by the company the 
Board then rediscounted the bills with the participating 
commercial banks with the Central Bank of Nigeria.
Three separate consortia of banks and other financial 
institutions operated the scheme for the three marketing 
boards; and at the height of the scheme, nearly all the 
commercial banks were involved.
The scheme worked well up to 1964. Besides ensuring 
the provision of adequate credit for the marketing of 
the crops concerned, the bills so created provided a 
further important vehicle for short-term investment. 
Unfortunately the scheme began to crack at the beginning 
of the 1964-5 cocoa season when Nigeria and other members 
of the Cocoa Producers Alliance withdrew from the World 
Cocoa Market in an effort to get the cocoa produce 
manufacturers to increase the price of cocoa to at least 
N380 per ton. With this withdrawal., sales contracts which 
formed the basis on which bills were drawn under the 
finance scheme were no longer available. Consequently, 
the members of the consortium became unwilling to grant 
advances against, or discount bills drawn on, the security 
of the stocks of produce. This put the Western Nigeria
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Marketing Board into serious financial difficulties. To
relieve the pressure, the Central Bank of Nigeria granted
direct advances to the Western Nigeria Marketing Board to
enable it to maintain the purchase of cocoa from that
which had been produced locally. The advances amounted
to N20m plus a further N21m. In the 1965-6 season and
again in 1966-7, the Central Bank of Nigeria gave direct
advances to the Northern States Marketing Board, the banks
having again refused to give loans to finance groundnuts
purchased in the absence of a sales contract in the first
instance; and in the second because of falling prices and
lack of faith in the country's ability to transport crops
to the ports in the face of the political crisis which
complicated the transportation difficulties. In order to
remove this uncertainty of finance in such a vital sector
of the economy, the Central Bank of Nigeria took over the
responsibility for Marketing Board crop finance. At
the close of 1 968 the Central Bank of N igeria's credit
to the various marketing boards in the country stood at
N69.2m. And so ended the dream of a flourishing bill
5
market in the country.
The Bill Market Scheme brought the Central Bank of 
Nigeria into direct financing of the marketing boards 
thereby breaching the Central Bank's set guidelines which 
stipulated that the "Central Bank should not, indeed 
cannot, provide such essential short-term credit direct
5 G.O. Nwankwo, The Nigeria Financial System 1980, 
p. 126. We are grateful to the authors for this 
part of our work.
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to the borrower. It must at all times operate through 
the commercial banking system and on a sound banking 
basis as a lender of last resort.
From the foregoing it would be seen that African 
countries' money markets developments were due to several 
factors. One was the need to Africanise the credit base, 
secondly the economic demand to repatriate investments 
in London and thirdly the government's financial require­
ments. Indeed this overriding concern, the determination 
of the Government to provide the necessary machinery 
not only to finance itself but also to moblise resources 
for development, explains the reason for the africanisation 
policy mentioned above. It also explains the introduction 
of the Call Money Scheme in 1962 and of the Treasury 
Certificate in 1968. This factor has had a particularly 
dominating influence in the growth and development of 
the money market, especially during the revenue deficit 
years from 1962 through the political crisis and the Civil 
War
An Appraisal of the Nigerian Money Market
From the foregoing analysis of the functions and 
objectives of an African money market it can be seen that 
the establishment of the markets has not significantly 
heiged to encourage economic growth. The main reasons have 
beea:
1 One of the functions of a money market is to
6 Sobilisation Budget in The Six Budget Speeches, p. 125.
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provide a channel for the injection of central 
bank cash into the banking system as a leverage 
for the operation of open market operations.
With the abolition of the Bill Market scheme in 
Nigeria in 1968 and the stoppage of the issues 
of Treasury Bills and treasury certificates during 
the Nigerian oil boom of 1973-6 there were vir­
tually no more instruments in the market. The 
position reverted almost to what the financial 
market was at the establishment of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria.
2 Similarly, in its functions as borrower and lender 
of short-term funds, a money market should ensure 
that no loose funds lie idle. It should there­
fore, when properly organised, promote an 
efficient allocation and utilisation of resources 
in the economy. In Nigeria the market is not 
discharging this function effectively. Idle 
funds lie about and various merchant banks have 
been known to refuse deposits with interest for 
lack of investment outlets.
3 It is also the function of a money market to 
provide a line of defence against cash shortages 
for banks. The practice with commercial banks is 
that when they realise that their balances at the 
central bank are about to fall below the minimum 
statutorily permitted they would draw on call 
money first and as the next line of defence would 
discount available bills for cash. As pointed
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out earlier, the call money scheme has been dis­
continued and treasury bills have not been in 
sufficient supply. As excess idle funds are 
still lying side by side with extreme liquidity 
shortages among the Nigerian banks, it could be 
seen that the money market has not been a success­
ful institution for economic growth in Nigeria.
An efficient money market should be able to 
maintain an equilibrium between idle funds and 
extreme liquidity shortages.
One way in which the Central Bank of Nigeria has 
tried to make the most effective use of these idle 
resources and close the gap between illiquidity 
and idle funds is the directive to commercial 
banks to establish 200 new branches in rural 
areas. The savings from rural banks can be 
employed by banks to purchase money market instru­
ments. Regrettably, for the reasons advanced at 
page 410/ the rural banking programme has not been 
very successful in the total mobilisation of funds.
4 The City of London money market as well as the 
money markets in Tokyo, Hong Kong and New York, 
are well known for the specialised money market 
knowledge they have accumulated over the years. 
Because of the poor performance of the Nigerian 
money market, the acquisition of such knowledge 
is painful and elusive.
5 The creation of an indigenised credit base that 
a money market was meant to achieve as an
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objective cannot materialise in an economy where 
there is a dearth of investment instruments.
6 There is always a preference for the banks to
maintain a low cash revenue if they hold sufficient 
funds in treasury and other bills and in call 
money f u n d s . Where these instruments are not 
available, banks tend to hold higher cash revenues 
than they would have employed in short-term bills. 
With the abolition of the call money scheme, the 
Nigerian money market does not any longer provide 
this service for the banks.
It may be recalled that the Nigerian money market 
flourished and grew rapidly during the 1960s. However, 
this rapid growth was short-lived because of the phenomenal 
buoyancy of government revenues following the big increase 
in oil prices since 1973. Indeed this was a very serious 
threat to the existence of the money market. As a result 
of the increase in the price of oil and the consequent 
increase in Federal Government revenues, the Government 
began announcing record budget, each year's budget far 
exceeding the preceding year's. The consequent highly in­
creased government spending and expenditure pumped a great 
deal of money into the economy. On top of this came the 
Udoji salary awards early in 1975 with retrospective effect 
to 1 April 1974. Most of these funds found their way back 
into the banking system and thereby increased the excess 
liquidity. With such amounts of cash holdings, short-term 
investment instruments became inadequate to absorb the 
excess liquidity. On the other hand, the fact that the
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government itself had surplus funds meant that the Govern­
ment had no need to increase Treasury Bills and Treasury 
Certificate issues. As a result of this shortage of money 
market instruments, the Central Bank of Nigeria abolished 
the Call Money Scheme in July 1974, as there were not
enough Treasury Bills in which to invest the funds.
With the abolition of the Bill Market scheme in 1968 
and of the Call Money Scheme, the money market was left 
with only two instruments - Treasury Bills and Treasury 
Certificates. In the 1975-6 Budget speech it was announced 
t h a t :
"Treasury Certificates will henceforth be 
retired as they mature. There is no further 
justification for the Federal Government 
to continue to hold these instruments which
it does not actually need in view of its
own favourable liquid position. It was also 
decided that the volume of Treasury Bills 
will remain unchanged for the time being.
With the Treasury Certificate abolished and 
Treasury Bills stagnant, the Nigeria money 
market became virtually dead."
At page 117 it was stated that the Fisher Report on the 
Desirability and Practicability of establishing a Central 
Bank in Nigeria as an instrument for Promoting Economic 
Development of the country had rejected the idea of estab­
lishing a central bank for Nigeria because of the absence 
of a Nigerian money market and good access to the London 
money market. When the issue was debated in the Nigerian 
Parliament on a motion by the Hon. K.O. Mbadiwe on 21 March, 
1952, the then Financial Secretary stated that the govern­
ment was opposed to the idea for various reasons, one of
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which was the absence of a stock and money market. If 
Mr. Fisher had an opportunity to report in 1984 on his 
subject he would probably hold the same view, as did the 
Financial Secretary, the Hon. E. Hunsworth C M G , that a 
central bank without a financial market is a non-starter.
g
Dr. Mars was of the opinion during the Second World War 
that a central bank in Nigeria could play a significant 
role in establishing the economy. He cautioned however that 
a central bank could only be effective if a market for 
government securities existed. Such a market takes a long 
time to develop. Newyln and Rowan in their study of 1953 
rejected M a r s ’ argument in favour of a central bank in 
Nigeria. In their comments they say, "The view that a 
central bank can (in Nigerian circumstances) promote econ­
omic stability by monetary management is, to put matters
9
tersely, nothing but an illusion." They argued strongly 
that a central bank in Nigeria would not be able to 
achieve economic stabilisation since the Nigerian economy 
was a dependent one where destabilising forces frequently 
originated abroad and where lack of developed financial
7 House of Representatives Debates, First Session 1952, v 1 
p. 377: "That as a practical means of consolidating the 
financial resources (including regulation of Gold and 
Currency) of this country for the purpose of rapid 
economic development in all its phases, and as well as 
strengthening the existing African Banks, that the 
government should initiate, organise and establish a 
Central Bank of the Nation within two years from the 
passage of this motion."
8 For Mars' view see C.V. Brown, The Nigerian Banking 
System, 1966 , p. 128.
9 Ibid, p . 128.
350
institutions made central bank control ineffective. They 
argued further that private investment in Nigeria was low 
and that the expatriate banks in Nigeria would not depend 
on the Central Bank as the lender of last resort since they 
had access to the London money market. They therefore 
advocated the establishment of an economic development- 
oriented central bank in Nigeria, i.e. without a money 
market.
All financial, economic and banking experts appeared
from the above analysis to agree on one thing, viz: that
it is an illusion to hold that a central bank can promote
economic stability by monetary management without regard to
a well-developed money market. It is our view therefore
that the time was not ripe for the establishment of a
Central Bank of Nigeria when it was set up, and that it
would have been adequate if the central bank in Nigeria had
been established with limited powers which would help a
smooth economic development and an early establishment of a 
1 0money market. J.K. Onoh is therefore, it is submitted, 
correct when he said:
"The money market, by nature, is an indica­
tor of the degree of monetary stability
in an economy, and contributes significantly 
to the achievement of such stability. The 
Nigerian money market therefore has still 
a major role to play in this direction."^
As the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria put it:
10 See Report of the Mission from the International Bank 
Of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 1954.
11 J.K. Onoh, The Foundations of Nigeria's Financial 
Infrastructure, p. 134.
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"The importance of an active and efficient 
securities market in ameliorating a country's 
financial strain is worth emphasising and 
it should be a matter of great concern to 
us that so far the role played by the capital 
market in reducing Nigeria's financial 
strain has not been very impressive. It 
is my fervent hope that by the end of this 
seminar we would have identified the salient 
features of the market, pinpointed major 
areas of bottlenecks or imperfections and 
suggested feasible methods to make the capital 
market an effective boost to economic 
development."12
Legislation should be enacted to control the amount of 
Treasury Bills on issue weekly in Nigeria. 150% of the 
estimated resources of the Federal Government and the 
State governments is monstrous and inflationary and counter 
productive. A level of 25% would seem to be adequate.
The Capital Market
The capital market is part of the financial market.
It is concerned with long-term investments. While the 
money market provides funds for those who need to borrow 
for short-term purposes, capital market is primarily for 
those who are short of funds but want to borrow for the 
long-term. In a wide sense capital market embraces all 
services that are rendered by institutions and the facili­
ties that are provided for mobilising long-term funds and 
for channelling such funds to ultimate users. A capital 
market may therefore be defined as a financial market in 
which lenders provide long-term funds in exchange for fin­
ancial assets issued by borrowers traded by holders of
12 The CBN Bulletin Vol. 8, No. 1, Jan/March 1983, p. 2.
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outstanding negotiable debt instruments. The securities 
offered in the capital market may be classified into debt 
securities and equity (ownership) shares or the market may 
be analysed in terms of its primary and secondary segments. 
Two distinct types of capital markets exist in Nigeria: 
one segment of the capital market deals with new issues of 
long-term securities in which titles to productive assets 
(e.g. stocks and shares) are sold and bought. The other 
segment of the capital market deals with old issues of 
securities in which existing securities are re-sold.
Objectives for the Establishment of Capital Markets in 
Anglophone Africa
The financial markets in Nigeria as well as in other 
Commonwealth African countries are of recent origin. There 
are both political and economic reasons for this. As poli­
tically independent nations, the countries concerned were 
barely over two decades old. Although commercial banking 
activity started in these countries in 1892, in the case 
of Nigeria, this was dominated by a few expatriate banks 
whose main preoccupation was the finance of external trade 
which was also monopolistically undertaken by expatriate 
trading companies. The colonial governments were never 
seriously concerned with the pursuit of accelerated economic 
development which would have necessitated the^ active mob i ­
lisation of financial resources, among other productive 
inputs. Thus the active development of the financial 
system beyond commercial banking and the foundation of 
organised and modern financial markets had to wait for the
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nationalist governments of post-independent Nigeria and 
those countries.
By 1960 12 commercial banks were operating in Nigeria 
with 160 offices and branches established to spread bank­
ing services beyond the capital cities. Other financial 
institutions including the central bank were established 
many decades after commercial banking activity had gained a 
foothold in the economy. One purpose for which the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was established in 1959 was the 
fostering of the development of an efficient financial 
system in all its ramifications. Indeed the Central Bank 
of Nigeria actively pursued the development of the financial 
markets in order to facilitate not only the regulation of 
the economy through orthodox monetary and fiscal policies 
but also the mobilisation of financial capital to implement 
the national development plan of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. In what follows we shall analyse the evolution 
and growth of the capital markets, the attendant problems 
and the prospects for further development of the markets.
In addition to the reasons noted at page 344 for the 
establishment of money markets in Africa we can identify 
other main objectives which capital markets are expected to 
serve. They provide facilities and opportunities for the 
quotation and marketing of stocks and shares to raise fresh 
capital in the market. The markets provide opportunities 
for co-operation of indigenous and foreign entrepreneurs 
to pull resources together for mutual advantage. Another 
reason for establishing capital markets is to enable the 
authorities to mobilise long-term capital for the economic
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development of the country. Apart from providing local 
opportunity for borrowing and lending for long-term purposes 
through their operations, the markets introduce a code of 
conduct for operators in the markets, thus checking abuses 
in the system.
Composition of the Capital Market
The major participants in the Nigerian Capital Market
a r e :
the Nigerian Stock Exchange
the Specialised or development banks
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
1 3The major sources of funds to the primary segment of the 
market are the Central Bank of Nigeria, the development 
banks, the Mortgage Bank, non-bank financial institutions 
and individuals. The minor sources of funds include com­
mercial and merchant banks, state and local governments, 
individuals, etc. The development banks include the 
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB), the Nigerian 
Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI) and the Federal 
Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) which specialises in real 
estate finance. These institutions supply largely medium 
and long-term financial capital and are designed to concen­
trate their lending and investment operations in different 
sectors of the economy ranging from agricultre, industry 
to construction.
In Kenya and Zambia the capital markets are similarly
13 See also Chapter 9.
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composed. However in Chapter 5 it was remarked that in 
line with the economic philosophy of socialist states, 
Tanzania did not develop her capital market. It is not 
surprising therefore that there is no stock exchange in 
Tanzania. It is also of common knowledge that in almost 
all socialist countries nationalisation of the banking 
system has been followed quickly by the creation of a single 
large bank combining the functions of issuing bank, com­
mercial and control of plan implementation.
The Stock Exchange
A stock exchange is an organised auction market for 
the purchase and sale of securities. Many of the exchanges 
buy and sell on their customers' orders and charge a 
commission. Not all stocks are traded on a stock exchange. 
Stock exchanges will list or admit a stock to trading only 
after the company meets certain requirements. These often 
include a minimum size, publication of financial informa­
tion, assurance of adequate facilities for transferring 
stock certificates, the guaranteeing of certain rights to 
stockholders, and so on.
Once a company's stock is outstanding its price will 
fluctuate in accordance with the changes in expectations 
about future earnings of the firm. Unlike a bond, a share 
has neither a fixed maturity value nor a fixed interest 
payment. The earnings per share and the price per share 
will therefore tend to move up and down together.
14 Above, p. 315.
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In Nigeria the Stock Exchange was established by the 
Lagos Stock Exchange Act, 1961, following the Report of 
the Committee Appointed to advise on Ways and Means of 
Fostering a Share Market in Nigeria. The Committee was 
appointed in 1958 and headed by Professor R.H. Barback.
The Report was published in 1959 and among other things 
recommended:
(a) the creation of facilities for dealing in 
shares;
(b) the establishment of rules regulating transfers;
(c ) the reduction or elimination of stamp duties on 
transfers and the elimination of tax deductions 
at source, including measures to encourage 
savings and issue of securities of Government by 
the Government and other organisations.
The Functions of Stock Exchange
In Anglophone Africa stock exchanges are in general 
expected to perform very vital functions in the countries' 
economies. They are expected to provide a central meeting 
place for members to buy and sell existing stocks and 
shares and for granting quotations to new ones and to pro­
vide opportunities for raising new and fresh capital.
In addition stock exchanges provide the machinery for 
mobilising private and public savings and making them 
available for productive investment through stocks and 
shares. By providing the market they facilitate the pur­
chase and sale of securities, thereby helping to reduce the 
risk of illiquidity which some companies run. The
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exchanges provide opportunity for attracting foreign 
capital for the countries' development. In Nigeria for 
example the exchange provides channels for the Government's 
implementation of the Indigenisation Decree. The indige- 
nisation programme presented opportunities to Nigerians to 
buy foreign businesses which implied heavy capital 
expenditure. In addition to these functions a stock ex­
change is established to perform the following functions:
(a) to provide appropriate machinery to facilitate
further offerings of stocks and shares to the 
general public;
(b) to promote increasing participation by the public
in the private sector of the economy;
(c) to encourage the investment of savings as soon
as it is clear that stocks and shares are readily
available.
Dealings in the Stock Exchange
In Commonwealth Africa, stock exchanges have the power 
to make investments and in that regard can on behalf of 
the Exchange appoint a director or other directors for the 
discharge of the affairs of the Exchange; and to inform, 
discipline, hear disputes or complaints between members and 
they may adjudicate if they consider it fit to do so in 
disputes between members and non-members. The exchange is 
therefore usually vested with the powers of governing and 
administering the exchange. In that regard they may 
approve quotations of securities on the exchange after the 
companies have complied fully with the regulations and
requirements of the securities and exchange applicable law. 
Dealing in the Stock Exchange takes three different forms:
Direct Issue or Offer for Subscriptions
One method of raising funds is by direct issue of a 
prospectus inviting the public to subscribe to shares.
The money raised goes directly to the company. If this 
method is adopted the issuing company has no say as to who 
should subscribe to the shares. When allocations are made, 
those who have been allocated shares are issued with shares 
corresponding to the amounts and type that they have 
applied for or have been allocated.
The second method of raising funds in the exchange is 
in the nature of an offer of shares for sale by existing 
shareholders. It differs from direct issue in that the 
proceeds do not go to the company but to the selling share­
holders. Again, unlike direct issues, offers do not result 
in new issues of securities. This method is in a sense 
technically a transfer of ownership of shares from exisit- 
ing shareholders to new holders.
The third method of seeking to raise funds in the 
exchange is by making available to brokers a block of 
shares or stocks of a company. As soon as the block is 
made available to the public the company is admitted to 
the official list.
All dealings on tie exchange are made through brokers 
and jobbers who buy and sell securities and earn their 
living through profits made on such investments, such gains 
being called 'the jobbers' turn'. In Africa the same
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people are jobbers and brokers, unlike the position at the 
London Stock Exchange where all buying and selling orders 
received from clients are negotiated with the jobbers by 
the brokers; a jobber is not allowed to deal direct with 
the public except through brokers who also must pass all 
buying and selling orders through jobbers. A member cannot 
operate both as a broker and jobber at the same time.
Stock Exchange in East Africa
The institution of stock exchange in Anglophone East 
Africa was established by the British colonialists and 
modelled upon British tradition. After many years of 
independence the stock exchanges are in a precarious posi­
tion. One factor responsible for this is the absence of 
clientele which was drawn almost entirely from European and 
Asian communities which never exceeded 3% of the total 
population. Another factor resulting in minimal African 
participation in most financial institutions until after 
independence was that some enactments prevented Africans
1 5from investing or taking part in financial institutions.
As independence approached expatriate personnel became 
uneasy and one company chairman remarked:
"The full measure of the Government disas­
trous policy in Africa is slowly but surely 
whipping the winds into storms of hate, 
disaster and bloodshed which, with the
15 The Control of the Business of Life Assurance with
Africans Ordinance 1945 prevented Africans from taking 
out life assurance. Credit to Natives (Restriction) 
Ordinance, 1931 in Tanganyika required Africans to 
obtain written permission from local administrators 
before entering into debt obligations with non-Africans. 
Kenya implemented a similar ordinance in 1948.
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passage of a very short time, will make 
Africa virtually impossible for prudent 
European investment. The losses that 
will accrue to British interests alone 
will in my opinion be calculated in mil­
lions. The wisdom of our decision to
withdraw from Africa, which needs both 
courage and foresight, is clear to us all 
as every day goes b y . " ^
The grant of Independence to the three British territories
in East Africa had therefore a disastrous effect upon most
monetary institutions. The commercial banks suffered a 
capital outflow of over £15 million; the building society 
movement completely collapsed for similar but more varied 
reasons, the Post Office Savings Bank and even hire pur­
chase companies experienced losses of deposits as
expatriates took their money and often themselves back to 
17
Europe.
Stock Exchange in Kenya
In Kenya the Nairobi Stock Exchange was formally 
incorporated by six brokers in July 1954. In the early 
stages the Government showed great interest by offering to 
establish a support fund to encourage greater dealing in 
government securities and to finance a stock exchange 
building although the suggestion was later rejected by 
government. Government interest gradually waned and the 
exchange was left entirely in the hands of independent
16 Director's Report, Lombard Bank Ltd., Chairman's 
Address for year ending 1961.
17 Private Enterprises and the East African Company, 1969, 
by P.A. Thomas, p. 136.
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private brokers unsupervised and uncontrolled by legisla­
tion. The exchange continued to rely for growth on the 
wealthier Asians and Africans, insurance companies,
National Provident Funds and the Post Office Savings Banks.
Failure to develop can be attributed to two other 
main factors. The first was that the industrial sector 
of the economy was developed mainly on foreign investment 
and local Asian and European private capital. There was 
also a highly developed European-owned farming industry. 
Naturally, the benefits of development were disproportion­
ately reaped by the non-African communities. Much ill-will 
had been generated among the African and non-African 
communities and particularly because after independence 
more than 1 million acres of previously European-owned 
land was transferred to African smallholders. This radi­
cally changed the structure of Kenya agriculture and the 
system of investment in capital markets and the exchange. 
Small-scale purchases of shares on the stock exchange by 
smallholders cannot give any hope for the development of 
the exchange as the best that can be expected from mobili­
sation of their resources will only be of marginal 
signif icance.
Secondly, the initial success of Kenya in industriali­
sation and agriculture rested upon the belief among 
potential foreign investors in the stability of the govern­
ment and the environment. Generally the more conservative 
the political and social climate the better for foreign 
capital investment. On the other hand, when governments 
pursue radical policies there is a decline in foreign
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commitment to the development of the host country. After 
Independence there were pressures on the private sector 
to Africanise with specific attention directed towards 
the displacement of Asian traders. The result was the 
flight of capital which Kenya needed very much for economic 
development.
It can be seen therefore that the capital market or 
the stock exchange in Kenya is in the hands of expatriates 
and is not well developed. The table below shows vividly 
that new issues have been negligible between 1952 and 1966. 
The Stock Exchange in Kenya has therefore not played any 
significant role in mobilising funds for economic develop­
ment in Kenya. P.A. Thomas confirms this:
"That the exchange is the only financial 
institution of any sophistication which 
is not governed by special legislation or 
controls is undoubtedly a reflection of 
its relative insignificance in the field 
of capital mobilisation and of the confine­
ment of its activities until recently to a 
small well-educated and wealthy minority 
of the population which, many would say, 
had little need for such protection."^°
He went further to conclude that:
"As soon as any positive steps are taken 
to increase African participation in industry 
either on a skilled manpower or a capital 
ownership basis, demand on the Stock Exchange 
will fall rapidly and the importance of this 
institution in the mobilisation of new 
capital will once again become zero. The 
history of the exchange has shown that such 
a narrow market reacts violently to internal 
political factors. The next time it loses
18 Private Enterprise and the East African Company, op. 
c i t , p . 135.
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its principal clientele there will be no 
immediate substitute group ready to take 
over. The consolation for the Kenya Govern­
ment would be that if the exchange collapsed 
because of Government policy, there would 
be no great loss since the exchange never 
has been successful in performing what 
should have been its most important function, 
that of raising new investment c a p i t a l . " ^
The table below shows the stunted growth of the Nairobi 
Exchange from 1952-6 6.
Table 15 Nairobi Stock Exchange
N o . of Quoted 
Companies
Value of Issued 
Capital F.m.
1952 43 11.8
1955 50 18.3
1 958 58 33.0
1964 58 33.0
1965 61 33.4
1 966 64 41.4
The Stock Exchange in Zambia
On 19 April, 1958 the Government of Zambia announced 
that a Stock Exchange was to be established. It also 
announced plans to take a majority shareholding in 28 large 
privately-owned companies, most of them foreign. The plan 
included an arrangement under which all Zambian firms would 
have to go public as soon as they attained a certain size 
and thereafter such companies would have to offer their 
shares on the stock exchange. Subsequently when an
19 Ibid, p. 155.
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expansion ceiling was reached the companies would be 
nationalised. The system would appear to be counter­
productive. It is difficult to see how a stock exchange 
established to encourage private investment can succeed 
with a threat of nationalisation. The curious system of 
encouraging private sector companies to grow only to be 
nationalised has discouraged growth of the capital market 
in Zambia.
Stock Exchange in Tanzania
In February 1967 Tanzania nationalised all the major
financial, manufacturing and trading concerns. As noted 
20in Chapter 5 capital markets do not exist in a socialist 
state because individuals cannot own a debenture which is 
a financial claim on enterprise. Accordingly a stock 
exchange in Tanzania is another instrument of oppression of 
the masses by the capitalist elite.
21
However as Dr. J. Loxley remarked
"Even then, a scheme is under consideration 
whereby small investors can purchase shares 
in a finance company, the assets of which 
are National Development Corporation shares. 
So far however the only purchasers of the 
shares have been financial institutions and 
this is a very far cry from establishing a 
stock exchange. In the Tanzania situation, 
with major emphasis on socialist expansion 
of the public sector, an exchange is neither 
needed or desired."
2 0 Above, p. 319.
21 Private Enterprise and the East African Company, op. 
cit, pp. 152-3.
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The Lagos Stock Exchange
As stated above, the Lagos Stock Exchange was incor­
porated under the Companies Ordinance as an association 
limited by guarantee in 1960 and reconstituted into the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange in 1977. It now operates two 
branches at Kaduna and Port Harcourt. Activities in the 
market cover both the issue of primary securities and 
trading in secondary securities belonging to the government 
as well as the private sector.
The first Nigerian Government Registered Stock 1956/
61 amounting to N600,000 at 3\% discount was issued by the 
Treasury under the colonial government in 1946. This was 
followed in 1959 when the Central Bank of Nigeria at its 
establishment took over responsibility for the floating of 
government debt instruments and accordingly issued the 
Federation of Nigeria First Development Loan of N4 million. 
This was a very successful operation resulting in over­
subscription and hence the allocation of N 4 .7 million which 
exceeded initial issue by N700,000. The Second Development 
Stock was issued in 1961 with maturity spread of 6-25 
years and thereafter the issue of stocks became an annual 
event. The initial secondary market in Development Stocks 
was provided by the Central Bank of Nigeria until in 1961 
when the Lagos Stock Exchange took over from the Central 
Bank of Nigeria all secondary market transactions in 
government stocks.
In Nigeria as well as East African countries two types 
of securities are dealt with on the stock exchange. One 
is the Government Loan Stocks and the other is the
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industrial securities. Foreign securities are not quoted 
on the exchange. The attached tables show the number of 
transactions at the Lagos Stock Exchange and the value of 
the transactions.
In terms of the number of transactions each year from 
1961-77 it can be seen that the rise has not been pheno­
menal. Table 16 illustrates the yearly growth of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange since inception. Between 1961 and 
1977 listed companies on the Exchange increased from 3 to 
13, while between 1971 and 1982 the number increased from 
13 to 93. At the end of 1982 168 securities were listed 
on the Exchange, composed of 92 equities, 16 industrial 
loans and 57 government securities with a total market 
capitalisation of N4.03 billion. The Central Bank of 
Nigeria is the underwriter and registrar of the Federal 
Government Stocks which accounted for 75.7% of the total 
market capitalisation as at end of 1982. As.the under­
writer, initial take-up of the Central Bank of Nigeria for 
the past five years has been between 90.6% and 98.8% except 
in 198 2 when it took 72.5% owing to the upward revision of 
interest rates (details are set out in Table 18). It is 
necessary to point out that of the 93 listed companies in 
the Exchange only 5 are 100% indigenised one of which is a 
wholly-owned Nigerian-promoted enterprise. This strange 
feature should be eliminated in order to widen the indige­
nous credit base of the economy.
The influence of the government - and its pre-eminent 
financial agency the Central Bank of Nigeria - over the 
financial markets in Nigeria is far-reaching and pervasive.
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Table 16
Growth of Securities on the Nigerian Stock Exchange Since
1 961
Number of
Year Government 
Securities
Equities Preference Shares Total 
and Debentures
1961 5 3 - 8
1962 3 1 3 7
1963 4 1 1 6
1964 3 - - 3
1965 3 - 1 4
1966 3 ' 1 1 5
1967 4 - - 4
1 968 4 - - 4
1969 3 1 - 4
1970 4 1 2 7
1971 3 5 - 8
1 972 3 6 3 12
1973 6 4 - 10
1 974 3 1 0 - 13
1975 3 - 1 4
1976 5 1 - 6
1977 3 - 4 7
1978 4 8 3 15
1979 5 39 1 45
1980 4 10 2 16
1981 4 2 2 8
1982 4 - 7 11
Total 83 93 31 207
Q,
*o 40.1 44 .9 15.0 100
Note: Government Securities, Preference Shares and Debentures 
which may have specified existence would have part 
of their numbers redeemed within the years.
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigerian Stock Exchange
and Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission
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Table 17
Value of Transactions at Lagos Stock Exchange
Year Government
(1000N)
o,
'o Industrial 
(100ON)
Q.*8 Total
(1000N)
1961 1420.8 93.4 99.6 6 .6 1520.4
1 962 4231.8 92.8 330 .6 7.2 4562.4
1 963 9736 .6 93.8 646 .2 6.2 10382.8
1 964 11819.0 84 .5 2173.2 15.5 13992.2
1965 14389.8 90.7 1469 .6 9.3 15859.4
1 966 1 5226 .2 92.9 1169.4 7.1 16395.6
1967 12103.4 96 .9 300 .0 3.1 12493.4
1 968 12582.8 98 .4 210.8 1 .6 12793.6
1 969 16190.0 98 .9 180.0 1 .1 16570 .0
1970 16396 .0 98.6 238 .0 1 .4 16634 .0
1 971 16342.3 90.3 1753.8 9.7 18096 .1
1972 26190.0 96.4 982.6 3.6 27172 .6
1973 91858 .0 99.4 527.8 0.6 92385.8
1974 48374 .2 97 .4 1298.5 2.6 49672.7
1975 62830 .0 98.6 903 .0 1 .4 63733.0
1976 111282.0 99.5 560.0 0.5 1 1 1842 .0
1977 178783.0 99.3 1223 .0 0.7 180006.0
Source: CBN, Lagos
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Table 18(a)
Structure of Interest Rates 1970-1980
Year Minimum
Rediscount
Rate
Trea sury 
Bill Rate
Time
Deposits 
for 6 
months
Time
Deposits 
for over 12 
months
Savings
1970 4 1 4 4* 3* 5
1971 4 \ 4 3* 4 3
1972 4* 4 3* 4 3
1973 4 3 4 3* 4 3
1974 4* 4 3 2 4 3
1975 3* 2^ 3 4 4
1976 3* 2i 31 3 i 4
1977 4 3 3 2 4
1978 5 4 5* 4
1979 5 4 5! 5* 5
1980 6 5 *1 6 2 6
Source: Central Bank of Nigerian Annual Reports
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Table 18(b)
Interest Rate Structure in Nigeria
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
1 Minimum Rediscount Rate 5 5 6 6 8
2 Treasury Bill Issue Rate 4 4 5 5 7
3 Treasury Certificate (1
year) 4* 4* 5* 5* 7*
4 Treasury Certificate (2  ^ _
years) % 48 6 6 8
5 Federal Government Dev.
Stock 6-7 6-7 7-8 7-8 9-!
4-8 years rraturity 6 6 7 7 9
919-14 years maturity 6* 6* 7* 7*
15-20 years maturity fi34 4 1 74- 9*
21-25 years maturity 7 7 8 8 94-
Deposit Rates
Savings Deposits 4 5 6 6 7*
Time Deposits with 7 days
notice 4* 4* 5 6 6 3
" " for 1 month 4* 4* 5* 5* 7
" " for 1-3 months 4 4! 5* 5* 71
" " for 3-6 months 5 5 6 6 7*
" " for over 12
months 5* 5* 6 5 6 2 8
Lending Rates
Minimum 7 7 7* 7* 9*
Maximum 11 11 11 i 11* 13
1 Preferred Sectors 
Maximum 9 9 9* 9* 11*
2 Less Preferred Sectors 
Maximum 8-12 8-11 11* 11* 13
3 Agricultural Credit 
Guarantee Scheme 4-6 4-6 5-6 5-6 6-7
4 Residential housing 
costing not more than 
(N100,000.00) 6 6 6 6 7
5 Agricultural Production 6 6 6 7
1978 Revision upwards for most instruments
1979 Same as 1978
1980 Revision upwards
1981 Same as 1980
1982 Revision upwards by 2 percentage point in April but slight 
reduction by 1 percentage point from 1st
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The Central Bank of Nigeria's control and regulation of 
the money market determines to a large extent the volume 
and cost of credit in the market. Interest rates are 
administered and insulated from the forces of supply and 
demand in the credit markets and thereby kept relatively 
l o w .
Of particular importance is the increasing role played 
by the government in influencing the volume and prices of 
private securities in the capital market. This is asso­
ciated largely with two developments - an institutional and 
a legislative development. The institutional development 
concerns the establishment of the Capital Issues Commission 
(CIC) in 1973, which was converted into the Nigerian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (NSEC) in April 1978.
The CIC was itself reconstituted from an Ad hoc Committee 
(Capital Issues Committee) established in 1962. The CIC 
was empowered to assume responsibility for the following:
(a) determining the price at which shares or deben­
tures of a company are to be sold to the public 
either through offer for sale or by direct 
issue;
(b) such other matters incidental or supplementary to 
the foregoing as the Commission may at its 
discretion determine.
The second development is the indigenisation of scheduled 
enterprises and shares formerly owned by expatriate 
businessmen by enacting the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Act in 1972 and expanding its coverage in 1977. To under­
line the interrelationship of these developments it should
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be noted that the CIC (now NSEC) has and will continue to 
play the major role in determining the price of shares and 
in controlling the securities market as noted below.
The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission
Historically the Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission is the apical regulatory organ of the capital 
market. It is the institution that fixes the price at 
which issues can be made and determines the timing and 
volume of such issues. The Commission had its origin in 
the 'ad hoc' Capital Issues Committee with no legal back­
ing which was set up in July 1962 as an integral arm of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria. The Commission was replaced in 
1973 by the Capital Issues Commission, which again was a 
department within the Central Bank. It was set up to help 
accelerate the indigenisation of the economy and had 
p o w e r s :
(a) to determine the price at which shares and 
debentures of public companies were to be sold
(b) the timing and amount of sale.
Emphasising the role of the Capital Issues Commission, the
22
Chairman of the Commission said:
"In a sense the Capital Issues Commission 
Decree was designed in 1972 to moderate 
the more extreme forms of capitalism, par­
ticularly in circumstances in which the 
level of awareness of the investing public 
is on the average rather than modest. Large 
business organisations are relatively new
22 S.O. Asabia, Share Valuation: The Nigerian Experience. 
Paper at the Symposium of the Nigerian Economic Society, 
9 November 1974. Mr. Asabia was at the time Deputy 
Governor of the CBN and Chairman of CIC.
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to Nigeria and the stock market is barely 
fourteen years old. Indeed the structure 
of business organisations and the pattern 
of share ownership have until recently been 
such that Nigerian individuals and to some 
extent Nigerian institutions were effectively 
excluded from participation. It has been 
one of the main objects of public policy in 
recent years to reverse this trend."
In a speech by the Federal Commissioner for Finance at the 
inaugural meeting of the Capital Issues Commission in May 
1973 he said:
"While accepting the universal principle 
that market forces should be given free 
play in the determination of prices, we 
must by the same token give due weight to 
the fact that as of now there are relatively 
few stocks on issue. Furthermore once stocks 
are purchased they hardly ever change hands 
... we must bear in mind that some of the 
purchasers of these debentures and shares 
will be relatively unsophisticated. It is 
important therefore that their interests 
are protected. Apart from the direct interests 
of individual investors, if the market 
operates such that the public loses confidence 
in it, the market would collapse, leading to 
a chain of reactions in the financial system 
which would adversely affect our economic 
development."
The question of timing of issues is equally important 
because, given the relatively low level of mobilisable 
savings, if issuers of debentures and shares are left to 
approach the market in a disorderly manner, it may well turn 
out that the market would be flooded by more issues than it 
can sustain. Thus it is necessary that various issues be 
timed to go on the market at periods when it is judged 
that they will be most successful. This Commission, the 
Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (NSEC) was 
replaced in 1978 by the Securities and Exchange Commission
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which we will now examine.
The Securities and Exchange Commission
Following the report of the Financial System Review 
23
Committee and its subsequent acceptance by government 
the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 27 September 
1979 was enacted with retrospective effect to 1 April 1978. 
This Act established the Securities and Exchange Commission 
as an autonomous body which was charged with the following 
functions:
1. to register all securities proposed to be 
offered to, or for subscription by the public or 
to be offered privately with the intention that 
they would be held ultimately other than by 
those to whom the offers were made;
2. to maintain surveillance over the securities 
market so as to forestall or take steps or 
reprimand or otherwise punish, any persons res­
ponsible for the creation or emergence of a 
false market in securities;
3. to register stock exchanges and securities dealers 
and the agents of the latter with a view to 
maintaining proper standards of conduct and 
professionalism in the securities business;
4. to act as the regulatory 'apex' organisation for 
the nation's stock exchanges to which it would 
be at liberty to delegate a wide range of powers
23 The Report of the committee on the Nigerian Financial 
System, 1976, pp. 26-7.
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comparable with those delegated to, and the 
prerogatives conferred on, any recognised stock 
exchange under the provisions of the Companies 
Decree, 1968;
5. to approve share allotments prior to publication 
and ensure that the spread of the securities is 
fair and equitable;
6. to ensure that small investors are given the 
maximum allotment of shares and that the allot­
ment should not vitiate the active interest of 
some equity holders in the management of the 
enterprise whose shares are being issued.
Appraisal of the Nigerian Securities Market
Institutionally the Nigerian financial markets have 
made some progress over a relatively short period of two 
decades since the political independence of the country. 
There has been some measure of success in the attempt to 
diversify the assets in the money market segment but govern­
ment securities remain predominant. There is therefore a 
need for the private sector to take up the challenge and 
develop attractive short-term assets to redress the present 
imbalance between government and private securities in the 
market. The Nigerian capital market owes its existence 
largely to official initiatives and support. The private 
loan market is dominated by official capital supplied by 
government owned development and mortage institutions 
while the market in government development stocks leans also 
heavily on the CBN as the major lender. There is also a
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need for the private sector to increase its participation 
in the market. The commercial as well as the merchant 
banks can do much more to support the market, by 
investment.
An examination of the Nigeria Securities market shows 
some disconcerting facts. After over two decades of 
existence of the Nigerian Stock Exchange the Nigeria Capital 
Market had only six merchant banks for corporate finance 
activites, underwriting and investing banking, 65 insurance 
companies and 10 stockbroking firms, 19 commercial banks 
and specialised banks were overseeing savings, mortgages, 
agricultural, commercial and industrial devleopment. The 
following problems have been identified for the poor 
performance of the markets.
The first is the interest rate structure which.was 
static until 1978 when it was marginally reviewed upwards. 
Fixed interest-bearing securities are relatively unattrac­
tive to private and non-institutional investors. This 
explains why it is mainly the Central Bank of Nigeria that 
absorbs most of the unsubscribed low interest government 
instruments. Table 18 shows at a glance the interest 
structure.
Another factor that militates against the securities 
market is the inadequacy of financial intermediation. The 
level is still very low. There are only 21 commercial 
banks with 1132 branches to over 94 million population; 
that is, one commercial bank to about 2.8 million people, 
or one bank branch to about 8 3,000 people. Evidently the 
country is under-banked hence the inadequate banking
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services provided for customers especially the small 
savers. As in many sectors of the economy, banking is a 
sellers market where customers have to accept a 'take-it- 
or-leave-it1 form of service.
The Nigerian market has not the advantage of an 
efficient telecommunications system that could facilitate 
the dissemination of market information. The delay in 
delivery service by the Ministry of Communications and the 
often non-delivery of mail and share certificates discour­
ages would-be investors. The imperfections of the market 
are diverse and many and serve only to isolate would-be 
investors or issues from the market.
Suggested Improvements
To make the securities in the market attractive to 
investors, it is suggested that the interest rate structure 
be reviewed u pwards.
The problem of paucity of shares in the market will 
dwindle into insignificance if investment trust institu­
tions are established. The level of financial intermedia­
tion should be increased to add a new dimension to the 
market. The public would then have the opportunity to 
invest or disinvest at will. Government majority ownership 
of the equity and capital market militates against the 
objective of reducing government control of the economy 
or of improving capital formation.
The infrastructure inadequacies that stand as a cog
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in the wheel of progress of the capital market should be 
removed. Postal and telecommunications facilities should 
be improved to enable the market operators to have a near 
perfect market.
The Nigerian Companies Act of 1968 needs to be amended 
in line with what obtains in Britain under the 1980 
Companies Act. This could take one of two forms: the 
amendment would stipulate either that a company which has 
a specific capital base or a specified turnover or a 
specified net asset could automatically become public. Once 
it becomes public it follows that the way to stock 
exchange is open and such companies would fall within the 
purview of the Commission. At the moment the Commission 
has power over all public companies whether quoted or not, 
and also all private companies which have alien interest.
The Commission does not monitor the activities of 100% 
Nigerian-owned private companies.
Some Nigerian fiscal measures have tended to discour­
age investments in the financial market. For instance one 
investor can reap from the proceeds of the premium on his 
life assurance policies; he can also receive interest on 
premium government bonds, but he cannot receive the full 
benefit from the dividends on his shares. Under current 
regulations only 30% of the dividends can be paid to 
investors while 70% is ploughed back into the business.
There are similar bodies in other parts of the world, 
created by their governments. The Commission Bancaire 
performs this function in Belgium as distinct from the 
Comite de la Cote of the stock exchange. In some other
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countries the Minister of Finance has the final word of 
approval or veto: in Italy, for example, the Minister of 
Finance and of Economics and the Governor of the Bank of 
Italy have to give their approval prior to subsequent 
approval for listing by the chambers of commerce of the 
town where the stock exchange is located. In France, a 
mixed committee of the Stock Exchange and of the government 
vets applications, but the Minister of Finance has the 
final word. In Nigeria the decree establishing the 
Commission gives the Minister/Commissiom/of Finance the 
final word, since aggrieved companies can appeal to him.
There should be a legal framework to correct the 
inadequacies and to promote the realisation of the follow­
ing objectives:
(a) mobilisation of savings for economic growth;
(b) diversion of capital from less productive sectors 
such as industries;
(c) augmentation of the credit facilities in the 
banking system and the dependence of government 
on taxation for economic development;
(d) decentralisation of the ownership of assets and 
the creation of a healthy private sector;
(e) avoidance of excessive concentration of economic 
power in the hands of government;
(f) avoidance of excessive concentration of power in 
the hands of a small private group;
(g) encouragement of a more even distribution of 
w e a l t h ;
(h) facilitation of co-operation between indigenes
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and aliens in fostering economic development.
The burden of achieving these objectives lies on the
Central Bank of Nigeria as a statutory duty to promote "the
development of a money market or securities market in
Nigeria or of improving the financial or economic 
24
development."
The Exchange operates independently but to ensure that 
it pursued the defined objectives the Central Bank should 
demand a report of the activities on a quarterly or monthly 
basis. The Bank should therefore analyse the reports on a 
continuous basis for the purpose of monitoring development 
in the capital market and for policy guidance of the 
government.
As to the realisation of the objectives in creating 
financial markets for the economic development of anglo­
phone African countries and Nigeria in particular, it is 
evident that not much has been achieved in this direction. 
In the words of the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria
"An examination of our securities market 
reveals some disconcerting facts. Whereas 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange (formerly the 
Lagos Stock Exchange) is as old as the Stock 
Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore and its 
level and pace of activity fall behind that 
of the two Far Eastern countries which had 
300 equity issues after only a decade of 
development compared with only 30 equity 
issues during the same period on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange. Despite the Nigerian Enter­
prise Promotions Acts of 1972 and 1977 which 
facilitated more companies going public we 
still find that total securities on the 
exchange are only 168 comprising 93 equity 
issues, 58 government stock and 17 industrial
24 Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958, s.29(2)(a).
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loan and preference stocks. The volume of 
trading on the Nigerian Stock Exchange is 
very much below the market value of securities 
on the exchange. For example, the volume of 
trading in equity issues in the past few 
years has remained at less than one per cent 
of total market value of the equity listed 
stocks on the exchange, only two are wholly 
Nigerian-owned. The investment behaviour 
of Nigerians is to buy and hold on to their 
securities virtually for life, while specula­
tion in securities is non-existent. Trading 
in debentures or bond market is regimented.
The ownership pattern of development stocks 
outstanding shows that the Central Bank 
continues to be the largest holder. As at 
the end of 1981, out of the total of N3.35 
billion stocks outstanding, the Central 
Bank held 45.6 per cent. Also in 1980 it 
held about the same proportion. The conclu­
sion is that there are some structural 
distortions that make government stock 
relatively unattractive to individuals and 
private enterprises. Other factors that 
affect the securities market include inade­
quate level of financial intermediation, 
infrastructural inadequacies such as the drag 
and delays in postal and telegraphic services, 
and allegedly restrictive requirements for 
listing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
The imperfections of the market are diverse 
and many and serve only to insulate would-be 
investors or issues from the market."
He concluded by saying:
"The benefits of an efficient market, are 
more in terms of the stability added on to 
the economic system - the availability of 
a strong domestic financial base and source 
of funds, the ability of the market to attract 
foreign funds thereby reducing some of the 
foreign exchange problems and the possibility 
of providing a virile African Capital Market 
(comparable to the Singapore experience in 
Asia) able to compete in international markets. 
It is high time Nigeria put her money where 
her mouth is or vice versa, that is develop­
ing a strong domestic financial base. This 
is a sure catalyst for achieving self-reliance 
and meaningful diversification in economic 
development."2 5
25 CBN B u l l ^ O n ,  Vol. 8, No. 1, Jan/March 1983 , pp. 3-4
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CHAPTER 7
SERVICE FUNCTIONS TO COMMERCIAL BANKS
This Chapter discusses some Central bank functions to 
the commercial banks and are treated under five headings, 
viz: the supervisory function of the banking system, inter­
bank clearing, call money scheme, Rural banking and finally 
the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme.
BANKING SUPERVISION
A major responsibility of Commonwealth African Central 
Banks is the supervisory function which the central banks 
exercise over the banking system. This power is derived from 
the organic laws of the banks which entrust them with the 
functions of supervision and periodical examination of all 
banking institutions. The Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958 
specifies in section 39 that:
"The bank shall wherever necessary seek the cooperation 
of and cooperate with, other banks in Nigeria to:
(a) promote and maintain adequate and reasonable
banking services for the public;
(b) ensure high standard of conduct and manage­
ment throughout the banking system;
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(c) further such policies not inconsistent with
this Act as shall be in the national interest.
The Bank also derives its power of examination from 
sections 20-25 of the Banking Act, 1969 (otherwise called 
Decree No. 40 section 20(1) which stipulates that:
"(1) There shall be an Examiner, who-
(a) shall be an officer of the Central Bank
appointed by the Bank with power to examine 
periodically, under conditions of secrecy, 
the books and affairs of each and every 
licensed bank;
(b) shall have a right of access at all times
to the books and accounts and vouchers of 
the bank; and
(c) shall be entitled to require from the officers 
and directors of the bank such information and 
explanation as he thinks necessary for the 
performance of his duties,
and the Examiner shall be given and shall have access to any 
accounts, returns or information regarding banks licensed 
under this Decree that are in the possession of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance.
The Central Bank of Kenya Act 1969 in sections 19-20 
and the Central Bank of Zambia Act 1964, in section 35 also 
have similar provisions.
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Supervision Philosophy
The philosophy behind the creation of this department
rests on manifold elements, to wit; in several countries
there were numerous and serious losses and liquidations
suffered by mushroom banks which led to the idea of
controlling the banks. Between 1947 and 1952 some 185
banking companies were registered in Nigeria of which 145
1
were registered in 1947 and 40 in 1952. Most of these
banks failed and many depositors lost millions of Naira
(then pounds). In Nigeria, this led to the appointment
of Mr. Paton to review the banking system with the terms
of reference to investigate banking conditions in the
country and to stipulate conditions for healthy banking
operations and particularly to "enquire generally into
the business of banking in Nigeria and make recommendations
to the Government on the form and extent of control which
2should be introduced.
Although the 1952 Ordinance provided for bank exam­
ination and supervision, there were hardly any examination 
at all and the few inspections carried out were generally 
ineffective. In most cases, banks were able to circumvent 
the law by window-dressing, as the following letter clearly
1. C .V . Brown, The Nigerian Banking System 1966 reports at
p.25 that no less than 18 indigenous banks were registered 
between February 1951 and May 1952.
2 . Ibid., p p .7-9.
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shows:3
"Dear Sir,
Reserve of Liquid Assets
We are drawing near the end of the financial year.
As you are aware many returns covering banking 
transactions for the year will be forwarded to 
the Government, and, as we have since emphasised, 
they will be required to give an accurate picture 
of the general situation of our enterprise. As 
far as the accounting aspect is concerned, we 
have endeavoured in the past to secure uniformity 
among branches and geared out policy to the end of 
meeting the accounting requirements of the Banking 
Ordinance. The need for accuracy in branches' 
returns cannot therefore be overemphasised.
The main purpose of this letter is to draw the 
timely attention of branches to the absolute need 
for conserving sufficiently large reserves of 
liquid assets (cash) at the end of March, 
particularly on the 31st March, so that our overall 
percentage of cash on hand to the total of current 
deposit and other accounts will, if not conform to 
the requirements of the Banking Ordinance, at least 
meet them half way.
To this end, branches are advised to conduct 
vigorous house to house campaigns for cash deposits 
by customers against the end of the month. Reliable 
and wealthy customers should be especially approached 
to deposit, even for one day on the 31st March, 
a substantial sum of money which can be withdrawn 
by them after that date as soon as they desire. In 
the course of the campaign for funds, special care 
should be taken to avoid playing into the hands of 
those whose sole motive is to see the bank ruined.
Not an inconsiderable number of them are customers, 
their intrusion should be vigilantly guarded against.
Branch managers are reminded of their responsibility 
in this important subject. Their future will depend 
largely upon the measure of efforts directed towards 
accumulating substantial cash balances on the day in 
question, for the purpose of our statutory returns. 
Redoubled efforts should be employed to treat all 
outstanding entries in the Inter-Nigerian Branches 
Account before the end of the month so that all 
adjustments may be taken into the books.
Please acknowledge receipt.
Sincerely yours
A.K. Blankson
General Manager
3. See the Foster Sutton Tribunal Report for the ACB and 
the Coker Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of 
Certain Statutory Corporations in Western Nigeria, 
Sessional paper no 4. (1962) p.8.
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The above letter was written on 19 March 1954 by 
Mr. Blankson, the then General Manager of the African 
Continental Bank Ltd., to each of the fourteen branches 
of the bank, and marked 'strictly confidential1.
A similar deliberate attempt to deceive the Banking
I
Examiner was also embarked upon by the National Bank. It 
was for instance, found that:
in making substantial amounts of money available 
to the Action Group, the National Bank embarked 
on a process of operating a Suspense Account and a 
Sundry Persons Account in order to hide the name of 
the Action Group as the true recipient of these sums 
of money ... but the Bank nevertheless proceeded to 
prepare two paying slips for £670,000 (N1.34m.) and 
£5000 (N10,000), respectively to make it appear that 
the Bank had recovered the sum of £675,000 (N1.350m.) 
in cash when no such payment was in fact made or 
received. This was a deliberate attempt to deceive 
the Bank Examiner of the Federal Ministry of Finance 
when he paid a visit to the Bank early in I960.4
The deposit-taking institutions in any country help 
to mobilise the nation's savings and make funds available 
to finance commerce and industry. The deposits of 
commercial banks and thrift institutions provide a means by 
which hard-working individuals can safely set aside the 
funds they wish to hold for future needs. The failure of 
one or mo re major depository institutions can have 
repercussions that go far beyond the individual institution, 
producing damage to public confidence in banks and thrift 
institutions and disrupting commerce and trade. For these 
reasons, most countries today recognize that sustainable
4. See comments of the Federal Government on the Report of 
Coker Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Certain 
Statutory Corporations in Western Nigeria, 1962, p. 5-
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economic growth requires a strong and resilient system of 
commercial banks and thrift institutions and banking super­
vision departments have been set up to ensure the attainment 
of these ideals. The various pieces of legislation were 
therefore designed to eliminate the severe problems arising 
from periodic waves of financial panic when bank deposits 
contracted sharply.
2. Another factor contributing to supervision has been 
the growing sensitivity about the protection of depositors. 
It is our contention that when a bank is involved in 
international trade the fact of its association with another 
bank overseas places its reputation inevitably at stake.
3. There has been a great increase in the number of 
banks and branches in the countries surveyed and it is 
only natural that the range of institutions should be placed 
under the purview of the banking supervision departments of 
central banks for supervision.
4. As the economies of the countries surveyed developed 
and prospered, it became increasingly apparent that some 
regularisation of banking practices was needed if the 
banking systems were to develop strong financial controls. 
For this reason the principle of protecting the public 
interest became increasingly important as a rationale for 
regulating and supervising banks. It is increasingly 
difficult with the complications of modern banking for 
other banks and institutions or individuals to form a 
completely dependable assessment of banks with which they
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may wish to trade. They therefore need to be assured that 
someone or an organisation is regularly examining their
potential trading partners in depth.
5. The increasing involvement of central banks in inter­
national trade and operations in foreign exchange has become 
an important factor for creating banking supervision offices 
whose responsibility it is to monitor effectively the
inflows of foreign currencies and the way and manner these
currencies are allocated to ensure judicious disbursement.
Objectives of Banking Supervision
The various enactments in Commonwealth African central 
banks were intended, in places like Nigeria, to avoid a 
repetition of certain perceived evils, such as excessive 
grants of loans without collaterals, which were believed 
to have been instrumental in the widespread banking failures 
between 1947 and 1952.
The constant growth and increasing sophistication of 
banking and the proliferation of mushroom banks in the 
financial field have made it imperative that some measure 
of control should be exerted on the banks. The enactments 
had the effect of strengthening the powers of the central 
banks to stop unsound banking practices, curb violations of 
laws and regulations, and deal with weak or incompetent 
management and at the same time, it enables the Commonwealth 
African central banks to protect the safety and soundness of 
commercial banking.
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The task of examiners is therefore to evaluate the 
soundness of a bank’s assets, the skill of its management, 
the quality of the bank’s internal audit controls and 
procedures, and its compliance with laws and regulations.
The supervisory function of the central banks over 
the banking system has two facets namely:
(a) bank examination, or the periodical overseeing 
of the books and affairs of licensed banks; and
(b) bank scrutiny, which involves the appraisal of 
the operations and financial position of the 
banks based mainly on the statutory returns 
and annual balance sheets.
To this end, a special department of bank supervision 
has been set up by each of the Commonwealth Central Banks.
In Nigeria a banking supervision department was 
established in January 1967 when the Banking Examination 
Division of the Ministry of Finance merged with the Central 
Bank’s Scrutiny Office. The department was to carry out 
these two broad functions of examination and scrutiny which 
in outline comprise:
1. Periodical routine examination of the licensed 
banks and other affected financial institutions 
under section 20 of the Banking Decree, 1969.
2. The special examination of licensed banks and 
other financial institutions under section 21 
of the Banking Decree, 1969.
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3. The scrutiny of the monthly returns and annual 
accounts of the licensed banks and other 
financial institutions obliged to render returns 
to the Central Bank.
4. Processing of all applications for banking 
licence, branch expansion, bank's purchases, 
sales or leases of property and bank's 
advertisements.
5. Investigation of bank accounts in accordance 
with the provisions of the Banking Amendment 
Decree No. 5 of 1966.
6. The determination of residual balances of the 
bank accounts under Banking Obligations 
(Eastern States) Decree No. 56 of 1970.
7. General supervision of the licensed banks and 
other financial institutions in order to 
ensure that:
(a) they operate their businesses in 
compliance with the provisions of the 
Banking Decree;
(b) directives in respect of financial and 
monetary policies issued to the banks 
by the Central Bank are complied with;
(c) the practices and conventions of banking, 
particularly in relation to dealings by 
the banks amongst themselves and the
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dealings between the banks and their 
customers and other foreign banks, are 
observed
8. Continuous review of policies, laws and 
regulations relating to the operation of 
licensed banks; research into the banking 
system in order to modify existing procedures, 
practices and law with a view to introducing 
new services to suit the changing needs of 
the Nigerian economy.
9. Training and Manpower development: for the
proper and efficient discharge of these functions, 
the department is organised into three divisions, 
viz: (a) Field Examination; (b) Central
Supervision; (c) Financial Sector Development.
The two functions of bank examination and bank scrutiny 
were initially carried out by two separate sets of function­
aries of the government machinery. While the former was 
undertaken by the examination division of the Federal Minstry 
of Finance between 1960 and 1965, the latter was allocated to 
the Central Bank of Nigeria. In January 1966, the Central 
Bank took over the entire function of bank supervision. It 
will be seen therefore that supervision of banks was a 
recent phenomenon in Nigeria. For the proper and efficient 
discharge of these functions, the Banking Supervision 
Department of the Central Bank of Nigeria was organised into 
three divisions, viz:
(a) Field examination;
(b) Central Supervision; and
(c) Financial Sector Development.
Techniques of Bank Supervision
Different central banks adopt different approaches to 
supervision. At one extreme is the Bank of England. In 
the Bank of England Act 1946, which nationalised the Bank 
of England, the power to issue directives to banks was given 
to the Banking Supervision Department. The exercise of 
close and continuing supervision and the acceptance by 
the Bank of wider responsibilities in this field have, 
according to Mr. George Blunden of the Bank of England, 
been gradual and have been in response to market require­
ments or to events recognized, sometimes grudgingly as 
necessary or at least as tolerable by the organisations 
affected. Explaining the approaches to supervision which 
the Bank has adopted said:
"The natural evolution of our supervisory role 
has conditioned the nature of our approach to 
it and has given it four essential characteristics. 
First, it is flexible, we have never tried to 
make banks conform to rigid patterns. The 
absence of a legislative sanction and the 
need to carry the supervised with us have 
made this inevitable. But this flexibility 
is also welcome to us. We believe that each 
bank is a unique institution which must be 
judged individually. We do not accept the 
sort of system found in some other countries 
in which legislation lays down rigid standards 
and ratios with which all banks must comply at 
all times. We accept that such standards and 
ratios are of value but only as yardsticks not 
as categorical imperatives. We believe, for 
example, that a particular relationship between 
capital and reserves and deposit liabilities
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may be a danger signal for one bank but can 
be accepted with equanimity for another.
And a ratio which at one time in one set of
market circumstances may be imprudent may
be perfectly acceptable at another time in 
different circumstances. So we will not 
accept a system of supervision which puts 
banks into a strait-jacket. Each bank needs 
to be looked at as an individual entity and 
the criteria by which we judge banks must be 
adaptable to changing circumstances.
Continuing, he said:
ft'
Secondly, and this follows very much from what I 
have just said about each bank being judged individually,
our approach is personal. The (staff) have thus been
able to establish friendly, personal relationships over 
time with senior management in the banks which have 
helped the Bank to form effective assessments of them 
and have enabled them to talk to us with trust and 
confidence.
Thirdly, our approach has always allowed for 
progression. We believe that a bank of the highest 
quality does not suddenly emerge like Venus from the 
waves. It attains that status only after a long period 
of growth.
Fourthly, our system of supervision has been 
participative, especially in judging when a bank was 
ready for further recognition. We do not believe that 
the man in Threadneedle Street knows best and we are
5. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 15 No. 2
June 1975 p.189.
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very well aware that central bankers are not commercial 
bankers. So we have always taken note, in assessing a
bank, of the opinions held about it by other banks and
0
of the recognition given to it by other banks."
In the United States of America, the Federal Reserve, 
along with two other supervisory authorities (the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation), employs the following basic 
supervisory tools:^
1. Establishment and publication of regulations 
and regulatory policies which provide banks 
with explicit guidance as to their responsi­
bilities under the banking laws;
2. Receipt of regular financial reports. Under 
the law, banks must submit periodic balance 
sheets and income statements. Much of the 
information in these periodic reports is made 
available to the public on the premise that 
investors, stock holders and depositors are 
entitled to accurate information about the 
financial condition of banking organisations 
in which they invest or with whom they place 
these funds.
6 . Ibid., p .190.
7. See"Philosophy, objectives and Techniques of Bank super­
vision Remarks to the Central Banking Seminar, October 
16, 1979, Leon Korobow, Assistant Vice President,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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3. Conduct of regular on-site examinations during 
which commercial examiners review all aspects 
of a bank's domestic and international deposit- 
taking and lending activities, trust procedures 
and computer operations.
4. Continuous in-house analysis, where the task of 
the examiners is to evaluate the soundness, of 
a bank's assets, the skill of its management, 
the quality of the banks internal controls and 
procedures, and its compliance with operating 
rules. The examination process is an in-depth 
study of the bank's condition and management 
rather than an audit to verify the bank's 
assets and liabilities.
In Nigeria and other East African anglophone central 
banks the techniques of supervision are rudimentary quite 
different from those obtaining in the more advanced 
countries. The reason is not far to seek. The legislative 
backgrounds against which the systems operate (Federal and/ 
or state laws), the banking systems (state and private 
ownerships, computerisation), the political structures (for 
instance unified or federative) of the different countries, 
are all vastly different from those obtaining in the UK 
and USA. However, the systems in various Commonwealth 
countries are basically similar in structure and organisation.
In Nigeria, for example, the procedure for routine 
examination starts at the head office of the bank with a
discussion on recent developments within the banking 
industry and the bank, and on policy matters raised in the 
previous examination report. Such discussions are usually 
held with the bank's chief executive. After the discussion 
the examiners proceed to examine the books and records at 
the head office.
According to the Central Bank of Nigeria Manual of
g
Banking Supervision Department the procedure involved in 
the exercise is as follows:
1. Examination of the books and records at the 
Head Office.
(a) Read the Board of Directors minute book and 
note the Board's decisions regarding the 
operations of the bank;
(b) Read the bank's inspectors and/or external 
auditor's reports and note the deficiencies 
highlighted therein;
(c) Obtain the Head Office statement of position 
and check the balances therein to the Head 
Office general ledger. Agree the balances 
in the general ledger with the corresponding 
balances in the respective subsidiary books/ 
ledgers;
8. At p.5.
(d) Scrutinise the subsidiary books to ensure that 
items therein are properly classified in the 
general ledger;
(e) Ensure the books are neatly kept, and all
cancellations or alterations are duly
initialled by a responsible officer;
(f) Obtain list of senior staff showing experience, 
qualifications, status, salary and respon­
sibilities, etc.;
(g) Verify the assets and liabilities shown in the 
Head Office statement of position in the same
way as detailed for the branches. It is usual
to collect returns from branches at the Head 
Office for cross-checking with copies of such 
returns kept at the respective branches.
Examination at the Branches
While at the branch, the examination team holds
preliminary discussions with the Branch Manager who is the 
de facto executive at the branch level in the same way as 
is done at the Head Office before commencement of examination 
work. During the inspection the examination team makes an 
assessment of the financial position and methods of operation 
of the bank concerned. The inspection covers the bank's 
organisational set-up, investment, credit portfolio manage­
ment, credit appraisal, mobilization of deposits and other
facets of the operations of the bank that contribute in
achieving social and developmental objectives and protecting 
the interests of the bank's depositors. Whereas the Bank 
of England adopts the procedure of a "relaxed two-way exchange 
not for an inquisitorial examination" and sends advance 
notice to the bank to be examined, the African central banks 
have adopted the procedure of springing surprise inspections 
by taking up the inspection of certain controlling offices 
or branches of a bank at different places simultaneously 
on the day on which the inspection of the head office is 
commenced.
In terms of section 21 of the Banking Act, 1969, the 
Bank can conduct ad hoc investigations into banks in respect 
of serious complaints, reported major irregularities and 
frauds. The central bank can also conduct sample studies to 
examine compliance with the selective credit control guide­
lines and various instructions issued by them from time to 
time relating to credit policy.
The various central Banks' Acts empower the central 
banks to inspect the branches of their countries' banks 
situated outside their countries. During these inspections 
besides the usual scrutiny of assets and liabilities and 
the internal control systems, the more advanced countries 
usually pay attention to the assessment of the extent to 
which these branches have succeeded in exploiting the 
business potential, and assisted in promoting exports 
from their countries. Such initiatives are lacking in the 
methodology adopted by African countries particularly 
Nigeria. Nigeria should take advantage of the presence of
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those banks in foreign countries to promote Nigerian 
business, trade and exports.
Methods of Enforcing Policies and Correcting Violations
At the conclusion of the examination of each bank the 
team leader summarises the salient points for discussion by 
the Head of the Banking Supervision department with the 
chief executive of the bank examined. Thereafter, a 
report of the examination is compiled with appropriate 
examiners' comments. Appropriate recommendations based on 
the ,examiners' findings and contained in the report are 
made and distributed to the governors' of the central banks, 
the appropriate ministry, usually finance, and the chief 
executive of the bank concerned drawing attention to
important problems or weaknesses.
Depending upon the nature of the findings of the 
inspection, suitable steps are taken or suggested by the 
central banks to bring about the desired degree of improve­
ment in the working of the bank or changes in its management. 
If, for example, the examination discloses serious violations 
of law or regulation or in cases where the policies and 
practices of the bank present a threat to the safety and
soundness of the bank, the bank's board of directors and
management are urged to make the required changes without 
delay.
If in the opinion of the Finance Minister, an 
examination shows that a licensed bank is carrying on its
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business in a manner detrimental to the interests of its 
depositors and other creditors, or has insufficient assets 
to cover its liabilities to the public, or is contravening 
the provisions of the Act the Finance Minister may, in 
addition to the steps stipulated above, appoint a person 
who in his opinion has had proper training and experience 
to advise the licensed bank in the proper conduct of its 
business and fix the remuneration to be paid by the licensed 
bank to such person. The Minister of Finance may also 
report the circumstances to the Federal Executive Council 
which, unless satisfied that the bank is taking adequate 
measures to put its affairs in order, may direct the 
Commissioner to make an order:
(i) revoking the bank's licence and requiring 
its business to be wound-up; or
(ii) requiring the Central Bank to assume control
and carry on the business of the licensed bank
except that the Commissioner shall not so report the
circumstances without giving the bank reasonable prior
notice of his intention to do so and an opportunity of
g
submitting a written statement in reply.
Sections 3 and 8 of the Nigerian Banking Act 1969 
prescribe the punishment for violation of the prescribed 
conditions and regulations. Where the licence is 
revoked that bank shall within 14 days after making of
9. The Nigeria Banking Act 1969 sections 3 and 22; 
section 6 of Kenya Banking Act 1969.
the order apply to the High Court for an order winding up 
the affairs of that bank under supervision of that co u r t . ^
Since in Tanzania and Zambia, the commercial banks 
have been nationalised it is doubtful whether these 
provisions would be relevant. The central banks resort 
to such extreme measures only where the affairs of a bank 
are observed to be beyond redemption, with a view to safe­
guarding the interests of the depositing public.
Appraisal of Banking Supervision
In Nigeria examination! have in general been carried 
out on each bank every two y<: ars and these entail visits to 
the head offices and a number of selected offices or branches 
of the bank at various locations in the country. In between 
examinations, the banks are a: oraised on the basis of 
statutory monthly and annual r eturns. Due to shortage of 
trained and suitable personne. in the Banking Supervision 
Department, it has not been possible to undertake compre­
hensive annual examination.
The major weaknesses an: problems identified through
the procedure system of bank supervision are many, 
including:
1. Deficiencies in a.counting and internal control 
systems are rampat.
10. The Nigerian Banking Act 1969, section 25.
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2. Incidence of unsatisfactory, sometimes 
precarious financial conditions, unwholesome 
lending practices.
3. Questionable investment policies.
4. Transgressions of the Banking Act.
5. Breaches with impunity of the Central Bank 
credit guidelines.
6. He-avy losses arising from increase in bad and 
doubtful debts reflecting inefficient investment 
portfolio management.
7. Complex organised fraudulent practices and
swindling involving bank employees.
To organise, arrange and operate a comprehensive and 
effective system of bank examination in the African Central 
Banks would appear to be beyond their scope and capability 
for the reasons given below. Since the examination teams 
come once in a very long while, the bank's have a field day 
to operate in any manner they choose. In an interview 
with the Deputy Director, Banking Supervision Department of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria, Mr. Mike Udom, gave some 
of the following reasons as the factors responsible for the 
extremely poor performance of the banking supervision 
departments of central banks particularly the Central Bank 
of Nigeria:
1. The departments lack a sufficient number of
trained staff to carry out the bank examinations.
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2. Due to the difficult terrains ,waterways and bad 
roads, it is difficult for the examination 
teams to undertake long and tedious journeys, 
particularly during the rainy seasons.
3. The land area of Nigeria, for instance, is too
large and as a result it would be a herculean 
task to be able to visit all the banks' branches 
as required by law for the purposes of 
examinat ions.
4. Lack of other basic infrastructures like tele­
phone and communications system, electricity 
supply, pipe-borne water, medical facilities 
and hote1■accommodation.
5. The bank-person ratio of 1:83,000 is high, and
besides there are still many bank offices across 
the countries to examine.
6. The bahk staff are poorly supervised, their
attitude to work is poor, outmoded facilities 
and non-functional equipment are provided.
In a situation where central banks have not the 
facilities and capability to supervise the banking system 
as a statutory duty imposed on them, one would obviously 
expect poor results and minimum economic growth.
To help promote economic growth through the services 
rendered by the banking supervision the following steps 
should be taken by them as appropriate.
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1. There is need for the banking system to evolve 
positive policies aimed at encouraging banking 
habits beyond media advertisements.
2. The Banking Supervision Department of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria should be decentralised in its 
field examination activities such that each r -  
Central Bank branch in each state of the 
Federation will have a unit which will be 
responsible for the field examination of the 
Head Office operations of licensed banks, in 
addition to central supervision. The arrange­
ment will be in consonance with the zonal 
system suggested in Chapter 4.
3. In the exercise of the powers conferred on it 
by section 20 of the Banking Act 1969, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria should examine each bank 
at least once a year. The breach of this 
section of the law should no longer be condoned 
or encouraged.
4. The management of the central bank of Nigeria 
should publish a Bank Examination Manual for 
the guidance of the staff and the commercial 
ban ks.
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INTER-BANK CLEARING
Inter-bank clearing is another type of service which 
central banks render to commercial banks in their bid to 
promote economic progress. All anglophone central banks 
in Africa have a clearing system which makes available to 
the clearing banks a means of exchanging, and obtaining 
payment for, the millions of cheques drawn on other clearing 
banks that are paid in by customers to branches throughout 
the countries. Under this system each member bank sends 
to the clearing house every morning clerks who deliver 
cheques to representatives of the banks on which they are 
drawn. The net balance only, to be received or. paid, is 
settled by means of transfers between the accounts maintained 
with the central bank by each of the clearing banks. The 
various central bank Acts of the countries surveyed gave 
powers to the central banks to organise a clearing house.
The Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958 provides that:
"It shall be the duty of the Bank to facilitate 
the clearing of cheques and other credit instru­
ments for banks carrying on business in Nigeria.
For this purpose the Bank shall, at any appropriate 
time and in conjunction with the other banks, 
organise a clearing house in Lagos and in such 
other place or places as may be desirable in 
premises provided by the Bank.""1'1
Section 29(2)(s) provides that the Bank may promote 
the establishment of bank clearing systems and give facilities 
for the conduct of clearing business in premises belonging 
to the Bank.
11 . Section 42.
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The central banks of Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia have 
provisions in sections 34(4), 43(2) and 23(q) of their Acts 
respectively to the same effect.
In Nigeria before the first clearing house was
established in Lagos in 1961 each bank operated its own
reciprocal arrangements with every other bank. Under this
arrangement bank clerks would make a round of other banks
to pay into the bank’s clearing accounts with other banks,
the cheques drawn on each of those banks which had been
paid by customers the day previous. The position was
similar to what it was in England from around 1770 before
the first clearing house was built in 1833 on part of the
site in Lombard Street occup ed by the present modern building
"when clerks from the private banks had met daily at a
central pointin the city to exchange drafts drawn on each 
1 2others Houses." The system as it was in Nigeria before 
1961 proved to be inefficient, costly and time wasting.
As a result, the Central Bank of Nigeria established in 
Lagos the first Clearing House. Other clearing centres were 
established as quickly as new Central Bank branches were 
established in Kano (1963), Port-Harcourt (1964), Ibadan 
(1966), Enugu (1966), Benin (1967), Kaduna (1969), Jos 
(1972) and Maiduguri (1977). The Central bank assumes 
the responsibility for providing all clearing facilities 
as one of the services it renders for the development of 
an efficient banking system. The efficiency of the clearing
12. Thomson's Dictionary of banking by F.R. Ryder and 
D.B. Jankins, 1980, p.144.
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mechanism is measured by the speed at which the system 
operates. This in turn depends on the efficiency of the 
telecommunication and transportation systems which in 
Nigeria are in themselves very inefficient. This is one 
of the reasons why Nigerians are reluctant to accept 
payment by cheques regardless of the integrity of the drawer 
and particularly if the cheque is an upland one. The 
reluctance of Nigerians to accept cheques has led to a 
slow development of the clearing system. The table below 
shows this stagnating progress as vividly portrayed by 
Dr. P .N .C . Ok igbo:
"What is in fact more disturbing is not the length 
of lead time but the slow growth of the system of 
clearing and the relative decline in the procedure. 
The picture of Lagos, the financial capital of 
Nigeria, is certainly disturbing:
Rate of Growth of the Clearing System
Table 19 Year
Numbe r of Cheques Cleared 1973 1975 1976 1978 1979 1980
Dai ly ('0 0 0 ) 8 . 8 19.8 12.7 14.7 14.0 15.9
Amount ( N ' m ) 13.4 31 . 2 46. 2 82. 7 32. 7 22. 9
Between 1973 and 1980, the number cleared had risen 
from 8,800 to 15,900 or only 1.8 times in seven years. 
But look at the value which had risen in the same 
period from N13.4 million to N82.7 million in 1978, 
only to decline to N22.9 million in 1980. This trend 
should indicate to the authorities that the banking 
experience needs considerable stimulus. It betokens, 
to an alarming degree, a radical loss of confidence 
in the banking system as a whole.
In the other centres, the picture is perhaps worse: 
in Enugu, for the same period, the number of cheques 
has remained below 1,000 daily at between 800 and 
1,000 for 1973 to 1979; at Ibadan, between 1,700 
and 2,200 from 1974 to 1977, falling below 2,000 
most of 1978 and 1980; even in Kaduna and Kano, 
the picture is at best static. It is extraordinary 
that over a period of seven years, there is no 
improvement in the use of this facility which exists 
for bankers and that therefore the general public
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either have not raised their use of cheques (it having 
declined in Lagos) or that the bankers have not gained 
any speed and efficiency in the use of a clearing 
system. This failure must be placed squarely at the 
door of the Central Bank which has the obligation 
placed on it by section 29(1)(s) of the Central Bank 
Act to ’promote the establishment of bank clearing 
systems and give facilities for the conduct of bank 
clearing business in premises belonging to the Bank.’ 
Bank clearing systems represent one major aspect of 
reform that should be imaginatively and vigorously 
tackled by the Central Bank for the 1 9 9 0 ’s.”-^
We agree with Dr. P.N. Okigbo that the failure of the system
must be placed squarely at the door of the Central Bank of
Nigeria.
CALL MONEY FUND
The call money scheme is yet another service which 
central banks render to the commercial banks whereby the 
participating banks and finance houses invest monies for 
which they have no immediate need on an overnight basis 
with interest and withdrawable on demand. In the United 
Kingdom two separate institutions, the London Discount 
Market and the Inter Bank Market (for non clearing banks) 
organise and run each a call money system; in the U.S. 
the arrangement is organised by the banks themselves and 
the markets are called ’’Federal Funds” .
In Nigeria the arrangement was introduced in July 1962 
under which the commercial banks and later other financial 
institutions were able to lend their surplus funds to a 
’’Call Money Fund” administered by the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Participators were required to maintain a prescribed minimum
13. Lecture on Reforming the Banking System Given to the 
Nigerian Institution of Bankers on 10th June, 1983 
by Pius Okigbo.
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cash balance with the Central Bank for clearing purposes. 
Balances in excess of the required minimum constituted the 
financial resources which the Fund invested on behalf of the 
depositor banks or institutions and any deficits were made 
up by borrowing from the fund. The funds were generally 
invested in- treasury bills. As a result of the unprecedented 
buoyancy of government revenue arising from the oil boom of 
1973-76, the Central Bank abolished the Scheme in July 1974 
for lack of investment outlets for idle funds.
With the abolition of the Scheme, the Central Bank and 
the banking system have lost the ability and the opportunity 
to absorb immediate liquidity pressures on the market 
through overnight investments. From the foregoing it is 
clear that the objective for establishing a call money fund, 
which is to satisfy an overnight need which short-term 
treasury bills are not geared for, has not been achieved and 
there again another road that leads to economic growth has 
been closed and sealed.
RURAL BANKING
This important aspect of the Banks' supervisory 
function relates to the control exercised over expansion 
of banks' branches. The genesis of the control may be 
traced to the indiscriminate branch expansion which tended 
to accentuate the concentration of bank offices in the 
urban centres while leaving large areas of the country 
either inadequately served or not served at all. The
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objectives of establishing the rural banks are to create 
awareness on the part of the rural communities of the benefits 
which the banks can bestow, and to help them cultivate good 
banking habits. The banks will thereby be in a position to 
mobilise savings and provide credit for small-scale ventures, 
as well as to offer rural employment opportunities. The 
rural banking programme has as its main objective the 
extension of banking facilities to rural and semi-urban 
areas.
The major services provided by rural banks include 
deposit-taking, the granting of loans and advances, opening 
of letters of credit, money transfers, advisory services, 
issue of drafts and collection of bills. In some of the 
rural areas it could be observed that many banks do not 
open the rural branches for business on a daily basis.
This is attributed to low level of business at the branches. 
One of the factors responsible for the low level of business 
at the rural branches is the failure of the rural people to 
avail themselves of the banking services provided by the banks
In operating the rural programme banks in Nigeria have 
encountered various other problems in addition to those 
enumerated above at page 402 such as:
(a) Inadequate trained staff because of the banks' 
unwillingness and unpreparedness for the 
take-off of the scheme;
(b) inadequate publicity on the role and functions 
of the rural banks;
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(c) Lack of suitable accommodation both for office 
and staff as well as difficulty in obtaining 
land and certificates of occupancy thereof;
(d) High cost of renting properties if it is known 
that the prospective tenant is a bank;
(e) Lack of security, e.g. Police Stations not
available in rural communities.
In Nigeria at the beginning of the Rural Banking 
Programme in 1977 the bankrperson ratio was 1:170,000 but 
at 31st December, 1983 when a total of 1,132 bank branches 
were in existence in Nigeria, the bank:person ratio came down 
to 1:80,000. Compared with the developed countries of the 
world, Nigeria is still seriously under-banked. Britain has 
a ratio of 1:4,000; USA 1:6,000 and India with its large
population has a ratio of 1:52,000. With the 1984
population figures (94,000,000) announced in September 1984,
the ratio is now 1:83,000, showing that the rate of 
providing the services does not catch up with the rate of 
population growth. In addition from the rural banking 
scheme returns rendered as at 30th September 1983 by 15 
of the 20 banks that participated in the scheme, the rural 
branches accounted for N350,853,853.00 or 3.0% of the 
N13,475,600,000.00 deposits generated within the banking 
system (Tables attached)# In effect the country has not 
realised the objectives of establishing rural banks, 
particularly the need to harness savings and extend banking 
services to the people.
412
TABLE 20
ANALYSIS OF RURAL AND URBAN BRANCHES 
AS AT 31 ST DECEMBER, 1983
B A N K S
No . Commercial Banks Total Urban Rural (Rurc
1. African Continental Bank Ltd 89 56 33 37
2. Allied Bank (Nigeria) Ltd 23 10 13 56
3. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int.(Nig)Ltd 18 14 4 22
4. Bank of the North Ltd 60 46 14 23
5. Co-operative Bank Ltd 35 24 11 31
6. Co-operative & Commerce Bank Ltd 34 23 11 32
7. Commercial Bank (Credit Lyonnais) (Nig) Ltd 1 1 - -
8. First Bank of Nigeria Ltd 208 133 75 36
9. Habib Nigeria Bank Ltd 3 3 - -
10. International Bank for West Africa Ltd 51 33 18 35
11. Kaduna Co-operative Bank Ltd 10 6 4 40
12. Kano Co-operative Bank Ltd 10 1 9 90
13. Lobi Bank (Nigeria) Ltd 2 2 - -
14. Mercantile Bank of Nigeria Ltd 21 14 7 33
15. National Bank of Nigeria Ltd 82 62 20 24
16. New Nigeria Bank Ltd 33 22 11 33
17. Nigeria-Arab Bank Ltd 21 10 11 52
18. Owena Bank of Nigeria Ltd 9 9 - -
19. Pan African Bank Ltd 26 19 7 27
20. Progress Bank of Nigeria Ltd 5 5 - -
21. Savannah Bank of Nigeria Ltd 27 9 18 67
22. Societe Generate Bank (Nigeria) Ltd 13 7 6 46
23. Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd 184 127 57 31
24. United Bank for Africa Ltd 115 64 51 44
25. Wema Bank Ltd 28 19 9 32
SUB-TOTAL 719
ICDII
con
Icon H
Merchant Banks
1. Chase Merchant Bank Ltd 4 4
2. ICON Ltd (Merchant Bankers) 3 3
3. INDO-Nigeria Merchant Bank 1 1
4. International Merchant Bank Ltd 3 3
5. NAL Merchant Bank Ltd 4 4
6. Nigerian-American Merchant Bank Ltd 3 3
7. Nigeria Merchant Bank Ltd 3 3
8. Merchant Banking Corporation (Nig) Ltd 1 1
9. Merchant Bank of Africa (Nig) Ltd 1 1
10. First City Merchant Bank Ltd 1 1
TOTAL 1,132 743 389* 34
Includes Branches that do not form part of the Rural Banking Scheme.
413
00 00 O CM 00 CD oo CD st N- P h- CD CD t- O CO
0 00 CD N- h- CD ID 00 CD LD 00 0- CM CD 00 CM T h-
CD 0(3 0 CD o 00 T” T- CM 00 ID OO st 00 O O ID st OO st
CD O
0 CD c N- 00 ID 00 00 O 00 N- CD sf CD P CM LD LD LD
P c cti 00 00 O CD o CM r- CD CD LD CD O 00 P K OO CM
CD 0 > 00 CO 00 oo T” 0- 00 CO 00 P ID CM CM 00
> o ~o •>
< _J < st N- 00
00 o CD CD T~ P T CM CO O ID St CD O st st o
CM CD 00 00 o OO 00 ID P CD N- LD LD st 00 CM st
0 T- 00 ID ID 00 T 00 CD CD O CD CD CD ID CD CD CM: 0 -P
CD ■H CD CD CD CM st oo st st CD St CM LD CM 1 st O st
i Cti 0 O) CD CM St o o st CM CM CD O ID T 00 CD CD O
LU P O C\J 00 O CM N- CD 00 Y” St 00 00 oo CD ID OO CD
I 0 Q_ - •« •> •> •• r *• *
: o > 0 CM T~ t— ID 00 CM T T P p 00 P
2 < O CM P
S <
i cr
| CD
CO CD CD CD st O CD 00 N- 0) LD |p st O 00
! -J S? 00 00 LO CM St CM 00 P 00 P P P 00 N-
! <
! cr
I =3
I CC O 00 St CD T 00 00 N- CD CD 00 st co st CM o PT- st CM O CM st 00 LD N- oo CM CD 00 st N LD CM
' LL
! _ fp CD O st OO CD 00 ID st St CM P CD P CM CD LDo
i oo XD 00 CM CM ID CD CM CD 00 St CM T~ oo 00 O st CD T~
! cn 00 c 0 st CO o CD T~ T— LD t- 1^ r- 00 CM CM ID ID CM St
; Lu CD cti 0 CD 00 ID t- 1^ o O 00 CM h- ID N- O 00 fs- O CM
! CJ P o •> •» •> *■ »> «■ •> *■ •> •> »■
i z 0 c r- P T~ r^ D CD CM St CD T~ CD CM O (p
! < c cti CM r~ T~ T~ CD T” |s-! > cr Cti > T co
□ LU o TO •>
; < CD < CD‘ vH
CMj D LU
z t-
I ^ < CL ID P LD 00 t- CD CD CM T~ CM CD O O 00 O; _1 LU ID CD st (O CM D CD r^ i~ o LO h- O) CD st CD Oi CD <1" oo OO o st CM CM 00 ID CM st st 00 00 CD T— T~ 00 00 Oz •> « » n •• •» •> •> *• *; 1— < X CM P st st st D CO st- CD o h- LD CD CD OO o
1 o h- O 00 st ID h- r^ O T CD T CM st CD o
I —i o 0 P LD 00 CD St 00 O St CO st st CD CD CO CDi 00 -p •t •v «
1 Q •rH ID ID CD o ID O O) St N- D o CD CM LD o ID
! z 1- 0 t- T“ co 00 oo CD 00 T~ T CM ID
! < < o OO st
i Q. «>
; f- oo 0 OO
' i—i < Q T~
00
o
CL 0
LU 0
Q <+- XI
o CJ 00 st CD CD T o 00 T— LD CO N- N- st O ID CM
LL c 00 P T- st LD ID T~ I- T~ T~ i- OO
O • cti T-
o c_
OO z m I-
1—1
00
>- XD
_J XD -P rH
< ■P T3 _l 0
z _J +-> T3 T3 XD •rH r-
< +-> +J ■P o
D ~o XD _l _l C p _
-P +-> 0 XD c 0
£_ _J _J c JL • CD -P 0 E
o XD TO 0 c c CD _l CD E C
0 z +-> +-> jL CD 0 0 •rH • o
j*: c _J _J C CD CD z E XD Cl O rH CJ -1
c 0 0 0 0 E +J O 0 0
cti TO XI CD jL jL TO CD •i—I 0 0 O _l 1 £_ c_ 1—1
CD -P +-> C C -P £_ 0 i—1 c o O < D I—1 J
_J 0 0 _l XI 0 ■H •H 0 • CJ 1 cr <
c+- c+- 0 m CD 0 CD C_ +-> CD od < 0 -—
O . O c • c ■H L— C • 0 •rH
CD o -p C < c z < 0 CL Q. c P r-H rH <
0 . •rH 0 o • 0 o O o • D 0 0 0
E O c +-> £_ •rH CD > § C £_ 1 1 CD T5 CD ■P -P 1
cti cti 0 •H c • 0 0 0 0 o o • 0 •H o O
Z < m z LL => cn z CL o o PI z 1— 1-
414
In the words of the Central Bank:
Over 80% or 751 bank branches are urban-based. In 
spite of this significant number, it is common 
knowledge that the urban branches are congested and 
the 'waiting time' for a simple banking transaction 
like obtaining bank balances is enormous. Various 
reasons including shortage of staff, inadequate 
accommodation, poor attitude to work, out-moded 
facilities have been advanced in the process as being 
responsible for this poor state of affairs. Whatever 
the causes are, the situation is disgusting and 
intolerable. There is an urgent need to improve 
the situation in the interest of the banking system 
and the public. For this reason, emphasis should 
be placed on the training of staff, acquisition 
of functional equipment and provision of incentives 
to staff. Other ways of improving the system will 
include the opening of more urban branches to decongest 
the existing ones.""14
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEME
By Section 29(2)(a) and (b) of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria Act 1958 the Central Bank is obliged, as one of its 
major objectives of promoting economic development and a 
sound financial structure capable of mobilising and allo­
cating resources for rapid economic transformation, to 
promote or undertake financial, industrial, agricultural 
and public utility enterprises.
The Central Bank has, therefore through its monetary 
and banking policy over the years introduced measures by 
which the financial institutions are encouraged to allocate 
a good part of their resources to the productive sectors of 
the economy, of which agriculture is an important sub-sector.
14. Board Memorandum on the Review of the Rural Banking 
Programme and over all Branch Expansion of the Banks 
by Banking Supervision Department, 1983, p. 7.
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TABLE 23 PRODUCTION OF MAJOR CROPS AND LIVESTOCK IN NIGERIA FROM
1960-1980 (CROPS IN 'r000 TONNES)
YEAR RICE GROUND­ COCOA PALM PALM RUBBER COTTON POULTRY CATTLE
NUT OIL KERNEL (HEADS) (HEADS)
60/61 155 747 198 552 430
61/62 133 878 194 541 437
62/63 257 976 179 560 372 60.1
63/64 195 1145 219 511 406 64.2
64/65 220 1180 298 516 409 72.2
65/66 231 1180 185 531 463 69.0
66/67 199 1177 267 509 436 71.0
67/68 385 1104 239 325 250 70.2
68/69 353 1160 190 349 225 52.8
69/70 325 1222 218 425 265 56.7 6688000
70/71 n.a. 408 308 490 300 55.3 4480000
71/72 268 439 255 n.a. 50.2
72/73 448 792 241 104 41.2 220 87870000
73/74 486 140 215 119 49.3 140 94500000 8410000
74/75 787 130 214 134 31.0 286.4 148830000 11000000
75/76 643 82 216 178 52.7 333.5 110643000 5980000
76/77 232 n.a. 165 121 32.5 456 59950000 4038000
77/78 400 n.a. 205 125 37.5 200 65940000 3360000
78/79 417 n.a. 138 31.1 206 72530000 2790000
79/80 n.a. n.a. 160 24.0 185
Source (1) & (2) Agricultural Development - Nigeria 1973-1985 F.M.A.N.R.
Lagos 1974 and Nigeria Groundnut Board Information 
Kano Nigeria.
(3) Cocoa Marketing Board No. 288 by Gills and Duffs.
(4) & (5) F.A.O.
(6 ) Nigerian Rubber Board
(7) Nigerian Cotton Board 
(8) & (9) F.O.S. Agric. Survey
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TABLE 24 FOOD IMPORTATION IN NIGERIA 
A.
Year Value in (NMillion)
1962 46,986
1963 4 3,804
1964 41,240
1965 46,076
1966 51,568
1967 42,560
1968 28,392
1969 41,372
1970 57,694
1971 87,910
1972 95,104
1973 126 ,260
1974 155,708
1975 277,863
1976 438,927
1977 702,013
1978 1,108 ,662
1979 1,105,901
1980 not avail
Note that Food includes 
Cereals, Meat, Dairy,
Dairy Products, Fish, etc.
RICE IMPORTATION IN NIGERIA 
B.
Year Value in (MMillion)
1974 1.5
1975 2.3
1976 20.14
1977 154.94
1978 194.76
1979 212.72
1980 not available
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Without any enabling law the Central Bank in the late 1960s 
assumed responsibility for financing part of the operations 
of the Marketing Boards (now known as Commodity Boards) 
when it became apparent that commercial banks were no 
longer willirrg to continue with their discounting of the 
Boards' commercial paper under an agreed financing arrange- 
ment.
As a sideline, the Central Bank of Nigeria in a 
subsidiary law (Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund 
Act 1977) has added another developmental function which 
goes beyond those conventionally ascribed to it.
The Bank initiated the setting up of an Agricultural
1 ^Credit Guarantee Scheme, which it also administers, with 
an initial capital of N100m. It also identified itself with 
the aspirations of the Federal Government on the various 
governments' policies of "Operation Feed the Nation" 1976. 
and "Green Revolution" April 1980 aimed at achieving agrarian 
reform and self-sufficiency in food production in the country. 
In a bid to reactivate agriculture on which the country once 
depended but which has now slipped to an insignificant 
position (as tables 22-24 show) the Central Bank
undertook a series of visits to India, Pakistan, the 
Phillipines and Brazil to assess the institutional arrange­
ments for financing agriculture in thos? countries.
Nigeria is still typically a country of a peasant 
agriculture. About 90-95% of total agricultural production
15. Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund Act 1977 , s . i| .
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is by peasants. Livestock are in the hands of nomadic 
herdsmen; the small-scale fishing is done by local fisher­
men who spend all day fishing with hooks and baits without 
motorised canoes or fishing trawlers; the fishing sector is 
therefore predominantly artisanal. Agriculture still 
provides employment for most Nigerians. In spite of the 
difficulties the industry faces, some of which are man-made, 
it provides the bulk of the food for the country. It used 
to be the major foreign exchange earner for the country 
before the growth of crude oil exports.
The causes of the slow growth of Nigerian agriculture 
are many and complex and many are avoidable. One of the 
greatest institutional problems facing the agricultural 
sector is the collapse and failure of the agricultural 
extension service. Before the era of the oil boom in 
Nigeria, each local government area had agricultural 
offices and a host of subordinate staff who maintained 
regular contacts with the farmers to help them carry out 
successfully many farm programmes. Apart from the effect 
of the oil boom very few senior staff were available to 
direct the affairs of the extension service because the 
career prospects were very limited and unattractive.
The second institutional problem is the state of the 
social infrastructure available to the rural majority who 
are disadvantaged in terms of accessibility to the essentials 
of life, i.e. access to roads, good education, and tele­
communications facilities. The lack of physical and social 
infrastructure has fuelled the well-known rural to urban
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migration and made it difficult for rural peasants and 
extension workers to remain in rural areas.
Because there is no institutionalised system of 
reporting food stocks; gluts sometimes occur in scattered 
localities, especially soon after harvest. Government 
intervention in storing and marketing has not been forth­
coming. The Nigerian Grains Board and the National Grains 
Production Company have also not been helpful to the farmers 
in the task of storing, processing and marketing the grains.
Akin to this problem is that of ineffective entre­
preneurship. The supply of effective entrepreneurship to 
Nigerian agriculture is almost at zero point because of the 
conditions inherent in traditional production and agriculture's 
inability to compete with the industrial sector. The vital 
catalyst in any agricultural development is the management 
factor. The manager must innovate, adapt, plan and possess 
sufficient technological knowledge and competence to manage.
In Nigeria and the African countries surveyed these attributes 
are lacking.
In an effort to increase output through technological 
innovation gained from the experiences of the advanced 
countries, some Commonwealth African countries like Nigeria 
introduced Western mechanised systems (fertilization etc) 
in ecological and Sidaphic conditions that are totally 
different from what they are in the advanced countries.
The government or the central Bank should arrange research 
on our agricultural land with a view to determining the side
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effects of using chemical fertilizers on the texture, 
fertility and composition of our soils.
Research and soil tests would also determine what 
fertilizers would be most suitable for a particular land area 
and whether the right types are imported. Proper study of 
the operations and adaptability of imported modern farm 
equipment which are beyond the reach of the average African 
must be undertaken. As T.W. Schultz pointed out:
"Economic growth from the agricultural sector of a 
poor country depends predominantly upon the avail­
ability and price of modern (non traditional) agri­
cultural factors. The principal source of high 
productivity in modern agriculture are reproduceable 
sources. They consist of particular material inputs 
and of skills and other capabilities required to use 
such inputs successfully ... But these modern 
material inputs are seldom ready made. They can rarely 
be taken over and introduced into farming in a 
typically poor community in their present form ...
They are very few reproduceable agricultural factors 
in technically advanced countries that are ready-made 
for most poor communities. In general, what is 
available is a body of useful knowledge which has 
made it possible for the advanced countries to 
produce for their own use of factors that are 
technically superior to those employed elsewhere.
This body of knowledge can be used to develop 
similar and as a rule, superior, new factors, 
appropriate to the biological and other conditions 
that are specific to the agriculture of poor 
communities .""16
The emphasis of governments and farmers should shift 
from the use of sophisticated machinery and equipment to 
the introduction of simple and cheap hand tools which 
would be appropriate to African social, economic and 
geographical conditions. The more advanced tools and
16. Q.B.O. Anthonia, 1971, Proceedings of the Agricultural 
Society of Nigeria, vol. 8 , July 1971.
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machinery should be introduced to the corporate farmers and 
organised extension farms for large-scale production of food 
and agricultural commodities. Mechanisation is good in 
itself but the questions of cost, adaptability, reliability, 
availability of spare parts and so on are some of the 
problems associated with it. Other problems identified in 
the agricultural system in Nigeria may be summarised as 
follows:
1. Inadequate agricultural incentives system, 
especially the absence of certain types of 
subsidies (e.g. on seeds) and insurance 
against risk.
2. Planning problems as reflected in lack of 
data, shortage of technical personnel, little 
ex-post policy evaluation and lack of a 
strategy in overall agricultural policy.
3. Inadequate provision and untimely release of 
funds in the national budget and bureaucratic 
delays in commercial banks and the central 
bank in giving approvals to projects and 
releasing funds.
4. Lack of adequate pre-project studies and 
appraisal before granting loans.
5. Counter productive government fiscal policies,
e.g. encouraging increase in the production of 
poultry and at the same time banning poultry 
feeds and also allowing the importation of 
frozen chicken while the locally produced ones 
cannot be sold.
6 . Unjustifiable insistence on the following 
particular types of collaterals which are not 
within the reach of the peasant farmers for 
the purposes of a loan under the scheme:
a. a charge on land in which the borrower
holds a legal interest or a right to 
farm or a charge on assets on the land 
including fixed assets, crops or 
livestock;
b. a charge on the movable property of the
borrower;
c. a life assurance policy, a promissory
note or other negotiable security;
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d . stocks and shares;
e. any other security acceptable to the bank;
17
f. a personal guarantee.” (
7. Bio-physical problems e.g. unpredictable 
weather, soil, water, heat and other environ­
mental factors like pests and diseases and 
other natural hazards.
8 . Misconception about bank loans being regarded
as national cake instead of depositors' money.
"From 1977 to this year (1983) the Bank has advanced
the Board up to N2.06 Billion out of which N390 million 
is being regarded as a loss."'l8
Recommendat ions
These problems may be interpreted as reflections of the 
failure of the Central Bank agricultural credit scheme to 
guarantee the realisation of self-sufficiency in foods. It 
is not clear to what extent loans to African farmers have 
resulted in incremental production of agricultural produce 
because of lack of data, but it is common knowledge that 
poor results have been achieved by approaches which ought 
to be promising if the scheme were supported by adequate 
physical and institutional infrastructure, supervision 
and management.
In many large cities of Nigeria, both the state 
governments and private sectors should acquire areas of land 
which could be developed and laid out as industrial estates. 
These could then be leased on a long-term basis to various
17. Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund Act 1977, 
section 10.
18. A Paper on the Desirability of Incorporating a National 
or Federal Commercial Bank in Nigeria by the Banking 
Supervision, 1983, p. 3.
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corporate industrialists, foreign and indigenous. In the 
same vein, such an exercise could be carried out for farmers, 
and let out plots of land on leasehold basis on terms 
favourable to indigenous farmers without discrimination.
The idea here is this. After mapping out possible 
areas within the country suitable for farming, the federal 
and/or state governments could acquire vast areas of unused 
land around towns and then divide them into plots of varying 
sizes of several hectares. These will be serviced with the 
usual infrastructure and leased out to farmers. Admittedly 
the cost of this exercise may be enormous but it could be 
done in stages; part of the cost of such programme can be 
met by advance payment by lessees in full or in part as 
the case may be.
Direct labour through the Ministry of Works of various 
governments could be used while the expected balance of 
expenses to be incurred can be provided in the budget of 
the respective governments.
The private sector should be encouraged to participate 
in the acquisition, clearing and leasing of farmlands also 
in such a way as would be complementary to government efforts 
in this direction. Here too, individual owners of private 
smallholdings in villages will be encouraged and given 
incentives and subsidies to. enable them to cultivate their 
small holdings.
The best way to bring this about is the extensive use 
of agricultural extension workers. Through them the results
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of various agricultural research centres could reach every 
farmer. The nation-wide application of these extension 
services requires recruitment and training of several 
thousands of these experts, but the benefit derived from 
this exercise far outweighs the costs involved and produces 
better results than the present indiscriminate loans to 
small-scale farmers which often either never get to the 
right end user or are spent unwisely on taking more wives 
or acquiring Mercedes Benz cars.
Farmers and investors with limited resources who are 
not able to afford large sums of money to buy land from 
villagers and to develop it for farming can do so under the 
lease-hold arrangement. This suggestion implies also a 
better control of the growth of each town as well as land 
usage; for instance, a federal or state government law 
could be introduced to determine the proportion of land 
within any town that will be built up and that which must 
be reserved for farming. Another obvious consequence 
of this national-wide land-lease system will be the disappear­
ance of urban and rural, advanced and backward areas, because 
every corner of the country would have been able to enjoy 
the basic amenities of life.
Nigeria should take a cue from Kenya. In Kenya, there 
was no credit guarantee scheme for small-scale farmers 
although one was planned for the plan period ending 1983.
The Central Bank of Kenya pursues a policy of promoting 
rural development by encouraging banks and other credit 
institutions like the Cooperative Savings Scheme and the
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Cooperative Production Credit Scheme to increase their 
lending to farmers. The Cooperative Bank of Kenya which 
serves as the apex financial organisation in the cooperative 
credit structure lends to the Cooperative Production Credit 
Scheme (CPCS) for crop finance, coffee factories and cotton 
ginneries; it runs also, under the Ministry's supervision, 
Small-holder Production Services and Credit Project (SPSCP) 
Programme which is intended to provide comprehensive pro­
duction and marketing services for increasing their production. 
The Cooperative Bank also runs the Integrated Agricultural 
Development Programme (IADP) under which the cooperative 
movement, supervised by the Department of Cooperatives, 
channels production loans to farmers, distributes farm 
inputs, proc00ures storage and markets produce.
The Central Bank of Kenya also runs a crop-refinaneing
scheme under which promissory notes related to the sale of
crops are rediscounted at the Bank at the rate of 8)2%
per annum. In its monetary policy directive issued in
July 1975 it directed banks to increase their lending to
agriculture to 17% of their net deposits. The result in
Kenya, according to J.D. Von Pischke and John Rouse, is
that the Cooperative Savings Scheme (CSS), which provides
short and medium-term loans to cooperators who are primarily
small coffee farmers, has been successful, having expanded
beyond the initial pilot operation and accumulated more
1 9savings balances than outstanding loans.
19. Selected Successful Experiences in Agricultural Credit 
and Rural Finance in Africa., Proceedings of a seminar 
organised by Central Bank of Nigeria, April 27-30, 1981,
p. 489.
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On the achievement of the agricultural sector of 
the Kenya economy, Hon. Tom Mboya late Minister for Economic 
Planning and Development had this to say:
"In the field of agriculture, considerable efforts 
have been made, and are continuing, to identify 
appropriate crops for the wide variety of soils 
and climatic conditions that exist in Kenya.
These opportunities are transmitted to our many 
small farmers through our extension services and 
Farmers Training Centres and are supported through 
development loans, crop loans, support prices, 
tractor services and the like. Special crop 
programmes apply to sugar, tea, coffee, maize and 
cotton among others, some extending to assistance 
with plantation development and infrastructure such 
as tea and sugar roads and nucleus estates.
Our programme to consolidate and register land 
holdings provides mortgageable titles and influences 
land use in the areas concerned. We are initiating 
studies on land tenure policy and hope to.establish 
a firmer basis on which to make major land use 
decisions as between, for example, tourism, 
agriculture, forestry, and infrastructure."20
Other steps that should be taken to improve agricultural 
production in Nigeria are as follows:
1. Bridging of the gap between urban and rural 
incomes by creating better environment in 
rural areas and increasing employment 
opportunities.
2. Establishment of a network of functional agro­
services centres in each state of the
f ede rat ion.
3. Making the small-scale farmer the centre piece 
of increased production rather than government 
agenc ies.
4. Expansion of agricultural manpower training.
5. Creating virile, dynamic and viable research 
institutions and development of appropriate 
and viable innovations in technology.
20. The role of the private sector in Kenyan National 
Development, see Private Enterprise and the East 
African Company, op .c i t . , p.197.
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6.
7.
8 .
9.
1 0 .
11 .
1 2 .
13.
14.
15.
16.
Development of practices, technologies and 
methods for better conservation management 
and utilization of our natural resources.
Provision of adequate funds in the budget and 
timely release of such funds.
The establishment of a crop/livestock insurance 
po1 icy.
The Organisation of farmers into co-operatives.
There should be adequate pre-project planning 
on the part of the farmers, including where 
need be, consultation with agricultural 
specialists.
Credit policy must be coordinated with other 
measures, that is, through the package approach 
which must include an efficient marketing 
system, an incentive price structure, adequate 
supply of farm inputs, provision of infra­
structural facilities and creation of strong 
farmers' organisations. Realistic prices must 
be set, and surplus farm output, after normal 
sales, must be bought by government agencies 
in order to ensure enhanced profitability.
Government parastatals engaged in agricultural 
production to be self-accounting and to sell 
to well established markets and not to 
Ministry officials.
The Central Bank should channel funds to 
research for the aid of agricultural development.
Efforts should be made by the Central Bank to 
get the banks to avoid a lopsided lending. At 
present, there seems to be over-emphasis on 
poultry and livestock financing by banks.
Traditional rural institutions, such as the 
extended family and village provide a basis for 
organizing financial services to particpants 
in these institutions.
The Central Bank as the managing agent for the 
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme should 
take appropriate steps, including legislation, 
to correct the anomalies identified in the 
scheme.
As noted above, the Agricultural Credit Guarantee 
Scheme Fund Act was enacted in 1977. It provides for a
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Board of six members to manage the Scheme. Two of the 
members represent the Central Bank of Nigeria, while the 
remaining four are appointed by the Federal Ministry of 
Finance. Of the four the Federal Ministry of Finance and 
the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources 
are represented each by one member and two non-government 
officials, one of whom is the Chairman of the Board. Under 
section 3 of the Scheme the Board, under the direction of 
the Minister, has responsibility for policy-making while 
the Central Bank of Nigeria under section 4 is appointed 
the managing agent responsible for the day to day affairs.
Section 2 of the Act established the Board and is 
silent as to the qualifications and experience of Chairman 
and members of the Board. Apart from the two representatives 
from the Central Bank, other members of the Board are 
appointed by the Minister of Finance. We had argued in 
Chapter 4 that some of the causes of the failure of 
central banks in Commonwealth Africa to attain optimum 
economic and social growth are:
a. the appointment of Governors and members of 
the Board of Direct z & i f r s who have no functional 
qualificat ions;
b. the appointment of politicians who failed 
elective political posts to the boards of 
directors who see such appointments as 
opportunities to recoup themselves from 
campaign expenses;
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c. the appointments, tenure of office and stipends 
of governors and directors which are determined 
by the minister tends to induce them to dance 
to the tune of politicians thereby weakening 
the effectiveness of central banks.
We saw that the presence of government representatives 
on central bank boards weakens the independnece of central 
banks which should be seen as independence within the 
government rather than of the government.
In the Marquis of Butes Case (1892) 2 Ch. 100 where the 
Marquis became president of the Cardiff Savings Bank when 
he was six months old inheriting the office from his father 
and attended one board meeting in 38 years, he was held not 
liable for irregularities which occurred in the Bank's 
lending policy.
In a similar case, Re Denham & Co. (1883) 25 Ch.D. 752, 
the director had not attended any meetings for four years.
The director was exonerated for not detecting the frauds 
of the Chairman in contriving the accounts to show fictitious 
profits because "he was a country gentleman and not a skilled 
accountant."
In the case of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme 
there are two Boards of Directors it has to contend with; 
one is the Fund's Board and the other, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria Board. It is a double jeopardy and the failure of 
the Scheme to make an impact is not surprising.
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CHAPTER 8
MONETARY MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
TECHNIQUES OF MONETARY MANAGEMENT
In Chapter 1 we enumerated the roles money can play 
in the economy and stated that money is used as a medium 
of exchange, store of value, standard of deferred payments 
and unit of accounts. For money to perform effeciently and 
effectively these vital roles, it rquires skilful manage­
ment through monetary policy formulation and implementation. 
In this chapter therefore we shall examine how the central 
banks have performed these functions in dealing with the 
four broad objectives of monetary management, to wit, price 
stability, high rate of employment, a desirable or sustain­
able rate of economic growth and balance of payment 
equilibrium. We shall therefore examine some of the 
techniques available to the central banks, their applica­
bility and the extent to which they have been an instrument 
of economic growth. The tools generally applied are: open 
market operations, discount■rate mechanism, direct 
regulation of interest rate, reserve requirements, moral 
suasion, stabilisation securities and exchange control 
measures.
Open Market Operations
Open Market Operations as an instrument of credit
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control is employed by central banks to alter the liquidity 
position of banks by dealing directly in the market. The 
central banks do this by purchases and sales of a variety 
of assets such as government securities and commercial 
bills of exchange. When the central bank purchases govern­
ment securities from the banks, the banks' deposits with 
the central bank tend to increase, thus adding to the 
cash reserves of banks. This increase in the reserves 
enables the banks to expand credit. Conversely, the banks' 
deposits with the central bank would get reduced if the 
central bank sells securities to them. The net result 
would be a contraction of credit and a reduction in money 
supply.
The efficacy and effectiveness of open market opera­
tions as an instrument of monetary control will depend on 
two factors, namely, the type and amount of assets or 
securities the central bank has in its portfolio and 
secondly on the size of the gilt-edged market.
In Chapter 5 at page 307et seq we stated the main 
objectives of setting up of markets for securities as, 
among other things, to mobilise idle funds and to provide 
a machinery for government short term financing requirements.
The Bill Market scheme in Nigeria was abolished in
1968 and the Call Money scheme in 1974. Abolished also was
the use of Treasury Certificates of Deposits. The use of
Treasury Bills did not expand, indeed the reverse: there
1
were virtually no longer any instruments in the market.
1 See Chapter 6, p. 348.
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The Government in explaining why the issue of treasury 
bills had not been increased and other bills abolished, 
stated that it had no need for the money in view of its 
excess liquidity. If this is so, it only follows that 
money markets could not operate since there can be no mar­
ket if there are no instruments to trade in. According to 
G.O. Nwankwo, Executive Director, Central Bank of Nigeria, although 
the Central Bank of Nigeria right from its inception had 
been buying and selling securities, these were not open 
market operations in the traditional and technical sense 
of the word, since the aim of those operations had always 
been to raise funds for the government and to service 
government debt. He goes on to say that the Central Bank 
had never undertaken open market operations as a deliberate 
policy and with the objective of influencing the cash base 
and lending power of the commercial banks and the rest of 
the financial system. He concludes:
"In its refusal or inability to use open 
market operations as an instrument of monetary 
control, the Central Bank of Nigeria tends 
to have been influenced and guided by the 
traditional argument that exercise of the 
instrument will be inoperative in a developing 
economy without developed money and capital 
markets. As we indicated in Chapter 1, this 
was one of the arguments against the estab­
lishment of central banks in developing 
countries in the 1950s".2
Although the instrument of open market operations was 
available to Commonwealth central banks in Africa it was
2 The Nigerian Financial S ystem, op. cit, p. 30.
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not generally utilised in pursuit of the general objectives 
for which these instruments are created by Commonwealth 
central banks. In the absence of a Treasury Bill market, 
open market operations in Nigeria will be entirely confined 
to government bonds; in Nigeria their holders refuse to 
release them, with the result that to that extent the 
potency of open market operations as an instrument is 
reduced to nothing.
Discount Rate Mechanism
A central bank's discount rate (bank rate) is the rate 
at which it is prepared to lend to the banking system when 
the latter is short of funds. The discount rate is the 
bank rate, it is the peg on which the spectrum of interest 
rates is structured; other rates rise and fall as the 
minimum rediscount rate is raised or lowered. This is a 
last resort lending function of central banks under which 
central banks honour demands for financial accommodation 
from the commercial banks, but only at penal rates, since 
banks are not expected to resort to it unless it becomes 
absolutely necessary to borrow to meet a temporary imbalance 
in their portfolio of assets and liabilities. In sophis­
ticated financial markets an increase in the minimum 
rediscount rate is a signal to the banks to raise the cost 
of obtaining credit. In the developing countries like 
Nigeria, the possible advantage of this instrument is that 
the threat of a penalty may be just as effective in 
inducing the banking system to behave in the desired way 
as the use of the penalty. Apart from this, this instrument
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for monetary regulation has not in any way advanced economic 
development in Nigeria. For example, credit institutions 
have never raised their cost and hence restrain credit 
availability to potential borrowers. About the failure of 
this instrument as a technique of monetary control the 
Central Bank of Nigeria had this to say:
"The discount rate policy has not played 
a significant role in influencing the cost 
and availability of credit in Nigeria. 
Although an amendment to the CBN Act in 1962 
required bank lending rates to have a 
specified and defined relationship with the 
discount rate, the rigidity inherent in the 
administered structure of the Nigerian 
interest rates make it an ineffective tool 
of monetary control. Perhaps a more funda­
mental limitation to the effectiveness of 
interest rate changes as a technique of 
demand management in Nigeria, as in several 
developing countries, arises from the fact 
that investment decisions are more dependent 
on the expected rate of returns on invest­
ment than on the cost of borrowing. In 
Nigeria, the returns on investment are so 
high that the restraining rates of interest 
might be too high for the monetary authori­
ties to contemplate.3
Direct Regulation of Interest Rates
Central Banks derive their authority to regulate the 
interest rates of banks from various Acts. In Nigeria 
section 14 of the Banking Act 1969 stipulates that:
"(1) The rate of interest charged on advances, 
loans or credit facilities or paid on 
deposits by any licensed bank shall be 
linked to the minimum rediscount rate of
3 Central Bank of Nigeria, Twenty Years of Central Banking
in N i g e r i a , 1979, p. 101.
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the central bank subject to stated mini­
mum and maximum rates of interest, and 
the minimum and maximum rates of interest 
when so approved shall be the same for all 
licensed banks; provided that differential 
rates may be approved for the various 
categories of banks to which this decree 
applies;
(2) The interest rate structure of each licensed 
bank shall be subject to the approval of 
the Central B a n k ."
The Central Bank of Kenya Act s.39 provides that;
"The Bank may, from time to time, acting 
in consultation with the Minister, deter­
mine and publish the maximum and minimum 
rates of interest which specified banks 
or specified financial institutions may 
pay on deposits and charge for loans or 
advances provided that the Bank may in 
consultation with the Minister determine 
different rates of interest;
i) for different types of deposits and loan; 
and
ii) for different types of specified banks and 
financial institutions".
The power to stipulate the rates of interest covers 
both the deposit and the lending rates. The main purpose 
of controlling rates on loans and advances is to influence 
the demand for credit and to introduce an element of disci­
pline in the use of credit. This central banks generally 
do by stipulating minimum rates of interest. Minimum 
lending rates are with the same objective prescribed for 
extending credit in accordance with selective credit con­
trol . Furthermore, ceiling rates of interest are made 
applicable to advances to certain sectors in order to 
reduce the interest burden on the borrowers from those 
sectors. The objective behind fixing the rates on deposits 
is to avoid unhealthy competition amongst the banks for
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deposits and the charges in rates are, in a majority of 
instances, to encourage deposit mobilisation.
Direct controls operate by placing limits on the 
commercial banks' freedom to undertake certain activities; 
if left free of control it is feared that other methods of 
control, e.g. moral suasion, would not work sufficiently 
quickly or produce the desired result. If, for example, 
it is desired to check quickly the growth of a bank lending 
it is necessary to increase the rate of interest so as to 
reduce demands from borrowers.
In Nigeria, as in other developing countries according 
to the authors of the 20 Years of Central Banking, "the 
interest rate structure is directly managed by the govern­
ment under the expert advice of the monetary authority.
The reason for this is not far to seek. The underdeveloped 
nature of the financial markets coupled with the relative 
scarcity of capital resources in the economy, are important 
factors which could make market determined interest rates
incapable of producing the most desirable pattern of
4
resource allocation." This conclusion appears apt, not 
merely for Nigeria but for other Commonwealth African 
countries.
Special Deposits and Stabilisation Securities
Section 4 0 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act requires 
the Bank to employ the instrument of special deposits as a 
tool of monetary management. As in the case of most other
4 Ibi d , p . 102.
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instruments in the Act, this power has been exercised on 
only one occasion. In 1971 the Central Bank required all 
importers to deposit with their bankers the local currency 
equivalent of the amount of the foreign currency value of
their imports for which foreign exchange had not been
allocated. N4 00m in local currency was deposited which 
inflated the banks' liquidity. As a result of the over 
liquidity in the banking system the Central Bank on 10th 
June, 1971 ordered that banks whose level of short-term 
external liabilities was above N20m should deposit the 
excess with it on or before 30th June, 1971. The table
I below shows the percentage of the compulsory advance
|
t deposits on categories of imports:
i[
| Table 25
| Percentage of the Compulsory Advance Deposits on Categories
of Imports
Items Per cent
Raw materials 10
Spare parts 15
Food (except rice) 50
Medicaments 50
Building materials 50
Capital goods 50
Books 50
Motor vehicles and trucks 200
Motor cars 250
Other goods 250
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Similarly, section 40(7) of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria Act and section 12 of the Banking Act 1969 give the 
Central Bank of Nigeria powers to use stabilisation 
securities as an instrument of control. Section 40(7) for 
example, provides that:
"The Bank may for the purposes of main­
taining monetary stability of the economy 
of Nigeria, issue, place, sell, repurchase, 
amortize or redeem securities to be known 
as 'stabilization securities' (which shall 
constitute its obligations) and the securities 
shall be issued at such rate of interest 
and under such conditions of maturity, amor­
tization, negotiability and redemption as 
the Bank may deem appropriate."
By subsections 9 and 10 the Bank has the power of sanction 
over a bank that refuses to buy the securities. These 
subsections provide:
"If any institution fails to comply with 
any direction issued under the provisions 
of this section, the Bank shall have power 
t o :
(a) Prohibit the institution concerned from 
extending new loans and advances, and from 
undertaking new investment, until full 
compliance with the direction has been 
obtained by the Bank;
(b) levy fines, which shall be a civil debt, 
against the institution, but such fines 
shall not exceed fifty pounds for the 
default or, as the case may be, for every 
day during which the default continues.
Any institution which furnishes false 
information to the Bank shall be guilty 
of an offence and liable to a fine not 
exceeding £100 (two hundred Naira) for the 
first offence, and for a second or subse­
quent offences the fine shall be £200 (four 
hundred n a i r a ) ."
This instrument was introduced on the recommendation
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of the Anti-Inflation Task Force in 1976 when it concluded 
t h a t ,
"We believe that the Central Bank was 
given power to issue stabilisation secu­
rities precisely because of the situations 
(serious inflation) like the one that now 
exists. We believe that there is now some 
evidence that the banks are using their 
excess liquidity positions in a manner that 
is further aggravating monetary instability. 
We therefore recommend the issue of stabi­
lisation securities to neutralise the excess 
liquidity of the commercial banks."^
In a White Paper the Federal Government accepted the 
recommendation and directed that the "Bank should exercise 
now its power of issuing stabilisation securities and 
determine how much of such securities to issue to each 
bank." It was in 1976 that the first and the only one 
issue of stabilisation securities was made by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria.
Another instrument of monetary control usually employed 
by central banks is the cash reserve ratio requirement by 
which every commercial bank should maintain at all times 
in the form of cash reserve with the Central Bank a sum
g
equal to a ratio of the bank's deposit liabilities. For 
this purpose the Central Bank has the power to prescribe 
different cash reserve ratios to be maintained by each of 
the following categories of institutions in relation to 
their sizes:
5 First Report of the Anti-Inflation Task Force, October 
1975, Federal Ministry of Information, December 1975, 
p . 3 .
6 S.40(1) (a) of Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 1 958 .
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Table 26
Cash Reserve Ratios to be Maintained by Banks in Categories (A)
Class of Bank Amount of Deposit Reserve Ratio %
A N30m or more 25
B N10m but less than N30m 25
7
C Less than N10m 25
The cash ratio is designed to raise or reduce the 
liquidity of the banking system by determining the level 
of cash reserve balances (the credit base of the system)
which the Central Bank system should maintain. The Act
as we said earlier gave the Central Bank the power to
g
prescribe the liquidity ratio for the commercial banks 
and specified a ratio of 25% (as the Table above shows) 
which according to the Central Bank had remained unchs^ed 
ever since. But according to G.O. Nwankwo this instrument 
was utilised in 1976 when
"For the first time in history, each
commercial bank was required to maintain
with the CBN a cash ratio expressed as a 
ratio of its total demand deposits plus 
time deposits on which it pays its depo­
sitors interest of less than 2\ per cent 
per annum."
The stipulated cash reserve ranges from 2 to 5% and varies 
with the size of banks' deposit liabilities as follows:
7 Ibi d , s .4 0(2) .
8 Twenty Years of Central Banking, op. cit, p. 103.
9 The Nigerian Financial System, op. cit, p. 32.
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Table 27
Cash Reserve Ratios to be Maintained with CBN (Bi
Class of Bank Amount of Relevant Stipulated Cash
____________________   deposits___ Reserve Ratio (%)
A N300m or more 5.0
B N300m or more but
less than N300m 4.0
C N30m or more but
less than N100m 3.0
D Less than M30m 2.0
Appraisal of the Use of the Monetary Tools
It will be seen that the Central Bank of Nigeria is 
fully equipped with authority by the various Acts to 
control and regulate the monetary system and it thus 
possesses an armoury of tools or techniques to meet the 
demands of the system. Standard tools have been devised, 
according to the authors of Twenty Years of Central Banking
• xt • • 10in Nigeria,
"to facilitate monetary management but 
the major problem here again is that the 
tools are not universally applicable.
There is a strong need for selectivity 
depending on each country's circumstances 
and stage of development. There has to 
be the right financial environment and 
conditions conducive to the use of any 
package of instruments selected. Perhaps 
enough has been said to sound a note of 
warning that the state of the art of mone­
tary management has not attained the desired 
level of perfection and hence much experi­
mentation and ad hockery still remain as 
would be evidenced in the following review 
of the Nigerian case."
10 Twenty Years of Central Banking, p. 99.
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In assessing the performance of the monetary tools in 
Nigeria the Central Bank of Nigeria had this to say:
"In the context of the overall objective 
of accelerated economic development, mone­
tary policy has had to grapple with two 
major problems, namely, the maintenance 
of a healthy balance of payments and relative 
price stability. The relative success or 
lack of it, in the attainment of such demand 
management objectives should not be arrogated 
to or blamed on monetary policy because other 
policies and factors simultaneously influence 
the macro-economic goals of income, employ­
ment, prices and balance of payments 
equilibrium...
For the future, there are obvious indica­
tions that the CBN would continue to face 
complex financial situation featuring, among 
other things, a destabilising monetary 
expansion from factors largely outside its 
direct control. This being the case, there 
is a critical need to employ monetary policy 
more flexibly to counteract the destabili­
sing effects of exogenous factors and steer 
the economy along the desired path of socio­
economic progress. The persisting practice 
of annual frequency in monetary policy 
formulation as if it were a mere component 
of the Federal Government annual budgetary 
exercise, is not only peculiar but also 
represents an inadvertent compounding of 
the problem of action lag in policy formu­
lation. This is clearly unsatisfactory in 
a dynamic and rapidly changing society such 
as Nigeria. In advanced and more financially 
sophisticated societies monetary policy 
changes of varying scope have a frequency 
of as small as one week. For instance, 
in the United States of America, the 'fine 
tu n i n g 1 of the economy usually calls for 
weekly open market operations. Although the 
Nigerian financial and economic conditions 
do not as yet admit of such frequency of 
monetary regulation, there is obviously a 
convincing case for taking an immediate 
monetary policy action as soon as the need 
is recognised rather than wait for the 
beginning of every fiscal year before formu­
lating monetary policy."1*1
11 Ibid, p. 127.
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Sections 23-25 of the Bank of Zambia Act 1964 and 
sections 47-52 of the Bank of Tanzania Act 1965 as well as 
sections 35-41 of the Central Bank of Kenya Act, make 
provisions for the monetary control of the economies of the 
different countries. As in the case of the Central Bank 
of Nigeria, each country is faced with the problem of 
illiquidity in the banking system and the effects of the 
world-wide economic recession. There are large external 
debts to pay, there are the dwindling foreign reserves, 
there are unemployment, wage freezes and so on. Each 
country in recent years has had surplus funds which were 
allowed to be frittered away. All the omens were favour­
able, but the disadvantages were dissipated, both in the 
case of Nigeria or Kenya and Zambia. The Central Bank of 
Nigeria, between 1973 and 1976, as noted in Chapter 5, 
had enormous reserves and the banking system was very 
liquid. This was due to the oil boom of that period. As 
these developing countries were trying to adjust to the 
shock-waves brought about by the oil crisis, Kenya's 
economy also had a boost. The severe frost of July 1975 
destroyed a large part of the Brazilian coffee crop. This 
resulted in a sharp reduction in world coffee production 
from 79.2m bags in 1974 to 63.9m and 60.9m in 1975 and 
1976, respectively. World coffee prices escalated and 
Kenya benefitted from the rise in price. As the price of 
coffee increased, some consumers were induced to substitute 
tea, which, in turn, led to a higher world price. Kenya 
as a result benefitted from the 'two worlds' of coffee, 
her most important export, and tea, her second most
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important export crop. Kenya recorded a balance of pay-
1 2
ments surplus in 1976 and 1977.
In Zambia also, a boom was recorded during the same 
period. Copper prices improved considerably in 1973 and 
reached an all-time high in 1974, thereby putting the 
Zambian economy in prosperity. Copper contributes about 
90% of the country's total exports in terms of value and 
about 75% of the recurrent revenue of the government. The 
prosperity, again as in the previous cases reviewed, was 
short-lived as copper prices declined again in 1975. The 
economy suffered because of this and other factors. There 
was the severe transportation crisis which resulted from 
Zambia's closing of the border with Rhodesia in 19 73.
The Benguela Railway passing through Zaire to Angola's 
Lobita Bay and the road route through Tanzania were used. 
In addition, the Mufulira, the largest copper mine in 
Zambia, caved in; this and the deteriorating foreign 
exchange position, greater mining depths and loss of 
skilled manpower, resulted in an 8% fall in production in 
1981 .
It has been noted above that oil, coffee, tea and 
copper contribute over 90% of the countries' total exports 
and over 70% of governments' recurrent revenue. In a 
situation such as the countries found themselves, where 
there was dependence on the fortunes of a single export
12 Sources and Uses of Foreign Exchange in Kenya 19 74— 
1 979 , 1981 , pp. 11-12.
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commodity, any wide fluctuation in the world demand for 
the commodity would have serious consequences on the 
economy. Some of the obvious consequences have been a fall 
in the revenue from the exporting companies, and a fall 
in government revenue because less tax will be collected; 
there will also be a reduction in wages and employment 
opportunities; there will be disequilibrium in the balance 
of payments; and there will be increased external debt 
burden coupled with budget deficits.
As domestic money incomes fall as just noted, econo­
mic activity will invariably slow down. As the banks and 
other financial instititutions are no longer sufficiently 
liquid to provide assets for the financial markets, the 
use of sophisticated monetary instruments in such under­
developed economies will be a misplaced strategy which can 
hardly achieve the desired goals. For example, in cases 
of "a very sharp fall in export earnings, deficit finan­
cing of government expenditure may reduce considerably the
1 3impact on the domestic economy of an export slump".
From the foregoing it will be noted that the anglo­
phone central banks can,*under their various Acts, require 
commercial banks to maintain minimum cash balances on 
deposits with them against their total liabilities, to 
maintain liquid assets ratio, apply open market operations 
and stabilization securities and so on. In spite of all 
this copious legislation, most of these monetary instru­
ments have not been applied by the various central banks.
13 Money Banking and Economic Development in Zambia, op.
c i t , p . 9 .
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Explaining the reason why it was that only once and for a 
brief period at the beginning of 1972 the commercial banks 
were required to depost with the Central Bank 5% of their 
net deposit liabilities in order to reduce excessive 
expansion of credit, and why the lack of use generally of 
these monetary instruments, the Central Bank of Kenya 
said:
"In practice, the Bank has relied on the 
effectiveness of a liquidity ratio and 
its powers of selective credit control 
as the main instruments. It has not made 
use of the classical mechanisms like the 
Bank Rate and open market operations in 
view of the underdeveloped nature of the 
Kenya money and capital markets. Indeed, 
the Bank has not hitherto felt that official 
changes in interest rate would be a useful 
instrument to influence economic acitivity 
and the flow of credit in the e conomy."14
It is our conclusion therefore that these monetary instru­
ments are not being used nor can they be effectively used 
in Nigeria and the other countries surveyed because of the 
level of development of the economies and the under­
developed nature of the financial systems.
EXCHANGE CONTROL
Objectives of Exchange Control
Foreign exchange is the act of converting the currency 
of one country into the currency of another. Exchange 
Control prevents or controls payments to persons abroad,
14 Money and Banking in K e n y a , op. cit, p. 10.
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and is designed primarily to mobilise and control a 
country's liquid resources abroad and the international 
movement of currency owned by residents of that country.
In African central banks it is a means of adjusting the 
demand for foreign exchange to the current supply, conserv­
ing reserves as well as maximising the use of foreign 
exchange reserve by ensuring that essential imports are 
given priority over other imports. Exchange control 
becomes necessary when the country's external reserves are 
not adequate for meeting its current and potential require­
ments. It, therefore, involves a rationing of foreign 
exchange among various competing demands for it. It may 
be imposed only on payments or only on receipts, more 
usually on both. The purpose of introducing exchange 
control on receipts is to centralise a country's means of 
external payments in a common pool in the hands of the 
monetary authorities to facilitate its judicious use, 
while the purpose of imposing exchange control on payment 
is to restrain the demand for foreign exchange broadly 
in consonance with the national interests, within the 
limits of available resources. Exchange control is man­
aged by a country's central bank acting on behalf of the 
Treasury or the Ministry of Finance as in Commonwealth 
Africa. The commercial banks and hotels known as "Autho­
rised Dealers" or "Authorised Buyers" are appointed sub­
agents of the central banks to whom wide powers have been 
delegated to approve, inter alia, the purchase of exchange 
for transfer abroad.
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Exchange Control Techniques
Whatever technique a country may adopt depends on the 
decision of the Government as to whether to have a restric­
tive system of control or a relatively free one. A 
country that is in persistent balance of payments 
disequilibrium or fears a fundamental disequilibrium in 
its balance of payments may adopt very strict exchange 
control measures. On the other hand, if the deficit is 
considered only as a temporary measure and can be corrected 
easily, a country may have a liberal exchange control 
policy. In some cases, countries adopt control measures 
mainly to ensure that certain formalities are completed for 
example, the payment of tax on profits or dividends, before 
funds are transferred abroad. Regardless of the degree of 
control, exchange control system involves control over the 
resources or the supply of, and the demand for foreign 
exchange, including:
(a) imports and exports of goods
(b) capital and capital service items, and specula­
tive transactions.
The moderate type of exchange restrictions is 
committed to the prevention of sharp fluctuations of the 
exchange rates through the prohibition of abnormal capital 
flows and speculation in the exchange markets. It is 
obvious that any capital movement of sizeable proportions 
can easily become of a dimension not easily susceptible to 
any but the most drastic and comprehensive restrictive 
measures.
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Historical Development of Exchange Control in Nigeria
Exchange control was first introduced in Nigeria 
under the Defence (Finance Regulations) 1939 as a war 
measure to protect the pound sterling. In 194 7 the 
Exchange Control Act, 194 7 was enacted by the U.K. Parlia­
ment and it sought to codify all exchange control orders 
made under the Defence Finance Regulations. Under the Act 
the world was divided into two parts. The first consisted 
of the United Kingdom and the Scheduled Territories; the 
second comprised the remaining countries. Before 2 3 June, 
1972, the Scheduled Territories were defined by the First 
Schedule of the Act - as amended - as the British 
Commonwealth (except Canada and Rhodesia), Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Iceland, the Irish Republic, the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, South Africa 
and South West Africa, United Arab Emirates, the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen.
In December 1950, the Exchange Control Ordinance 1950 
was enacted for the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.
When Nigeria assumed the status of independence in 1960 
the need arose to replace the 1950 Ordinance to reflect the 
sovereign status of the country and to impose certain 
exchange control restrictions. Consequently, the Exchange 
Control Act 1962 was enacted and ever since has remained 
the principal source of authority for all foreign exchange 
transactions between Nigeria and other countries. Other 
subsidiary laws include the Exchange Control Anti-Sabotage 
Decree 1977, repealed and re-enacted as Exchange Control 
Anti-Sabotage Decree 1984, the Pre-shipment Inspection of
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Imports of Goods Act 1978 and the Exchange Control Manual.
Until 1962, exchange control policies and practices 
were based on a complete body of rules derived from the 
Bank of England which were circulated to all Exchange con­
trol departments in the Sterling Areas. Under the system, 
exchange control practices were such as to allow free 
payment to scheduled territories for all genuine transac­
tions. However, special permission was required for 
payment for imports from non-scheduled territories. Under 
the Act, all currencies other than the Nigerian pound were 
defined as foreign currencies. Hitherto, other scheduled 
territory currencies had not been so defined. All persons 
resident outside Nigeria were classified as non residents, 
and three types of non-resident accounts were created, 
v i z :
(i) The Scheduled Territory Accounts for residents 
of the Scheduled Territory countries other than 
N i g e r i a ;
(ii) External Accounts for residents of non-scheduled 
territory countries;
(iii)Rhodesia Account, introduced for accounts mai n ­
tained for residents of Rhodesia following that 
colony's unilateral declaration of independence 
in 1965.
In Tanzania, the Exchange Control Ordinance Cap 294 
and the subsidiary legislation and rules and regulations 
made under it together form one of the most important 
means for the management of the Tanzanian economy. Control 
was introduced in 1951 to regulate transactions between
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Tanganyika (which was then a part of the Sterling A r e a ) , 
and the rest of the world. Transactions within the 
Sterling Area were without restrictions.
On the attainment of political independence in 1961, 
a number of people who had dual loyalties migrated, taking 
out all their assets to other Sterling Areas like Canada, 
U.K., India and Pakistan. The flight of capital was most 
noticeable during the break-up of the East African Currency 
Board in 196 5 and this necessitated imposing in the same 
year control on transactions with other Sterling Area 
countries, except for Kenya and Uganda, which also took 
similar action. In 1967 the Treaty for East African C o ­
operation was signed under which Article 25(1), Partner 
States were required to give without undue delay all the 
permission required for making bona fide payments. In 
March 1971 this arrangement came to an end and exchange 
transactions with Kenya and Uganda were brought under 
restrictions.
As in all other East African Commonwealth countries, 
the Minister of Finance has delegated the administration 
of exchange control to the Bank of Tanzania but exercises 
the discretionary powers in the Ordinance which have over­
all national implications by the issue of orders.
Tanzania has an import control mechanism which predates 
the similar one in Nigeria - the Preshipment of Import of 
Goods Decree 1978. Import control in Tanzania, then 
Tanganyika, was first introduced in 1942 under the Defence 
Regulations in a manner similar to the system we described 
earlier in this section. The purpose was to protect the
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British Government's balance of payments and to facilitate 
it in its prosecution of the Second World War. Import 
control is administered through import licences. The legal 
basis for issuing of licences is the Import Control 
Ordinance of 1951 (cap. 292) as amended by the Finance Act, 
1973 .
Administration of Exchange Control in Nigeria
As stated earlier, the Exchange Control Act, 196 2 
vests an overall authority in the Federal Minister of 
Finance, with power to delegate. In exercise of the powers 
conferred by section 32(4) and the Exchange Control Dele­
gation of Powers Notice, Legal Notice No. 82, 1962, the 
Minister has appointed the Central Bank of Nigeria as the 
principal administrative agent of exchange control. The 
Bank is therefore responsible for the day-to-day admini­
stration of the law.
The Minister has also appointed licensed banks and 
hotels to act as "Authorised Dealers" and "Authorised 
Buyers" respectively. The three arms of the Minister, the 
Bank, and the authorised dealers share powers of approval 
in exchange control matters in Nigeria.
The Minister is still responsible for the determination 
of applications concerning some aspects of policy. As it 
concerns authorised dealers, they are required to carry 
out their appointed duties in accordance with such instruc­
tions and directions as are contained in the Exchange 
Control Manual and Circulars. The division of powers 
between the 3 arms is as in the appended table.
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Table 28
Foreign Exchange Approving Authorities
ITEMS
Imports
Education, Students etc.
Membership & Subscription
Books & Correspondence 
Courses
Commission and Brokerages 
Miscellaneous
Shipping 
Airlines 
Insurance Trade 
Insurance Non-Trade 
Fishing
Nigerian Embassies
(i) Commercial Imports
(ii) Others
Ministry of Defence
Statutory Corporations 
Including Universities
(i) Commercial Imports
(ii) Others 
Official Tours:
(i) States
(ii) Federal)
, . . )(1 1 1 ) Leave )
Business Travel
Basic Travel Allowance
Leave and Medical Tours
(i) Public
(ii) Private 
Educational Tours
Pilgrims
APPROVING AUTHORITY
Central Bank and Authorised 
Dealers
Central Bank and Authorised 
Dealers
Authorised Dealers (including 
Federal Savings Bank)
Authorised Dealers 
Central Bank
Central Bank and Federal 
Ministry of Finance
Central Bank
Central Bank
Central Bank
Central Bank
Central Bank
Federal Ministry of Finance 
Central Bank
Federal Ministry of Finance 
Federal Ministry of Finance
Central Bank
Federal Ministry of Finance 
Central Bank
Federal Ministry of Finance
Central Bank 
Authorised Dealers
Federal Ministry of Finance 
Central Bank
Central Bank and Autorised 
Dealers
Central Bank and Authorised 
Dealers
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Foreign Exchange Approving Authorities contd
ITEMS
Home Remittances
Pension
Cash Gifts
Profits & Dividends
Loans Repayment - Public
Loans Repayment - Private
Others - (including
indigenisation)
Copyrights, Patent, Manage­
ment, Royalties, Technical 
and other fees
Contingency
Strategic Reserves
External Account
Offshore Costs 
Consultancy & Service Fees
APPROVING AUTHORITY
Central Bank
Central Bank
Central Bank
Federal Ministry of Finance
Federal Ministry of Finance
Federal Ministry of Finance
Federal Ministry of Finance
Federal Ministry of Finance
Federal Ministry of Finance
Federal Ministry of Finance
Federal
Central
Ministry
Bank
of Finance
Federal Ministry of Finance
Federal
Central
Ministry
Bank
of Finance
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria
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Obligations Under the Exchange Control Act 1962
The Exchange Control Act 1962 was a precautionary 
measure, designed to provide the legal and administrative 
framework for an orderly and effective imposition of 
controls when the balance of payments situation necessita­
ted such control measures. Therefore, to achieve the 
objectives behind the Exchange Control Act, certain 
obligations are imposed on all residents of Nigeria in 
respect of transactions in foreign currencies and securities 
which they may own or acquire, and in respect of payments 
which they may wish to make abroad. The nature of these 
obligations is as follows:
(a) It prohibits all payments outside Nigeria by 
residents of Nigeria except with prior Exchange 
Control approval.
(b) Certain foreign currencies have been declared 
"Specified Currencies" in which transactions 
must be effected through Authorised Dealers.
(c) Accounts of all non-residents of Nigeria are 
designated as non-operated as prescribed by law.
(d) Proceeds of goods exported from Nigeria are to 
be repatriated within three months.
(e) It prohibits compensation deals, i.e. the setting 
off transactions by means other than those pre­
scribed by law.
(f) It also prohibits all payments in respect of 
pools and betting arrangements.
The pattern of control is, however, not static. It 
continues to be revised to reflect the changing circumstances
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of the economy.
Impact of the Exchange Control Act 196 2 on the Economy 
In spite of the 196 2 Act the impact of the new 
regulation was not felt in the economy by the authorities 
because of the pressure on the reserve and because the 
authorised dealers lacked the necessary experience and the 
importers and general public could not adjust quickly to 
the new order. The Nigerian civil war, 1967-70, and the 
immediate post-war reconstruction programme raised the 
import bill to an unprecedented level; as a result foreign 
exchange earnings could not keep pace with the expenditure 
on war armaments and reconstruction hardware. The events 
of the early 1970s showed that the 1962 Act was grossly 
inadequate to deal effectively with the foreign exchange 
abuses of the time. The decade witnessed the promulgation 
of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, which caught 
most foreign nationals operating in the country offguard. 
Schedule 1 of the Decree exclusively reserved certain types 
of business enterprises to Nigerians and foreign operators 
were given a definite period within which they had to move 
to other lines of business. Most of the affected com­
panies were making excessively large profits; but, in 
order to pay less tax, they were in the habit of declaring 
a low turnover and therefore a low profit for the year.
How to transfer such undeclared profits then became a 
problem. In an effort to siphon such funds abroad, some 
of them resorted to various forms of exchange control 
malpractices.
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One may cite an item in the Nigerian Daily Times of 
Thursday 15th November, 1984, page 1 as an example:
"About N300 million was illegally trans­
ferred out of the country for a construction 
company - Soleh Boneh by a Swiss National, 
the Exchange Control (Anti-Sabotage) Tribunal 
heard yesterday.
It also heard that Nicholas Johannes, 
standing trial in a N7 million 'arrangee;'. 
deal with two others, also helped some 
other companies for the same illegal deal.
Testifying for the prosecution, a deputy 
commissioner of police, whose name was not 
disclosed, said he knew Johannes last March 
when he received an information that an 
expatriate had a large sum of money in 
foreign currency to sell for naira.
'I arranged to meet him at 46, Balogun 
Street, Lagos about 10 am on March 31, this 
year. He was introduced to me as Nicholas 
and I introduced myself as Ibrabim Isa, a 
businessman from Maiduguri.
'I told Johannes that I was enquiring 
about someone who has foreign currency to 
sell for naira and he immediately said he 
and his company - inter Swiss Trust of 
Zurich Switzerland - have large sums of 
dollars or any other foreign currency to 
sell for naira.
'When I asked how possible it was and 
the guarantee that I will get the money 
he said that it was a simple matter and 
that he had just concluded a similar 
business for Soleh Boneh Construction 
Company in Nigeria, where he successfully 
transferred N300 million and at that time, 
he was about to do another business worth 
N7 million using a bank at Ikoyi.
'He said he had reliable collaboration 
in a local bank in Nigeria.'"
Some unscrupulous Nigerians also joined in the foreign 
exchange malpractices for various other reasons.
The high level of liquidity circulating in the economy in 
the early '70s, fed the appetite of Nigerians generally 
for imported goods. The Government's monetization of its 
oil revenue further reinforced the already pent-up demand
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for imported goods. However, the re-activation of the 
war damaged economy continued to put strains on the balance 
of payments position. Nigeria therefore adopted a system 
of obligatory deferred payments system for various cate­
gories of imports. This in effect meant a discontinuation 
of the system of pre-payments for imports. On the other 
hand, some foriegn suppliers of items like made-to-wear 
dresses, books, professional articles, etc., insisted on 
full payment on order, or at least a substantial part as 
deposit. Local banks were unwilling to open Letters of 
Credit for these classes of importers as they were consi­
dered not credit-worthy. Some therefore connived with the 
exporters to inflate their invoices so as to use the 
excess as a buffer against future importation. Others 
resorted to other kinds of malpractice, so as to enable 
them to use the funds to supplement their annual basic 
travel allowance to purchase personal effects when visiting 
Europe. Affluent Nigerians following the pattern of 
"Conspicuous Consumption" bought themselves homes in 
Europe for their summer relaxation rather than stay in 
hotels. For these and other reasons, individuals resorted 
to various forms of exchange control malpractices which 
the 1962 Act was ill-equipped to deal with. There was a
consequent and drastic decline in the level of external
1 5reserves as the attached Table 29 vividly shows.
A basic shortcoming of the Exchange Control Act, 1962
15 Exchange Control - Government View, a lecture to
Management Staff of U.A.C. Nigeria Ltd. on 29 November 
1978, by S.D. Dambo, p. 7.
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Table 29
Nigeria's Level of External Reserves in Relation to Imports 
and Balance of Payments 1960-1979
•
Total 
External 
Reserves 
(N'Million) 
(a)
Average 
Monthly 
Imports 
(N'Million) 
(b)
Months 
Reserves 
Can Sustain 
(c)
Balance of 
Payments 
(N'Million) 
(d)
1960 343.3 35.1 9.3 - 138.6
1961 305.5 37.1 8 . 2 - 126 .2
1962 250 .6 33 .9 7.4 - 1 0 0 . 2
1963 195.4 34 .6 5.6 - 103.2
1964 193.5 42.3 4.6 - 184 .0
1965 197.1 45.8 4.3 - 127.4
1966 184 .6 42.7 4.3 - 118.4
1967 101 .2 37.3 2.7 - 166.0
1968 105.3 32.1 3.3 - 168.2
1969 114.6 41.5 2 . 8 - 108.6
1970 180.4 63.0 2.9 - 50.0
1971 302 .7 89 .9 3.4 . - 229.4
1972 270.6 82.3 3.3 - 322 .7
1973 438 .6 1 0 2 . 1 4.3 + 174 .4
1974 3,471 .6 144 .8 23.9 + 3,102.2
1975 3,702.6 309 .8 1 2 . 0 + 157.5
1976 3,482.5 427.7 8 . 1 - 339 .9
1977 3,040.0 608 .1 5.0 - 447 .0
1978 1 ,078 .5 654 .2 1 .6 - 1 ,382 .4
1979 3,150.0 493 .4 5.32 + 1 ,900 .0
Deficit 
+ Surplus
* Estimated
Source: C.B.N. Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts
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was that it failed to specify adequate penalties for 
infringements of the Act. Law not backed by force cannot 
be effective. As Hobbes has aptly expressed it in his 
"Leviathan" "Convenant without sword is but words, and of 
no effect in yeilding man". Therefore to make the enforce­
ment of the law effective, Government decided to promulgate 
the Exchange Control Anti-Sabotage Decree 1977 prescribing 
detailed legal rules as well as stiff deterrent penalties 
for those convicted of offences under the Decree.
Section 1 of the Decree spelt out the conditions under 
which a person may be convicted under the Decree. In the 
words of Section 1 -
"1(i) Any person who whether or not before the
commencement of this Decree but not earlier 
than 29th July, 1975 does any of the 
following, that is to say -
(a) without the permission of the appropriate 
authority -
(i) makes any payment to or for the credit of 
any persons resident outside Nigeria; or
(ii) makes any payment to or for the credit of 
any persons resident in Nigeria by order 
or on behalf of a person who is resident 
outside Nigeria;
(iii)makes any payment whatsoever in respect
of any loan, bank overdraft or other credit 
facilities outside Nigeria; or
(iv) places any sum to the credit of any person 
resident outside Nigeria.
(b) without the permission of the appropriate 
authority, and being a person resident in 
Nigeria, makes any payment outside Nigeria 
to or for the credit of a person resident 
outside Nigeria, or takes or accepts any 
loan, bank overdraft or other credit 
facilities... shall, nowithstanding anything 
to the contrary in any law, be guilty of
an offence under this Decree."
An important feature of the Decree is that even 
where a person may not have directly committed an offence
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under the Decree but has merely aided, abetted, counselled 
or procured someone to commit an offence under the Decree, 
this makes the person a party to the crime.
It will be pertinent to point out here that most of 
the offences created by the Decree are also provided for 
in Part 2 of the Exchange Control Act of 1962. The diffe­
rence between the 1962 Act and the Decree is mainly in the 
severity of the punishment provided for in the Decree and 
the determination to enforce the provisions of the Decree. 
While a person convicted under the Exchange Control Act of 
1962 is liable to no more than 3 m o n t h s 1 imprisonment or 
a fine, a convicted person under the Decree faced a minimum 
of 5 years imprisonment without the option of a fine. A 
convicted person will in addition pay a fine of an amount 
not less than the amount or value of the currency, secu­
rity payment, property or transaction in respect of which 
the offence was committed. A convicted corporate body 
will be liable to a fine of not less than five times the 
amount or value of the currency, security payment, property 
or transaction in r.espect of which t h e  offence was commit­
ted or a fine of N T 0 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 , whichever is higher.
It was noted above that the Exchange Control Anti- 
Sabotage Decree 1984 replaced the Exchange Control Anti- 
Sabotage Decree 1977 which was repealed on the eve of the 
handing-over of power by the Military to the civilian 
administration in September 1979. The 1984 Decree re­
enacted most of the provisions of the earlier Decree but 
providing for greater severity in punishment of convicted 
persons.
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Other Measures of Control
In spite of the stiff penalties provided in the 
Excahnge Control Anti-Sabotage Decree 1977 exchange control 
abuses and malpractices continued unabated. The excesses 
of importers took new turns. Foreign suppliers shipped 
to Nigeria old but reconditioned machinery and plants and 
goods of inferior quality. In some cases certain items 
were short-supplied while in others containers arriving 
in Nigeria arrived at the Ports empty or containing only 
sand and stone, and yet applications were made to pay for 
the "goods" they were supposed to carry. Some old and 
empty vessels were intentionally sunk at sea and inflated 
claims submitted for payment of goods said to be contained 
in them.
During this period the Federal Government Executive 
Council at its meeting on 19th May, 1976 appointed a Study 
Group on Buying Commission, of which the present writer 
then Deputy Exchange Controller of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria was a member to:
(i) examine the role of buying commission in inter­
national trade in all its forms and categories;
(ii) examine the existing rates of buying commission
on the various categories of Nigeria's Imports;
(iii) recommend rates of buying commision that are
payable according to categories of imports where 
necessary;
(iv) suggest areas, ways and means of eliminating or
reducing the payment of buying commission where 
necessary.
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The Study Group, at pages 30 and 31, reported, inter
a l i a :
"As a further check against the over­
invoicing of import bills we suggest that 
the General Superintendence Company should 
be employed for the general policing of 
our import trade. This Company which has 
its headquarters in G e n e v a , now acts in 
such a capacity for a number of countries, 
including Ghana. The Company should, for 
imports exceeding some specified value, 
say N50,000 be empowered to scrutinize 
f.o.b. prices, freight charges and buying 
commission (if any) to ensure that they are 
consistent with international competitive 
rates. The Company should also have to 
verify the quality of procured merchandise 
before they are shipped to Nigeria. Approval 
for payments of imports should be condi­
tional on a Clean Bill of Report from the 
General Superintendence Company, attesting 
to the quality of the imports and reason­
ableness of the price."
Arising from this, visits were paid to many European 
countries and to Ghana where the services of the Societe 
Generate de Surveillance S.A. of Geneva have been employed, 
in order to study the operation of the scheme. Pursuant 
to the study an appraisal of the findings was made which 
formed the basis of a Memorandum submitted by the present 
writer to the Central Bank and thence to the Federal 
Government on the subject-matter along with the Foreign 
Exchange Budget Proposals for the 1978/79 fiscal year.
Following the submission of this memorandum by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria to the Government in February 1978, 
entitled "Commodity-Price Intelligence: General Import 
Superintendence Scheme", a decision was taken and an 
announcement was accordingly made during the BudgetfSpeech 
on 1st April, 1978 to install such a scheme in Nigeria.
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In that speech, the former Head of State among other 
things made the following statement
"One of the measures to be taken to 
ensure adherence to this new budget is 
the introduction of Import Supervision 
before shipment. This is a scheme where­
by a competent company and reputable 
international institution will be retained 
by the Federal Military Government to 
examine all shipments of certain categories 
of goods destined for the Nigerian market 
before shipment from the countries of manu­
facture. The task of the company will be 
to confirm that the goods are in accordance 
with the specifications of the importer 
and that the prices being charged are 
reasonable and competitive."
The present writer and the Federal Ministry of Justice then 
drafted the Decree which was promulgated as Pre-shipment 
Inspection of Imports Decree No. 36, 1978. Under the Decree 
all imports into Nigeria after the 1st January, 1979 were 
subject to compulsory quality and quantity inspection and 
price comparison by the Societe Generale de Surveillance 
S.A. (SGS) before shipment was made.
Assessment of the Exchange Control System in Nigeria
Notwithstanding that the pre-shipment inspection 
scheme has helped to check the disorderly and reckless 
manner of importation of a wide range of luxury and non- 
essential goods and the deterrent effect is served, delay 
is inherently built into the system. The delay arises from 
the ineffective internal communication system and the 
massive land area of the country.
The Scheme failed also because of the highly publi­
cised allegation of bribery levelled against the SGS and
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some members of the defunct Nigerian National Parliament
who visited the SGS Geneva offices. The crude oil glut
was another debilitating factor in the failure of the
exchange control system.
Oil in the Nigerian economy is the major source of
Federal Government revenue constituting about 98% of
Nigeria's total export earnings. Federal Government oil
revenue rose sharply from N166.4m or 26.3% of total revenue
in 1970, to N510.2m or 43.5% in 1971. In quick succession,
it rose to N1 billion and N3.7 billion representing 60 and
82% of Federal revenue in 1973 and 1974 respectively.
With the exception of 1978, oil revenue increased rapidly
to a peak of N11 billion in 1980 and declined to N9.2 
1 6billion in 1981 and has steadily declined to N7.3 billion
in 1982. Foreign exchange receipts dropped by over N1
billion in 1982 to a total of N8.4 billion, while foreign
exchange payments were more than the receipts and stood at 
1 7
N8.7 billion. Coupled with the reported setback in the 
oil sector, non-oil sector export maintained a declining 
trend, while merchandise imports rose by leaps and bounds. 
Non-oil exports fell successively from N670.0 million in
1979 to a meagre N189.8 million in 1981. The end result 
was that total export earnings fell from N14.1 billion in
1980 to N10.5 billion in 1981. In the same period,
16 C.B.N. Annual Report, 1983, p. 8 6 .
17 Address by the Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria at 
the Quarterly Luncheon of the Industrial group of the 
Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry, on Thursday 
30th September, 1982.
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however, imports rose from N9.7 billion to N12.0 billion.
Thus the substantial over-all balance of payments surpluses
recorded in 1979 and 198 0 turned into a heavy deficit of
N3.0 billion in 1981. It is not surprising therefore that
the unfavourable developments in the Nigerian economy have
been dominated by the vicissitudes of the oil sector.
Cumulative public sector external loans commitments
including outstanding payments arrears were estimated at
N18.5 billion at the end of 1983. In 1983 also, public
debt service (i.e. repayment of principal and interest)
18rose to N 1 .3 billion. It is therefore evident that the 
mounting debt problems of the country have had a major 
impact on the Nigerian economy and on the ability of the 
Central Bank to manage the economy.
Other factors responsible for the ineffectiveness or 
failure of Exchange Control regulations and practices other 
than those enumerated earlier are:
1. As stated earlier, power of approval of exchange 
control applications is shared by the Federal 
Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank and the 
Authorised Dealers. Control over the activities 
of the Federal Ministry of Finance and the 1132 
branches of commercial banks has been an impos­
sible and cumbersome task. In the result, huge 
sums of foreign exchange are remitted through the 
system (e.g. by travellers' cheques) without the 
fore knowledge of the Central Bank.
18 C.B.N. Annual Report, 1983, p. 95.
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2. The activities of the Federal Ministry of Commerce 
are outside the control of the Central Bank on 
the question of the issue of licences for imports. 
In the same way Customs officials are not 
answerable to the Bank and the degree of corrup­
tion in that sector of the international trade 
has worried successive Nigerian governments. The 
police on their part cannot cope with reported 
cases of malpractices.
3. The exchange control system in Nigeria is over­
regulated. Apart from the enacted legislation 
and delegated regulations, circulars are issued 
in such quick successions, sometimes twice a day, 
so that the system involves keeping importers and 
bankers, investors and all involved in foreign 
trade in a state of confusion. Backdating of 
laws adds to the confused state of the law and 
scares off investors.
4. Nigerians have, after the civil war, appeared to 
lose confidence in their ability to live together 
as a nation. This has given rise to the flight 
of capital to Europe where Nigerians maintain 
huge bank accounts on which they can draw should 
the country get into ethnic troubles.
5. During the periods of civil rule, political 
manoeuvres and influence directed at bank autho­
rities and the Central Bank weighed heavily on 
them and led to mismanagement and misapplication 
of scarce foreign exchange.
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6 . Corruption in high and low places was rampant and 
its existence was acknowledged by everyone, 
including bank officials. Fraudulent sales of 
foreign exchange, particularly travellers' 
cheques, helped to reduce the pool of available 
foreign exchange.
7. Some aliens came to Nigeria to dig, as it were, 
the gold mine. They stopped at nothing to trans­
fer by hook or crook any available foreign 
exchange. Some aliens have been convicted for 
fraudulent exchange control practices and for 
transferring money illegally out of Nigeria. As 
in Kenya, some aliens make false declarations on 
export forms (Form NCD3 in Nigeria and CD3 in 
Kenya) , giving wrong addresses and so on and 
bribing bank clerks to withdraw the export forms. 
Before the end of the statutory period (90 days) 
for the return of the export proceeds some of the 
aliens often disappear and flee the country.
8 . In 1974 the scope of the Bank's functions widened
when it started to open letters of credit for
Federal Government agencies and parastatals. It
started with the opening of letters of credit for
cement which resulted in what was described as
1 9
the "Cement Armada". The Trendtex case and 
other cases in Europe and America against the 
Bank gave it a very poor image and cast doubts on
19 See Chapter 3, page 143.
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the ability of the Bank to honour credits and 
agreements.
9. The malpractices practised by importers, Nigerians 
and aliens considerably weakened the efficacy 
of the comprehensive Import Supervision Scheme.
The major malpractices were: 
a Vague description of goods in pro-forma invoices 
and Form M in the hope of obtaining exemption 
from pre-shipment inspection, 
b The use of words"spare parts" where in fact the 
imports consist of prohibited items of machinery 
- CKD equipment - SKD equipment, 
c Licence splitting with the aim of obtaining Forms 
M of a value below N 1 0.000 in order to avoid 
pre-shipment inspection, 
d The use of descriptions in all import documenta­
tion suggesting the purchase of Spare Parts or 
Raw Materials, but where the intention was to 
ship items of a completely different nature, 
banned from importation, or were prohibited 
luxury items. 
e Over-invoicing on transactions that have been 
exempted from pre-shipment inspection, 
f Forgeries of shipping documents and SGS Clean 
Reports of Findings, 
g The cumbersome systems of import licensing and 
the inefficiency and corruption of their admini­
stration have discouraged imports for long-term 
capital investment in industry and agriculture,
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in f a v o u r  of c o n s u m e r s '  g o o d s  a n d  m a t e r i a l s  for 
luixiury’ a n d  u n e s s e n t i a l  g o o d s .
S u g g e s t i o n s  as -to H o w  to I m p r o v e  the S y s t e m  of E x c h a n g e  
Cont r o l
F r o m  th e  f o r e g o i n g  it b e c o m e s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  
and o t h e r  p r e s s u r e s  o n  the s y s t e m  l e f t  the e c o n o m y  
depressed,, p r i c e s  of g o o d s  h a v e  sky-rocketed,, d o m e s t i c  
p r o d u c t i o n  h a s  s h r u n k e n ;  t h e r e  is i n c r e a s e d  u n e m p l o y m e n t  
a g g r a v a t e d  b y  m a s s  r e t r e n c h m e n t  of w o r k e r s  a n d  the c o n s c i o u s  
r e d u c t i o n  on th e  w o r k i n g  s t r e n g t h  of th e  p u b l i c  a n d  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r s . In r e t r o s p e c t  the (Governor o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  B a n k  
lamented t h a t :
" F r e q u e n t  r e c u r r e n c e  o f  d e p l e t i o n  in 
f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  a n d  the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of 
s t r i n g e n t  m e a s u r e s  c a n n o t  b e  d i s s o c i a t e d  
f r o m  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  a n d  h a p h a z a r d  d i s m a n t l i n g  
of such e c o n o m i c  m e a s u r e s .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  
th e  s t r u c t u r a l  shifts n e c e s s a r y  to mov e  
t h e  e c o n o m y  onto a p a t h  o f  sel f  s u s t a i n i n g  
g r o w t h  w e r e  n o t  a l l o w e d  t o  t a k e  place. T h e  
e n d  r e s u l t  is that we f i n d  o u r s e l v e s  in a 
v i c i o u s  c y c l e  of s t o p —go p o l i c i e s  a n d  the 
m u c h  t a l k e d  a b o u t  o b j e c t i v e  of e c o n o m i c  2 q
s e l f — r e l i a n c e  b e c o m e s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  e l u s i v e . "
I n  the face- o f  d w i n d l i n g  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r e s e r v e s ,  
huge outflows; a n d  r a p i d l y  f a l l i n g  i n f l o w s  a n d  th e  g l o o m y  
p r o s p e c t  of c r u d e  oil, th e  ove r  W5 b i l l i o n  k n o w n  m e r c h a n ­
dise i m p o r t  c o m m i t m e n t s  d e m o n s t r a t e  v i v i d l y  the c r i t i c a l  
s i t u a t i o n  w h i c h  t h e  e c o n o m y  i s  facing.. T h e  g l o o m y  e c o n o m i c
20 A d d r e s s  b y  t h e  G o v e r n o r  o f  the C e n t r a l  B a n k  of '.Nigeria, 
A l h a j i  A b d u l k a d i r  A h m e d  a t  the Q u a r t e r l y  M e e t i n g /  
L u n c h e o n  of the I n d u s t r i a l  G r o u p  o f  the Lago>s C h a m b e r  
of C o m m e r c e  a n d  I n d u s t r y ,  S e p t e m b e r  30), 1 982 , p>. 11.
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scene dictates that stringent measures must be taken to 
revamp the economy. One of such measures should be the 
judicious allocation of scarce foreign exchanges to areas of 
the economy that need it most. The foreign exchange plan 
employed in Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya should be adopted 
in Nigeria. Under the scheme, the plan determines the 
total amount of foreign exchange that can be spent on 
imports during a financial year. Applications for import 
licences are invited by the Central Bank from importers 
before the beginning of each half year. On receipt they 
are examined from various angles such as Governments' 
policies concerning industrialisation, protection to indi­
genous items competing with imports, avoidance of non­
standardised items and so on.
The following guidelines are followed by an inter- 
ministerial Committee which in Kenya, according to Mr. 
Wanjohi Muriithi, head of the Exchange Control Department 
comprises the Ministries of Industry, Finance, Planning and 
the Central Bank .*
(a) Licences for imports of goods the like of which 
are produced locally or which are capable of being 
easily manufactured locally are not ordinarily 
issued. Applicants have first to contact 
indigenous manufacturers and only if these or the 
Ministry of Industries confirm in writing that 
the goods are not available can they apply for
an import licence.
(b) Importation of used machinery equipment and 
spares whether reconditioned or not is ordinarily 
not allowed.
(c) Application for importation of goods which are 
confined to any parastatal institution have
to be submitted through the respective 
confinee.
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(d) Applicants wishing to import technical equipment 
and machinery for stocking and resale have first 
to ensure that they have the necessary servicing 
facilities and technical know-how for the after 
sales back-up of such equipment.
Generally, the Central Banks in East Africa consider 
applications for essential imports by traders with already 
established importing experience or records. In granting 
licences the Banks endeavour to ensure a satisfactory 
regional or geographical spread of importers.
After such examinations and scrutiny, the demand for 
import licences for each licensing period is consolidated 
according to the main categories of imports and considered 
in the light of the availability of foreign exchange by the 
Import Licensing Advisory Committees in these countries 
which make appropriate allocations for these categories. 
Those allocations are then sub-divided amongst the diffe­
rent importers according to such factors as size of
business, past performance, etc. Import licences are ordi-
21narily issued with initial validity period of 6 months. 
Government itself must impose on itself a number of auste­
rity measures to check the growth in public expenditure.
The measures proposed to put the economy on the right path 
leading to a glorious tomorrow have been outlined in 
Chapter 10.
21 Bank of Tanzania: Its Role and Functions, 1979, p. 76.
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CHAPTER 9 
GAPS IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
It has been generally observed that the activities of 
financial houses other than banks and of non-banking and 
non-financial institutions, have been expanding strikingly, 
and they have been collecting huge deposits from the 
public, sometimes offering attractive rates of interest 
without any sort of control or regulation by the central 
banks of their deposit acceptance and intermediation activi­
ties. Basically central banks and commercial banks provide 
short-term capital and no adequate provision is made for 
medium and long term-financing. This leaves the gap in 
the banking and financial system at its most critical point 
where it has the most serious implications for long-term 
economic growth. There is also a gap in the law.
In this chapter we shall attempt to determine the gaps 
that exist in the law and in the banking system so far as 
these institutions are concerned and to what extent this is 
significant for the economy. This review will entail an 
assessment of the performance of the financial institutions 
in question; it will be complemented by some suggestions 
for plugging the loopholes identified.
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The Roles of Development Banks and Non-Banking 
Institutions
The financial institutions variously referred to as 
financial intermediaries, financial institutions, non­
banking and non-financial institutions usually provide long 
term and medium-term finance for industry, commerce, 
agriculture and other developmental projects. They provide 
financial assets that will attract and meet the interests 
of savers, thereby inducing them to invest their savings. 
These institutions also help to stimulate their countries 1 
capital markets by selling or buying stocks and bonds. In 
their role as financial intermediaries, they help to faci­
litate the transfer of funds from surplus spending units 
to deficit spending units. In economies with an inadequate 
financial infrastructure (i.e. money market and securities 
for example), funds may remain sterile or are offered at 
excessive rates or at differentials that may ultimately 
lead to unfavourable or unproductive investment. The 
African Commonwealth countries have tried to encourage and 
capture national savings by establishing or licensing 
institutions that accept deposits from the public for 
investments which may conduce towards economic growth.
Non-Bank Financial Institutions in East Africa
Under section 2 of the Central Bank of Kenya Act, 1966 
the Central Bank may specify certain institutions as 
"specified financial institutions" falling under the regu­
latory provision of sections 39-4 3 of the Central Bank of
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Kenya Act, 1966. By Legal Notice No. 159 of July 27, 1971, 
the Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya specified the 
financial institutions set out below as "specified finan­
cial institutions" for the purposes of enabling it to 
pursue effective monetary policy over these institutions. 
Credit Finance Corporation Ltd 
Diamond Trust of Kenya Ltd 
East African Acceptances Ltd 
Grindlays International Finance (Kenya) Ltd 
Housing Finance Company of Kenya Ltd 
National Industrial Credit (E.A.) Ltd 
Savings and Loans Kenya Ltd 
Ismailia Corporation Ltd 
Kenya Commercial Finance Company Ltd 
Akiba and Finances Ltd 
All the institutions are licensed under the Banking 
Act, 1968, the same statute under which commercial banks 
are licensed in Kenya. Although they can accept deposits 
they are not allowed the use of cheques. From the funds 
deposited by the public in them, these institutitions are 
able to finance a range of credit requirements. For example, 
Savings and Loans Kenya Ltd specialises in mortgage lending 
for the purchase or erection of houses and office build­
ings. These financial intermediaries compete actively with 
commercial banks; they offer higher interest rates, and 
accounts are opened with as little as K£5 compared to 
KE15-25 with most commercial banks.
Data from the consolidated balance sheets of these 
institutions show that as at June 30, 1971, total assets/
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liabilities amounted to K£23.1 million, which was 10.7% 
of the total assets of commercial banks. Their private 
deposits in proportion to private time and savings deposits 
with commercial banks were 8% while their loans and 
advances were 14.4%. Private deposits with these institu­
tions as at June 30, 1971, accounted for 60% of their 
total assets compared to 33% for commercial banks (exclud­
ing current account deposits). Deposits, supplemented by 
issued capital and reserves, and a modest amount of loans 
and advances from the commercial banks, are the main 
sources of funds for these institutions.
The asset side of the consolidated balance sheets of
these institutions shows that loans and advances to private
enterprises and households amounted to KE13.9 million at
30 June, 1971. This represented 60% of total assets.
Deposits with commercial banks amounted to KE5.1 million or
1
22% of total assets.
Other important intermediaries in Kenya for mobilising 
long-term savings are Life insurance companies licensed 
under the Insurance Companies Act. Their importance lies 
in the fact that they have the ability to accumulate consi­
derable funds which are invested in credit instruments 
such as bonds and long-term loans.
Apart from these private sector intermediaries, there 
are also the following public sector institutions:- 
National Social Security Fund
1 Money and Banking in Kenya by the Central Bank of Kenya 
on the Occasion of the Official Opening of the New 
Headquarters, n.d., p. 23.
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Post Office Savings Bank 
The Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation 
Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation 
Development Finance Company of Kenya 
Kenya Tourist Development Corporation 
National Housing Corporation 
Housing Finance Company of Kenya 
Although sections 35-41 of the Central Bank of Kenya 
Act have provided a range of instruments to: prescribe the 
minimum holdings of liquid assets; regulate the rate of 
interest payable on deposits; control the volume, terms and 
conditions of credit; these statutory instruments are dead 
letters in the books. Since its establishment the Central 
Bank has resorted only once to its statutory powers to 
control the volume of credit extended by financial institu­
tions. During the first six months of 1971, credit 
extended by specified institutions expanded by 36.3%. 
Concurrently, there was an upsurge in credit extended by 
commercial banks to the private sector. The major portion 
of the increased credit by the financial system went to 
finance the importation of capital and consumer goods, which 
increased the import bill by more than 20% during the first 
half of 1971. As a result, there was a sharp decline in 
Kenya's overseas reserves.^
The Governor of the Bank, in exercise of the powers 
conferred by section 41(1) of the Central Bank of Kenya
2 Ibid, p . 25.
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Act, issued instructions on July 27, 1971, to all specified 
financial institutions restricting the volume of credit 
they might extend in future. The banking supervision
I
! services of the Bank did not cover the activities of these
! 3I financial intermediaries.
t
i In Tanzania, most voluntary savings are held in the
form of deposits with financial intermediaries. There are 
9 institutions besides the Bank of Tanzania, four of these 
being:
National Bank of Commerce 
People's Bank of Zanzibar 
Tanzania Housing Bank
; Post Office Savings Bank
These are in the public sector and account for the over­
whelming part of deposits collected. The other five are:- 
Diamond Jubilee Investment Trust 
Tanzania Rural Development Bank 
Tanzania Investment Bank
f
[ Tanganyika Development Finance Co. Ltd.
Karadha Company Ltd.
i
1 Besides those institutions there are:-
National Insurance Corporation 
National Provident Fund 
The last two institutions mobilise long-term savings 
through premium incomes and provident fund contributions.
3 Personal interviews with Mr. G.K. Kinyua, Financial
Controller and Mr. J.M. Kiama, Principal Bank Inspector 
of the Banking Supervision Department of the Central 
Bank of Kenya confirmed this statement.
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The appended Table shows the forms in which the savings 
are mobilised and the types of credit given by these 
institutions.
Tanzania today has a remarkably sound and efficient
credit system, well structured from the institutional point
of view, with good coverage and a high degree of functional
specialisation. But according to Clara Caselli, "the
result is not that the savings of the population are at all
thoroughly mobilized; on the contrary this multiplicity
leads to useless duplication of effort and waste of
resources. The whole system stands in need of rationali- 
4
sation." The Bank of Tanzania concurred when it said
that "there are several inadequacies in the present strucp.
5
ture of financial institutions in the country."
As in Kenya, these multifarious financial institutions 
mobilise a great deal of capital without adequate control 
and supervision by the Bank of Tanzania and in the case of 
Tanzania the Banking Supervision Directorate had 12 offi­
cials only in the unit at the time the present writer 
visited the Bank. Agreeing with this lapse, the Bank has 
said^
"Thus as regards savings mobilization 
while the commercial banks, the POSB and 
the THB between them accept all types of 
deposits? the first two have a good geo­
graphical spread of offices for the purpose,
4 Clara Caselli, The Banking System in Tanzania, 1975, 
op. cit., p . 323.
5 Bank of Tanzania, its Role and Functions, 1979, p. 84.
6 Ibid, pp. 84-85.
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there are no arrangements whereby the 
long term lending institutions like the 
TIB and the TRDB can mobilise the types 
of local.'• savings they need. The result 
is that these institutions are heavily 
dependent on the Government for local 
resources. Secondly, all the three devel­
opment banks are limited as regards 
geographical spread because of limitation 
of manpower and other resources. Thirdly, 
because of the restrictions of NBC to 
confine its operations to the provision 
of only short term credit to the produc­
tive and distributive sectors, it cannot 
step in the breach and take over the 
functions of providing medium or long term 
credit to those sectors which happen to be 
inadequately served by the development 
banks. All this means that a good deal 
of co-ordination is needed among these 
institutions if the financial structure 
is to serve the country's requirements of 
credit and exchange in an appropriate manner. 
And since the Bank has the overall respon­
sibility to promote the conditions necessary 
in this area, it has to take the lead in 
the matter and devise ways and means by 
which such inadequacies can be remedied."
In Zambia the striking feature of the non-banking 
financial institutions is the complete state monopolisation 
of this field of financing. There are 4 credit institutions 
v i z . the Development Bank of Zambia which was established 
in December 1972 to provide medium and long-term loans to 
finance industrial and agricultural projects; the Agricul­
tural Finance Company and the Industrial Finance Corporation 
which had the Rural Development Corporation as their 
holding company also provide seasonal, medium and long-term 
finance.
Other savings institutions include the Zambia National 
Building Society, the Zambia State Insurance Corporation 
(which took over 17 insurance companies with a fund of 
K47.6m as at the end of 1973) the National Savings and
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Credit Bank of Zambia. The fourth savings institution 
is the Zambia National Provident Fund, which has accumula­
ted financial assets amounting to K100 million, making it 
one of the two largest non-bank financial institutions in
Zambia. In 19 73, the Fund introduced funeral and maternity
7
grants and has started a home ownership scheme.
As in Kenya and Tanzania, the financial institutions 
are not directly and effectively controlled by the Bank of 
Zambia in the same way as commercial banks are supervised 
by the Banking Supervision arm of the Bank.
Nigerian Financial Houses
Before 1970 one development bank and two specialised 
banks were operating in Nigeria. These were the Nigerian 
Industrial Development Bank (NIDB), the Post Office Savings 
Bank (POSB) and the Nigerian Building Society (NBS). By 
the end of the decade, two other development banks, the 
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI), and the 
Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank (NACB), were 
set up in 1973. The establishment of these specialised 
financial institutions was aimed at filling existing credit 
gaps and to mobilise long-term finance for the development 
of the economy. The two specialised institutions, the Post 
Office Savings Bank and the Nigerian Building Society named 
earlier were transformed into the Federal Savings Bank and 
the Federal Mortgage Bank respectively.
Some of the financial institutions will now be
7 10 Years of Banking in Zambia, op. cit, p. 18.
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examined in greater detail to see how far they have been 
able to fill the gap of providing long-term capital 
necessary for development.
The Nigerian Industrial Development Bank
The Investment Company of Nigeria Limited otherwise 
called ICON, and established in 1953, with the approval of 
the World Bank, was reorganised in 1964 to form what is now 
known as the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB). 
NIDB started with an authorised capital of N10 million of 
which N4 million was issued and fully paid. In 1976, the 
Federal Government acquired 94.2% of the shares and in 
1977 the authorised share capital was increased to N4 0 
million.
The Bank according to its memorandum and Guides to 
Applicants has as its objective the primary concern of 
providing medium and long-term finance to enterprises in 
Nigeria which are privately owned and managed. In the 
First National Development Plan, 1962-1968, the Bank was 
expected t o :
"Join foreign skills and experience and 
foreign private capital with Nigerian 
skills and capital in the development of 
new industries and the expansion of existing 
o n e s ;
evaluate proposals on commercial principles 
but stand ready to finance enterprises which 
cannot get funds through regular commercial 
channels either because such channels do 
not exist or because the risks are deemed 
unattractive for private financing;
create attractive opportunities for invest­
ment in Nigerian savings;
and work closely with the various regional
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governments and regional development corporations. 
Although it would be concerned primarily with 
medium- and large-scale enterprises, it was expected 
to provide some facilities for smaller scale indus­
tries through other expanded credit institutions."
In addition to all these objectives, the Bank was to 
undertake promotional activities by assisting entrepreneurs 
to prepare well articulated projects and to find managerial 
and technical staff.
The Performance of NIDB
It is the view of Professor G.O j Nwankwo that the 
NIDB made a serious effort to live up to expectations, as 
can be seen from the attached Table, but it has been beset 
by a number of problems. One of these is that the forma­
tive years of the Bank coincided with the political crises 
in Nigeria and the resulting civil war followed by rehab­
ilitation and reconstruction of the battered economy. The 
other major problem that rendered the activities of the 
Bank ineffective related to its operational constraints.
It was prohibited from engaging in trade and commerce, and 
from financing small-scale business and financing govern­
ment projects. It could not advance loans that were below 
N20,000.00. With these operational constraints the Bank 
found it could not play any effective role in postwar 
reconstruction and development without a change in these 
restrictions
As a result of the poor performance of the NIDB, the
8 The Nigerian Financial System, op. cit, p. 104.
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Table 3 3 NIDB Ltd: Amount of Investments Approved (Nm.)
Year ,i;1 Foreign 
; Controlled
% Nigerian
Controlled
%
1965
1966
1967
1968 1 .4 t .35 96.4 .05 3.6
1969 4 .8 3.50 72.9 1 .30 27.1
1970 6.4 2 . 6 8 41 .9 3 .72 58.1
1971 11 .4 3.91 34 .3 7.49 65.7
1972 4.0 0.7 17.5 3.3 82.5
1973 17.80 4.10 23.0 13.70 77.0
1974 19.3 1 .5 7.8 17.8 92.2
1975 59.8 15.6 26.1 44 .2 73.9
1976 51 .4 0.7 1 .4 50.7 98.6
1977 74 .2 6 . 1 8 . 2 6 8 . 1 91 .8
Source: NIDB Ltd
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Industrial Enterprises Panel was appointed by the Federal 
Government to find the causes. The Panel was not happy 
that the Bank's loans of government funds to alien enter­
prises exceeded those to indigenous enterprises (see
9
attached table). The Panel went further to say that:
"Even if the low volume of NIDB sanctions 
and disbursements or its propensity to 
provide funds for alien enterprises were 
to be excused on grounds of absence of 
suitable projects in general and indigenous 
projects in particular, no excuse can be 
seen in the equally poor showing of the 
NIDB as regards projects promotion and 
development. Though authorised by its board 
on 18th March 1974 to promote suitable pro­
jects and often spoken about by its management, 
the Panel could not identify concrete results 
of NIDB's projects promotion effort. On 
the contrary, its style of management seems 
to have been to sit and wait for business 
to come, whereas the country's requirement 
and the NIDB's expected role was and still 
is for a dynamic development bank.
NIDB has thus not measured up to 
expectation in terms of overall impact.
:it will be necessary for it to play a 
completely new role. The desired new role 
should be that of a dynamic institution 
taking the initiative effectively to promote 
and finance new enterprises in strategic 
areas of the economy. However, as much as 
the new role of the NIDB is desirable and 
indeed mandatory the Panel is of the view 
that given existing organisational struc­
ture, management's lack of aggression in 
the past, its limited vision of what 
development banking-is all'about and the 
low level of performance and impact on the 
economy, the NIDB in its existing form 
cannot successfully undertake the new role 
expected of it without a complete 
reorganisation."
9 Federal Military Government's views on the Report of 
the Industrial Enterprises Panel, Federal Ministry of 
Information, 1976, p. 26.
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The gap of providing medium and long-term capital 
which NIDB was conceived to fill is thus as wide as ever. x
The Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry Ltd (NBCI)
The Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry was 
established by Decree No. 22 of 1973 to:
"Provide equity capital and funds by way 
of loans to indigenous persons, institu­
tions and organisations for medium and 
long-term investments in industry and 
commerce at such rates and upon such terms 
as may be determined by the Board in 
accordance with the policy directed by the 
Federal Executive C o u n c i l . " ^
Section 2(2) of the Decree further authorised the 
Bank t o :
(a) engage in all aspects of merchant banking, parti­
cularly, confirmation,of bills and financing 
obligation of third parties, and acceptance 
discounting of bills;
(b) underwrite such stocks, shares and debentures as 
are issued in furtherance of the policy of the 
Government;
(c) purchase and sell stocks and shares quoted on the 
Lagos Stock Exchange;
(d) provide guarantees, including guarantees in res­
pect of export credit and letters of credit 
issued by licensed banks;
(e) accept term deposits from the public, financial
10 Decree No. 22 of 1973 , s.2.
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institutions, trust funds, the Post Office and 
such other bodies as the Board may direct; and
(f) provide cheque facilities for its customers.
The intention of government was to close the gap 
created by the ineffective operations of the existing
I
financial institutions in Nigeria and to speed up the rate 
of economic development in the country. The government 
granted the Bank an authorised capital of N50m, N3 5m of 
which was fully paid up towards achieving this goal.
Appraisal of the Operations of the NBCI
One of the objectives of government in setting up the 
NBCI was to facilitate the provision of finance for the 
first phase of the indigenisation exercise. The Bank could 
not achieve this objective because it commenced business 
some six months before the end of the compliance period in 
1974 having been conceived in a hurry and established with­
out adequate ground work preparation as to what precisely 
the Bank's functions and policies would be. To finance 
indigenisation can hardly be a valid reason to establish a 
bank and a casual look at the National Development Plan 1970-74 
would show that the Bank was not mentioned anywhere.
The NBCI has been criticised for not being able to 
take any initiative towards providing services demanded by 
section 2 of the Decree. Thus Professor G.O. Nwankwo says:
"The real criticism is that having taken 
the initiative to identify the above 
deficiencies, management, in its attempt 
to 'carve out a place under the sun' for 
the NBCI, apparently copied carte blanche
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the operational policies and orientation 
of the only existing development bank in 
the country at the time - the Nigerian 
Industrial Development Bank Ltd(NIDB). A 
glance through the NBCI's Information Book** 
let and Guide to Applicants makes this 
abundantly clear.
Not only is it of the same design and 
content as the NIDB's Information Booklet 
and Guide to Applicants, but also most of 
the paragraphs and phrases are copied 
verbatim. A few illustrations will 
suffice ."11
In a way therefore the activities and functions of the 
NIDB we had earlier considered, have been duplicated in 
the NBCI. In accepting the fact of its ineffectiveness 
the NBCI argued in its memorandum to the Financial System 
Review Committee that: (Table 34 shows the poor perfomance)
"This period has been quite hectic and 
perhaps rather short for the company to 
put on stream several of its intended 
functions. Besides the usual teething 
problems, lack of office and operational 
space in Lagos was a major deterrent from 
accomplishing m o r e . " 1 2
One other criticism levelled against the Bank is that 
most of its investments is to finance government current 
spending instead of investing the idle funds in projects. 
This was the view expressed by a writer when he said:
"The NBCI invests its idle funds in short­
term, medium-term and long-term government 
and private sector securities. Treasury 
Bills and Treasury Certificates in its 
assets portfolio had a value of N11.7 
million in 1976 and N17.3 million in 1978.
11 The Nigerian Financial System, op. cit, p. 110.
12 Ibid, p. 111.
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The N B C I 's investments in shares for these 
years (1976 and 1978) and amounted to 
N1.5 million and N 8 . 8  million respectively. 
Nigerian Government Development Stocks also 
too N 7 .1 million of its resources in 1976 
and N6.0 million in 1978. However, one 
would have expected that the NBCI would 
have invested the bulk of these idle resources 
in some concrete projects in the economy, 
rather than simply helping to finance the 
Government's current s p e n d i n g . 3
The Federal Mortgage Bank
Another intermediary institution is the Federal 
Mortgage Bank which was established by Decree 7 of January 
20, 1977. It took over the functions of the Nigerian 
Building Society which was incorporated in December 1956 
and partly owned by the( Commonwealth Development Corporation 
and the Government of the Federation of Nigeria. Follow­
ing the dissolution of the Society the FBMN took over the 
assets and liabilities of the N B S . The authorised capital 
of the FMBN was at its establishment N20 million which was 
divided into 200,000 shares of N100 each. Under the Decree 
the Bank, among other things, has the following objectives:
1 . the provision of long-term credit facilities
to mortgage institutions in the country at such 
rates and upon such terms as may be determined by 
the Board in accordance with the policy directed 
by the Federal Executive Council...
2 . the provision of long-term credit facilities 
directly to Nigerian individuals at such rates
13 Ade T. Ojo, Banking and Finance in Nigeria, 1982, p. 
121 .
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and upon such terms as may be determined by the 
Board...
Performance of the Mortgage Bank
The Bank was beset with myriad problems that affected 
its efficiency. Like other development banks already 
considered, it had the problem of inadequate capital for 
its lending commitments. At the end of June 1979, for 
example, total offers made by the Bank, without funds to 
meet such offers was in the region of N4 00 million. In 
order to ameliorate the position the capital base was 
raised from N20m to N150 million. There was also lack of 
control in asset management, cash flows and accounting oper 
ations which severely affected the Bank's financial 
position. As a result mortgage loans to the tune of N6 
million were in arrears.
In addition to these problems there were other struc­
tural constraints. The Bank's offices were housed in five 
different locations, four of them hired, and each at least 
5 kilometres away from the head office. The result is 
that there is considerable inefficiency in communication
and transportation of files and documents and in some cases
14savings books get lost in transit.
The Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank
The other development bank in the banking system in
14 For problem and prospects of the Federal Mortgage Bank 
see The Bullion Central Bank of Nigeria, Vol. 5, No.
2, April-June 1980, p. 18.
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Nigeria is the Nigeria Agricultural and Co-operative Bank, 
established in 1973. Its main objective is "to enhance the 
level and quality of agricultural production, including 
horticulture, poultry farming, pig breeding, fisheries, 
forestry and timber production, animal husbandry and any 
other type of farming as well as storage, distribution and 
marketing connected with such production in the country".
Like the other development banks already dealt with 
the Agricultural Bank has the problems of inadequate capi­
tal base, disbursements falling short of total approvals of 
projects in all the years. The geographical spread of the 
bank is very narrow having only one branch in the whole 
country. It had acute managerial problems which led to a 
commission of enquiry into its affairs. Another reason for 
failure of the Bank is the requirement that peasant farmers 
should pay 25% of the project cost as owners' contribution. 
The attached tables show at a glance the poor performance 
of the Bank for the period 1974 to 1978 and G.D. Paton had 
a premonition of failure of such a bank when he said that 
"the fundamental prerequisite of such a bank - the avail­
ability of land, the title to which is clear and free of 
any restrictions - is conspicuous by its absence in Nigeria; 
that the complicated and ill-defined system of land tenure 
rules out an orthodox agricultural bank; and the consensus 
of opinion is that the economic position of the farmer is
good at present and there is no shortage of funds at low
1 5
rates of interest."
15 Reports on Banks and Banking in Nigeria, by G.D. Paton,l948. 
p a r a s . 1 0 - 1 1 .
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Table 35
N A C B : Commitments by Type of Client, August 1973 - May 19 77
Class No. of Amount Percentage Cumulative % of
Projects Committed of Total Disburse- Total
Corrmitment ment as at 
31/5/77
(M'0 0 0) (%) (N'000)
Companies 65 50,123 20 10,388 10
Individuals 58 40,220 16 29,953 28
State Agencies 25 99,027 39 42,301 39
Co-operatives 15 27,725 11 11,340 10
State-Owned
Companies 7 36,412 14 13,858 13
TOTAL 170 253,507 100 107,840 100
Source; The Bullion, Vol. 2, Nos. 3 & 4, July-Septerriber/October- 
December 1977, p. 29.
Table 36
NACB; Volume of Business by Type of Projects August 1973 - 
May 19 77
Type of Projects No. of Loan Amount Amount Disbursed
Projects
(N'000) % of (N'000) % of
total total
Poultry 52 5,670 2.2 2,878 2.7
Cattle 3 3,663 1.4 568 0.5
Piggery 4 717 0.3 469 0.4
Fisheries 8 41,209 16.3 31,369 29.1
Tree Crops 16 33,531 13.2 9,691 9.0
Arable Crops 44 61,028 24.1 18,329 17.0
Marketing 16 65,666 25.9 36,055 33.4
Integrated Projects 4 14,377 5.7 3,608 3.3
Mixed Fanning 11 4,281 1.7 2,351 2.2
Agro-Allied 2 11,702 4.6 - -
Forestry 1 3,224 1.3 630 0.6
Mixed Crops 6 6,894 2.7 858 0.8
Others 3 1,545 0.6 1,035 1.0
TOTAL 170 253,507 100.0 107,841 100.0
Source; The Bullion, Vol. 2, Nos. 3 % 4, July-September/October- 
Deceirber 1977, p. 29.
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Table 37
NACB - Operations 1974-1979
Sanctions: Disbursements Sanctions:
Year No. of Projects Cost of Projects
(N'000) (N'000)
1974 38 7,729 32,431
1975 52 31,447 62,329
1976 67 71,974 150,615
1977 66 40,500 162,800
1978 7 52,500 20,500
I
| Note: All operations have been with indigenous persons
and enterprises.
Source: NACB, Kaduna.
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Causes of Ineffectiveness of Development Banks
The causes of failure or ineffectiveness of the 
development banks have been identified:
1. The low level of the activities of the development
banks can be attributed to the low level of their
funding (under-capitalisation) and their failure
to "perform a major aspect of their expected
banking function, namely, the mobilisation of
1 6financial resources."
2. The poor performance of the banks can also be 
attributed to the general suitable manpower short­
age in the economies. This problem affects not 
only the banks but also the proprietors of the 
businesses.
3. For efficient performance of their functions i 
banks need a reliable supply of water, transport, 
telecommunication system, electricity and good 
roads. These basic infrastructural facilities 
are not in adequate supply in the countries 
surveyed.
4. Failure of central banks to supervise these banks 
as they do with respect to commercial banks is 
critical to the success of these intermediaries. 
The failure is more regrettable in Kenya and 
Tanzania, where the organic laws provide in 
sections 39-42 of Kenya Central Bank Act and 
sections 47-52 of the Bank of Tanzania
16 Banking and Finance in Nigeria, op. cit, p. 122.
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Act 1965, for supervision of specified financial 
institutions.
5. The attitude of customers of the banks is rather 
cavalier towards the liquidation of loans granted. 
There is a poor repayment record. Tying up 
financial resources further limits the ability
of the banks to venture into new projects or 
assist more clients.
6 . Most of the idle resources of the banks are 
invested in governments' current spending instead 
of on concrete viable projects.
The function of the banks is essentially to provide 
medium and long-term funds which the Central Banks and the 
commercial banks could not provide. A vital way in which 
the central banks can influence the course and pace of 
development of the African Commonwealth economies is by the 
promotion of the establishment of the development banks, 
mobilising and channelling savings into productive invest­
ments. The same arguments hold for insurance companies 
which have enormous capital, as in the attached Table. It 
is not enough for central banks to control the development 
banks through participation in the equity base of the banks 
or outright nationalisation as in Zambia; more conscious 
efforts should be made to inspect and supervise them. It 
is the apparent lack of adequate control and the existence 
of the above named factors that have given rise to;
(a) gaps in the supply of medium and long-term finan­
ces necessary for economic development in the 
countries;
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Table 38
Net Premiums Written by Nigerian Insurance Companies 
(1960-73) (thousand Naira)
I
i
Life Non-Life Total
Year Amount % of 
Total
Amount % of 
Total
Grand
Total
1960 614 8.71 6438 91 .29 7052
1961 964 11 .5 7418 8 8 .5 8382
1962 1276 13.87 7924 86.13 9200
1963 1970 19.89 7936 80.11 9906
1964 3284 25.54 9574 74 .46 12858
1965 3764 28.66 9368 71 .34 13132
1966 6642 40.03 9952 59.97 16594
1967 4866 36.04 8634 63.96 13500
1968 4262 37.16 7108 62.84 11470
1969 5300 39.90 7982 60.10 13282
1970 5646 33.97 10622 6 6 .03 16086
1971 10956 41 .04 15742 58.96 26698
1972 9935 29.12 24186 70.88 34121
1973 17311 38.70 27418 61 .30 44729
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(b) gap in the mobilisation process of idle funds in 
the hands of the public;
(c) gap in the law which has multiplied the effect 
of (a) and (b), and rendered the central banks 
(e.g. the Central Bank of Nigeria) impotent to 
take statutory steps to supervise the 
intermediaries.
As we have said elsewhere where there is a will a dynamic 
central bank can invoke the ancillary clauses in the organic 
law to promote economic growth. In the instant case the 
Central Bank of Nigeria could invoke section 39 of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958 and section 41 (1) (d) of 
the Banking Act 1969 to supervise the financial inter­
mediaries in order to achieve ordered progressive economic 
growth. Although the Kenya Act provides for such control 
there was in fact only one occasion that the Central Bank 
applied the provisions of section 41 of the Act to give 
directives to the intermediaries. In Tanzania the inter­
mediaries, in spite of the provisions of sections 48-52 of 
the Act do not come under the umbrella of the Banking 
Supervision Department. When interviewed by the present 
writer, Mr. Francis Mlozi, Head of the Banking Supervision
(r
Department and twice a fellow coursant at the Bank of 
England, confirmed this and regretted the inability of 
most central banks to inspect financial intermediaries.
Other Non-Bank Non-Financial Houses
Apart from the financial houses considered in the 
previous paragraphs, there are various other institutions
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that are deposit-taking and between them hold substantial 
amounts of funds. The political regime in Nigeria 
allowed the political parties to receive donations from 
persons and institutions. In a capitalist country like 
Nigeria, individuals and companies use the avenue of dona­
tions and gifts to political parties to gain favour with 
the political parties and the governments they control. In 
this way, they can win contracts worth millions of naira.
It is also usually a condition of such awards of contract 
that between 10 and 2 0 per cent of the value of the contract 
should be paid into the political party funds. Such a huge 
accumulation of capital in the developing countries is used 
to bribe the electorate and enrich party hacks. In one
instance, it was reported that the Lagos State Government
gave N 1 4,691,000 to the Unity Party of Nigeria. The report 
said t h a t : ^
"Under the heading in respect of Lagos 
State, Chief Awolowo said that 'Donations
paid to the Party by the Lagos State Branch
of the Party, from 4 January to 2 September,
1983 - N14 ,691 ,000'. The leader of the 
banned UPN also listed the donations received 
from the other branches... General Buhari 
said that he was not aware of any law in 
Nigeria which allowed politicians to siphon 
public funds to run their parties."
Although there is no record to show the amount of 
money in party coffers and using the example of Lagos as a 
standard, the political parties must have had between 
themselves over a billion naira of idle funds (i.e. at N15m 
a year for each of the 19 States for 4 ye a r s ) . As General 
Buhari has remarked, public funds should not be spent that
17 Sunday Concord, February 19, 1984, p. 1.
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way and if parties must do so then there should be some 
measure of control and directives given as to how such 
funds should be invested in the money market. In such 
cases the Central Bank can only give advice because such 
idle funds cause disequilibrium in the economy.
Apart from party funds there are also large sums in 
the chests of Hire Purchase Houses, Provident Funds and 
so on.
1 8In Chapter 2 it was stated that traditional finan­
cial institutions perform functions which are similar to 
those performed by modern banks and financial institutions. 
They accept deposits and give credit and do provide long­
term finance for development as well.
The most prominent and popular traditional financial 
institutions are Isusu, town unions, social clubs, women's 
societies, Igbe Oha (community chest), age-grade societies, 
or associations and local money lenders. Each is primarily 
concerned with matters of loans, savings, and mutual aid 
for the benefit of the group or the community. They aim 
to provide the necessary funds for marriage ceremonies, 
building community halls, building a home, buying a sewing 
machine or a bicycle, for money lending, for condolence 
purse to dependents of a deceased member. Such societies, 
such as the DIBUGO Club, the IBUSA PREMIER CLUB Nigeria, the 
PEOPLE'S CLUB and AKADUCHIEME Club, build houses for the 
deceased member if he dies without owning a house and in 
addition give to the dependents lump sums of money to the 
tune of N 1 0,000 or more after burial expenses. Most
18 Above, page 91.
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people-in Southern Nigeria therefore prefer joining social 
clubs to taking out life assurance policies.
Although there is no record of the total amount of 
money which these societies collect from their members and 
hoard, it is common knowledge that millions of naira are 
collected every week and these enormous sums revolve among 
the members.
There are no written laws or rules that guide the 
operation of the traditional financial institutions, nor do 
the provisions of the Banking Act cover their operations. 
They have no accounting system, nor experience of modern 
investing techniques. The result therefore is that the 
absence of legislation has made it impossible to harmonise 
their functions and control their activities.
Because of the existing gap in the banking laws, the 
enormous capital that is in the traditional financial 
system cannot be harnessed and channelled to priority areas 
in the economy. The failure of the Central Bank to do this 
is critical to the operations and success of the rural 
banking scheme and conversely the absence of banking 
facilities for the rural people will continue to encourage 
the proliferation of the traditional financial institutions. 
The Central Bank should establish a pilot scheme of mobile 
savings banks to enable rural people to deposit their 
savings into the national financial "grid". The inclusion 
of the traditional thrift system in the national "grid" 
should be by way of recognising the institutions as finan­
cial institutions and or organising them into co-operatives 
and to be subject to inspection and supervision by the
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Central Bank in order to achieve economic growth.
18We conclude with J.K. Onoh that:
"Non-bank financial institutions include 
insurance companies, hire-purchase companies, 
savings and loans companies, development 
finance companies, mutual funds, etc. In 
the past it was wrongly believed that the 
commercial banks alone were responsible 
for the excess liquidity of some economies. 
Excess liquidity breeds inflation. The 
Radcliffe Report of 1959 has revealed the 
possibility of monetary disturbances from 
sources other than the commercial banks. 
Empirical studies of the United States 
economy also confirm that non-bank financial 
institutions can contribute to excess 
liquidity.
Non-bank financial institutions can cause 
monetary disturbances with the funds at 
their disposal through their lending or 
investment patterns, especially when such 
funds are large. Insurance companies, 
development finance companies, hire-purchase 
companies, and a number of other financial 
institutions, are now under the control of 
the central bank in many countries. The aim 
is to ensure that they invest their funds 
properly and that their lending practices 
do not run counter to general economic 
objectives. Monetary authorities have 
devised means for controlling the invest­
ment activities, maturity pattern and 
composition of investments of non-bank 
financial institutions. For example, the 
lending rates of non-bank financial 
institutions have been harmonised in some 
countries with those of commercial banks 
to ensure that the economy is not destabi­
lised through excessive lendings."
Central Banking in a Military Regime
When the British Prime Minister Mr. Macmillan prophe­
tically announced in 196 0 that "the wind of change" was 
sweeping over the continent of Africa, he was saying that
18 Money and Banking in A frica, op. cit, pp. 179-180.
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most African states would gain political independence 
during the decade. Indeed, from the Table in Chapter 2 
page 57 over 42 countries attained political independence 
between 1960 and 1970. Political independence was then 
thought to bring hopes and progress and economic growth to 
the new nations, but regrettably the "wind of change" has 
blown in a wrong direction accompanied by sufferings 
resulting from political and economic malaise on an unpre­
cedented scale. In 1984 African countries are saddled 
with foreign debts of over h 160 billion, and they have 
nothing by way of sufficient food, good shelter, good health 
care, good roads and other infrastructural facilities to 
show for these heavy external debts.
At independence the African countries particularly the 
Commonwealth countries chose democracy as their form of 
government and, in particular, the Westminster model.
Things have fallen apart so much that within the past 25 
years or so when the wind of change started to blow more 
than 70 leaders in 29 countries have been deposed by assass­
ination, purges or coups. The Table below shows the 
distribution of military, one-party and multi-party states 
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Types of Governments in Sub-Sahara Africa Table 39
Military___________ One-Party State____ Multi-Party State
Burundi Angola Botswana
Central Africa Benin Republic Gambia
Republic
Chad Cameroon Lesotho (in practice
one party)
Equatorial Guinea
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Military__________
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau 
Liberia
Madagascar
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Somalia
Sudan
Togo
Upper Volta 
18
Source: Time Maga 
1984 .
One-Party State 
Congo 
Dj ibouti
Gabon
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Malawi 
Mali
Mozambique 
Sierra Leone 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Zaire 
Zambia 
16
ine - International
Multi-Party State
Senegal
South Africa
Uganda (de facto 
one party)
Zimbabwe (trying to 
be one party)
7
Edition January 16,
The degree of military intervention is an indication 
of the level of economic growth in Africa. In Europe and 
America and other developed countries military interventions 
in government are unheard of and unthinkable.
The intervention of the military is only an indication 
of the extent by which democracy has failed to thrive in 
Africa. The claim of the military is usually that they 
intervene in order to save an African country from economic 
suicide and also to stop rapes on democracies. It is
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often alleged by each military junta that they are pro­
voked to take over governments because of the failure of 
the successive leaders and political parties to practise 
democracy and rule fairly and justly. As one top military 
officer after criticising the government they toppled 
accused it of being inept and corrupt said:
"I and my colleagues in the armed forces 
have, in the discharge of our national 
role as the promoters and protectors of 
our national interest, decided to effect 
a change of leadership of the government 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to form 
a Federal Military Government."^
The question poses itself, since the politicians and the 
military are products of the same culture will the perfor­
mance of the military in government be any better? They 
are not insulated from the vices and malpractices of
citizens of their countries and they are not endowed with
special skills or techniques or expertise which in any 
case are in short supply in the larger society in which they 
live. On the question as to whether the military is a 
virtuous institution capable of leading their countrymen 
along the paths of economic growth, Mr. Olatunde Odetola 
in his book, Military Regime and Development arrived at the 
following conclusions: ^
"that there is a low level of profes­
sionalism in the armies of many African
nations,
that the assumed puritanical orientation 
of the military is called into question 
by evidence of corruption and indiscipline
19 Sunday Times, January 1, 1984, p. 1.
20 The Nigerian Guardian, November 28, 1984, p. 13.
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found in the military organisation itself,
that the military organisation in Africa 
has not in general been able to sustain 
the initial enthusiasm with which it came 
to power,
that while the military has taken some dras­
tic steps to correct the ills of the society 
in Africa, such steps are lightly moralistic 
and fragmented and do not add up to a real 
effort to discipline the society,
that military nationalism cannot be divorced 
from military corporate interest,
that the economic performance of the military 
has worked from country to country due to 
varying manner in which the national bour­
geoisie has been brought into the process 
of development,
that the military has probably recorded 
greater success in their performance in the 
political sector than in the economic sector, 
and
that the military has been as benevolent 
in specific instances as have been the 
civilian politicians."
That democracy in Nigeria has been deposed in favour 
of military dictatorship is not a surprise given the poor 
performance of the economy and the manipulations and 
manoeuvres of political parties during the civil regime of 
1979-1983. The central role that money, corruption and 
contractorship came to play in the operation of the Nigerian 
political system led Alhaji Balarabe Musa in a statement 
on June 29, 1982 to describe the situation as one in 
which:
"instead of a democracy in which you have 
in operation, government for the people, 
by the people, and of the people; you have 
a contractors, by contractors and of con­
tractors. Politics is being reduced to a 
fight between one gang of greedy tycoons, 
each backed by their foreign business masters, 
and others; and each waving some tribal, or 
sectional, banner to confuse and divide our 
people."
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Further, a Ministerial Committee on the causes of 
the Excessively High Cost of Government Contracts for Works 
and Services in Nigeria reported in July 1980 "that the 
costs of government projects given to contractors are 200
per cent higher in Nigeria than in Kenya and 130 per cent
21 22 higher than in Algeria, at that time". A writer
illustrating the extent of damage this has caused to the
economy said:
"let us take seven contracts awarded by 
four state governments since 1982, all 
of which went to British construction 
companies. These are:
1 Alfred McAlpine - N65m, hospitals, clinics, 
a medical school and boreholes in Plateau 
State.
2 Balfour Beatty Construction N45m, Balanga 
Dam and irrigation project in Bauchi 
State.
3 Hispanic Construction N70m, Roads in Bendel 
State.
4 Costain Limited N120m, Water supply and 
irrigation in Oyo State.
5 Lilley Construction N52m, Water supply in 
Plateau State.
6 Balfour Beatty Construction N51m, A modern 
market in Bauchi State.
7 Biwater Group N151m, Water supply in Kwara 
State.
The total is N4 39 million,"
and concluded that these seven contracts have involved 
inflation of costs amounting to about N250 million over 
Algeria, another major oil and gas exporter.
Speaking of such manipulation, the Academic Staff
21 New Nigerian, February 1, 1984, p. 3.
22 Ibid, Bala Musa.
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Union of Nigerian Universities (ASUU) meeting at the 
University of Nigeria Nsukka on 15th and 16th August, 1984 
said inter alia:
"ASUU submits that the crisis that has 
overtaken Nigeria, resulting in the retrench­
ment of hundreds of thousands of workers 
and in other so-called austerity measures 
is not simply a crisis of mismanagement 
petroleum glut or stealing on the part of 
a few people, very important as these factors 
are in creating the crisis. In short, we 
are in a great capitalist depression. A 
great capitalist depression, such as that 
which occurred in the early 1930s, and is 
for the umpteenth time repeating itself 
now, brings untold suffering to millions 
of people.
Discussions at the Conference on the 
State of the Nigerian Economy organised 
by our Union at Benin from 9th to 13 April 
this year showed quite clearly that the 
suffering of the country arises from the 
capitalistic and parasitic pattern of 
development chosen for the country by its 
own bourgeois elite and their imperialist 
allies.
Beyond any shadow of doubt we are running 
an economy that is parasitic, contradictory 
and unjust in all its facets: the capitalist 
employer exploits the worker to get rich, 
landlords exploit tenants to get rich, money 
lenders exploit the needy to get rich, 
monopolies and big contractors destroy small 
businessmen to grow richer, traders of all 
types hoard goods and collude against poor 
consumers to get rich and expatriates exploit 
Nigerian workers and ally with indigenous 
capitalists to cheat the government and the 
country in order to expand their financial 
empires. Hence no one can once and for all 
solve the problems of inflation, recurrent 
depressions, endemic poverty, and unemployn 
ment, stealing, kick-backs etc. within such 
an economy. Therefore the question before 
the Nigerian people, but especially patriots, 
whatever their profession or calling, is 
whether we can afford to retain a system 
which according to its very mode of working, 
which includes in-built stealing, fraud 
and graft, must, of necessity, subject 
millions of people to indescribable suffer­
ing. Nigerian academicians, by and large, 
have pointed out how the underdevelopment
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of the country arises from capitalist 
colonialist and neo-colonialist exploita­
tion of the last one hundred years.
Philosophically minded Nigerians, including 
academicians, have pointed out that we should 
not take-over from Europe a civilisation 
in which the acquisition of money is every­
thing and the man sent to you is n o t h i n g . "23
The military in Nigeria in attacking and finding 
solutions to the depressed economy and those who plundered 
and pillaged the economy employed the means familiar to 
them namely, decrees, detentions and corrective actions 
with military precision, assaulting the rule of law in the 
process. Decrees and edicts were promulgated without 
consultations, and some times back-dated with retrospective 
effect. One of such laws is the Exchange Control Anti- 
Sabotage Decree 1984 which is a source of Central Bank law 
under which Nigerians and aliens have been sentenced to 
various prison terms. Some of the Tribunals set up were 
headed by soldiers not versed in the law. Nigerian lawyers 
have refused under the circumstances to appear in what 
they called kangaroo courts and at the "emergency General 
Conference held in Lagos on the 5th of May, 1984, and 
which was widely publicised passed a resolution urging mem­
bers not to be involved in the secret trials under Decree 
No. 3 of 1 984 ".24
Whether a military dictatorship is better than a 
civilian government that attempted to impeach chief judges
23 National Concord, September 5, 1984, p. 7.
24 Presidential Welcome Address by the President of the 
Nigerian Bar Association, A.N. Anyamene, S.A.N. to the 
Annual Conference held in Lagos o n NAugust 27, 1984, p. 5.
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is a matter of opinion as the Chief Justice of Lagos State 
tried to put it when he said in a paper he presented on 
"An Independent Judiciary under a Military Government" at 
the Annual Bar Conference on 29th August, 1984 in Lagos:
"The paper which I shall read is substan­
tially a reproduction of another paper I 
had read on the 22nd February, 19 79 on the 
theme 'Independence of the Judiciary in 
Nigeria' to the 8th General Assembly of the 
Magistrates Association of Nigeria held 
at Ibadan. The circumstances were quite 
similar to the circumstances in which we 
are gathered together today. At that time 
we were watching the end of a thirteen year 
old military regime and we were looking 
forward with great hope, to the advent and 
return of a civilian government. In the 
paper I had read then I was expressing 
thoughts such as the military in enacting 
their decrees consulted no member of the 
public but that under an Executive Presidential 
system of Government, Bills would be pub­
lished in the papers and the Public would 
have an advantage of reading them and could 
express themselves on these bills and even 
lobby legislators on them. But we now 
know better. We had watched with great 
dismay the impeachment proceedings. They 
even threatened to remove Chief Judges by 
impeachment. In that spirit I want to give 
my address."2 5
The role of the Central Bank should be to take advan­
tage of the speed with which the military works to solve 
most of the problems and shortcomings besetting the economy 
and identified in this thesis. In the four years of the 
past civilian regime, the Parliament passed a total of 34 
laws during its first term of 4 years in office. The 
military regime, on the other hand, promulgated 31 decrees
2 5 At pp. 1-2 of the Introductory Part by Justice J.A. 
Adefarasin.
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between 31 December, 1983 and 31 December, 1984 , that is 
after only one year in office. However, it is not the 
same thing as saying that the flurry and tempo of legisla­
tion which has characterised the first year in office will 
be maintained in the future. The notion that the turn-over 
of enactments of a government is necessarily an index of 
its performance is fallacious. There are of course other 
considerations and criteria, for example, how good, 
appropriate or necessary have the enactments been, and 
how well have the authorities been able to administer them. 
A central .bank should therefore initiate reviews of its 
organic laws and the subsidiary legislation to remove 
clogs and fill lacunaft in the law so that law will properly 
be a vehicle for reformation of the banking and financial 
system.
As delay is not conducive to effective monetary man­
agement, the Central Bank should use the opportunity of 
the presence of the military regime, which can ■
potentially act with speed, to find solutions
to those problems which the politicians could not tackle
because of political and vested interests.
In order to provide a good climate for foreign invest­
ment, it is essential that there be political stability and 
rule of law.
The people generally do not object to military inter­
ventions, so long as they are only shock therapies. So it 
will not be misplaced enthusiasm for the Central Bank to 
advise the military that where incursion has to be made at 
all, it has to be exactly interventionist, brisk and short-*
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lived. Entrepreneurs, both domestic and foreign, can 
participate in the economic development and growth of 
a country with confidence, if there is an environment of 
political stability. A military inter-regnum should 
ideally not last longer than the life of a Parliament.
The question of political appointments of governors 
and directors to the board of the Central Bank without 
regard to functional qualifications should be corrected 
and the law amended accordingly. Indeed all the reforms 
proposed in Chapter 10 hereof can be implemented by the 
Central Bank during the military rule.
As bankers and advisers to the government the Central 
Bank should take the opportunity of military rule to 
render incessant consistent advice as to how effective econ­
omic growth can be achieved. The experience with the 
military in Nigeria is that they are always willing to con­
sider proposals presented to them. The following encounter 
with one of the military rulers shows the extent to which 
they can not only listen to advice but also put proposals 
into action:
"Traditional medicine (otherwise known as 
'juju' or magic) may be used in Ogun State 
to stop insects and other dangerous bugs 
from attacking crops and other agricultural 
products.
Governor Oladipo Diya of Ogun State, who 
revealed this to the Daily Times in Abeokuta 
yesterday, said that government was consult­
ing a man who had prepared native 'juju' 
that had scared insects and other dangerous 
insects away from a farm he the governor had 
personally visited.
According to Brigadier Diya, reports 
reaching him proved that the elderly man was 
effective.
An expatriate in charge of the farm where
521
the native juju was tested had also testi­
fied to its effectiveness, he said.
Still confirming his belief in the local 
'juju' Brigadier Diya said: 'This has been 
tested in the presence of people, I have 
asked questions and people have told me that 
the medicine was responsible.'
The governor said that he had asked the 
Commissioner for Agriculture to invite the 
elderly 'juju' man for more discussions on 
the subject.
Such discussions, the governor told the 
Daily Times might provoke some other ideas 
that could assist government efforts to 
boost food production and vital agricultural 
products in the state.
Brigadier Diya was of the opinion that such 
adventure could complement government's 
efforts to boost agricultural production.
What was left after such a thing had been 
detected, the governor said was for our 
scientists to research into and develop it."26
Proposals can be made to government on the following 
matters:
Population Explosion and the effect on the 
economy
Birth Control
Health Care
Government Expenditure - the pumping of too much 
money into economy
Salary Increases and price policy
Over Reliance on oil as a source of foreign 
exchange earning
Promotion of Exports
Provision of basic infrastructural facilities to 
all parts of the country
Total commitment to Agricultural production 
The rule of law
2 6 Nigerian Daily Times, November 30, 1984, p. 1. Juju
can be in the form of a ring or powder or other concoc­
tion. In this case the juju must have been tied to a 
stick at the entrance of the farm or buried.
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At first sight it would look odd to suggest that a 
Central Bank should offer advice on such areas as the rule 
of law or population growth. When General Buhari came to 
power in Nigeria in 198 3 he told the world that he would 
not countenance the meddling of lawyers in the country.
This statement, probably made innocently and with the best 
of intentions, sent ripples across the world, particularly 
in the Commonwealth countries. We have argued above that 
where the law in a society is uncertain and unpredictable 
and changes with immediate effect and retrospectively, 
investors will be deterred from investing in such a country. 
Similarly, we have argued in Chapter 10 that the population 
explosion destabilises and distorts economic growth. In 
this situation the role of the Central Bank in a military 
regime must be to advise and counsel the military authori­
ties on these matters even if they do not want to listen. 
Constant and persistent dialogue with them will certainly 
produce favourable results for as stated earlier, the 
military seem disposed to listen even to unusual suggestions. 
To further make their points the Central Bank should 
cultivate the habit of putting down their thoughts and 
proposals in writing in the form of memoranda. A memoran­
dum containing well-argued points backed by statistics and 
data will not fail to make its mark. The Bank should also 
cash in on the speed and precision with which the Army 
carry out their operations and assignments. If these steps 
are taken, the Central Bank should be able to carry out 
most of the reforms recommended in the next chapter and 
in the result be properly placed in the path for economic
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recovery and growth for the progress and prosperity of 
the citizens of Nigeria today and for generations yet 
unborn.
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CHAPTER 10
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDED REFORMS
Part I of this final chapter attempts to give a summary 
of the findings in the preceding chapters. Part 2 looks 
at the purpose of the thesis which is to investigate the 
following questions:-
1. What is the need, if any, for a central bank in 
the selected countries (Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania 
and Zambia)?
2. If there is a need for a Central Bank, should it 
be a part of government, or an autonomous 
institution independent of Government?
3. A Central Bank has a fundamental role in colla­
boration with other financial institutions. Is 
co-operation with the financial institutions 
necessary?
4. Bearing in mind the critical position of most 
African countries in regard to terms of trade and 
balance of payments, how do external Central Bank 
operations contribute to national economic 
survival?
5. In short, has the central banking law promoted 
economic stability and growth, or the reverse?
Part 2 also attempts to answer the questions and draw
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conclusions from the facts already presented in the 
previous chapters. Following this, a number of submissions 
have been made which is intended to summarise the reasons 
for the apparent failure of the central banking system in 
Commonwealth Africa.
Finally in Part 3, the thesis gives in a nutshell a 
number of recommendations for appropriate reform of the 
central banking system. The model is the Central Bank of 
Nigeria, but most of the recommendations made apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to the other central banks of Commonwealth 
Africa, viz. the Central Bank of Kenya, the Bank of 
Tanzania and the Bank of Zambia. It is hoped that the 
reforms proposed here will match the level of development 
of the countries surveyed and ultimately conduce to pro­
gressive economic growth and transformation of the present 
lethargic central banking system into an effective, dynamic 
and result-oriented system. This hope has been reflected 
in the Epilogue that caps the chapter.
PART I SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Definition of Central Banking
Before a meaningful attempt can be made to ascertain 
the impact of central banking legislation on the economies 
of Anglophone African countries, one must define "central 
banking" as this will also facilitate a comparative analy­
sis of similiar institutions elsewhere and their contribu­
tions towards promoting economic development. After
1
examining the traditional definitions of the concept of 
1 Above, p. 12.
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central banking by various authors and commentators, e.g. 
J.L. Fisher, J.G. Coates, Professor G.O. Nwankwo, who have 
tried to define central banking by reference to the clas­
sical and modern functions of central banks, our definition 
sees central banking as the science or art of banking in 
which a single bank at the apex of the monetary and banking
systems has a complete or residuary monopoly of the
regulation of credit, currency and the functions of money 
and control of the banking and financial institutions in 
a country in accordance with statute and in the national 
economic interest.
Central banking is a science in so far as it adopts 
the modern scientific and technological approach to banking 
making periodical readjustments in the system. Central 
banking is also an art in that it has developed its own
codes of rules, practices and procedures.
Evolution of Money
In view of the fact that money is central to the 
operations of a central bank and indeed to any form of 
banking, it is imperative to discuss the evolution of the 
concept of money and banking elsewhere and in Africa.
This was discussed in Chapter 1. Prior to the advent of 
money, trade was by barter in its various forms, which 
included exchange of good for good, gift exchanges and sil­
ent or dumb trade. As society began to get more sophisti­
cated with its complexities in commerce and growing 
internationalisation, trade by barter became an unsatisfac­
tory medium of exchange, and accordingly money was evolved
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to overcome the difficulties of trade by barter. This 
forms a background to the emergence of banking, probably 
in the ancient Near East. So far as Africa is concerned, 
the historical development of banking in Africa before and 
after independence did not exactly mirror experience else­
where. Banking as practised in Europe differed from 
AFrican traditional banking (cf. the Isusu, Igbe Oha and 
other similar systems). Modern banking was imposed on the 
traditional African monetary system by the colonial 
governments.
Historical Development of Central Banking
Having examined the evolution of money and banking,
2
the thesis in Chapter 2 traces the historical development 
of central banking. Primarily attempts were made to 
ascertain whether the concept of central banking can be 
traced to Africa. It was noted that the traditional or 
classical concept of central banking had evolved going 
beyond currency stabilisation and prevention of inflation 
to extend its influence and functions to the relations of 
Central Banks with the government, the public, the financial 
and banking institutions. It is this new concept of central 
banking that is part Of our colonial heritage.
Thus after tracing the evolution of the classical and 
modern concepts of central banking, it was submitted that, 
like the concept of banking, there is no tradition of 
central banking in Africa. It is an imposed system without 
a solid base. It is accordingly submitted that this new 
and now general concept of central banking is a product of 
2 Above, p. 52.
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financial evolution in the advanced countries, and is 
largely un-African,, having emerged in mature, industrialised 
advanced countries with diversified economic structures and 
sophisticated money and capital markets.
Currency Boards
During the process of colonisation of West and East 
Africa, the colonial administrations felt the need for the 
services of a form of central monetary authority or 
central bank. Indeed, prior to the establishment of the 
West African Currency Board (1912), there were in existence 
in East and West Africa British private colonial banks that 
operated the banking system. The colonial governments 
assumed the responsibility of the issue of notes and cur­
rencies which was a classical function of the older central 
banks.
For example, a monopoly of the issue of silver coin and 
the right to open bank accounts for the governments were 
granted to the then Bank of British West Africa. The 
government of the West African colonies and the Bank of 
British West Africa thus together played the role of a 
central bank. However, the Emmott Committee set up by the 
Colonial Secretary in 1900 recommended inter alia the est­
ablishment of a currency board. In consequence a West 
African Currency Board was appointed in November 1912 with 
the function of the issuance of West African Currency Board 
notes and coins which were accorded full legal tender status 
in all the four British West African territories and the 
performance of other central bank functions.
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An identical Board was established for the East 
African sub-region in December 1919; and for the then 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation the Central African 
Currency Board was established in 1939 in the same way. The 
East African Currency Board had the additional task of 
harmonising the conflicting situation in the exchange rates 
of sterling and the Indian rupee, which was then the 
standard coin in East Africa.
These Currency Boards operated as mere administrators 
of the monetary systems, and were not in a position to 
formulate a national monetary or credit policy. Thus they 
were by no means substitutes for central banks. Further 
they did not supervise the existing banking systems or act 
as banker to the governments, nor were they lenders of last 
resort to the banking system. Despite these shortcomings 
and limited functions, they represented a partial introduc­
tion of traditional central banking suited to the then 
level of economic development.
Sources of Law
4
In Chapter 3 the sources of Central Bank Law in 
Commonwealth Africa are set out. It comprises:
i domestic law and subsidiary domestic law sources
ii basic international law
iii subsidiary international law sources
iv received law (which includes the English common
3 See p . 80.
4 See p.125.
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law, the doctrines of equity and statutes of 
general application)
Added to this list in some countries like Nigeria is 
indigenous customary law which regulates the operations of 
the traditional credit institutions.
Objectives of Legislation
An assessment of the general economic and social 
objectives adopted by government is important in determin­
ing the impact of the consequent central banking laws on 
Anglophone African countries. The immediate background to 
the setting up of central banks was the colonial experience, 
in which private British transnational commercial banks 
dominated the banking scene. The nationalists regarded the 
operations of the British banks as broadly anti-social and 
predatory and against the interests of the Africans. They 
believed that the banks' control of credit and refusal to 
grant loans to private manufacturers and primary producers 
were detrimental to the Africans' commercial activities 
and developments; they concluded that a central bank was 
the only remedy.
These expatriate banks, in our opinion, constituted a 
major tool with which the colonialists exploited the econ­
omies of Anglophone Africa. Indigenisation of the commer­
cial banking system went a long way to provide the answer 
to this.
There were other motives - political maturity, national 
pride, the creating of a national currency and international 
financial co-operation.
The social and political reasons seem to have weighed 
more in the balance than the economic reasons for the
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setting up of the central banks. Thus from the outset 
central banks have been set on a false path leading to 
dismal failure.
Legal Structures of Central Banks
Generally speaking, the basic structure of the central 
banks surveyed comprises a Board of Directors and staff 
directed by the Chief Executive or Governor. Members of 
the Board of Directors are appointed by Ministers or 
political heads from party members, particularly as a con­
solation prize for those who have failed to obtain elective 
posts. In Nigeria there is also the idea of ethnic balanc­
ing and geographical spread underlying most of such appoint­
ments. The result is the politicisation of these offices, 
and their holders forfeit their independence and their 
consciences. There is an analogy with the attitude of 
English law to the appointment of directors, viz., that 
directors need not have any special qualifications for 
office. This attitude has been adopted in the appointment 
of directors to the boards of central banks. This is one 
reason why central banks in Commonwealth Africa have failed 
to promote optimum economic and social growth. Another 
reason is the lack of qualifications of board members.
Functional or professional qualification of board 
members is a sine qua non. In the advanced countries mem­
bers with banking, financial, agricultural and other 
experience are appointed; whereas directors of African 
central banks can be librarians, secondary school non­
graduate teachers. Square pegs cannot fill round holes,
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and decisions on central banking should be left to experts 
qualified in relevant fields.
Allowances to Incumbents
Similarly, it was noted at page 221 that Governors and 
Deputy Governors of central banks and Directors are appoin­
ted by the President or the appropriate Minister for a 
specific term of years, holding office at the pleasure of 
the government. In Zambia, for instance, it is the 
Minister who determines what stipends and allowances to pay 
to the Governors and the Directors. The results, once 
again, are lack of independence and the weakening of the 
operations of central banks generally, but especially in 
their efforts to achieve economic growth.
Government Representation on Boards and the Autonomy of 
Central Banks
In some Commonwealth African countries there is provi­
sion for government representation on the managerial boards 
of central banks. Their presence can adversely affect 
objective analysis and deliberations and frank expressions 
of views by the Directors. Conflicts can arise between 
governments and the boards; some of the central bank laws 
state in unmistakable terms the power of the government or 
the Minister to issue directives to the central bank which 
puts in question the independence of central banks. Cen­
tral banks should be seen to be independent within the 
government rather than as an arm of the government.
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Implied Powers of the Board
An overview of the institution of central banking 
shows that the Board of Directors is responsible for the 
general policy and administration of the bank, while the 
Chief Executive or the Governor is responsible for the day 
to day management of the bank.
All the Anglophone central banks have incidental 
clauses in their organic laws which provide in effect that 
the Boards not only have the expressly enumerated powers 
but also implied powers to take all action that appears to 
them reasonably incidental to their express powers. From 
the decision in Doherty v. Tafawa Balewa the Privy Council 
seems to say that the doctrine of implied powers can be 
invoked by central banks for the purpose of extending the 
scope of legal powers provided in their organic laws 
beyond those that have been expressly granted. A dyanmic 
Board or Governor can in theory initiate many actions on 
their own authority. However, in practice Boards have been 
reticent to invoke this clause, thus neglecting an oppor­
tunity to secure effective control of the banking system 
and the promotion of economic growth.
Organisation of the Central Banks
The structure and organisation of Commonwealth African 
central banks have been influenced by the practice of the 
Bank of England. Statutory departments typically found 
in Commonwealth African central banks include: economic 
research and statistics; banking supervision; domestic 
operation; personnel; and internal audit. Apart from this
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functional organisation, there is also the aspect of 
geographical organisation. Geographically, some banks have 
zonal offices which enable central banks to expand the 
sphere of their operations and bring their services nearer 
to the people. By way of contrast however, it was noted 
that the Central Bank of Nigeria has no zonal offices for 
the co-ordination of the activities of its branches and 
currency centres or from where to represent as far as 
possible, territorial and economic interests and the inte­
rest of local and indigenous banks. It was further noted 
that because of the large and unwieldy population and land 
mass of Nigeria, the poor and inefficient postal and 
telecommunications system, the lack of a network of good 
roads and other infrastructural facilities, the Central 
Bank of Nigeria has not fully succeeded in monitoring 
and supervising efficiently the work in the branches and 
currency centres and of the banking system as a whole.
Staff Management and Welfare
Trade unions form an essential part of the structure 
of any central bank. Trade unionism is a protection 
against discrimination, job insecurity and exploitation by 
employers of labour, and strengthens the weak bargaining 
power of workers.
In Nigeria, the 1979 Federal Constitution guarantees 
the right to belong to any trade union, yet section 11 of 
the Trade Unions Act, 1973, prohibits central bank employees 
from joining unions. This act is capable of causing 
disagreements between management and staff of the Central
535
Bank of Nigeria, as has happened several times, and the 
Bank may thereby fail to benefit from industrial peace and 
harmony, and improved productivity.
Central Banking in a Federal State
The US, India and Nigeria are the three largest demo­
cracies in the world. They contain between them about 
one-third of the world population. Each of the countries 
is a federation and has a central bank. While the US has 
12 Federal Reserve Banks as regional boards, and India has 
4 local boards, Nigeria has only one central board. The 
Central Bank of Nigeria has no zonal offices from which 
one might co-ordinate the activities of the 19 Central 
Bank branches and Currency Centres as well as commercial 
banks. This lack of contact contributes to the failure of 
the Bank to balance its books regularly and it creates a 
climate favourable to the perpetration of fraudulent 
practices.
Issuing of Currency and Money Supply and Legal Tender 
Status
In Chapter 5^, an attempt is made to examine some of 
the service functions of central banks. One of the pioneer 
service functions is the issuing of legal tender currency.
Traditionally the central banks of Commonwealth Africa 
have had the sole right to issue bank notes and coins in 
and for their respective countries. Except for the Bank
5 Above , p . 275 ^
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of Zambia, all the central banks surveyed have provisions 
prescribing territorial limitations on the use of notes 
and coins as legal tender. These are based on the general 
principle of law that the public laws of a country are 
normally not intended to have extraterritorial effect.
The central bank laws usually provide that notes and 
coins may be legal tender for the settlement of debts of 
any amount in the territory of the issuing country. How­
ever, notes and coins may be legal tender only in designated 
areas of a country, as in England and Wales.
In Nigeria the function of currency issue has been 
bedevilled with illegalities and intractable problems.
Legal tender status is withdrawn without regard to law; the 
monetary authorities do not appear to know how much money 
there is in circulation; Nigerians carry on their business 
with ready cash; the country has to contend with currency 
smugglers and traffickers and other multifarious ways of 
sabotaging the economy.
Five currency exchange exercises in 25 years are too 
many; they waste resources and time, and can cause erosion 
of confidence of both the domestic and international commu­
nities in the monetary system; further, they may discourage 
investments and consequently diminish the prospect of 
rapid economic growth.
Public Debt
6In the management of the public debt Anglophone African 
central banks usually make use of three categories of debt
6 See p. 307
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instruments; Treasury Bills, Treasury Certificates and 
Development Stocks, which constitute the mechanism by 
which the banks mobilise financial resources on behalf of 
governments by short-term borrowing.
Central banks fuel the embers of inflation by pumping 
too much money into gilt-edged securities. Also high 
inflationary pressures arise from the high level of money 
supply as a result of high military expenditure, and 
government expenditure on projects with no direct capacity 
effect such as the Festival of the African Arts and Culture 
(FESTAC).
Banker and Adviser
Central banks have a duty to give informed advice to 
government on cardinal issues that affect the national 
economy, such as the population explosion. Accelerating 
population growth has aggravated the problem of capital 
shortage in Nigeria, which is one of the most important 
obstacles to economic development, and has made it diffi­
cult to save enough money for investment which will lead 
to economic development. The Nigerian Central Bank has 
conspicuously failed to take a lead in this and similar 
matters.
Financial Markets
7
In Chapter 6 the thesis examines how the Commonwealth 
African central banks promote economic development through
7 See p. 333.
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the financial markets. The establishment of money and 
capital markets has not significantly helped to encourage 
economic growth in Nigeria. It was observed that Nigerian 
markets are ineffective for various reasons : first, the
static nature of the interest rate structure. Fixed 
interest rates are relatively unattractive to private and 
non-institutional investors. Another factor is the inade­
quacy of financial intermediation. There are only 21 
commercial banks with 1132 branches to serve a population 
of over 94 million. Moreover, the markets do not have the 
advantage of an efficient telecommunications system which 
could facilitate the dissemination of market information.
g
The Fisher Report of 1953 on The Desirability and 
Practicability of Establishing a Central Bank in Nigeria, 
like previous and later reports, had rejected the idea of 
establishing a central bank for Nigeria because of the 
absence of a Nigerian money market. Similarly, Dr. Mars 
also warned that a central bank in Nigeria could only be 
effective if a market for government securities existed.
In Nigeria the position of the markets has not improved 
much. Between 1961 and 1971 companies listed on the 
Exchange increased from 3 to 13, and from 13 to 93 between 
1971 and 1982. Only 5 companies were 100% indigenised, 
only one of which is a wholly-owned Nigerian-promoted 
enterprise. The Nigerian money market was established to 
perform for the country all the functions which a money 
market traditionally performs. One of these is to provide
8 See p. II7
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the basis for operating and exerting an effective monetary 
policy.
This has failed in Nigeria and it is one of the 
sophisticated functions of Central Banks that should be 
discarded as unsuitable in Africa for now.
Banking Supervision
Banking supervision of commercial banks has not been 
an easy task in Nigeria. The difficult terrains, waterways 
and bad roads inhibit the movement of personnel and make 
it an uphill task for the Banking Supervision Department 
of the Central Bank to supervise the banks effectively.
The lack of a basic infrastructure, sufficient trained 
staff and the enormous land area make it impossible for the 
Department to fulfil their statutory duty of examining 
every bank office at least once a year.
Because of these problems of supervision there is 
ample room for bank malpractices. There are deficiencies 
in accounting and internal control systems and questionable 
investment policies. There are incidents of organised 
fraudulent practices and swindling by bank employees, and 
transgressions of the Banking Act. All these problems have 
contributed to the poor performance of the central bank.
Rural Banking
This important aspect of the Bank's supervisory func-
9
tion is surveyed in Chapter 7 and it relates to the
9 Above, p. 409.
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control exercised over expansion of bank branches. The 
history of the control may be traced to the uncontrolled 
branch expansion which led to the proliferation of bank 
offices in the urban centres while leaving large areas of 
the country either inadequately served or not served at 
all.
The main objective in establishing rural banks is to 
encourage the rural community to cultivate ,the habit of 
banking and to enable banks to mobilise savings and provide 
credit for small-scale ventures, as well as offer rural 
employment opportunities.
As stated in Chapter 7, in Nigeria, at the beginning 
of the Rural Banking Programme in 1977 the bank-person 
ratio was 1:80,000, but with the new population figure of 
94 million the ratio is now 1:83,000, showing that expan­
sion in the provision of services has not caught up with 
the rate of population growth. In effect the country has 
made no progress in this direction.
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme
The Central Bank of Nigeria administers an agricul­
tural credit guarantee scheme under which it guarantees 
the loans advanced by banks to farmers. This scheme has 
not succeeded because of (i) the problem of obtaining 
certificates of occupancy under the Land Use Act 1978 by 
farmers to meet the collateral requirements of the banks;
(ii) failure of some borrowers to meet repayment schedules;
(iii) absence of farmers' co-operatives; (iv) the fall in 
world commodity prices; (v) dearth of trained technical
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staff; and (vi) difficulties encountered by some farmers 
in disposing of their produce due to marketing bottlenecks 
and lack of processing and storing facilities. The failure 
of the Central Bank to formulate a viable dynamic agricul­
tural policy is fatal to the objective of leading Nigeria 
towards self-sufficiency and self-reliance.
Techniques of Monetary Control
Generally, monetary policies in Africa are directed to 
achieving high levels of employment, stable prices, rapid 
growth of Gross National Product, a favourable balance of 
payments position, and mobilisation of funds and channel­
ling them to priority economic activities. In Anglophone 
Africa, monetary policies have not on the whole been 
effectively applied to achieve rapid economic growth.
In Nigeria, such instruments as open-market operations, 
liquidity ratio, cash reserve ratio, moral suasion, 
special deposits, interest rate, stabilisation securities, 
etc. have been used little, if at all. Even if used, they 
could not, in the circumstances of Nigeria, work. The 
arsenal of instruments is thus illusory. They are theore­
tically provided for by the various Banking Acts, but 
without them monetary stability in the countries in question
has not been, and cannot be, achieved.
1 0It was also noted in Chapter 8 that in spite of the 
Nigerian Exchange control Anti-Sabotage Decree 1977 and 
the comprehensive import supervision scheme (CISS),
10 Above, p. 467.
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exchange control abuses continued. Political pressures 
on the administrators of foreign exchange gathered momentum 
towards the end of the civil rule and the result was that 
preferential treatment was given to foreign exchange 
transfers depending on who was the applicant and emphasis 
was no longer placed on the priority and economic develop­
ment factors. Consequently, Nigeria soon became a beggar 
nation with a debt of N5 billion on import bills.
In short, monetary control as a function of central 
banking in Anglophone Africa has been a useless appendage, 
too sophisticated for the African Central Banks to 
o per a t e .
Gaps in the Law
11In Chapter 9 the thesis considers the three types 
of gaps which have been identified in the banking and 
financial system. One is the gap that arises as a neglect 
or failure on the part of central banks to provide medium 
and long term capital in the financial system. The commer­
cial banks, as a rule, provide short-term capital for 
commerce, servicing industry and financing working capital. 
Central banks in Anglophone Africa, in accordance with 
general central banking tradition, also provide short-term 
capi t a l , in addition to providing banking facilities of 
various kinds for government. This leaves a gap in the 
supply of long-term capital. This gap must be plugged 
in order to make capital available for financing industry.
1 1 See p . 479 .
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Some steps have been taken in this regard by the establish­
ment of a few development banks, e.g. the Nigerian 
Industrial Development Bank and the Nigerian Bank for 
Commerce and Industry, but their activities are very 
limited, both geographically and otherwise, so their 
performance has been disappointing.
A similar gap was identified in the UK banking system 
by the historic Macmillan Committee on Finance and 
Industry Report from which the 'Macmillan Gap' theory 
derives. As a result of the recommendations of this com­
mittee, specialist finance institutions were established, 
viz., the Industrial Commercial Finance Corporation and 
the Industrial Finance Corporation.
The second type of gaps in the law is in connection 
with other finance and credit associations, provident funds 
insurance companies and so on, which have enormous capital 
collected from their customers. Such funds invariably lie 
idle or are invested in non-priority sectors of the economy 
There is no government or central bank assistance, guidance 
or control afforded them; as a result, these bodies do not 
function in a consistent manner or keep proper records, so 
that it has been impossible to obtain from them adequate 
information about their operation.
The Central Bank's control over the financial system 
must cover the whole system to be effective. The Report 
of the Committee on the Nigerian financial system of 1976 
fully endorsed this point when it recommended in its 
report to the Government "that if national objectives are 
to be effectively achieved, the Central Bank should be
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given power to control some relevant aspects of the opera­
tions of all financial institutions. The Bank should, 
therefore, assume the role of a supervisory authority over
finance houses. Where there is a lacuna in the law a
dynamic central bank board can invoke its implied powers 
to perform those functions that are not expressly stated;
and in the present case section 41(1) which refers to com­
panies "receiving monies from outside sources as deposits 
irrespective of the payment of interest...", can be applied 
to control finance houses.
The third gap observed in the system refers to the 
lack of control of political party funds and of the 
indigenous financial institutions like "Isusu". We have 
argued that these traditional financial institutions should 
be upgraded to the level of co-operative banks so that the 
capital coming from this source can be directed towards 
economic development. The failure to. fill these gaps is 
detrimental to the achievement of economic growth.
PART 2 CONCLUSIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
1 2
At the beginning of this chapter we set out in the 
form of questions the propositions that have formed the 
bedrock of this thesis. Although answers were given in 
the different chapters, this part of this chapter provides 
further answers to the questions posed.
1 2 See p . 524.
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The Need for a Central Bank
When we surveyed the objectives of establishing cen­
tral banks in Chapter 3 it was clear from our analysis 
that some of the political, social and economic objectives 
set by governments for establishing central banks were 
sound, progressive, well-intentioned and achievable. To 
achieve these objectives and also promote economic growth 
there ought to be rules and regulations as well as opera­
tors whose duty it is to realise the set objectives by 
means of appropriate policy instrumets. Thus under 
monetary policy objectives, the structure of the liquidity 
ratio, credit ceiling, cash reserve ratio, moral suasion, 
interest rate restructuring, open market operations, 
credit measures of different types, stabilisation securities 
special deposits and so on, are to be carried out with
appropriate policy instruments by a designated autority.
1 3The Radcliffe Report summarised the traditional functions 
found in the organic laws of most central b a n k s :-
The Report names them as:
(1) to issue legal tender currency
(2) to maintain external reserves
(3) to safeguard the international value of the 
currency
(4) to promote monetary stability and a sound 
financial system
(5) to act as a banker and financial adviser to the 
government.
13 Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, 
Report Cmnd. 8 27, London, August 1959.
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In order to be able to achieve these objectives it is 
imperative that a monetary authority should be super­
imposed on the machinery and instruments that would be 
customarily used to achieve them. The machinery is the 
banking system and according to our definition at page 14 
of Chapter 1 the central bank is at the apex of the banking 
system. Policy makers have therefore had to employ the 
services the central banks can offer in order to achieve 
declared objectives. What form this central controlling 
body takes is another matter. It could be called the 
Treasury, the reserve bank, the central bank, or the mone­
tary authority of Nigeria, for example, or the West or 
East African Currency Board. It is our conclusion that a 
central bank, by whatever name called, is necessary in an 
economy because of the vital role it has to play. In 
answer to our first question therefore our conclusion is 
that there is real need for the selected African countries 
to establish central banks in the countries.
Hong Kong - The Other View
The position in Hong Kong is an interesting one and 
runs counter to arrangements in other Commonwealth coun­
tries, but the arrangement supports our view that the 
institution of a central bank as generally understood is 
not an absolute necessity in an economy.
In Hong Kong the designated authority is neither the 
central bank nor the Treasury. Unlike most major economies 
Hong Kong has no central bank. Those functions which 
might typically be performed by one - such as supervising
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financial institutions, managing official foreign exchange 
reserves or providing banking services to the government - 
are carried out by various different government offices 
(the Monetary Affairs Branch of the government secretariat 
under the directives of the Financial Secretary) or by the 
two note-issuing banks. The Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank, the two note- 
issuing authorities, issue notes in denominations of KS$10, 
HK$100, HK$500 and HK$1000 while notes and coins of low 
denominations are issued by government.
The counterpart of the banking supervision department 
of central banks is the Commissioner of Banking appointed 
under the Hong Kong Banking Ordinance. He exercises 
general supervision and control over banks. The most 
intriguing aspect of the control of the banking system in 
Hong Kong is the special position occupied by the Hong 
Kong Association of Banks. Under section 4 of Ordinance 
No. 76 of 1980, the Association has the following functions
(a) to further the interests of licensed banks
(b) to make rules from time to time for the conduct
of the business of banking
(c) to consider, investigate, and inquire into all
matters and questions connected with or relating 
to the business of banking
(d) to promote, consider, support, oppose, make 
representations as to and generally deal with 
any law affecting or likely to affect the 
business of banking
(e) to collect, circulate and disseminate information
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relating to the business of banking or otherwise 
likely to be of interest to members and others
(f) to represent its members at and appear before any 
public body, committee or inquiry or before any 
court or tribunal
(g) to act as an advisory body to its members and to 
co-operate and maintain relations with other 
bodies and organisations in all matters touching 
or concerning the business of banking
(h) to provide a meeting place or places for its 
members and to adopt such means of publicising 
or making known its activities and information 
and opinions on matters touching or concerning 
the business of banking as may be thought fit
(i) to provide or procure, by means of a management 
agreement or otherwise, facilities for the 
clearing of cheques and other instruments, and 
for the processing of banking transactions 
presented by members
(j) to establish, subsidise, support, co-operate
with or otherwise assist any person engaged in 
any artistic, cultural, benevolent, charitable, 
welfare or similar activity and to contribute 
money for and to take part in any such activities 
as the Committe may think fit
(k) to do or cause to be done all such other acts and 
things as may conduce to the progress, prosperity 
and advancement of the general body of members 
Furthermore, under sections 18 to 21 the Committee of the
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Association exercises all the banking powers exercised by 
Ministers of Finance in Commonwealth central banks. The 
Ordinance for instance provides that:
"21(1) The Committee may, following a recommenda­
tion by the Disciplinary Committee, in 
its discretion impose or procure to be 
imposed on a member any of the following 
penalties for breach of any rule made 
pursuant to section 12(1) —
(a) a reprimand
(b) after consultation with the Financial 
Secretary, the suspension of membership 
for any period not exceeding 3 months
(c) after consultation with the Financial 
Secretary, the suspension of facilities 
for the clearing of cheques and other 
instruments of a member for any period 
not exceeding 3 months
(d) with the approval of the Governor in 
Council, the expulsion of a member from 
membership of the Association.
Provided that any decision to impose or 
procure the imposition of any penalty shall 
be made by an affirmative vote of not less 
than three quarters of the members of the 
Committee present and voting at the meeting 
at which such decision is taken.
(1) No appeal shall lie against the decision 
of the Committee to impose or procure any 
penalty pursuant to subsection (1).
(2) Where a penalty is imposed pursuant to 
subsection (1), the Committee
(a) May cause notice of the imposition 
of such penalty to be published in 
the Gazette
(b) Shall give written notice to the 
Financial Secretary of such action 
and the reasons therefore
(3) Where the Committee, after consultation 
with the Financial Secretary, suspends 
or procures the suspension of clearing 
facilities pursuant to subsection (1)(c) 
then whilst such suspension is in force 
no member shall act as sub-clearer for 
the member whose clearing facilities have 
been suspended".
Hong Kong with a land area of only 1066 square
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kilometers and a total population of 5,344,000 at the end 
of 1983 has 136 licensed banks with a total of 1531 offices 
and 115 foreign banks representative offices. Hong Kong 
now ranks as the world's third largest financial centre 
and since 1973 there have been no restrictions covering 
the movement of funds into or out of Hong Kong for any 
purpose. Banks and other deposit-taking institutions, 
insurance companies, pension funds, unit trusts and similar 
functions, foreign exchange and money brokers, stock and 
commodity brokers, four stock exchanges, and other finan­
cial organisations combine to provide a wide range of 
financial services to both local and international customers 
- all without the services of a traditional central bank.
When interviewed by the present writer, Mr. A.J. Monk 
of the Chartered Bank and the Secretary of the B ankers' 
Association, and Mr. K.K. Wong, acting Assistant Commis­
sioner of Banking, expressed the opinion that the arrange­
ments for the central control of banking in Hong Kong were 
satisfactory and effective.
The institution in Hong Kong as we have just seen 
confirms our submission that while the institution or 
system of central banking or such arrangement is desirable, 
a central bank, so called, need not be the supervising 
authority.
The Nigerian banking industry has bottleneck problems 
infrastructural, administrative and human in nature to 
contend with and which ought to have been fought success-" 
fully to a reasonable measure before establishing a full- 
fledged central bank. This was the position as illustrated
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above taken by J.L. Fisher, IBRD, Sir Cecil Trevor, Erwin 
Blumenthal, W.T. Newlyn and Rowan. They all argued that 
a central bank or monetary authority was necessary but that 
it should be one with limited powers until the economies 
of the countries were ripe to assume in stages the tradi­
tional functions of central banks as envisaged by the 
Brussels convention of 1920 and 1922. The present writer 
respectfully concurs with the views of these eminent 
economists and bankers.
Should the Central Banks be Autonomous?
In Chapter 4 it was seen that there has been no 
settled view regarding the independence of central banks, 
the majority of countries, particularly those in the 
Commonwealth, appearing to adopt Montague Norman's dictum 
that the elected government ought to have the final say in 
the implementation of policies for which it is politically 
answerable. It was in that spirit and towards attaining 
this goal that some state banks were nationalised. This 
implies that central banks will be unable to pursue poli­
cies which run counter to the objectives of the national 
economic policy which are fashioned to achieve the targets 
set by governments.
On the other side of the scales, it must be recognized 
that there are many advantages associated with the indepen­
dence of central banks from government.
An independent central bank will be able to operate 
with greater flexibility, speed and business efficiency. 
Another factor is that monetary affairs are highly
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technical and must be managed independently, objectively
and professionally. However, the most important reason for
granting autonomy to central banking is that political
control of the currency carries a danger of inflation.
This means that government control of a central bank may
subject the bank to political pressures that could result
in unsound monetary policy, and that the exigencies of
government finance may conflict with the dictates of
sound monetary management.
If the operation of a central bank is to be in the
economic interests of the people proponents of central bank
autonomy agree that monetary and banking policy must be
unbiased and insulated from any type of external pressures.
As a former chairman of the US Federal Reserve System (Mr.
William M. Matins) put it, "When the Federal Reserve System
succumbs to the pressure of political expediency or the
dictates of private interest the-groundwork of sound money 
14is undermined". A central bank is in a better position 
to carry out its functions more efficiently when it is 
independent within the structure of the government. This 
is further supported in a recent address given by Arthur 
F. Burns, Chairman of the Board of the Federal Reserve 
System that:
"the capacity of the Federal Reserve to 
maintain a meaningful anti-inflation 
posture is made possible by its considerable 
degree of independence"
and that
14 Report on the Role of the Central Bank of Nigeria and 
the Relation Between Government, 1979, pp. 3-4.
553
"it is no accident that Germany and 
Switzerland which in recent years also 
have managed their economy better than 
most others happen to have strong and 
independent monetary authorities like 
our s ".
In similar vein, a recent Royal Commission in Canada 
thought that protection from inflation and immunity from 
the influence of day-to-day political considerations, on 
money markets where these considerations are unrelated to 
the broad aims of monetary and fiscal policy, were the 
major reasons for retaining the independence of the Bank 
of C a n a d a . ^
It is our conclusion, therefore, in line with the 
modern concept of independence, that central banks should 
be independent to a large extent in their policy formula­
tions as well as in the way and manner in which they carry 
out their technical operations in implementing the policies. 
While they could "press their points and advice to the 
point of nagging" (in the words of Montague Norman), their 
independence should be seen as independence within the 
government rather than of the government. The extent of 
the independence of central banks to governments has been 
set out below under "Reforms of the Law".
Is Co-operation with Financial Institutions Necessary?
Chapter 7 deals with some of the services which the 
central banks render to the commercial banks, it was seen 
that for central banks to succeed in their efforts to
1 5 I b i d ., p . 4.
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promote good banking services they have to rely on four 
important instruments: (i) moral suasion; (ii) credit
guidelines and other directives issued by them from time 
to time; (iii) the sanctions (e.g. fine or loss of licence) 
provided in the various laws governing banking in the 
countries; and (iv) the power granted to central banks to 
inspect and supervise the commercial banks. Above all, 
the various Acts make it statutorily obligatory for central 
banks to seek the co-operation of the banks. Section 39 
of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act provides that
"the Bank shall wherever necessary seek the 
co-operation of and co-operate with, other 
banks in Nigeria to promote and maintain 
adequate and reasonable banking services 
for the public to ensure high standard of 
conduct and management throughout the banking 
system and to further such policies not incon­
sistent with this Act as shall be in the 
national interest".
Without the co-operation of the banks, central banks 
would be seriously handicapped in implementing government 
policies and in applying the four major instruments 
mentioned above. It is therefore necessary for central 
bank laws to structure and maximise effective supervision 
of the system and offer effective leadership to the banking 
industry. In playing this role it has to provide for the 
educational and training needs of the banking industry as 
a whole.
Is Central Bank External Role Essential for Economic 
Survival?
In its external role a central bank performs the
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essential function of maintaining the external value of the 
national currency. Central banks have found it expedient 
to employ the technique of exchange control to restrict 
the use of limited foreign exchange resources in accordance 
with a scheme of priorities. The reasons for control of 
external payments include the need to adjust the demand 
for foreign exchange to the current supply, and the 
desire to conserve a country's foreign exchange reserves 
as well as maximise the use of reserves by ensuring that 
essential imports are given priority over other imports. 
Exchange control is one of the direct instruments for 
dealing with external payments problems. Various exchange 
control laws in the Commonwealth Africa and in Nigeria in 
particular give the overall responsibility for the admin­
istration of exchange control to the Ministry of Finance 
who usually delegates this function to the country's 
central bank. Commercial banks and some finance houses 
are sometimes appointed as authorised dealers with powers 
to engage in transactions involving the sale and purchase 
of gold and foreign currencies in accordance with the 
instructions and directives given by the country's central 
b a n k .
A centralised control of disbursements and earnings 
of foreign exchange is necessary for orderliness, certainty, 
confidence and ease of treatment of transactions. For 
this control the central banks also use foreign exchange 
budgeting, which tries to relate national aggregate 
expenditure to income. As with all budgeting exercises, 
this involves relating estimates of foreign exchange
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earnings from different sources to foreign exchange 
expenditure by category, thereby making it possible to 
know what accretion to or decrease from reserves could be 
expected at the end of a period. Foreign exchange budget­
ing and regulation are a sine qua non for an orderly 
movement of funds and a necessary operational tool to 
guide the officials handling the various foreign exchange 
applications submitted by those involved in international 
transactions. Without this type of central control there 
would be chaos in the international scene and in the 
external stability of the currency. The external stability 
of the currency is closely related to its internal stabi­
lity - the inherent economic strength of the country and 
the way it conducts its economic and monetary affairs. 
Domestic fiscal and monetary policies have, therefore, an 
important role in maintaining the external value of the 
currency without which national economic survival will be 
in jeopardy.
It is our conclusion therefore that in its external 
role a central bank's operations are essential for national 
economic growth.
Has the Law Failed To Promote Economic Stability and Growth?
To the marxist, law is an instrument of oppression 
of one class by another, and therefore necessarily a 
coercive force, destined to disappear when society becomes 
socialist and thus classless. It is a mark of societal 
development therefore if there is movement away from law 
and legal instutions, and, as Lenin has argued, the road
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to socialism begins with the destruction of the existing 
institutions. The progressive capitalist, on the other 
hand, may regard law as being above sectional interests 
and embodying fundamental human values. Consequently, 
communities which have no law or weak law are regarded as 
backward, so that the strengthening of law and legal 
institutions becomes a way out of arbitrariness and towards 
development and progress. He understands law as a system 
of rules which are binding in society, either generally or 
over specified persons, the rules deriving their validity 
either from a special form of promulgation (statute) or 
by a general rule of the legal system which recognises 
their validity (customary law or practice). The rules 
have the sanction of the State behind them, and the state 
apparatus is available in a variety of ways to help the 
observance and enforcement of the rules.
It is in the second sense that we are looking at law 
to see if the body of rules governing the behaviour of 
central banks has failed to promote economic growth in 
N i g e r i a .
As A .N . Allott put it:
"1. Economic growth in the developing African 
countries depends on capital accumulation 
and the stimulation of trade, investment 
and productivity. Hence the paramount 
importance of the laws in those countries 
governing investment, commercial enterprise 
and the grant of credit.
2. These policies and problems have legal sig­
nificance, because (i) the law is the 
instrument by which new economic arrangements 
can be introduced, and (ii) the law, or its 
relevant branches, may stimulate or inhibit 
economic activity (as where the absence of
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legislation on bankruptcy restricts the 
supply of credit)."16
Except in Zambia, the organic laws of the central 
banks of the Commonwealth countries surveyed are voluminous 
in extent. In Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria Act 
19 58, the Banking Act, 1969, the common law and the 
principles of equity and other domestic and international 
law sources appear to provide a strong armour for the 
Central Bank to administer and protect the principles of 
good banking in Nigeria. Sections 4, 29, 39, 40 and 41 £>/
the Central Bank of Nigeria Act deal with the power to 
control the banking system and promote economic stability 
and growth. These formidable provisions can be effectively 
used to achieve desired goals. Principles laid down by 
the Privy Council in the Doherty v . Balewa case
regarding the doctrine of implied powers mean that a bold Board can 
invoke its incidental powers under Section 29(2) (t) to 
discharge its duties more efficiently under the CBN Act.
If the doctrine were put to proper use by boards of 
directors, it would in the words of Alexander Hamilton 
yield "a criterion of what is constitutional, and of what 
is not so", and will be a beacon to guide directors in 
their search for constitutionality. What is lacking is a 
strong conviction, sense of purpose, determination and 
firmness to determine what is right for the economy and to 
have courage to speak out and defend an opinion held
16 "Credit and the law in Africa: a special study of 
some legal aspects of economic development" [1976]
J.A.L. 73.
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honestly.
However, despite the volume of existing legislation, 
there are still a number of gaps in the law which should 
be filled. In addition, there are some areas of "dead" 
law in the statute books that could be invoked in the 
interests of a better operation of the system. Sections 
29(3)(t) and 39(c) of the CBN Act and section 3 of the 
Banking Act are among them. Before the advent of the 
Europeans in Nigeria each of the various ethnic communities 
in Nigeria had its own indigenous system Of law. The 
English colonial administration came into Nigeria with a 
translocation of the English legal system and English 
notions of justice. The effect was that the Nigerian 
terrritorial legal system became an uneasy and uncertain 
amalgam of rules derived from the law of England, and rules 
elaborated on the spot by legislation or judicial 
interpretation.
The indigenous customary law and Islamic law became 
subjects of legislative regulation and courts were to give 
effect to rules of customary and Islamic law only if they 
were not repugnant to natural justice, equity, good con­
science and public policy, or not incompatible with any 
piece of legislation. Twenty-four years after political 
independence one would reasonably expect that radical 
legislative changes in the laws as they existed during the 
colonial period would have taken place. That however is 
not the case. The legal system is still dualistic or mu l ­
tiple in character and compounds the uncertainties of the 
system. The locally enacted statutes, like the Central
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Bank of Nigeria Act and the Banking Act, are nothing more 
than an uncritical copying of foreign statutes, a sort of 
legislative piracy and this explains why the various 
Anglophone countries' central banks Acts are similiarly 
w o r d e d .
There is therefore the need for the creation of a new 
system to replace the existing laws by way of a general 
overhaul of the substantive organic laws which will ensure 
legal simplification, legal certainty, social convenience 
and which will above all serve as a positive evidence of 
the truly independent status of the country and of its 
need to chart an independent course in the fields of 
finance and central bank organisation specially adapted to 
the peculiar needs of Nigeria. It is in this light that 
recommendations are put forward in Part 3 of this chapter 
as to the reforms that are necessary in the banking sys­
tem in order to enable the Central Bank of Nigeria to work 
more efficiently and to promote economic stability and 
growth in Nigeria.
To the question whether the existing organic laws of 
Commonwealth African central banks permit or hinder the 
promotion of economic growth of the economies and the 
implementation of the traditional functions of central 
banks, the broad conclusion is that the pattern of organi­
sation and administration of central banking in advanced 
countries is not well adapted to the needs and circumstances 
of these developing countries.
The central banks were not ripe for establishment at 
the time they were founded and it would have been adequate
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if these central banks were established with limited 
powers which would help to a smooth but gradual economic 
development.  ^^
The following submissions show why the legislation 
and the central banking system have not succeeded in 
promoting economic stability and growth particularly in 
N i g e r i a .
PART 3 SUBMISSIONS
The following submissions attempt to recap some of 
the reasons for the inevitable failure of our model, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria, to achieve desired economic 
growth in spite of its determined efforts to contain even 
those factors that are beyond its control. It is respect­
fully therefore submitted that:
1. The art of banking as practised in Europe is different 
from the African traditional banking which was noted 
in Isusu, Igbe Oha and other similar systems. The 
Nigerian banking customary law cannot therefore be 
effectively applied to the classical or modern con­
cepts of central banking which are alien cultures 
imposed on colonial subjects through imported foreign 
laws .
2. The concept of central banking is a product of finan­
cial evolution in the advanced countries with 
diversified economic structures and sophisticated
17 See Chapter 2, p . H 3
562
money and capital markets. It is also an imposed 
system that cannot work effectively in an under­
developed economy.
3. The classical central banking provided by the West 
African Currency Board and the East African Currency 
Board at the dying years of their existence suited 
the level of economic development of the countries at 
Independence and the status quo should have been 
maintained or at best monetary authorities could have 
been established in each of the countries that came 
under the jurisdiction of the Currency Boards.
4. The immediate cause of the hasty establishment of 
central banks by nationalist governments were poli­
tical and the domination of the banking scene by 
British transnational commercial banks which consti­
tuted a major tool with which the colonialists 
exploited the economies of Anglophone Africa. The 
foundation was weak as there were not available ade­
quate manpower and facilities for an indigenous 
banking system.
5. In the process of indigenising the banking system 
reasons motivated by political and social expediency 
by far outweighed the economic reasons. Thus, from 
the outset central banks were set on a backward course 
that inevitably led to dismal failure.
6 . Other institutional causes of failure of central banks 
in Commonwealth Africa to attain optimum economic
and social growth are:
(a) the appointment of Governors and members of the
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Board of Directors who have no functional 
qualifications;
(b) the appointment of politicians who failed elec­
tive political posts to the Boards of Directors 
who see such appointments as opportunities to 
recoup themselves from campaign expenses.
(c) the appointments, tenure of office and stipends 
of governors and directors which are determined 
by the Minister tend to induce them to dance to 
the tune of politicians thereby weakening the 
effectiveness of central banks.
7.. The presence of government representatives on central 
bank boards weakens the independence of central banks 
which should be seen as independent within the 
government rather than of the government.
8 . The boards have been very timid to invoke the 
implied as well as the express powers conferred by the 
applicable laws particularly the incidental clauses 
thereby failing to initiate appropriate dynamic actions.
9. Because of the large mo-ere land area of Nigeria, poor 
and inefficient postal and telecommunications system, 
lack of a network of good roads and other infrastruc­
tural facilities, the Central Bank of Nigeria has not 
fully succeeded in monitoring and supervising 
efficiently the work in its branches and currency 
centres and of the banking system as a whole. This 
failure has led to malpractices and inefficiency.
10. Five currency exchange exercies in 25 years, sometimes 
outside the processes of law, were too frequent, the
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exercises were wasteful of resources, time consuming 
and were capable of causing erosion of confidence of 
both the domestic and international communities and 
discouraging investments and consequently diminishing 
the chances of rapid economic growth.
11. Central banks fuel the embers of inflation by pumping 
too much money into gilt-edged securities and high 
level of money supply as a result of expensive mili­
tary expenditure and other projects with no direct 
capacity effect, for example, African Games.
12. The Central Bank of Nigeria was not ripe for estab­
lishment at the time it was set up, given the poor 
money and capital markets situation then. It would 
have been adequate if, as J.L. Fisher had recommended, 
the Central Bank was established with limited powers, 
taking on more and more functions as appropriate, 
which would lead to a smooth but gradual economic 
development.
13. The static nature of the interest rate structure, the 
inadequacy of financial intermediation, poor communi­
cation system, the unwillingness of the Nigerian 
investor to trade-in his stock, all contribute to 
the ineffectiveness of the capital market which is
an indicator of poor economic growth.
14. Poor performance of the banking supervision and the 
supervised commercial banks have in some large 
measure contributed to the slow economic growth of the 
economy.
15. Compared with the developed countries the bank-person
565
ratio in Nigeria of 1:83,000 (Britain 1:4,000; Japan 
1 : 14 ,500 ; USA 1 :6,000 and India .1:52 ,000) is too low 
for effective mobilisation of savings necessary for 
development.
16. The level of sophistication of modern banking parti­
cularly as practised in the developed countries is 
not suitable nor beneficial to the poor developing 
countries and the institution in Nigeria has not 
performed satisfactorily because of the reasons already 
given and further because:
(a) The level of literacy is very low. In Nigeria this 
has affected the standard of banking generally. The 
poor peasant farmer and market woman still ties her 
money to the waist and does not understand the prin­
ciples and advantages of banking. The 80% illiterates 
in Nigeria are therefore indifferent to banking and 
the services they provide.
(b) Infrastructural facilities are not available and 
where provided they are malfunctioning. Thus cheque 
clearing system, transfer of funds, and other banking 
transactions cannot be carried on. N.O. Odoh des­
cribed the situation succinctly when he said:
"Communication is the energiser and the 
appetiser in banking and it is of para­
mount importance in linking bank customers.
Without effective communication, good 
banking is impossible. Until communication 
and the mechanisation of banks are improved 
the development of banking awareness will 
continue to be an i l l u s i o n . " ^
18 Fundamental Problems of Banking in Nigeria, see Founda­
tions of Nigeria's Financial Infrastructure, 1980, op. 
c i t , p . 77.
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So indeed it is in Nigeria. As it is now so it was 
before the establishment of the central bank of 
Nigeria .
(c) Hard core of extreme poverty and destitution can be
found in the shanty towns of big cities and also
in the rural areas which are predominantly agricul­
tural. The people live below the minimum standard of 
living consistent with human dignity. 8 0% of the 
working population is on farming and their ability 
to save is virtually nil. They cannot contribute to 
the development of a banking system due to extreme 
poverty particularly before the 60s.
(d) The population explosion whith has resulted mainly 
from improved health services eats up a large part 
of the growth in national product. What is more, 
much of the increase in national income has gone into 
the pockets of a rather small section of the popula­
tion, a prosperous middle and upper class in the 
cities, leaving a large mass of the population v i r ­
tually untouched by the economic progress so far 
achieved. Life goes on at or near subsistence level. 
The population of Nigeria has risen astronomically 
from 30 million in 1962 to 94 million in July 1984, 
that is, at the rate of about 3 million every year.
(e) Skilled bank manpower was not available to undertake 
sophisticated banking. There was effluxion of the 
expatriate manpower on the attainment of independence 
and on promulgation of the Indigenisation Act 1972 
which directed that management positions in industries
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revert to indigenous Nigerians.
(f) Lack of confidence in paper money particularly in 
the early days of currency notes of the West African 
Currency Board and the reluctance to accept cheques 
have contributed in no small way to the low develop­
ment of banking habits in Nigeria even in the 80s.
(g) There was no financial market that would have enabled 
the authorities to mobilise short and long-term 
capital for the economic development of Nigeria and 
most Nigerian companies are family businesses and the 
families do not ordinarily want to share their busi­
ness with other Nigerians. Properly conceived, 
financial markets should finance or service industry 
and commerce, the government and commercial banks, 
but regrettably this was not the case.
REFORMS
Traditional Credit Institutions
1 . The traditional credit institutions like the Isusu 
which served the economic needs of Nigerians at local and 
inter-regional levels, by providing for institutional and 
local trade should be organised under a single enactment 
and upgraded to co-operative associations or banks for the 
purposes of mopping up the petty traders' and market 
women's idle cash.
The main characteristics of credit unions are given 
below, and should be noted by the Central Bank in drafting 
appropriate legislation:
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i) Credit unions form an essential part of the co­
operative system
ii) Credit unions teach village farmers:
(a) the need for systematic savings
(b) how to make their savings work for the benefit 
of their communities
(c) how to use short-term credit to increase their 
productive capacity.
iii) Credit unions are organised by people with a common 
b o n d .
iv) One becomes a full member of the union after subscrib­
ing at least one share and sometimes an entrance fee.
v) A full member of the union is expected to save 
regularly regardless of the amount being saved at a 
t i m e .
vi) Credit union operations in some areas of the country 
are now guided by bye-laws, formulated by members.
vii) Members are encouraged to minimise consumption in 
order to save, thus creating capital for their socio­
economic development.
viii)Credit unions' operations are controlled entirely by 
members and Co-operative Ministry should play only a 
supervisory role.
ix) Credit unions are run entirely by and for their 
m e m b e r s .
x) The common bond that exists between members implies 
that normally the members know each other and under­
stand each other's problems.
xi) Interest charge to members for loans is much lower
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compared with that charged by financial institutions.
xii) Loan terms are very flexible.
xiii)Procedure is relatively simple to understand and the 
information demanded are usually readily available.
xiv) The usual collateral securities are not demanded.
Indigenous Banks
2. The existing indigenous banks with state government 
support should be handed over to the respective states.
They should be called state banks and they should be 
commercially-oriented and will form part of the Nigerian 
National Commercial Bank proposed in "A Nigerian National 
Commerce Bank" below. This should be in line with the 
state Banks of Ghana. The state gpvernments now own 
practically all the indigenous banks.
Composition and Functions of Central Banks
3. The Board of the Central Bank of Nigeria should have 
functional representation in such a manner that the 
Chairman and other members of the Board of Directors should 
be chosen from various disciplines and such members should 
be experienced in and represent specified fields and areas 
of knowledge or persons of relevant qualifications.
4. To remove ambiguity and conflicts between s8(1) and 
s8(4) of the 1958 Act and to define the responsibilities 
of the Board which are "for the policy and general and 
administration of the affairs and business of the bank" and 
the duty of the Governor who shall be in charge of the 
day-to-day management of the Bank and shall be answerable
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to the Board for their acts and decisions.
Independence of Central Banks
5. Appointments of the Governor, Deputy Governor, and 
members of the Board of Directors should be made by the 
President or the Head of State to whom the Board should 
report directly.
6 . Salaries of Governors and Deputies and Board Directors 
should be fixed by the Central Bank Bye-laws in order to 
shield them from party directives, unwarranted influence 
and political manipulation.
7. Central Bank Bye-laws should also provide an entrenched 
clause on procedural safeguards against removal and 
instability of tenure of Governors and Directors in the 
same way as judges' tenure of offices is secured under 
s.256(1) of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution.
8 . S.8(3)(1) requiring the Board to inform the Commis­
sioner of the monetary and banking policies pursued or 
intended to be pursued by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
should be amended so as to replace the word "Commissioner" 
with the word "President" or "Head of State". This will 
enhance the independence status of the Central Bank.
9. S.8(3) (2) (3) of Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958
should be amended by deleting the following words: "may 
submit his (Minister of Finance) representation and that 
of the Central Bank of Nigeria to the Federal Executive 
Council" and substituting the words "the Central Bank of 
Nigeria shall submit its reports including monetary and 
banking policy reports direct to the Head of State or
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Parliament" and such reports should not be lost in the 
bureaucratic labyrinth.
10. The salaries structure and perquisites of offices of 
central bank staff should be different from those of the 
civil service and not subject to an approval of the 
government particularly since central bank budgets are not 
included in the nation's Annual Budget and Estimates.
Rural Banking
1 1 . Rural banking in Nigeria should be carefully and con­
scientiously organised in line with the system in Tanzania 
where almost every community has a rural bank. An enabling 
law should be enacted with the following objectives:
(a) Cultivation of banking habits amongst rural dwellers,
(b) Mobilisation of savings from the rural areas for the 
purposes of channelling same into profitable 
ventures,
(c) Creation of credit by way of equity and loans for 
small-scale industries.
(d) Development of agriculture and agro-allied industries 
in the rural areas with a view to achieving the 
objective of self-sufficiency in food production.
(e) Provision of a full range of banking services daily.
Licensing of Banks
12. Sections 2 and 3, 22-25 of the Banking Act 1969 
regarding the licensing of banks should be amended to vest 
the powers of licensing on the Central Bank of Nigeria 
instead of the Federal Minister of Finance in order to
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remove political control over licensing and to introduce 
more stiff penalties. The present N100.00 fine for 
example in sections 20 and 26 is a paltry sum.
Trade Unions and the Central Bank
13. S . 11 of Trade Union Act 1973 offends against s.37 of 
1979 Constitution and so void to the extent of the incon­
sistency. Section 11 should therefore be amended to 
remove the inconsistency, and to allow Central Bank of 
Nigeria staff to organise trade unionism for mutual benefit 
and to enjoy the opportunities offered to workers by s.37 
and s. 9(b) of Labour Act 1 974 and the International Labour 
Convention No. 98.
Zonal Boards
14. Zonal boards should be established whose functions 
would be to advise the Central Board of Directors on such 
matters as may be generally or specically referred to them 
on various matters of local importance, on which the mem­
bers can contribute by virtue of their specialised knowl­
edge of the region they represent. The Zones should have 
their headquarters in Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Benin, Enugu and 
Ibadan. Major matters and reports should be referred to 
the head office for information or determination.
Control of Currency and Money Supply
15. Appropriate legislation should be enacted to control 
and regulate the issue of currency and money supply in 
the system as follows:
(a) The Nigerian borders should be guarded and protected
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(b) An efficient cheque-clearing system should be evolved 
so that up-country cheques can be cleared as quickly 
as possible through the zonal centres suggested in 
Chapter 4.
(c) Payment for wages and utilities such as telephone, 
electricity, should be made by cheque to minimise the 
carrying of hand-to-hand currency.
Financial Markets
16. There should be a legal framework to correct the 
identified inadequacies and to promote realisation of the 
objectives for setting up financial markets:
(a) The interest rate structure should be reviewed 
u p w a r d s .
(b) Level of financial intermediation to be increased to 
add a new dimension to the market. Investment Trusts 
should also be established to solve the problem of 
paucity of shares in the market.
(c) The avoidance of excessive concentration of economic 
power in the hands of government and a small private 
g r o u p .
(d) The Nigerian Company Act 1968 should be amended to 
stipulate that a company that has a specific capital 
base or a specific turnover or a specified net asset 
should automatically become public.
Long-Term Economic Objectives
17. To achieve balanced economic growth the Central Bank 
should enunciate or formulate for the government long-term
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national objectives matching the objectives with appropri­
ate policy instruments. These objectives will include
(a) Reduction in the level of unemployment.
(b) Reduction of government expenditure.
(c) Increase in per capita income.
(d) Increase in the supply of high level manpower.
(e) Increase in the export of Nigerian commodities in
order to increase foreign exchange earnings and
release pressure on the meagre external reserve level
(f) Even distribution of income.
(g) Self-sufficiency in food.
1 9(h) Indigenisation of economic activity.
Banking Supervision
18. To help promote economic growth through the services 
rendered by the banking supervision the following steps 
should be taken by the operators:
1. There is need for the banking system to evolve posi­
tive policies aimed at encouraging banking habits 
beyond media advertisements.
2. The Banking Supervision Department of the central 
bank of Nigeria should be decentralised in its field 
examination activities such that each central bank 
branch in each state of the Federation will have a 
unit which will be responsible for the field examina­
tion of the operations of licensed banks, in addition 
to central supervision and financial sector
19 Third National Development Plan, 1975-80, Vol. 1 p. 29
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development. This arrangement will be in consonance 
with the zonal system suggested in Chapter 4.
3. In the exercise of the powers conferred on it by s.20 
of the Banking Act 1969 the Central Bank of Nigeria 
should examine each bank at least once a year. The 
breach of this section of the law should no longer be 
condoned or encouraged.
4. The management of the Central Bank of Nigeria should 
publish a bank examination manual for the guidance of 
the staff and the commercial banks.
The Central Bank must see the powers conferred by s.39 
as an instrument for the promotion of high standards and 
not for inquisitorial harassment. As with the Bank of 
England, the Central Bank must seek to persuade, educate, 
rather than to bully or destroy.
Gaps in the Law
19. S. 41(1) of the Banking Act defines "banking business"
as: "Receiving monies from outside sources as deposits
irrespective of the payment of interest and the granting
of money loans and the acceptance of credits or the
purchase of bills and cheques or the purchase and sale of
securities for account of others or the incurring of the
>
obligation to acquire claims in respect of loans prior to 
their maturity or the assumption of guarantees and other 
warranties for others or the effecting of transfers and 
clearings".
The same section of the Decree defines four categories 
of banks: Commercial bank by reference to acceptance of
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deposits withdrawable by cheques; acceptance house by 
reference to acceptance facilities; discount house by 
reference to trading in and holding commercial bills of 
exchange, treasury bills and other securities; financial 
institutions as any other banking business whose main 
activity is none of the previous three definitions.
From this definition companies seeking to engage in 
banking proper in discounting of bills, acceptances, deal­
ing in securities or providing various financial services 
could be licensed so that they can come under the purview 
of companies doing "banking business". The Central Bank 
can then supervise them and channel their funds to 
desired sectors.
20. S.39 of the CBN Act requires the central bank to 
"ensure high standards of conduct and management throughout 
the banking system. " The Central Bank has a duty to define 
for the banking and financial system criteria of standards 
to follow in accordance with the highest standards in the 
banking world.
21. An alternative to rural banking is the establishment 
of special institutions for rural credit (e.g. Land banks, 
co-operative banks) or the compelling of state governments 
to establish more branches of the banks owned by them 
without prejudice to reforms 2 and 24 hereof.
22. in a dynamic society like Nigeria, the law should be 
reviewed and updated at frequent intervals so that law can 
meet the social, economic changes that take place in the 
society. The Central Bank should therefore employ more 
legal staff, encourage them and use them not only to review
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the laws but also to give professional opinions on the 
hundreds of activities and decisions the Central Bank 
takes daily that affect its relationship with the public, 
the business world and the staff. The few lawyers in the 
employment of the Bank are idle. A visit by them to the 
legal office, Federal Reserve Bank of India in Bombay 
would be helpful.
Dishonoured Cheques
23. In Nigeria dishonoured cheques fly about in their 
thousands; government cheques are frequently dishonoured 
for various reasons too. When Central Bank cheques issued 
by government departments are dishonoured very frequently 
as they do the harm done to the public confidence in the 
banking system can better be imagined than expressed.
Since government has not laid good example it cannot have 
the moral courage to enforce the existing laws on this 
malady.
Inter-Bank Clearing and Commercial Bank Services
24. The system of bankers' clearing houses established 
some 23 years ago in Nigeria has not made any significant 
progress or impact on the economy. It takes upwards of 
three months to clear an up-country cheque. According to 
Dr. P.N.C. Okigbo:
"What is in fact more disturbing is not 
the length of lead time but the slow growth 
of the system of clearing and the relative 
decline in the procedure. The picture of 
Lagos, the financial capital of Nigeria, 
is certainly disturbing".
Bank clearing systems represent one major aspect of reform 
that should be imaginatively and vigorously tackled by
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the Central Bank.
25. The quality of bank services rendered to the public 
should be improved in the following significant ways:
i) The clearances of cheques should be considerably 
accelerated.
ii) Bank staff that come in contact with members of the 
public should be trained in basic elementary courtesy.
iii) Bank halls and waiting rooms should be made much 
cleaner and more comfortable.
iv) Statement of accounts should be sent to customers much 
more frequently.
v) Inflation of interest charges on customers' accounts 
should be checked.
vi) Interest on savings should be credited much more 
promptly.
vii) Banks should consider offering their customers simple 
incentives such as personalised cheque books, special 
cheque books, special holders, etc.
viii)Urgent steps should be taken to reduce waiting time 
at bank halls.
Staff Training and Development
26. The Central Bank should invest massively in the train­
ing and development of its staff and those of the banking 
system generally at all levels.
A Nigerian National Commercial Bank
27. As private commercial banks may not find it profitable 
to open new branches in certain areas or in smaller towns, 
even under the rural banking programme, owing, inter alia,
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to low deposit potential and the inability of borrowers to 
offer types of security which are really marketable, a 
Nigerian national commercial bank should be established 
with the important objective of widening and deepening of 
the banking system both in geographical and functional 
coverage. When established it should take over the illegal 
commercial functions of the central bank which have been 
weighing it down considerably. The emergence of the 
Nigerian national commercial banks may introduce an element 
of healthy competition among other commercial banks, this 
competition may reflect itself in the provision of better 
services, more vigorous efforts towards branch expansion 
and attraction of deposits. For instance, what is called 
the "pigmy deposit scheme" should yield the desired result 
of harnessing rural savings. Under this scheme, the idea 
is that if the small man does not come to the bank, the 
bank will go to the doors of the small man. This will 
therefore mean that the small and the medium trader, the 
new and struggling entrepreneur, the small farmer who is 
crossing the subsistence stage, will have to be brought 
into the fold of the banking system.
Agricultural Credit
28. The Central Bank Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme 
has run into some difficulties in its operation. These 
include the problem of obtaining certificates of occupancy 
under the Land Use Act 1978 by farmers to meet collateral 
requirements of the bank, failure of some borrowers to 
meet repayment schedules, absence of farmers' co-operatives
580
fall in commodity prices in the world markets, dearth of 
trained technical staff, and difficulties encountered by 
some farmers in disposing of their produce due to market­
ing bottlenecks and lack of processing and storage 
facilities. In this regard, therefore, the availability of 
credit from the banking system guaranteed by the Central 
Bank ife not the panacea for Nigerian agricultural problems.
On the contrary, available evidence according to the 
20World Bank shows that credit unaccompanied by other 
inputs, stands little chance of being used for productive 
purposes. The Central Bank should therefore overhaul the 
agricultural credit guarantee scheme and initiate appropri­
ate policies and amendments to the Agricultural Credit 
Guarantee Fund Act No. 20 of March 1977, bearing all these 
problems in mind to ensure better performance of the agri­
cultural sector of the economy. In particular it should 
formulate a scheme whereby the customary method of using 
land as a security will involve minimum of formality and 
the maximum of flexibility. In this regard, local agricul­
tural credit committees should be established at local 
Government levels to offer assistance and directive to 
farmers. The Committee should include representatives from 
the local government, State Ministry of Agriculture,
Central Bank State Branch, the state bank, some leading 
local farmers. If the Central Bank formulates a viable 
agricultural policy which is efficiently implemented, 
Nigeria would be heading towards self-sufficiency and
20 World Bank, Bank Policy on Agricultural Credit; Agri­
cultural and Rural Development, 1984.
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self-reliance which is all economic growth is about.
Foreign Exchange Management
29. Government should begin early to restrict the manner 
in which our foreign exchange reserves are applied to 
conspicuous and luxury consumption. Policy measures should 
more consciously redirect the use of these reserves in 
favour of the import of plant and machinery necessary for 
our rapid economic development.
Government should therefore undertake a further care­
ful screening of the import list with a view of curtailing 
more sharply in line with paragraph 41 hereof the import 
of prestige and luxury items, whose import so far seems 
unaffected by imposition of heavy import duties. In addi­
tion, the balance of payments and other related considera­
tions , the exchange control machinery and regulations should 
be used as vehicles for channelling the flow of funds to 
the priority areas, as defined by Government from time to 
t i m e .
30. The Central Bank of Nigeria should prepare at the 
beginning of each year a foreign exchange budget and make 
use of the powers conferred by section 4(1) bf the CBN Act 
1958.
Staff of the Central Bank
31. The process of decision-making is rather long and 
tedious and papers and applications are processed and 
passed from one cadre of staff to another in an unending 
hierarchy of powers. In most cases, all that one officer
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does is simply to initial against his name or position.
This circuitous way of taking decisions applies where 
there are no predetermined rules but a range of discre­
tionary powers. The Central Bank should ensure that every 
official position carries with it a description of duties, 
method of carrying them out and rules governing approvals 
of applications and so on. As one writer said:
"The preference for a rule is also based 
on the belief that authorities tend to 
make poor decisions, and even if they should 
make a decision that is right at the time 
it is made, the policy action may be inap­
propriate by the time it takes effect on 
the economy."21
32. The professional staff of the Central Bank should be 
strengthened to enable it to discharge its responsibilities 
both to the nation and to ECOWAS. The staff strength 
should be reduced to shake off the loafers and idlers.
The bank is grossly overstaffed.
Monetary Policy
33. The major problem in achieving all our economic goals 
is that the policy action necessary to move toward one 
goal may conflict with the action required to move toward 
some other goal. The relation between price stability and 
full employment is a case in point. If there is excessive 
unemployment, easing credit is an appropriate policy
22
action to stimulate demand as it was stated in Chapter 8.
21 Monetary Policy and the Financial System, 1983, by " 
Paul M. Horvitz and Richard A. Ward, p. 4 92.
22 Above, at p. 434.
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This increased demand, however, may have an inflationary 
effect on some segments of the economy. The Central Bank 
should therefore be very discreet in choosing policy 
options.
34. If national objectives are to be more effectively 
achieved, the Central Bank should be given power to control 
some relevant aspects of the operations of all financial 
institutions. The control which is necessary for the 
overall monetary policy objectives need not be of the same 
degree as that exercised over the commercial banks.
State Banks: Constitutional Position and Distribution of 
Functions
35. In order to prevent party political manipulation of 
the banking system and the board of directors. the present 
tendency towards statism in banking should be controlled. 
Banking in general should be on the Exclusive, instead of 
the Concurrent, legislative list.
Advisory Bodies
36. An advisory committee on monetary and financial policy 
should be established.
The committee should be located in the Federal Minis­
try of Finance and be composed of the Governor of the 
Central Bank, Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of 
Economic Development, Trade, Industries and Agriculture, 
the Managing Director or Chief Executive of the following 
apex institutions: the National Industrial Development 
Bank, National Bank for Commerce and Industry, National
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Bank for Agriculture and Co-operatives, the National R e ­
insurance Corporation and the National Mortgage Bank.
This committee should serve as a sounding board, a 
clearing forum for monetary and financial policy-making.
It should also be in a position to generate new ideas for 
monetary and financial policy.
In addition to these roles required of the committee 
during the annual major budgetary exercise, it should also 
play the same roles during the financial year, when adjust­
ments are to be made in monetary and financial policy.
Additionally, the committee will be available to con­
sider and advise on matters referred to it by the Federal 
Executive Council; such matters will include not only 
direct monetary and financial matters but also any other 
matters which have major monetary implication.
37. In addition to the Banker's Committee which has an 
official status, there is need for licensed banks to form 
an association as a forum for discussing common problems.
38. There is need for the establishment of a machinery 
for the monitoring of licensed banks in which the Federal 
Government beneficially owns the largest equity holding 
covering the following areas:
(a) Formulating operational policy guidelines for the 
banks in the context of national objectives for the 
banking system.
(b) Laying down performance criteria for the banks and 
ensuring their observance and generally keeping in 
check their operating c o sts.
(c) Evaluating the performance of the banks in the context
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of the approved operational policy guidelines and 
performance criteria.
(d) Recommending to the President candidates for appoint­
ments as Managing Directors/Directors/Chief Executives 
and Executive Directors of such banks.
Devolution of Functions
39. The Bank should delegate to commercial banks the 
following functions which over the years have weighed down
the B a n k :
(a) Monthly home remittance and gratuity
(b) Membership subscription, and Examination fees (private)
(c) Correspondence course fees
(d) Education (private) fees
(e) Business travel allowances
(f) Basic travel allowance
(g) Provident/pension fund contribution by non nationals
(h) Medical travel
(i) External accounts of missions abroad.
40. The Central Bank should rid itself of all commercial
banking activities which it now undertakes, of opening of 
letters of credit; maintaining of accounts for parastatals 
and other companies; payment of pensions and national 
provident fund contributions; payments to military person­
nel; financing of Commodity Boards operations; sections 
4(1) and 29(A) of the CBN 1958 to be amended accordingly.
Hiatus of 7 Years
41. It is now fashionable for almost all countries in the
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western world to operate a central banking system in line 
with the Bank of England or USA Federal Reserve systems.
In doing so they swallow, hook, line and sinker, both 
relevant and irrelevant aspects of the borrowed systems. 
The Commonwealth African countries should "boycott the 
boycottables" in the immortal words of the late Mazi 
Mbonu Ojike. To this end Nigeria should for the next 7 
years look inwards for the solution of her economic prob­
lems, develop her agriculture, manpower, local credit, 
electricity, water and other infrastructure and look out­
side only for the essential. Importation of goods and 
trade with the outside world should be severely curtailed 
and limited to drugs, books,essential raw materials and 
machinery. This would have the effect of reducing to 
manageable proportions the ubiquitous functions of the 
Central Bank. Its relationship with the:IMF, Bank for 
International Settlements and so on have not had any salu­
tary effect on the economy. Aid, according to Teresa 
Hayter, "has never been an unconditioned transfer of 
financial resources. Usually, the conditions of aid are
clearly and directly intended to serve the interests of
23
the governments providing it" and according to Peter
Bauer: "If foreign aid were indispensable for emergence
from poverty, the r i c h .countries of today could not have
24
developed because they did not receive foreign aid".
2 3 The Third World Problems and perspective by Alan B. 
Mo u n t j o y , p . 121.
24 I b i d , p . 6.
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Nigeria can afford in the next 7 years to do without them. 
During this moratorium economic commissions and study 
groups and workshops which should include lawyers with 
specialised knowledge and interest would come up with a 
blueprint on the ways of revamping the Nigerian economy.
At the end of this period it is likely that Nigeria 
would have discovered herself, her mistakes and miscalcul­
ations and with established infrastructure be ready for 
an economic take-off under dynamic financial and banking 
legislation and control.
An Ideology
42. Nigeria has no national ideology. Before capitalism 
engulfed Nigeria's political and economic systems, the 
dominant forms of ideology known to Nigeria were autocracy, 
communalism and welfarism which can still be found in 
the extended family system. With the coming of capitalism 
Nigeria appeared to have abandoned the native ideologies. 
America adopted capitalism, Russia communism, Britain 
democratic socialism, Sweden democratic welfarism,
Cuba pragmatic communism, China reformed communism,
Ghana conscientism, Tanzania African socialism or 
Ujaama, Senegal democratic socialism, Egypt Arab 
socialism, Zambia humanism and so on. Nigeria should 
like all countries adopt an ideology and stop flirting 
with various ideas and thoughts of other people which have 
given rise to importing foreign goods rather than to pro­
ducing competing goods, adopting British and American 
systems of government, education, judiciary, culture 
fashion, rather than experimenting on her own. What matters
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is not what ideology Nigeria adopts but how she can tailor 
any ideology to rhyme with the expectations of the people. 
In formulating policies the Central Bank should give 
serious thought to enunciating the ideology, preferrably 
pragmatic socialism. Whatever ideology is bred should 
find an entrenched position in the country's federal 
constitution.
Borrowing From The IMF
43. Since 198 3 the Central Bank of Nigeria and the repre­
sentatives of the Federal Government, have been negotiating 
a loan of about $2 billion from the IMF. The conditions 
under which the loan may be granted are: abolition or 
liberalisation of foreign exchange and import control; 
devaluation of the exchange rate, i.e. of the national 
currency; domestic anti-inflationary programmes including:
(a) Control of bank credit; higher interest rates and 
higher reserve requirement.
(b) Control of government deficits curbs in spending, 
increase in taxes and prices charges by public enter­
prises, abolition of consumer subsidies.
(c) Control of wage rises, in so far as this will not 
bring down the government in office.
(d) Dismantling of price controls.
(e) Greater hospitality to foreign investment, i.e. adop­
tion of an investment code more profitable to foreign 
investors.
To request Nigeria to devalue when it has only oil to 
export and to demand liberalisation of trade when there is
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no foreign reserve or to remove subsidy on petrol when 
cost of transport would rise astronmically is undoubtedly 
to provoke a catastrophe in the country. As the Academic 
Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) put it, "From what we 
observe the military government is, without saying so, 
implementing the conditions of the International Monetary 
Fund. It is the view of the ASUU that to inaugurate wage 
freezes and retrenchment in the name of efficiency, to 
raise school fees or impose new taxes on the needy in order 
to enable parasitic capitalists to prosper is to sacrifice 
the majority to the selfish interests of a few. Hence,
ASUU calls for an immediate stop to and a reversal of these 
anti-people m e a s u r e s . " ^
According to President Julius Nyerere, who is the 
current Chairman of the OAU, "the IMF and other interna­
tional institutions were becoming consciously or uncon­
sciously tools of the rich countries who control the 
economies of poor nations". President Nyerere made the 
statement, while addressing newsmen after signing a con­
tract with an Islamic firm for the development of gold 
mines in Northern Tanzania. Denying that his country was
closed to foreign investors, he said that he was using
2 6
capitalist firms to develop socialism in Tanzania.
On another occasion he said:
"The IMF is an instrument of control and 
not of development in Africa and the Third
25 National Concord, September 5, 1984, p. 7.
26 Daily Times, November 24, 1984, p. 1.
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World. The IMF is used by the rich 
countries of the World and, in particular, 
the powerful Western countries to control 
the economies of the World. The sooner 
the developing countries realised their 
situation the better. A few years ago,
Tanzania rejected IMF pre-conditions of 
wage-freeze, abolition of price subsidies, 
removal of import controls and devaluation 
by 50% in return for aid.27
Indonesia, Chile under Allende, Mexico, Brazil,
Sudan and Argentine have never survived the difficulties 
that led them to IMF loan package agreements. Once a 
country enters the vicious circle of the IMF, it finds 
it is impossible to live without it as to live with it, 
unless some radical action is taken by that country. For 
example, Sukarno restricted Indonesian imports from the 
West, placed some timid government controls over foreign 
oil companies, and, more importantly, announced the with­
drawal of Indonesia from the IMF and of course from the 
World Bank.
The Central Bank should therefore advise against taking 
IMF loans, and join hands with the Academic Staff Union 
of Universities (ASUU) to advise against taking the IMF 
loan.
Reorganisation of Central Banks
44. The Central Bank of Nigeria should from time to time 
appraise the roles it had played in directing the banking 
system and re-examine the modalities it had employed to 
see if they were still relevant to the dynamic society and
27 The Nigeria Punch, December 15, 1984, p. 16.
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"purge itself of its own inefficiencies by means of a
review of its organisation and operations using the
2 8
framework provided by the McKinsey Report, 1976". This 
is necessary because its operational efficiency is crucial 
to the efficient and effective management of the national 
economy particularly since it had been observed that:
"in practice top management expend consider­
able part of their official time dealing 
with trivial matters, at the expense of 
their more important roles of Planning, C o ­
ordinating and directing the affairs of the 
Bank and ultimately the effective management 
of the national e c o n o m y " . 29
If a review is carried out occasionally, say once
every three years, it should be aimed at improving the
scope and quality of its services and at addressing "itself
to those problems which inhibit the efficient operation
of the Banking System and the sound and healthy growth of
30Nigeria's financial system".
We conclude this section on Reforms by reiterating 
that the legislation and the resulting practices of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria have not left a strong impact on 
the economy of Nigeria and a fortiori those of other 
Anglophone African countries. The Central Bank of Nigeria 
itself had said so when it was noted by the Board Commit­
tee on the Banking System that:
28 Report of the Board Committee on the Banking System, 
November 1986, p. 6.
29 Ibid, p . 27.
30 I b i d , p . 28.
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"It is arguable whether the present unsat­
isfactory state of affairs in the operations 
of the Central Bank of Nigeria could have 
been avoided if the McKinsey Report had been 
fully implemented. At least, it could 
have mitigated the dynamic chaos which now 
exists and which is fast changing the envi­
able image of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
into one of those government organs where 
nothing works. The long daily queues of 
persons outside the Central Bank of Nigeria 
premises, waiting to see officials of the 
Bank, the delays in getting things done, 
the frustrations of the public in their 
interactions with the Banking System, the 
defective state of the Clearing System, the 
lackadaisical attitude of staff to their 
responsibilities and most disturbingly the 
mounting allegations of corrupt practices 
against officials of the Bank are only the 
agonising symptoms of the serious deterioration 
which has begun to set in the operational 
standards of the Central Bank of Nigeria."
EPILOGUE
From the foregoing it would seem that the efforts of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria in the process of economic 
development and growth of the Nigerian economy do not seem 
to be bringing forth the expected fruits. Nigeria still 
feels overly dependent on the rich countries for the 
supply of capital and know-how, for the purchase of her 
exports, for the exploitation of local minerals particu­
larly crude oil and other resources. The population 
explosion has eaten up a large chunk of the growth in 
national product, and failure to achieve economic growth 
at least as rapid as population growth has meant stagnation.
31 Ibi d , pp. 4-5.
593
The increase in national income has gone into the pockets 
of the new rich, a prosperous middle and upper class in 
the country. The large mass of the people are virtually 
untouched and unaffected by the economic progress achieved 
since Independence.
The measure of economic development of Nigeria is 
further compounded by the political constraints which have 
been noted as influencing many decisions that should have 
been considered as economic problems. The inefficiency and 
the ineffectiveness of the Central Bank to lead Nigeria to 
economic growth has been compounded by avoidable extraneous 
factors. The world recession, imported inflation and the 
inordinate scramble by some unscrupulous aliens to damage 
the economy through fraudulent importation practices and 
currency trafficking and forgeries are some of the debili­
tating factors. Other contributing factors are the 
intransigence of successive governments to heed economic 
advice particularly with regard to over-borrowing, uncon­
trolled government spending, prestigious uneconomic 
projects, external borrowing, widespread corruption in high 
and low places, the ineffectiveness of other arms of the 
economy, for example, the lame electricity corporation and 
other suppliers of infrastructural arsenal.
The technology which is available today in Nigeria 
and other African countries is capital-intensive but 
labour-saving. While, for instance industries and service 
occupations during the Industrial Revolution of the 19th 
century, were labour-intensive thus directly absorbing 
large numbers of unskilled workers, the technologies which
were transplanted to Nigeria involved labour-saving tech­
niques as we have noted above. The transference of such 
advanced technology consumes much of the developing world's 
scarce and expensive capital and offers little employment 
in countries where under- and unemployment are acute 
problems. The technology that Nigeria needs should be 
capital-saving. Those who industrialised during the 19th 
century had to invent their technologies as they went 
along, whereas Nigeria and other developing countries have 
at their disposal a range of technologies already in exis­
tence for which they require enormous capital. The pioneers 
had to find their investment capital entirely from their 
own savings; today the developing countries can obtain 
loans and grants from the rich countries at great cost to 
them. What Nigeria needs is to concern herself not with 
just economic growth alone but should also direct its 
attention to a combination of objectives, for example, 
full employment, equitable income distribution and so on. 
Growth for its own sake is not sufficient, economic growth 
must overcome poverty, perfidy, squalour, disease and 
ignorance.
Weighing up the pros and cons of our subject it is 
difficult to decide whether Nigeria and other Commonwealth 
African countries will find the road to economic develop­
ment through the operations and practices of the central 
banks. This view is shared by the World Bank, as reported 
in the London Observer of 23rd September, 1984, when it 
said that "It [the World Bank Report] paints a stark picture 
of an entire continent [Africa] spiralling down towards
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disaster, with economies slumping, less food being produced
and the population doubling by the end of the century".
In the past three years Africa South of the Sahara had
32
fallen back 15 years in development per capita. Income 
and output were both lower than they were in 1970 while 
foreign aid was stagnating. The Report blames the policies 
of both African countries and aid givers. Unlike most 
international reports, it mentioned names, particularly 
Uganda, Ghana, Sudan, Zambia and Nigeria which despite 
having some of the best natural resources in Africa are 
among those with the worst economic records.
The problem posed by economic growth have to be solved 
mainly by the governments, the central banks and other key 
operators in the banking system; but these problems cannot 
be solved by the efforts of these countries alone.
They do not have capital markets, entrepreneurial 
and managerial expertise, technological knowledge. They 
also lack vocational skills and the capacity to impart 
them. The advanced countries have a duty to bail out 
Nigeria and other countries in a similar position so that 
the world would be a better place for all the inhabitants, 
and in the words of President H.S. Truman (January 20,
1949), "We must embark on a bold new program for making 
the benefits of our scientific and industrial progress
32 The average standard of living of a country is vaguely 
measured by per capita income. In 1951 the United 
Nations attempted a definition of the developed and the 
developing countries. In 1951 therefore a country was 
considered undeveloped if the per capita income was 
less than a quarter of the per capita income of the USA 
which in 1951 was estimated at $2000 and a quarter of 
that sum was $500.
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available for the improvement and growth of under-developed 
areas". The Central Bank of Nigeria that wears the mantle 
of leadership in this economic crusade should wake up from 
its slumber and redeem the "giant of Africa" from economic 
stagnation in which it finds itself.
The need for reform is important and urgent and the 
reforms must be undertaken by the key operators and to 
the extent that these far-reaching reforms are pursued and 
effected particularly by these operators can it be said 
that the Central Bank of Nigeria is ready and willing to 
stimulate economic growth in Nigeria. This it can do under 
the guidance of law as the instrument of change with which 
reformed economic arrangements can be introduced. As the 
President of the World Bank, Mr. Robert McNamara, said:
"We are on the frontier of a new field of knowledge here, 
and we have far more questions than we have answers. But 
the urgency of the situation is such that we simply cannot 
wait until all the answers are in. We must begin now with 
what we know. And we clearly know enough to at least make 
a beginning. If we make mistakes we simply have to learn 
from t h e m i " ^
3 3 Address to the Board of Governors, Washington (28 
September, 1972), p. 16.
597
TABLE OF CASES
A. G. of Ogun State v A. G. of the Federation Suit No SC 53/1981 of 5/2/83.
Barclays Bank Ltd v Central Bank of Nigeria (1976) NCLR 288.
Basorun v Industrial Arbitration Tribunal & Ors Suit No LD/105/71
High Court of Lagos Unreported.
Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Limited Re [1911] 1 Ch. 425.
CBN v Barclays Bank Ltd (1976) NCLR 288.
CBN v Odaro (1974) NCLR 200.
Cheranci v Alkali Cheranci (1960) NNLR 24.
City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Limited. [1925] Ch. 428.
Denham & Co. Re [1883] 25 Ch. D. 752. (1964) 32 MLR.
Doherty v Sir A. Tafawa Balewa [1963] 1 WLR 949.
Edet v Essien (1932) 11 NLR 47.
Effiong Okon Ata Re (1930) 10 NLR 65.
Eshugbayi Eleko v Government of Nigeria. [1928] AC 459; [1931] AC 662.
Etablissement Esefka International Anstalt v Central Bank of Nigeria 
[1979] 1 Lloyds Report 445.
Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 H.A 461.
Grimwade v Mutual Society (1885) 52LT406 416.
Hedley Byrne v Heller and Partners [1964] AC 465.
Hispano Americana Mercantile S.A. v Central Bank of Nigeria [1979] 2 
Lloyds Report 277.
Inspector-General of Police v Kamara (1934) 2 WACA 185.
Labinjoh v Abeke (1924) 5NLR 33.
Lagunas Nitrate Company v Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch. 426.
Lakanmi v Attorney-General, Suit No SC 58/69 Supreme Court, Unreported. 
Laoye v Oyetunde [1944] AC 170.
Le Mesurier v Connor (1929) CLR 481. 497.
Mansouri v Singh LTR July 21, 1984.
Marquis of Butes Case [1892] 2 Ch. 100.
598
McCulloch v Maryland 4 Wheat 316 (1819) 421.
Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 69.
National Bank Ltd v C.B.N. (1976) NCLR 199.
Salomon v Salomon and Company Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22.
Sharif v Azad [1967] 1QB 605.
Texas v White 7 WALL 700 (1869) p. 700.
Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1976]
3 ALL E.R. 437.
Turquand: v Marshall [1869] L.R.4 Ch. App. 376, 386.
United City Merchants (Investment) Ltd. v Royal Bank of Canada 
[1983] 1 AC. 168.
Wilson, Smithett and Cope Ltd v Terrazzi [1976] QB 683, 694-5. 
Winter v Langrish Southern Limited (1966) E.A. 292.
599
TABLE OF STATUTES
Australia
Australian Commonwealth Bank Act 1945-53.
Canada
Bank of Canada Act 1954.
Ceylon
Central Bank of Ceylon Monetary Law Act No 58, 1949. 
Cuba
Central Bank Law of Cuba 1948.
Finland
Bank of Finland Act 1925.
Greece
Central Bank of Greece 
Hong Kong
Banking Ordinance No 76 of 1980.
India
Reserve Bank of India Act 1934.
Indian Industrial Disputes Act 1947.
Indonesia
Bank of Indonesia Act No 13 of 1968.
Kenya
Bills of Exchange Act of Kenya.
Central Bank of Nigeria of Kenya 1966.
Judicature Act of Kenya, Act 1967.
Kenya Currency Interpretation Ordinance No 1, 1922. 
The Kenya Banking Act 1969.
Korea
Bank of Korea Act, 1950.
600
Netherlands
Netherlands Bank Act 1948.
Nigeria
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund Act 1977.
Banking Obligations (Eastern States) Decree 56 of 1970. 
Banking Ordinance 1952.
Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958.
Central Bank of Nigeria Bye-Laws 1959.
Constitution (suspension and modification) Decree 1966. 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979. 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963.
Cowries Proclamation June 1904.
Decimal Currency Act No 21 1971.
Designation of Ordinances Act 1961.
Exchange Control Anti-Sabotage Decree 1977.
Exchange Control Anti-Sabotage Decree 1984.
Federal Military Government (Supremacy Enforcement of Powers) 
Decree No 28 1970.
Finance Decree, No 32, 1969.
High Court of Lagos Act Cap 80.
High Court Law Eastern States No 27.
High Court Law Mid Western States No 89 of 1964.
High Court Law Northern States No 8. 1955.
High Court Law Western States Cap 44.
Labour Decree 1974.
Lagos Stock Exchange Act 1961.
Money Lenders Ordinance 1939.
•Native Courts Proclamation NO 25 of 1901.
Native Currency Proclamation No 4 of 1902.
Native Market Proclamation 1901.
601
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry Decree No 22 1973. 
Nigerian Coinage Ordinance 1906.
Nigerian Companies Ordinance 1906.
Nigerian Companies Act 1968.
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act 1972.
Nigerian Evidence Act Cap 62.
Nigerian Exchange Control Ordinance 1950.
Nigerian Exchange Control Delegation of Powers Notice, Legal 
Notice No 82. 1962.
Nigerian Trade Unions Act 1973.
Northern Nigeria Children & Young Persons Law 1958.
Post Office Savings Bank Ordinance 1939.
Pre-shipment Inspection of Imports Act 1978.
Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1979.
The Nigerian Banking Act 1969.
Trade Disputes (Central Bank of Nigeria Arbitration Award) 
Confirming Order, 1971.
Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) (No 2 ) 
Decree 1969.
Treasury Bills (Amendment) Act 1961.
Treasury Bills (Amendment) Act No 2 1961.
Treasury Bills (Amendment) Act 1962.
Treasury Bills Certificate Decree 40, 1968.
Treasury Bills (Amendment) Decree 1967.
Treasury Bills (Amendment) Decree 1968.
Treasury Bills (Amendment) Decree 1970.
Treasury Bills Ordinance 1959.
Norway
'Monetary Act 1875 of the Kingdom of Norway
602
O.A.U.
Organization of African Unity Charter 1962.
Pakistan
State Bank of Pakistan Act^  1956.
Portugal
Decree Law No 43341 of November 22, 1960.
Central Bank of Portugal Act.
Rhodesia
Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Ordinance 1956.
Sudan
Bank of Sudan Act 1959.
Sweden
Sveriges Riksbank Act 1934.
Tanzania
Bank of Tanzania Act 1965.
Credit to Natives (Restriction) Ordinance 1931.
Tanzania Exchange Control Ordinance Cap 294, 1951.
Tanzania Finance Act 1973.
Tanzania Import Control Ordinance Cap 292. 1951.
The Control of the Business of Life Assurance with Africans 
Ordinance 1945.
Uganda
Bank of Uganda Act 1966.
East Africa and Uganda Currency Order in Council 1905.
East Africa Protectorate Order in Council 1902.
United Kingdom
Bank of England Act 1946.
Bretton Woods Agreement Order in Council No 36, 1946. 
Defence (Finance Regulations) 1939.
Exchange Control Act 1947.
603
Payment of Wages Act 1960.
Truck Act 1931.
U.S.A.
U.S. Federal Reserve Act.
U.S. International Banking Act September 17, 1978. 
U.N.O.
U.N.O. Charter 
Bretton Woods Agreement 
B.I.S. Convention.
I.B.R.D. Articles of Agreement.
IMF Fund Agreement 
Zambia
Bank of Zambia Act 1964.
Zambia Legal Notice No 59. of 1967.
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APPENDIX I
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA
(i) CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA ACT, 1958 (CAP. 30)
(as amended 1962-1969)
INCORPORATING ALL CENTRAL BANK PRINCIPAL 
LEGISLATIONS AMENDING THE 1958 ACT OF 
WHICH THE LATEST IS FINANCE DECREE. 
(DECREE No. 32, 1969)
(ii) CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA BYE-LAWS, 1959
(iii) BANKING DECREE, 1969 (as amended by
BANKING (Amendment) DECREE, 1970-Decree No. 3)
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CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA ACT, 1958 
(AS AMENDBD 1952-1969) 
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTION
1. Short title and commencement.
2. Interpretation.
. CONSTITUTION
3. Establishment and incorporation of the Bank.
4. Objects.
5. Head office and branches.
CAPITAL AND RESERVE
6. Capital.
7. General reserve fund. / •
ADMINISTRATION
8. Board of Directors.
Section 3 C.B.N. Act (Amendment) Decree No. 3, 1968.
9. Governor and Deputy Governor.
10. Directors:
11. Disqualification from and cessation of appointment.
12. Appointment to fill a vacancy.
13. Meetings of Board.
14. Appointments of officials.
15. Advisory Committee.
CURRENCY
16. Currency of Nigeria.
17. Parity of pound. S. 2 of C.B.N. Amendment Act, 1962.
18. Sole right to issue.
19. Provisions of issue.
20* Denomination and form of note and coin.
21. Bank’s currency to be legal tender.
22- Tampering with coinage.
23. Lost and damaged currency. ,
24- Exemption from stamp duty.
25- External reserve.
S. 4 of Amendment Act, 1962—Value of external reserve.
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OPERATIONS
S. 5 of Amendment Act, 1962. Obligation in respect of currency. 
(S. 26, 27, & 28 repealed).
29. General powers of Bank.
29A. Power of the Bank to require certain information.
Central Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Decree No. 3 
Decree No. 50, 1968 — Power to finance purchasing and 
marketing operations.
30. Prohibited activities.
31. Publication of rediscount rate.
j
RELATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
32. Functions regarding Federal Government.
33. Federal Government’s rights.
34. Advances to Federal Government.
35. Issue and management of Federal loans.
36. Federal funds and institutions.
37. Agency for Federal Government.
- RELATIONS WITH OTHER BANKS
38. Nigerian and other banks.
39. Co-operation with banks in Nigeria.
Sec. 2 of C.B.N. Act (Amendment) Decree 1968.
40. Bank may prescribe liquidity minimum.
41. Other banks as agents.
42. Clearing house.
ACCOUNTS AND STATEMENTS
43. Financial year.
44. Audit.
45. Accounts and annual report and publication thereof.
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
46. Preparatory provisions for first issue.
47. Existing currency.
MISCELLANEOUS
48. Bye-laws.
49. Income tax.
50. Companies Act.
51. Prohibited banking names.
52. Liquidation.
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FEDERATION OF NIGERIA
IN THE SEVENTH YEAR OF THB REION OF HER MAJESTY QUEEN
ELIZABETH II
S ir  R a l p h  F r a n c is  A l n w ic k  G r ey , k .c .v .o ., c .m .g ., o .b .e.
Officer Administering the Government o f  the Federation.
AN act to provide for the Establishment of a Central Bank of Nigeria and to provide for its Constitution and Functions: 
to provide that it shall be a Bank of Issue and for such purpose 
to provide that its Notes and Coins shall be legal tender 
and at some future date shall be the sole legal tender in 
Nigeria: to provide that the Central Bank shall be Bankers 
to the Government and shall have certain powers in relation to 
other Banks: and for purposes ancillary to the purposes 
aforesaid.
(By Notice)
BE IT ENACTED by the Legislature of the Federation 
of Nigeria as follows:
1. This Act may be cited as the Central Bank of Nigeria 
Act, 1958, and shall come into operation upon such date as 
may be notified in the Gazette by the Governor-General 
after the signification of the pleasure of Her Majesty thereon, 
and different dates may be prescribed for the coming into 
operation of different section of the Act.
INTERPRETATION
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— 
“ the Bank” means the Central Bank of Nigeria 
established by this Act.
“ the Board** means the Board of Directors of the 
Bank "the Governor*’ and “the Deputy Governor” 
mean, respectively, “ the Governor” and “the De­
puty Governor” of the bank; “ the Commissioner” 
means the Commissioner charged with responsibi­
lity for matters relating to finance in the Federa­
tion; “ State” or “ States” means appertaining to 
the States of Nigeria either individually or collec­
tively as the context requires.
Tiile
Commencement.
Enactment.
Short title and 
Commencement.
Interpretation.
Establiihments 
and Incorpora­
tion o f the Bank.
Objects. As 
amended by C. 
B. N . (Amend­
ment) Act, 1962 
and as amended 
by C. B. N . 
(Amendment) 
Decree 1967 
Section 1 (a).
Head Office and 
branches as 
amended by 
Section 1 (a) of 
C .B .N . Am end­
ment Decree 
1967.
CAPITAL
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CONSTITUTION
3. (1) A bank to be called the “ Central Bank of Nigeria” 
shall be established in accordance with the provisions of this 
Act and shall commence business on a day to be appointed 
by the Governor-General by notification in the Gazette.
(2) The Bank shall be a  body corporate and shall have 
perpetual succession and a common seal, and may sue and 
be sued in its own name, and subject to the limitations con­
tained in this Act may acquire, hold and dispose of movable 
and immovable property for the purpose o f its functions.
4. (1) The principal objects of the Bank shall be to issue 
legal tender currency in Nigeria to maintain external reserves 
to  safeguard the international value of that currency, to pro­
mote monetary stability and a sound financial structure in 
Nigeria and to act as banker and financial adviser to the 
Federal Government.
(2) The objects of the bank shall include the issue of 
legal tender currency in the Northern and Southern Camcroons 
in accordance with any arrangements in that behalf between 
the Government o f the Federation and the Governments of 
the Northern and Southern Cameroons.) No longer applicable.
5. The Bank shall have its head office in Lagos and may 
open branches in Nigeria and appoint agents and corres­
pondents in accordance with decisions o f the Board.
CAPITAL AND RESERVE
6. (1) The authorised capital of the Bank shall be one 
million five hundred thousand pounds. There shall be paid 
up such amount as shall be resolved by the Bank and con­
firmed by the Commissioner and this am ount shall be subscri­
bed by and paid up at par by the Federal Government upon 
the establishment o f the Bank.
(2) The paid-up portion of the authorised capital 
may be increased by such am ount as the Board 
may, from time to time, resolve with the agreement 
of the Commissioner, and the Federal Government 
shall subscribe and pay up at par the amount of 
such increase.
(3) All the paid-up capital shall be subscribed and 
held only by the Federal Government.
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7. (1) The Bank shall establish a general reserve fund 
to which shall be allocated at the end of each financial year 
of the Bank —
(a) one-eighth o f the net profits of the Bank for the 
year when, a t the end of that year, the fund is 
less in am ount than the paid-up capital of the 
Bank;
(b) one-sixteenth o f the net profits of the Bank for the 
year when, a t the end of that year, the fund is not 
less in am ount than the paid-up capital of the Bank 
but is less in am ount than twice the paid-up capital.
(2) After any allocation has been made in terms of 
subsection (1), one half of the remainder o f the 
net profits shall be applied to the retirement of any 
outstanding obligations of the Federal Govern­
ment to the Bank arising from the financing of the 
cost o f the printing, minting and shipment of the 
initial stock o f the Bank’s notes and coins.
(3) The remainder of the net profits shall be paid to 
the Federal Government.
(4) The net profits o f the Bank for each financial 
year shall be determined by the Bank after meeting all current 
expenditure for that year and after making such provision 
as it thinks fit for bad and doubtful debts, depreciation in 
assets, contributions to staff and superannuation , funds, 
and all other contingencies.
ADM INISTRATION
8. (1) There shall be a Board of Directors o f the Bank 
which shall be responsible for the policy and general admini­
stration of the affairs and business of the Bank.
(2) The Board shall consist o f a Governor, a Deputy 
Governor and five other directors.
Section 3 of C.B.N. Act (Amendment) Decree No. 3, 1968.
3. (1) The board shall keep the Commissioner informed 
of the m onetary and banking policy pursued or 
intended to be pursued by the Central Bank.
General reserve 
fund.
Board of  
Directors.
Direction as to 
policy.
(2) The Commissioner shall, from time to time if he 
disagrees with the Board on the monetary and
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Governor and
Deputy
Governor.
banking policy pursued or intended to be pursued 
by the Central Bank, so inform the board of his 
disagreement thereto, and the Commissioner may 
submit his representation and that of the Central 
Bank on the. disagreement to the Federal Executive 
Council.
(3) The Federal Executive Council may in writing 
after considering the representations direct the 
Central Bank as to the monetary and banking 
policy pursued or intended to be pursued and the 
direction shall be binding on the board which 
shall forthwith take all steps necessary or expedient 
to give effect thereto.
(4) The Governor or, in his absence, the Deputy 
Governor shall be in charge of the day-to-day management 
of the Bank and shall be answerable to the Board for their 
acts and decisions.
9. (1) The Governor and Deputy Governor shall be 
persons of recognised financial experience and shall be appoin­
ted by the Head of the Federal Military Government by ins­
trument under the public seal on such terms and conditions 
as may be set out in their respective letters of appointment.
(2) The Governor and Deputy Governor shall each be 
appointed for a term of five years and shall be eligible for 
reappointment: Provided that the appointment, or first 
appointment, of the first Deputy Governor shall be for a 
term of three years.
(3) The Governor and Deputy Governor shall devote 
the whole of their professional time to the service of the Bank 
and while holding office shall not occupy any other office 
or employment whether remunerated or not: .
Provided that they may by virtue of their office, be mem­
bers of or advisers to the Loans Advisory Board or its succes­
sor: Provided also that they may, if so appointed with the 
approval by resolution of the Board,
(a) act as members of any Commission established by 
the Federal Government to enquire into any 
matter affecting currency or banking in Nigeria;
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(6) become governors, directors, or members of the 
Board, by whatever name called, of any interna­
tional bank of international monetary authority 
to which the Federal Government shall have 
adhered or given support or approval;
(c) become directors of any corporation in Nigeria 
in which the Bank may participate under para­
graph (/) of section 29.
10. (1) The five other directors of the Bank shall be 
appointed by the Head of the Federal Military Government 
of the Federation.
(2) A director shall be a person of recognised standing 
and experience in affairs, but as a director of the Bank he 
shall not be regarded or act as a delegate on the Board from 
any Federal or, State authority, or from any commercial, 
financial, agricultural, industrial, or other interests with which 
he may have been connected.
(3) A director shall hold office for three years and be 
eligible for reappointment: Provided that, of the first five 
directors to be appointed under this section, one shall, or 
shall in the first instance, be appointed for one year, and two 
shall, or shall in the first instance, be appointed for two years.
(4) A director shall be entitled to fees and allowances 
in accordance with such rules as the Board, subject to confir­
mation by the Commissioner, may lay down.
11. (1) No person shall be appointed or shall remain 
Governor, Deputy Governor or other director of the Bank 
who —
(a) Is a member of a Federal Legislative House;
(b) Is a member of a State Legislative House;
(c) Is a director, salaried official or shareholder of 
any bank licensed under the provisions of tho 
Banking Act, 1958;
(d) Is an officer in the public service of the Federal 
or a State Government: Provided that this 
paragraph shall not render ineligible any person 
whose sole duties are those of economic adviser 
to the Federal Government.
Disqualification  
from and  
cessation o f  
appointment.
(S. 11 as amen­
ded by S. I. o f  
C .B .N .  Amend­
ment Act, 1962).
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Appointment to  
fill a vacancy. 
As amended by 
Section 1 (c) o f  
C .B .N . (Am end­
ment) Decree 
1967.
(2) (a) The Governor or Deputy Governor may resign
his office on giving at least three months* notice 
in writing to the Head of the Federal Military 
Government of his intention.
(6) Any Director may resign after a notice in writing 
of at least a month to the Head of the Federal 
Military Government of his intention.
(3) The Governor, Deputy Governor or any other director 
shall cease toehold office in the Bank, if—
(a) he becomes of unsound mind or incapable of 
carrying out his duties;
(b) he becomes bankrupt or suspends payment or 
compounds with his creditors;
(c) he is convicted of a felony or of any offence 
i n vol ving dishonesty;
(d) he is guilty of serious misconduct in relation to 
his duties;
(e) in the case of person on possessed of professional 
qualifications, he is disqualified or suspended 
(otherwise than at his own request) from practi­
sing his profession in any part of the Common­
wealth by the order of any competent authority 
made in respect of him personally. *
12. If the Governor or Deputy Governor or any other direc­
tor of the Bank dies, or resigns or otherwise vacates his office 
before the expiry of the term for which he has been appointed.
There shall be appointed a fit person in his place for
(a) a period of five years if the vacancy is that of 
the Governor or Deputy Governor with the 
appointment being made in the manner prescribed 
by Section 9 (1) of this Act; and.
(b) for the unexpired period of the term of the appoint­
ment if the vacancy is that of any other director 
with the appointment being made in the manner 
prescribed by Section 10 (1) of this Act.
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13. (1) Meeting of the Board shall take place as often as 
may be required but not less frequently than once in each of 
any ten months in every financial year of the Bank.
(2) The Governor, or in his absence the Deputy Gover­
nor, shall be chairman of the Board, and in the absence of 
both from any meeting the other directors attending shall elect 
a chairman for that meeting from among themselves.
(3) Four members of the_Board shall form a quorum 
at any meeting and, unless otherwise provided, decisions shall 
be adopted by a simple majority of the votes of the members 
present. In the case of an equality of votes, the chairman shall 
have a casting vote.
(4) No act or proceeding of the Board shall be invali­
dated merely by reason of the existence of a vacancy or vacan­
cies among the directors of the Bank.
(5) All acts done by any person acting in good faith 
as a director shall be as valid as if he were a director, notwith­
standing that some defect in his appointment or qualification 
be afterwards discovered.
14. (1) All appointments of officials and other employees 
of the Bank shall be only to positions created by decision of 
the Board and on such terms and conditions as shall be laid 
down by the Board.
(2) No salary, fee, wage, or other remuneration, or 
allowance paid by the Bank shall be computed by reference to 
the net or other profits of the Bank.
15. (1) There shall be an advisory committee of the Bank
which shall consist of —
(a) the Commissioner or his alternate;
(b) the Commissioner charged with responsibility for 
finance in respect of each State or his alternate;
(c) the Governor or Deputy Governor.
(2) The Committee shall meet not less than twice in 
each calendar year for the purpose of considering matters of 
common interest.
(3) Meetings of the committee shall take place in 
Lagos or in such other places as may be agreed from time to 
time. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure.
Meeting o f  
Board.
Appointment o f  
officials.
Advisory
Committee.
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CURRENCY
Currency of 
Nigeria.
Parity o f  pound 
(S. 17 o f  the 
Principal A ct 
repealed by S. 2  
o f  C . B . N . 
Amendment A ct 
1962).
16. (I) The unit of currency in Nigeria shall be Nigerian 
Naira pound which shall be divided into ten shilling each 
shilling being divided into ten pence.
(2) Subject to the provisions of section 46, every 
contract, sale, payment, bill, note, instrument and security 
for money and cveiy transaction, dealing, matter and thing 
whatsoever relating to money or involving the payment of or 
the liability to pay any money which, but for this subsection, 
would have been deemed to be made, executed, entered into, 
done and had, in and in relation to currency issued by the 
West African Currency Board shall in Nigeria be deemed 
instead to be made, executed, entered into, done and had, 
in and in relation to Nigerian pound: Provided that this 
clause shall not affect any obligation to pay any money in 
any country other than Nigeria where currency issued by the 
West African Currency Board is legal tender.
17. Section 2 of C.B.N. Amendment Act, 1962 —
2. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section the parity 
of the Nigerian pound shall be equivalent to 2*48828 grams 
fine gold.
(2) The parity of the Nigerian pound may from time 
to time be changed by the Bank with the approval of the 
Federal Executive Council. Notice of the change shall as 
soon as possible thereafter be published in the Gazette.
(3) Section 17 of the Principal Act is hereby repealed.
Sole right to  
issue.
18. The Bank shall have the sole right of issuing notes 
and coins throughout Nigeria and neither the Federal Govern­
ment nor any State Government nor any other person shall 
issue currency notes, bank notes or coins or any documents 
or tokens payable to bearer on demand being documents 
or token which are likely to pass as legal tender.
Provision for  
issue. A s
amended by  
Section 1 (d)
C .B .N . (A m end­
ment) D ecree, 
1967
19. The Bank shall —
(a) arrange for the printing of notes and the minting 
of coins;
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(b) issue, reissue and exchange notes ana coins at the 
Bank’s offices and at such agencies as the Bank may, from time 
to time, establish or appoint;
(c) arrange for the safe custody o f unissued stocks of 
currency and for the preparation, safe custody and destruction 
of plates and paper for the printing of notes and of dies for 
the minting of coins;
(d) arrange for the destruction of jiotes and coins 
withdrawn from circulation under the provisions of section 21
(3) of this Act or otherwise found by the Bank to be unfit 
for use.
20. (1) Notes and coins issued by the Bank —
(a) shall be in such denominations of the pound or 
fractions thereof as shall be approved by the Commissioner 
on the recommendation of the Bank;
(b) shall be of such forms and designs and bear such 
devices as shall be approved by the Commissioner on the 
recommendation of the Bank.
(2) The standard weight and composition of coins 
issued by the Bank and the amount of remedy and variation 
shall be determined by the Commissioner on the recommen­
dation of the Bank;
21. (1) Notes issued by the Bank shall be legal tender in 
Nigeria at their face value for the payment of any amount.
(2) Coins issued by the Bank shall, if such coins have 
not been tampered with, be legal tender in Nigeria at their face 
value up to an amount not exceeding ten pounds in the case of 
coins of denominations of not less than sixpence and up to an 
amount not exceeding one shilling in the case of coins of a 
lower denomination.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1) 
and (2) the Bank shall have power, on giving not less than 
three months* notice in the Gazette, to call in any of its notes 
and coins on payment of the face value thereof and any such 
notes or coins with respect to which a notice has been given 
under this clause shall, on the expiration of the notice, cease to 
be legal tender, but, subject to the provisions of section 23, 
shall be redeemed by the Bank upon demand.
Section 1 (d) o f  
C .B .N . (Am end­
ment) Decree 
1967
Denom ination  
and form o f  
notes and coins.
Bank’s currency 
to be legal tender
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22. A coin shall be deemed to have been tampered with 
if the coin has been impaired, diminished or lightened other­
wise than by fair wear and tear or has been defaced by stamp­
ing, engraving or piercing whether the coin has or has not 
been thereby diminished or lightened.
23. No person shall be entitled to recover from the 
Bank the value of any lost, stolen, mutilated or imperfect 
note or coin. The circumstances in which, and the conditions 
and limitation subject to which, the value of lost, stolen 
mutilated or imperfect notes or coins may be refunded as 
of grace shall be within the absolute discretion of the Bank.
24. The Bank shall not be liable to the payment of any 
stamp duty under the Stamp Duties Act in respect of its notes 
issued as currency.
25. The Bank shall at all times maintain a reserve of 
external assets consisting of all or any of the following —
(a) gold coin or bullion;
(b) balances at any bank outside Nigeria where the 
currency is sterling or is freely convertible into 
gold or sterling, and in such currency any notes, 
coin, money at call and where they bear at least 
two good signatures and have a maturity not 
exceeding ninety days exclusive of days of grace, 
any bill of exchange;
(c) Treasury Bills having a maturity not exceeding one 
year issued by the Government of any country 
outside Nigeria whose currency is sterling or is 
freely convertible into gold or sterling;
(d) securities of or guaranteed by a Government of any 
country outside Nigeria whose currency is sterling or 
is freely convertible into gold or sterling where the 
securities held under this paragraph will mature in 
a period not exceeding ten years from the date of 
acquisition.
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(e) Securities of or guaranteed by international financial 
institutions of which Nigeria is a member if such 
securities are expressed in sterling or in currency 
freely convertible into sterling or gold and the 
maturity of the securities so held will not exceed 
five years.
( / )  Nigeria’s gold tranche in the International Mone­
tary Fund (operative as from 29th Nov., 1967).
26. Repealed by Section 6 of the Central Bank Amend­
ment Act; 1962
27. For which the following two sections are in
28. substitution:
The value of the reserve of external assets shall be not 
less than twenty-five per centum of the total demand liabilities 
of the Bank.
(Sec. 4 of the Amendment Act)
OPERATION
(1) Unless otherwise prohibited by any law relating 
to the control of exchange the Bank shall, on demand at 
its head office in Lagos—
(a) issue and redeem Nigerian currency against sterling, 
and
(&) at its discretion issue and redeem Nigerian cur­
rency against gold or other currencies eligible for 
inclusion in the reserve of external assets under this 
Act: provided that the rates of exchange quoted 
by the Bank for spot transactions shall not differ 
by more than one per cent from the parity of the 
Nigerian pound with the parity of the other currency.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require 
the Bank to sell or buy sterling for an amount less than ten 
thousand pounds in respect of any one transaction.
New section 1 
(e) (iii) added by 
CBN (Amend­
ment) Decree 
1967.
N ew section 3 
(2) o f Finance 
Decree 1969 
(Decree N o . 32)
Value o f  
external reserve. 
As amended by 
Section 3 o f C.B. 
N . (Amendment) 
Decree 1967.
O bligation in 
respect o f  cur­
rency
(Sec. 5 of the Amendment Act)
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29. (1) The Bank may:
(a) issue demand drafts and effect other kinds of 
remittances payable at its own offices or at the 
offices of agencies or correspondents;
(b) purchase and sell gold coin or bullion;
(c) open accounts for and accept deposits from the 
Federal Government, the State Governments, the 
funds, institutions and corporations of all such 
Governments, banks, other credit institutions and, 
with the prior approval of the Commissioner, other 
persons in Nigeria;
(d) purchase, sell, discount and rediscount inland bills 
of exchange and promissory notes arising out of 
bona fide commercial transactions bearing two or 
more good signatures and maturing within ninety 
days, exclusive of days of grace, from the date 
of acquisition;
(e) purchase, sell, discount and rediscount inland bills 
of exchange and promissory notes bearing two 
or more good signatures, drawn or issued for 
the purpose of financing seasonal agricultural 
operations or the marketing of crops, and maturing 
within one hundred and eighty days, exclusive of 
days of grace, from the date of acquisition;
(/) purchase, sell, discount and rediscount Treasury 
Bills and Treasury Certificates of the Federal 
Government which have been publicly offered for 
sale and are to mature within ninety-three days;
(g) purchase and sell securities of the Federal Govern­
ment maturing in not more than twenty-five years 
which have been publicly offered for sale or form 
part of an issue which is being made to the public 
at the time of acquisition: Provided that the total 
amount of such securities of a maturity exceedr 
ing two years in the ownership of the Bank (other 
than securities held in terms of paragraph (A) of 
held by the Bank as collateral under sub-para­
graph (//) 6f paragraph (k) shall not together at 
any time exceed seventy-five per cent of the total 
demand liabilities of the Bank.
(A) invest in securities of the Federal Government 
for any amount, and to mature at any time, on 
behalf of staff and superannuation funds and 
other internal funds of the Bank;
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(0 with the approval of the Commissioner, subscribe 
to, hold and sell shares of any corporation or 
company or debentures hereof set up with the 
approval of or under the authority of the Fede­
ral Government for the purposes of:
(«) promoting the development of a money market 
or securities market in Nigeria or of improving the 
financial or economic development; or
(b) promoting or undertaking financial, industrial, 
agricultural and public -utility enterprises, pro­
vided that in any such case the total value of the 
holdings of shares or as the case may be, 
debentures to which this paragraph applies shall 
not at any time exceed ten times the aggregate of 
the Banks paid up capital and the General Reserve 
Fund of the Bank;
(j) grant advances for fixed periods not exceeding 
three months against publicly issued Treasury Bills 
of the Federal Government;
(k) grant advances for fixed periods not exceeding one 
year at a minimum rate of interest at least one per 
cent above the Bank’s minimum rediscount rate 
against—
(0 gold coin or bullion;
(//) securities of the Federal Government which have 
been publicly offered for sale and are to mature 
within a period of twenty-five years: Provided 
that no advance so secured shall at any time 
exceed seventy-five per cent of the market value 
of the security pledged and that the total of 
such securities held by the Bank is within the 
limitation imposed by paragraph (g);
(Hi) such bills of exchange and promissory notes as 
are eligible for purchase, discount or rediscount 
by the Bank up to seventy-five per cent of their 
nominal value;
(iv) warehouse warrants, or their equivalent (secu­
ring possession of goods), in respect of staple 
commodities or other goods duly insured and 
with a letter of hypothecation from the owner; 
Provided that no such advance shall exceed 
seventy-five per cent of the current market value 
of the commodities in question;
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(v) Treasury Certificates issued by the Federal 
Government: Provided that no advance so 
secured shall at any time exceed seventy-five per 
cent o f the market value of the certificate 
pledged;
{!) purchase and sell external currencies, and pur­
chase, sell, discount and rediscount bills o f ex­
change and Treasury Bills drawn in or on places 
abroad and maturing within one hundred and 
eighty-four days, exclusive of days of grace, from 
the date o f acquisition;
(m) maintain accounts with the Central Bank and other 
banks abroad;
(n) purchase and sell securities of or guaranteed by 
any Government whose currency is sterling or is 
freely convertible into gold o f  sterling or securities 
issued by international financial institutions, of 
which Nigeria is a  member, which are also 
expressed in currencies which are sterling or are 
freely convertible into gold or sterling;
(o) act as correspondent, banker or agent for any 
central bank or other monetary authority and for 
any international bank or international monetary 
authority established under governmental auspices;
(p) undertake the issue and management of loans 
publicly issued in Nigeria by the Federal or 
State Governments or by Federal or State 
public bodies;
(q) accept from customers for custody securities and 
other articles o f value;
(r) undertake on behalf of customers and correspon­
dents the purchase, sale, collection and payment 
of securities, currencies and credit instruments at 
home and abroad, and the purchase or sale o f gold 
and silver;
(s) promote the  establishment o f bank clearing 
systems and give facilities for the conduct of clearing 
business in premises belonging to the Bank;
( t ) subject as is expressly provided in this Ordinance, 
generally conduct business as a bank, and do all 
such things as are incidental to or consequential 
upon the exercise o f its powers or the discharge of 
its duties under this Act.
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(2) The G overnor may at any time in his discretion by 
previous notice in writing lodged with the Board decide that 
the powers conferred by subsection (1) in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraphs (/) , (g), (/j), (J) or sub-paragraph 
(//) of paragraph (k ) o f that subsection may be extended to the 
Treasury Bills and Treasury Certificates or the securities, 
as the case may be, of any State Government with which 
the Bank appears substantially to have established the rela­
tionship of banker, o r to any specified Treasury Bills and 
Treasury Certificates or securities of such a State Govern­
ment, subject to the same conditions as specified in those 
paragraphs and subject to the limitations specified in paragraph 
(g), which limitations shall then apply to the aggregate value of 
the Federal and State securities so dealt with.
NEW SECTIO N  29 (A) ADDED BY SECTION 2 C.B.N.
(AM ENDM ENT) DECREE 1967
29. A. (I) In addition to any other o f its powers under this 
Act, the Bank may require persons having access 
thereto, a t all reasonable times to supply to it 
inform ation, in such form as the Bank may from 
time to time direct, relating to, or touching or 
concerning matters affecting, the national economy 
o f Nigeria.
(2) The Board of Directors shall take account of 
matter o f a confidential nature supplied to the Bank under 
this section; but where the Bank is satisfied it is in the 
national interest and the informant supplying the informa­
tion does not object to a proposal to publish it within a reason­
able time o f becoming aware of it, the Bank may, from any 
information in its possession, compile and publish statistical 
data and anything relevant thereto, on the national economy.
(3) Where any person lawfully required to supply 
information for the purposes of this section —
(a) supplies inform ation which he knows to be 
false, o r supplies it recklessly as to its truth or 
falsity, or
(b) w ithout reasonable excuse (the proof o f the 
reasonableness to lie on him) fails to comply with 
any requirement of the Bank; the supply or 
failure to supply, as the case may be, as herein 
provided, shall be an offence under this section 
punishable upon conviction —
Power of Bank 
to require 
certain 
information.
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(i) by a fine of not less than £500 or more than 
£1000 for every false report, and 
(«) by a fine o f not less than £50 or more than 
£100 for every day during which the failure 
to comply with a  requirement of the Bank 
continues.
NEW  SECTION ADDED BY CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA 
ACT (AMENDMENT) No. 3 DECREE 1968, DECREE No. 50
1. (1) W ithout prejudice to so much of section 29 of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria Act as relates to the powers of that 
bank to grant advances and provisions for securities, the 
Central Bank shall to the exclusion of any other bank (within 
the meaning of the Banking Act), be responsible for granting 
advances to any authority to which this section relates—
(a) for fixed periods not exceeding one year at a 
rate o f interest which shall be a t least one per cent 
above the Central Bank’s minimum rediscount 
ra te ; and
(b) except as prescribed in subsection (2) of this section, 
upon such conditions as the Central Bank may, 
after consultation with the Commissioner, specify 
or as prescribed to ensure repayment thereof 
with interest.
2. Such advances may be granted under subsection (1) 
above in any particular case where a guarantee in writing is 
given by the Federal Government to the Central Bank on 
behalf of any such authority, so however that —
(a) the total advances, which may subject to the provi­
sions o f this section be granted shall not exceed 
an am ount considered by the bank to be adequate 
for the authority to commence its operations at 
the beginning of the season; and
(b) any such advances shall be secured, so soon after 
the advances have been granted as may be agreed 
by the Central Bank (either in part or in whole) as 
prescribed in Section 29 (1) (e) or (k ) of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria Act and the said provisions shall 
be so construed.
3. Any advances which may be granted by virtue o f the 
foregoing provisions o f this Decree shall be used solely for 
the purpose of financing—
'6V!
(a) any purchasing and marketing operations autho­
rised to be undertaken by any such authority by the 
law under which the authority was established or 
as may be approved by the Central Bank, and
(b) with the approval of the Central Bank, such other 
operations as may be incidental thereto:
“ Provided that any such authority may, if it so wishes, 
make advances to any licensed buying agent (within the 
meaning of any law under which the authority was established) 
for the purchase of produce for sale to the said authority, 
and provided also that the quantity of produce to be so 
purchased is included in the estimated tonnage of crops 
against which total advances are to be made by the Central 
Bank.”
(4) For the purposes of this Decree, every authority to 
which this section relates shall consult with the Central Bank 
in any given year before the opening of the relevant produce 
season for the purpose of determining prices to be paid by the 
authority during that season to local producers of crops under 
the authority’s control and both the authority and the Central 
Bank shall jointly agree on the prices to be so paid.
(5) This section relates to any marketing board or 
authority of the Federation, or of a State or two or more States, 
including an interim marketing board, established for such 
purpose by any law in operation in the Federation.
(6) The reference in this section to the granting of 
advances includes a reference to the provision 
of credit facilities.
30. The Bank may not—
(a) engage in trade or otherwise have a direct interest 
in any commercial, agricultural, industrial, or, save 
as provided in paragraph (/) of section 29, any 
other undertaking, except such interests as the 
Bank may in any way acquire in the course of 
the satisfaction of debts, due to it, and provided 
that all such interests so acquired shall be dis­
posed of at the earliest suitable moment;
(b) save as provided in paragraph (/) o f section 29, 
purchase the shares of any corporation o r com ­
pany, including the shares of any banking 
company,
Prohibited
activities.
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(c) grant loans upon the security of any shares;
(d) subject to the provisions of section 34, grant 
unsecured advances or advances secured otherwise 
than as laid down in paragraphs (j) and (k) o f 
section 29: Provided that in the event o f any 
debts due to the Bank becoming in the opinion 
o f the Bank endangered, the Bank may secure 
such debts on any real or other property o f 
the debtor and may acquire such property, which 
shall be resold at the earliest suitable moment;
(ie) purchase, acquire or lease real property except in 
accordance with the proviso to paragraph (d) and 
except so far as the bank shall consider necessary or 
expedient for the provision, or future provision or busi­
ness premises for the Bank and its agencies and 
any clearing houses set up in terms o f section 42, and 
of residences for the Governor, Deputy Governor, 
officials and other employees;
( / )  draw or accept bills payable otherwise than on 
dem and;
(g) allow the renewal or substitution of m aturing bills o f 
exchange purchased, discounted or rediscounted by 
or pledged with the Bank save in exceptional cir­
cumstances when the Board may by resolution 
authorise one renewal or one substitution only in 
either case of not more than fifty per cent o f the 
original amount of any such bill for a  period not 
exceeding ninety days;
(h) pay interest on deposits;
(/) accept for discount, or as security for an advance 
made by the Bank, bills or notes signed by members 
of the Board or by the Bank’s officials or other 
employees;
(j ) open accounts for and accept deposits from per­
sons other than as provided in paragraphs (c) and
(o) of Section 29.
31. The Bank shall make public at all times its mini­
mum rediscount ra te .'
RELATIONS W ITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNM ENT
32. (1) The Bank shall be entrusted with the Federal 
Government’s banking and foreign exchange transactions in 
Nigeria and abroad, (including payments to or in respect 
of the International Monetary Fund). (Amendment operative 
as from 16th March, 1969).
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(2) The Bank shall receive and disburse Federal 
Government moneys and keep account thereof without remune­
ration for such services.
(3) In  any place where the Bank has no branch, it 
may appoint another bank to act as its agent for the collection 
and payment of Federal Government moneys.
33. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 32, the 
Federal Government may—
(a) maintain accounts in Nigeria with other banks 
in such cases and on such conditions as may be 
agreed between the Commissioner and the Bank;
(b) use the services o f the State Treasuries 
for the collection and payment o f Federal 
Government moneys in places where it may be 
appropriate and convenient to do so.
34. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions o f paragraph {d) 
o f section 30, the Bank may grant temporary advances to the 
Federal Government in respect o f temporary deficiencies of 
budget revenue at such rate or rates of interest as the Bank 
may determine.
(2) The total am ount of such advances outstanding shall 
not at any time exceed twenty-five per cent of the estimated 
recurrent budget revenue as laid before the Federal Legislature 
for the Federal Government financial year in which the 
advances are granted.
(3) All such advances shall be repaid as soon as possible 
and shall in any event be repayable by the end o f the Federal 
Government financial year in which they are granted. If 
after that date any such advances remain unrepaid the power of 
the Bank to grant further such advances in any subsequent 
financial year shall not be exercisable unless and until the out­
standing advances have been repaid.
35. The Bank shall be entrusted with the issue and 
management of Federal Government loans publicly issued in 
Nigeria, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed 
between the Federal Government and the Bank.
36. The Bank may act as banker to any fund, institution 
or corporation o f the Federal Government o r o f a State 
Government.
Federajl
Government's
rights.
Advances to
Federal
Government.
As amended 
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37. The Bank may act generally as agenl for the Federal 
Government or for a State Government
{a) where the Bank can do so appropriately and 
consistently with the provisions of this Act and 
with its duties and functions as a Central Bank; 
and
(b) on such terms and conditions as may be agreed 
between the Bank and the Government concerned.
RELATIONS W ITH OTHER BANKS
38. The Bank may act as banker to other banks in 
Nigeria and abroad.
39. The Bank shall wherever necessary seek the co­
operation o f and co-operate with, other banks in Nigeria—
(a) to prom ote and maintain adequate and reasonable 
banking services for the public;
(b) to ensure high standard o f conduct and manage­
ment throughout the banking system;
(c) to further such policies not inconsistent with 
this Act as shall be in the national interest.
SECTION 2 O F C.B.N. ACT (AMENDMENT) DECREE
No. 3, 1968
2. (1) The Central Bank may, after consultation with 
the Commissioner prescribe a minimum ratio of total loans, 
advances and discounts, granted to indigenous persons, to be 
maintained by each bank licensed under the Banking Act.
(2) Any bank which fails to observe the minimum ratio 
tha t may be prescribed in accordance with subsectmp (1) 
of this section shall be guilty o f an offence and liable on con­
viction to a fine o f one thousand pounds.
40. (1) The Bank may from time to time issue directions, 
which shall subsequently be published in the Gazette requiring 
each bank licensed under the Banking Act (hereafter in this 
section referred to as the “ institution”) to do the following, 
that is —
(a) to maintain at all times in the form of cash reserves 
with the Bank at its Head Office, a sum equal to 
a ratio of the institution’s deposit liabilities;
(&) to hold a minimum amount of specified liquid 
assets which shall be expressed as a ratio of deposit 
liabilities of the institution; and
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(c) to m aintain as special deposits with the Bank at 
its Head Office, a percentage of the institution’s 
deposit liabilities and/or a percentage of any in­
crease or the absolute increase in such deposit 
liabilities over an am ount outstanding on a date, 
and for a period as shall be specified by the Bank.
(2) F or the purposes of subsection 1 (a) above, the
Bank shall specify —
(a) the class o f deposit liabilities against which the 
cash reserves mentioned in that subsection shall 
be held ; and
(b) a grace period, not exceeding fourteen days, within 
which any requirement under that paragraph must 
be satisfied by the institution concerned, and for 
prescribing the ratio of cash reserve which an 
institution shall so maintain, those institutions 
shall be classified into three categories, namely —
“ Class A ” —institutions with deposit liabilities of fifteen 
million pounds or more;
“ Class B“ — institutions with deposit liabilities of five 
million pounds or more, but less than fifteen 
million pounds;
“ Class C ” — institutions with deposit liabilities of less than 
five million pounds.
(3) F o r the purposes of subsection 1 (a) of this section—
(a) the Bank shall have power to prescribe different 
cash reserve ratios to be maintained by each cate­
gory o f institution specified in subsection (2) above: 
Provided that —
(i) “ Class A ” institutions shall maintain higher 
cash reserve ratios than “ Class B” and “ Class 
C” institutions; and
(ii) “ Class B” institutions shall maintain higher 
cash reserve ratios than “ Class C ’ institu­
tions;
(b) the cash reserve of an institution shall be deter­
mined, within such periods as the Bank may from 
time to time specify, on the basis of the period 
balances o f the institutions deposit liabilities;
(c) the Bank shall have power from time to time, to 
require each institution to prepare and deliver 
to the Bank in such form and within such period 
as the Bank may specify a true and correct state-
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ment showing the positions o f the deposit liabi­
lities of the institution; and the Bank may require 
such statement to be made at such periodical 
intervals, or as often as it may specify;
(d) the Bank shall have power to require any institu­
tion to furnish to it such information and statis­
tics in such form and as often as the Bank may 
deem necessary for the purpose of satisfying 
itself that the institution concerned is in com­
pliance with the provision of that subsection.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) (b) above tho 
Bank shall have power to vary —
(a) the composition of any specified liquid assets; 
and
(b) the proportion of each category of specified 
liquid assets that may from time to time be held 
by an institution;
(5) The Bank shall also have power —
(a) to require that all applications to each institution 
for loans exceeding such amount as the Bank 
may specify, shall be submitted by the institution 
to the Bank for approval and no such loan shall 
be made without that approval.
(b) to fix ceilings on the volume o f loans, advances 
and discounts outstanding a t each institution 
and it may fix different ceilings for different 
categories o f such loans, advances and discounts; 
and
(c) to fix ceiling on the aggregate amount of loans, 
advances and discounts granted by any institu­
tion and outstanding at any time; and the Bank 
may place limits on the rate o f increase in the 
aggregate amount o f such loans, advances and 
discounts within a  specified future period of time.
(6) For the purposes o f subsection (1) (c) above, 
the Bank shall have power to specify the class of deposit* 
to which the provisions of that subsection shall apply, and 
any special deposits held in accordance with that subsection 
shall not count as specified liquid assets for the purposes 
of subsection (1) (b) o f this section; and subject to the fore­
going provision of this subsection, the Bank may, at its 
discretion, pay interest on such special deposits held by it;
637
but that interest shall at its highest be one per centum below 
the Treasury Bill issue rate.
(7) The Bank may for the purposes of maintaining 
monetary stability of the economy of Nigeria, issue, place, 
sell, repurchase, amortize or redeem securities to be known 
as “stabilization securities” (which shall constitute its obli­
gations) and the securities shall be issued at such rate of 
interest and under such conditions of maturity, amortization, 
negotiability and redemption as the Bank may deem appro­
priate.
(8) The Bank shall have power —
(а) to sell or place by allocation to each institution 
any stabilization securities issued under subsection
(7) above;
(б) to repurchase, amortize or redeem, in such manner 
as the Bank may deem appropriate, any such 
stabilization securities, and any stabilization 
securities repurchased by the Bank shall bo 
extinguished, and shall not constitute the assets 
of the Bank.
(9) If any institution fails to comply with any direc­
tion issued under the provisions of this section, the Bank 
shall have power to —
(a) prohibit the institution concerned from extending 
new loans and advances, and from undertaking 
new investments, until full compliance with the 
direction has been obtained by the Bank;
{b) levy fines, which shall be a civil debt, against 
the institution, but such fines shall not exceed 
fifty pounds for the default or, as the case may 
be, for every day during which the default con­
tinues.
(10) Any institution which furnishes false information 
to the Bank shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine 
not exceeding £100 for the first offence, and for a second or 
subsequent offences the fine shall be £200.
41. The Bank may appoint one or more other banks 
in Nigeria to act as its agent for the issue, reissue, exchange 
and withdrawal of notes and coins, or for other purposes, on 
such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the 
Bank and each of such other banks.
Cap. 19
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42. It shall be the duty of the Bank to facilitate the 
clearing of cheques and other credit instruments for banks 
carrying on business in Nigeria. For this purpose the Bank 
shall, at any appropriate time and in conjunction with the 
other banks, organise a clearing house in Lagos and in such 
other place or places as may be desirable in premises provided 
by the Bank.
ACCOUNTS AND STATEMENTS
43. The financial year of the Bank shall begin on the 
1st day of April and end on the 31st day of March or shall be 
such other period as shall be prescribed by the Commissioner.
44. (1) The Accounts of the Bank shall be audited by an 
auditor appointed by the Bank with the approval o f the 
Commissioner;
(2) W ithout prejudice to the provisions o f subsection
(1) the Commissioner may at any time and from time to 
time request the Director o f Federal Audit to make an exami­
nation of and submit a  report on the accounts relating to the 
issue, reissue, exchange and withdrawal of notes and coins 
by the Bank as a whole, and the Director o f Federal A udit 
shall do so accordingly, and the Bank shall provide all 
necessary and proper facilities therefor.
45. (1) The Bank shall, within two months from the close 
of each financial year, transmit to the Commissioner a copy 
of the annual accounts certified by the auditor and such 
accounts shall then be, as soon as may be, published in the 
Gazette.
(2) The Bank shall, within four months from the close 
o f each financial year, submit to the Commissioner a report 
on its operations during that year. Such report shall be 
published by the Bank,
(3) Both such annual accounts and such annual report 
shall be, as soon as may be, laid before the Federal Legislative 
Houses.
(4) The Bank shall, as soon as may be, after the 
fifteenth day and also after the last day o f each month make up 
and publish a return of its assets and liabilities as at the close 
of business on that day; or, if either of those days is a holiday, 
as at the close o f business on the last preceding business day. 
A copy of the return shall be transmitted to the Commissioner 
and shall be published in the Gazette.
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(5) In the application of this section, the gold tranche 
position in the International Monetary Fund shall form part 
of the external reserves of assets of the Bank.
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
46. (1) A t any time after the enactment of this Act and be­
fore the coming into operation of section 19, the Commissioner 
may by writing under his hand authorise such persons or autho­
rities as he may think fit to make such arrangements as he 
may expressly authorise for the printing of notes and minting 
o f coins for the purpose of this Act, and for the safe custody 
of such notes and coins, and may provide for the method of 
reimbursement o f the cost thereof.
(2) A t any time after the establishment o f the Bank 
and notwithstanding that section 19 may not have been brought 
into operation, the Bank may take up Treasury Bills o f the 
Federal Governm ent issued in respect of the expense incurred 
under the provision of this section whether or not the same 
have been first offered to the public.
47. Currency notes and coins of the West African 
Currency Board which are legal tender in Nigeria on the com­
ing into operation of section 18 shall remain legal tender until 
such further day as the Bank, giving at least three m onths’ 
notice in the Gazette, may specify, and shall then cease to be 
legal tender in Nigeria: Provided that —
{a) The Bank may so specify different days in relation 
to different denominations of such currency notes 
and coins;
(b) with effect from the coming into operation of 
section 18, and thereafter while coins of the West 
African Currency Board remain legal tender in 
Nigeria, such coin shall be legal tender at their face 
value up to an am ount not exceeding ten pounds 
in the case of coins of denominations of not less 
than sixpence and up to an am ount not exceeding 
one shilling in the case of coins of a lower denomi­
nation.
M ISCELLANEOUS
48. The Board may with the approval of the Commis­
sioner make bye-laws for the good order and management of 
the Bank. Any such bye-laws shall be authenticated by the 
Bank’s seal and shall be published in the Gazette.
49. The Bank shall be exempt from the provisions of 
sections 27 and 45 of the Income Tax Act.
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50. The provisions of the Companies Act shall not 
apply to the Bank.
51. Save with the written consent of the Commissioner
on the recommendation of the Bank, no bank shall hereafter be 
registered under the provisions of any Federal o r State
legislation by a name which includes any o f the words 
“C entral", “ Federal,” “ Federation” , “ National” , 
“ Nigerian” , “ Reserve” or “State” .
52. The Bank shall not be placed in liquidation except 
pursuant to legislation passed in that behalf and then in such 
m anner as tha t legislation directs.
A P P E N D I X  II n4ti
CENTRAL BANK O F NIGERIA ACT, 1968 (CAP. 30) 
(No. 24 of 1968)
CENTRAL BANK O F NIGERIA BYE-LAWS, 1959
(CAP. 19)
CO M M ENCEM ENT: 9th APRIL, 1959
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 48 of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958, the Board of Directors of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria have made the following bye-laws with the 
approval of the Commissioner for Finance of the Federation.
PART I
1. These bye-laws may be cited as the Central Bank of 
Nigeria Bye-laws, 1959.
2. In these bye-laws except the context requires otherwise
(a) “ Director” m eans a member o f  the Board of 
Directors o f  the Central Bank of  Nigeria.
(b) “Advisory Com m ittee” means the Advisory Com ­
mittee of the Central Bank o f  Nigeria constituted 
in accordance with section 15 o f  the Act.
PART n
3. (1) Ordinarily not less than three weeks’ notice shall 
be given of each meeting of the Board and  such notice shall 
be sent to every Director to his registered address. Should 
it be found necessary to convene an emergency' meeting ail 
reasonable steps shall be taken to give notice to every Director 
who is at the time in Nigeria.
(2) No person other than  the Directors and the person 
appointed to record the minutes shall a ttend meetings 
of the Board, but the Chairm an may request the presence of 
officials of the Bank when technical matters are under con­
sideration.
4. (1) the Board shall cause minutes to be duly entered 
in books provided for that purpose—
(a) of all appointments of officers made by the Board;
(b) of the names o f  all Directors present at each 
meeting o f  the Board ;
(c) of all resolutions and proceedings o f  each meeting.
(2) A copy of the minutes shall be circulated at that 
or succeeding meeting and, after approval by the Board, 
signed by the Chairman.
Ci t a t i o n .
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642
U se o f  Seal.
Declaration by 
Directors Sche­
dule Form 1.
Declaration o f  
Interest.
Indemnity o f  
Directors and 
officials.
Duties o f  
Board.
PART III
5. The common seal of the Bank shall be affixed under 
such conditions as may be determined from time to time by a 
resolution of the Board.
6. Every Director shall, on appointment or re-appoint- 
ment, sign a declaration as in Form 1 in the Schedule affirming 
his allegiance and service to the Bank and pledging himself 
to observe strict secrecy respecting all transactions of the Bank.
7. Any Director having any interest, directly or indirectly 
in any dealing or business in which the Bank is concerned 
shall disclose such interest at the meeting of the Board at 
which the dealing or business is discussed and in no circum­
stances shall he vote on the matter. If required by the Board 
to do so, he shall withdraw from the meeting.
8. (1) Every Director, every official and other employee 
shall be indemnified by the Bank against all losses and expenses 
incurred by him by reason of any contract entered into or act 
or deed done in the proper and careful discharge of his duties. 
The Bank shall pay all such costs, losses and expenses.
(2) No Director, official or other employee shall be 
liable to the Bank for any loss or expense incurred by the 
Bank by the insufficiency or deficiency of value of, or title to, 
any property or security acquired or taken on behalf of the 
Bank or by the insolvency, bankruptcy or wrongful act of any 
customer or debtor of the Bank, unless due to wilful default 
in the execution of his duties.
PART IV
9. In consultation with the Board, the Governor and 
Deputy Governor shall be responsible for —
(a) consideration of monetary policy and the for­
mulation and execution of the credit policy of the 
Bank.
(b) fixing the rate or rates of discount or rediscount 
and the rate or rates of interest on advances to 
Government or to other customers of the Bank:
(c) determining the rates of exchange at which the 
Bank shall buy and sell sterling under section 28 
of the Act and other external currencies under 
subsection (1) of section 29 of the Act:
(<d) the appointment of auditors in accordance with 
section 44 of the Act, the provision of the necessary 
facilities and the rates of remuneration:
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(e) the establishment and closing of branches:
(/) the appointment of any currency agents:
(g) the appointment of officials and other employees: 
Provided that the Governor shall have authority 
to make such appointments as he deems appro­
priate without consultation with the Board in 
relation to officials and employees whose salaries 
do not exceed £1100 per annum.
10. The Governor and Deputy Governor shall have 
special responsibility for —
(а) the organisation of the management of the Bank 
at its Head Office, branches and agencies.
(б) causing—
(/) true accounts to be kept of all transactions entered 
into by the Bank and of the assets and liabilities of 
the Bank and of all valuables entrusted to the 
Bank:
(iV) the compilation, form and publication of accounts 
in accordance with section 45 of the Act:
(c) the safe-keeping of all the assets of the Bank and 
the valuables entrusted to the Bank:
(d) the discharge by officials and other employees of 
the Bank of the duties laid upon them:
(e) the supervision of arrangements relating to the 
issue and redemption of notes and coins and all 
matters connected with the form, design and 
composition of notes and coins. (The Chief of 
Banking Operations shall be charged with direct res­
ponsibility under the Governor, for these matters).
11. The books of the Bank shall be kept at the Head 
Office of the Bank or at such other places as the Board may 
from time to time determine.
12. The Governor shall formulate, for the approval of 
the- Board, general rules and any subsequent amendments 
thereto, providing for—
(a) the safe-keeping of the common seal of the Bank;
(b) the safe-keeping of the assets of the Bank and of 
valuables entrusted to the Bank;
(c) the safe-keeping of stocks of unissued or redeemed 
currency and the preparation, safe custody and 
destruction of plates and paper for the printing 
of notes and of dyes for the minting of coins:
Duty o f  Gover­
nor and Deputy 
Governor.
Books.
General rules.
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(icf) the protection of bank notes and coins in transit;
(e) the conditions under which any currency agents 
may be appointed.
i f)  the conditions governing discounts and advances;
(g) the exercise of dual control and general security 
throughout the Bank;
(h) generally such additional arrangements which may 
be made to ensure the efficient working of the . 
Bank, the proper observance of security and the 
accuracy of the internal accounts.
13. The Board by resolution shall, for such purposes as 
they may from time to time decide, authorise the Governor, 
the Deputy Governor or any official of the Bank to give 
instructions concerning the Bank’s affairs and to sign docu­
ment relating to all aspects of the Bank’s business, provided 
that such documents are not required by law or common 
practice to be given under seal. Any such authorisations shall 
forthwith be notified in the Gazette.
Central Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Bye-laws, 1964.
14. (a) No official or other employee of the Bank shall 
occupy any other office or employment whether remunerated 
or not except with the approval of the Board embodied in a 
resolution and only in the following capacities, that is to say—
(/) as member of any economic research institution 
or of any commission established by the Federal 
Government to enquire into any matter affecting 
currency or banking in Nigeria or into such other 
subject as may be relative to the functions of the 
Bank;
(//) as director or member of the Board, by whatever 
name called, of any international bank, inter­
national monetary authority or economic institu­
tion to which the Federal Government shall have 
adhered or given support or approval;
(i/7) as director or alternate director of any corporation 
in Nigeria in which the Bank may participate 
under subsection (1) of section 29 of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria Act, 1958, as amended by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Act, 1962.
(bj Any remuneration to which any official or other 
employee of the Bank is entitled in respect of any 
appointment made by virtue of the provisions of
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this bye-law shall be paid direct to the Bank.
(c) This bye-law shall not prevent the Bank from 
employing, at the Board’s discretion and subject 
to such terms and conditions as shall be laid down 
by the Board, part-time advisers for particular 
purposes and for specific periods of time.
15. All officials and employees of the Bank shall be 
required to sign a declaration as in Form 2 in the Schedule 
affirming their allegiance and service to the Bank and pledging 
themselves to observe strict secrecy respecting all transactions 
of the Bank.
16. (/) The appointment of an attorney to the Bank and 
any changes in that appointment shall be made by the Board 
on the recommendation of the Governor.
(//) Plaints, written statements, affidavits and all other 
documents connected with legal proceedings may be signed 
and verified on behalf of the Bank by any officer empowered 
by or under bye-law 13 to sign documents for and on behalf 
of the Bank.
17. The Board may require any official or other employee 
to give to the Bank, in such manner as the Board may deter­
mine, such security as it may regard as reasonable for the 
faithful discharge of his duty.
Declaration by 
officials and 
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Schedule Form I
(Bye-laws 6 and 15)
FORM OF DECLARATION OF ALLEGIANCE AND 
SECRECY BY DIRECTORS
I, ( ) being appointed a Direc­
tor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, do solemnly declare that I 
will faithfully perform the duties of Director and that I will to 
the best of my ability uphold the interests of the Central Bank 
of Nigeria and that I will observe strict secrecy respecting all 
transactions of the Bank and all matters relating thereto and 
that I  will not directly reveal any of the matters or any infor­
mation which may come to my knowledge in the discharge of 
my duties except when required or authorised to do so by the 
Board of the Bank or by law.
Signature....................................... ..................
Schedule Form II
FORM OF DECLARATION OF ALLEGIANCE ANb 
SECRECY BY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
I, ( ) being appointed to the
staff of the Central Bank of Nigeria, do solemnly declare that I 
will faithfully perform the duties assigned to me and that I  will 
to the best of my ability uphold the interests of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria and that I will observe strict secrecy respecting 
all transactions of the Bank and all matters relating thereto 
and that I will not directly or indirectly reveal any of the 
matters or any information which may come to my knowledge 
in the discharge of my duties except when required or autho­
rised to do so by the Board of the Bank or by law.
Signature_____________________________
Made at a meeting of the Board held on the thirtieth 
day of July, 1958, and sealed on the eleventh day of March, 
rised, in the presence of:
R. P. F e n t o n  — Governor
h: K  )  Directors
C hief J . A . O b a h o r  J
C . N .  Is o n g  — Secretary.
Approved this 24th day of March, 1959.
C h ief  F. S. O k o tie-E b o h , 
Federal Minister o f Finance
647
APPENDIX III
Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 8, Vol. 56, 11th February,
1969—Part A
THE BANKING DECREE 1969
A r r a n g e m e n t  o f  S e c t io n s
Section
P a r t  I 
L ic e n sin g  o f  B a n k s  
General
1. Banking business by licensed banks.
2. L icen sin g .
3. Power to vary conditions of licences.
Supplemental
4. Opening and closing of branches.
5. Restriction as to amalgamation, etc.
6. Requirements as to minimum paid-up capital.
7. Certain savings as to licences validly granted under the repealed enact­
ment.
8. Revocation of licences.
6«J’ART “
D u ties  o f  L ic e n s e d  B a n k s  
General
9. Maintenance of reserve fund.
10. Restriction on dividends.
11. Disclosure of interests by directors.
12. Minimum holding of cash reserves, specified liquid assets, special deposits
and stabilization securities, by licensed banks.
13. Restriction on certain activities of licensed banks.
14. Rates of interest on advances, etc.
Books o f Account
i
15. Keeping of books of account.
16. Delivery of returns, etc. to Central Bank.
17. Publication of profit and loss account and balance sheet.
18. Contents and form of accounts.
19. Appointment and powers of auditors.
P a r t  i l l  
P o w e r s  o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  B a n k
20. Appointment and powers of Examiners.
21. Special examination.
22. Powers after examination.
%
23. Control of licensed banks.
24. Licensed bank under control of Central Bank to co-operate with Central
Bank.
25. Power for winding up.
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Pa r t  IV
G e n e r a l  a n d  S u p p l e m e n t a l
26. Use of the word “bank” in company's name.
27. General restriction as to advertisement for deposits.
28. Strikes.
29. Prohibition of receipt of commission by staff.
30. Exclusion of certain individuals from management of licensed banks.
P a r t  V  
M isc ella n eo u s
31. Offences by companies, etc. and by servants and agents.
32. Penalties : directors and managers.
33. Penalties for offences not otherwise provided for.
34. Powers as to offences and the Attorney-Gcneral's fiat.
35. Jurisdiction.
36. Protection against adverse claims.
37. Priority of local deposit liabilities.
38. Exemptions.
39. Application : 1968 No. 51.
A r r a n g e m e n t  o f  S e c t i o n s - - c o n t i n u e d
Section
40. Regulations.
41. Interpretation.
42. Citation, extent and repeal.
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First Schedule : 
Second Schedule : 
Third Schedule : 
Fourth Schedule : 
Fifth Schedule :
SCHEDULES
Monthly Statement of Assets and Liabilities.
Report on Loans and Advances.
Accounts.
Matters to be expressly stated in Auditors* Report. 
Auditors* Analysis of Doubtful Advances.
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Decree No. 1
(7 th February, 1969)
THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT hereby 
decrees as follows:
P a r t  I 
L ic e n s in g  o f  B a n k s  -
General
1.(1) No banking business shall be transacted in Nigeria 
except by a company duly incorporated in Nigeria which 
is in possession of a valid licence granted by the Commis­
sioner authorising it to do so.
(2) The foregoing subsection (1) shall not apply—
(a) in relation to a bank (not being a bank to which 
paragraph (b) of this subsection refers), which 
was duly incorporated in Nigeria prior to the 
commencement of the Companies Decree 1968, 
and which holds a valid licence granted under 
the Act repealed by this Decree;
(b) in relation to a bank wliich was not, prior to 
the commencement of the Companies Decree 
1968, incorporated in Nigeria, and which at the 
commencement of this Decree holds a valid 
licence, if—
(/) the Nigerian branch or branches of the 
said bank shall, on or before 18th February, 
1969 become incorporated in Nigeria under 
the Companies Decree 1968 for the purposes 
of transacting banking business; and
(ii) the said bank has before that date applied 
to the Commissioner through the Governor 
of the Central Bank for a licence and such 
application has not been rejected by the 
said Commissioner.
(3) Any person who transacts banking business 
without a valid licence contrary to subsection
(1) above shall be guilty of an offence and liable 
to a fine of £50 for each day during which the 
offence continues.
Commencement
Banking busi­
ness by licensed 
banks.
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Licensing 2. (1) Any company which desires to carry on banking 
business in Nigeria shall apply in writing through the Central 
Bank to the Commissioner for the grant of a licence and shall 
submit the following, that is—
(a) a copy of the memorandum of association and 
articles of association or other instrument under 
which the company is incorporated duly verified 
by a statutory declaration made by a director, 
secretary, or other senior official of the company;
(b) a copy of the latest balance sheet of the company; 
and
(c) such other particulars as may be called for by 
the Central Bank.
(2) Upon receiving an application under subsection
(1) of this section the Central Bank shall require 
the Examiner appointed under section 20 of 
this Decree to cany out a preliminary exami­
nation of the books and affairs of such company.
(3) The Central Bank shall consider the application 
and the report of the Examiner and make a 
recommendation to the Commissioner stating 
whether or not a  licence should be granted and 
the conditions (if any) to be attached to the licence.
(4) Upon receiving an application under subsection
(1) of this section and the recommendation of 
the Central Bank under subsection (3) thereof 
the Commissioner may in accordance with the 
recommendation o f the Central Bank grant a 
licence, with or without conditions, or refuse 
to grant a licence.
(5) If  the Commissioner, notwithstanding the recom­
mendation of the Central Bank, is of the opinion—
(a) that it would be undesirable in the public interest 
that a licence should be granted; or
(b) that it would be desirable that a licence should 
be granted, he shall make a  report of the cir­
cumstances to the Federal Executive Council who 
may direct him to refuse or grant a licence, as the 
case may require; and where an application 
is refused, the Commissioner need not give any 
reason for the refusal.
(6) Where a licence is subject to conditions, the 
licensed bank shall comply with those conditions.
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(7) Any licensed bank which fails to comply with 
any of the conditions of its licence shall be guilty 
of an offence and shall be liable to a fine not
exceeding £50 for each day during which the
condition is not complied with.
3. (1) The Commissioner may, at any time on the 
recommendation of the Central Bank, vary or revoke any
of the conditions of a licence or impose such conditions
or additional conditions as he may deem necessary.
(2) Where the Commissioner proposes to vary, 
revoke or impose conditions in accordance with 
subsection (1) of this section, he shall before 
exercising such power give notice of his intention 
to the licensed bank concerned, and shall give 
the bank an opportunity to make representations 
to him and to submit reasons why the bank’s 
licence should not be so amended.
(3) Any licensed bank which fails to comply with 
any conditions as varied or imposed by virtue 
of subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of 
an oifence and shall be liable to a fine of £1000.
Supplemental
4. No person licensed to carry on banking business 
in Nigeria may, after the coming into force of this Decree, 
open or close branch offices anywhere in Nigeria or outside 
Nigeria except with the consent in writing o f the Central 
Bank.
5. Every licensed bank shall inform the Commissioner 
through the Central Bank of—
(a) any proposed agreement, or arrangement, for 
any sale or disposal of its business by amalga­
mation or otherwise;
(b) any proposal for reconstruction, and the Commis­
sioner may on the recommendation of the Central 
Bank approve or withhold approval of such agree­
ment or arrangement orproposal for reconstruction.
6. (1) No bank shall hold or be granted licence, unless—
(a) as respects a bank which is not directly or indirectly 
controlled from abroad, its paid-up share-capital 
is not less than £300,000; and
(b) as respects a bank which is directly or indirectly 
controlled from abroad its paid-up share Capital 
is not less than £750,000.
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(2) The Central Bank may, in consultation with the 
Commissioner, prescribe the minimum ratio  which licensed 
Banks shall maintain between their respective paid-up 
capital and statutory reserves on the one hand and their 
loans and advances on the other;
(3) In subsection (1) o f this section, a bank shall
be deemed to be controlled from  abroad—
(a) if the composition o f its board of directors consists 
wholly or mainly of persons who are not citizens 
of N igeria; or
(b) where the m ajority voting rights o f that company 
are held by persons who are not citizens of Nigeria.
(4) Any failure to comply with any o f  the foregoing 
provisions o f this section shall be a ground for
the revocation o f the licence o f the bank under
this Decree.
7. (1) Where any person carries on banking business 
under a licence validly granted under the A ct repealed by 
this Decree, and the licence was in force immediately before 
the commencement o f this Decree, tha t person shall not 
later than 6 m onths thereafter comply with the provisions 
of section 6 of this Decree relating to the minimum paid-up 
capital required for the purposes of that section.
(2) Any failure to comply with the provisions of 
subsection (1) o f this section shall be a ground for the revoca­
tion of the licence under this Decree.
8. (1) The Commissioner may on the recommendation 
o f the Central Bank by order published in the Federal Gazette 
revoke any licence—
(a) if the holder thereof ceases to carry on in Nigeria 
ihe type o f banking business for which he was 
licensed or goes into liquidation or is wound-up 
or otherwise dissolved; or
(b) if the holder thereof fails to fulfil the prescribed 
conditions and regulations ; or
(c) in the circumstances and in the manner where 
under this Decree failure to comply with any 
provisions thereof is a ground for revocation 
of licence.
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(2) Where the Commissioner proposes to revoke 
any licence in accordance with subsection (1) of this section, 
he shall before revoking any such licence give notice of his 
intention to the licensed bank and shall give the bank an 
opportunity to make representations and to submit reasons 
why its licence should not be so revoked.
Pa r t  I I  
D u ties o f  L icen sed  B a n k s  
General
9. Every licensed bank shall maintain a reserve fund 
and shall, out o f its net profits each year and before any 
dividend is declared—
(a) transfer to the reserve fund, where the am ount 
of the reserve fund is less than the paid-up share 
capital, a sum equal to not less than twenty-five 
per centum of such profits; or
(b) transfer to the reserve fund, where the am ount 
of the reserve fund is equal to or in excess o f the 
paid-up share capital, twelve-and-a-half per centum 
of the net profits o f the bank, but no transfer 
under the fore-going provisions o f this section 
shall be made until any past losses have been 
made good.
10. (1) No licensed bank shall pay any dividend on its 
shares until—
(a) all its preliminary expenses, organization expenses, 
shares selling commission, brokerage, am ounts 
of losses incurred and other capitalized expenses 
not represented by tangible assets have been 
completely written off; and
(b) after adequate provision for bad and doubtful 
debts has been made to the satisfaction o f the 
Central Bank.
(2) For the purposes o f this section, an issue of bonus 
shares out of profits shall be deemed to be a 
payment of dividends.
11. (1) Every director of a licensed bank who is in any 
manner whatsoever, whether directly or indirectly interested 
in an advance, loan or credit facility or proposed advance, 
loan or credit facility, from that bank shall as soon as prac­
ticable declare the nature o f his interest to the board of 
directors o f the bank, and the secretary of the bank shall 
cause such declaration to be circulated forthwith to all directors.
Maintenance of 
reserve fund.
Restriction on 
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(2) The requirements of subsection (1) of this section 
shall not apply in any case—
(a) where the interest of the director consists only 
of being a member or creditor of a company 
which is interested in an advance, loan or credit 
facility from the licensed bank; and
(b) if the interest of the director may properly be 
regarded by the Central Bank as not being a 
material interest.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (I) of this section 
a general notice given to the board of directors of 
a licensed bank by a director to the efTect—
(a) that he is an officer or member of a company or 
firm specified in the notice; and
(b) that he is to be regarded as interested in any 
advance, loan or credit facility which may, after 
the date of the notice, be made to tjiat company 
or firm, shall be deemed to be a sufficient declara­
tion of interest in relation to any such advance, 
loan or credit facility, if—
(/) the notice specifies the nature and extent of 
his interest in a company or firm so specified; 
(/7)such interest is not different in nature to or 
greater in extent than the nature and extent 
so specified in the notice at the time any 
advance, loan or credit facility is made; and
(iii) the notice is given at the meeting of the 
directors or the director takes reasonable 
steps to ensure that it is brought up and 
read at the next meeting of the directors 
after it is given.
^4) Every director of a licensed bank, who holds any 
office or possesses any property whereby, whether directly or 
indirectly, duties or interests might be created in conflict with 
his duties or interests as director, shall declare at a meeting 
of the director of the licensed bank the fact and the nature 
character and extent of the conflict.
(5) The declaration referred to in subsection (4) of this 
section shall be made at the first meeting of 
directors held—
(a) after he became a director of the licensed bank; or
Cb) if already a director, after he commenced to hold 
office or to possess the property.
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(6) The secretary of the licensed bank shall cause to 
be brought up and read any declaration made 
under subsection (1) or (4) of this section at the 
next meeting of the directors after it is made, and 
shall record any declaration made under this section 
in the minutes of the meeting at which it was made 
or at which it was brought up and read.
(7) Any director who contravenes subsection (1) or
(4) of this section shall be guilty of an offence and 
shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 3 years or to a fine not exceeding £5000 
or to both such imprisonment and fine.
12. (1) Every licensed bank shall maintain a holding of 
cash reserves, specified liquid assets, special deposits in the 
Central Bank and stabilization securities as the case may be, 
not less in amount than as may from time to time be prescribed 
by the Central Bank by virtue of section 40 of the Central Bank 
of Nigeria Act.
(2) Where there are both assets and liabilities due by or 
to other licensed banks, they shall be offset accord­
ingly, and any surplus of assets or liabilities shall 
be included as. specified liquid assets or demand 
liabilities as the case may be:
Provided that in the case of long term advances to a 
licensed bank or by an overseas branch or office of a licensed 
bank, the advances may with the approval of the Central 
Bank be excluded from the demand liabilities of the licensed 
bank.
(3) Every licensed bank—
(a) shall furnish within a reasonable time any infor­
mation required by the Central Bank to satisfy the 
Central Bank that the licensed bank is observing 
the requirements of subsection (1) of this section;
(b) shall not allow its holding of cash reserves, speci­
fied liquid assets, special deposits and stabilization 
securities to be less than as from time to time 
prescribed by the Central Bank; and
(c) shall not during the period of such deficiency, 
grant or permit increases in advances, loans or 
credit facilities to any person without the prior 
approval of the Central Bank.
Minimum hold­
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(4) Any licensed bank which fails to comply with any 
of the provisions of subsection (3) of this section 
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to 
a fine of £50—
(a) for every day during which a default under para­
graph (a) thereof exists;
(b) for every day during which a deficiency under 
paragraph (b) thereof exists; and
(c) for every offence under paragraph (c) thereof, 
and the Central Bank may also during the period 
when the licensed bank fails to comply with any 
of the requirements of subsection (3) as aforesaid 
withdraw any privileges or facilities that are 
normally accorded to the licensed bank.
(5) For the purposes of this seqtion “specified liquid 
assets’* provided they are freely transferable 
and free from any lien or charge of any kind shall, 
without prejudice to the provisions of section 2 
of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act (Amendment) 
(No. 3) Decree 1968, consist of all or any of the 
following, namely—
(a) notes and coins which arc legal tender in Nigeria;
(b) balances at the Central Bank;
(c) net balances a t any licensed bank (excluding 
uncleared effects) and money at call in Nigeria;
(d) Treasury Bills and Treasury Certificates issued by 
the Federal Government;
(e) inland bills of exchange and promissory notes 
rediscountable at the Central Bank.
13. (1) A licensed bank shall not—
(a) grant to any person any advance, loan or credit 
facility or give any financial guarantee or incur 
any other Lability on behalf of such person so 
that the total value of the advances, loans, credit 
facilities, financial guarantees and other liabilities 
in respect of such person is at any time more than 
thirty-three and one-third per centum of the sum 
of the paid-up capital and statutory reserves of the 
bank:
Provided that the provisions of this paragraph 
shall not apply to transactions between Lcensed 
banks or between branches of a licensed bank, or 
to the purchase of clean or documentary bills of 
exchange, telegraphic transfers or documents of
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title to goods the holder of which is entitled to 
payment for exports from Nigeria or to advances 
made against such bills transfers or documents; 
and for the purposes of this paragraph, all advan­
ces, loans or credit facilities extended to any person 
shall be aggregated and shall include all advances, 
loans or credit facilities extended to any subsi­
diaries and associates whatsoever of that person;
(b) grant any advances, loans or credit facilities against 
the security of its own .shares;
(c) grant or permit to be outstanding unsecured 
advances or loans, or unsecured credit facilities, 
of an aggregate amount in excess of £500—
(i) to its directors, or any of them, whether such 
advances, loans or credit facilities are obtained 
by its directors jointly or severally;
(ii) to any firm, partnership or private company in 
which it is or any one or more of its directors 
is interested as director, partner, manager or 
agent, or to any individual, firm, partnership 
or private company of which any one of its 
directors is a guarantor;
(7/7) to any public company in which it or any one 
or more of its directors jointly or severally 
maintains interest either directly or indirectly;
(<d) grant or permit to be outstanding to its officials 
and employees unsecured advances or loans, or 
unsecured credit facilities, which in aggregate 
amount for any one official or employee exceed one 
year’s salary of such official or employee;
(e) engage, whether on its own account or on a 
commission basis, in the wholesale or retail 
trade, including the import or export trade, 
except insofar as may exceptionally be necessary 
in the course of the banking operations and 
services of that licensed bank or in the course of 
the satisfaction of debts due to it;
( / )  acquire or hold any part of the share capital of 
any financial, commercial, agricultural, industrial 
or other undertaking, except—
A s amended by 
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(0 such shareholding as a licensed bank may with 
the prior approval o f the Central Bank acquire 
in the course of satisfaction of debts due to it 
which shareholding shall, however, be dis­
posed of at the earliest suitable moment,
(ii) any shareholding approved by the Central 
Bank in any statutory corporation set up for 
the purpose of promoting the development of 
a money market or securities market in 
Nigeria or of improving the financial machi­
nery for "the financing of economic deve­
lopment,^- ; J v ^
(///) all shareholdings approved by the Central 
Bank in other undertakings the aggregate 
value of which does no t'a t any time exceed 
twenty-five per centum o f  the sum o f , the 
paid-up capital and statutory reserves of that 
bank; ~ ,?• i c ..
(g) own any subsidiary company which is not carrying 
on a banking business; provided that the provi­
sions of this paragraph shall not apply to any 
nominee company o f a licensed bank Which deals 
in stocks and shares for or on behalf of the bank’s 
customers or clients; . v
(h) remit, either in whole or in part, the debts owed to 
it by any of its directors or past directors without 
the approval of the Central Bank;
(i) purchase, acquire or lease real estate, except as 
may be necessary for the purpose of conducting 
its business, including provisions for foreseeable 
future expansion or housing of its staf£ or other 
exceptional circumstances, where the agreement of 
the Central Bank is obtained; ~
(j ) sell, dispose or lease out any real estate, except with 
the prior approval of the Central Bank: Provided 
that a licensed bank may secure a debt on any real 
or other property, and in default o f repayment 
may acquire such property and exercise any 
power of sale, or as may be provided for in any 
instrument, or by . law prescribed, immediately 
upon such default* or soon thereafter as may be 
deemed proper. > ?
(2) In paragraphs (c) and (d) of subsection (1) of this 
section, the expression ‘'unsecured advances or 
loans,' or unsecured credit facilities’* means 
advances, loans or credit facilities made without 
security, or in respect of any advances, loans or
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credit facilities made with security, any part thereof 
which at any time exceeds the market value of 
the assets constituting the security, or where the 
Central Bank is satisfied that there is no established 
market value, the value of the assets as determined 
on the basis of a valuation approved by the 
Central Bank.
(3) In paragraphs (c) and (A) of subsection (1), the 
expression “director” includes the wife, husband, 
father, mother, son or daughter of a director.
(4) All directors of the bank shall be liable jointly or 
severally to indemnify the bank against any loss 
arising from any unsecured advances, loans or 
. credit facilities, under paragraph (e) of subsection (1)
of this section.
(5) Any licensed bank which after the commencement 
of this Decree enters into any transaction incon­
sistent with any of the provisions of paragraphs (a) 
to (A) of subsection (1) of this section shall be 
guilty of an offence and shall be liable to a fine of 
£50 for every day during which any such trans­
action continues.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed as 
permitting a licensed bank to grant to any market­
ing board established under any written law in 
Nigeria any advance, loan or credit facility, or to 
give any financial guarantee, or to incur any other 
liability on behalf of such board.
14. (1) The rate of interest charged on advances, loans
or credit facilities or paid on deposits by any 
licensed bank shall be linked to the minimum 
rediscount rate of the Central Bank subject to 
stated minimum and maximum rates of inte­
rest, and the minimum and maximum rates of 
interest when so approved shall be the same for 
all licensed banks; provided that differential 
rates may be approved for the various categories 
of banks to which this decree applies;
(2) The interest rate structure of each licensed bank 
shall be subject to the approval of the Central 
Bank.
Books o f Account
15. (1) Every licensed bank shall cause to be kept proper
books of account with respect to all the trans­
actions of the licensed bank.
Rates o f  interest 
on advance, etc.
As amended by 
S . 1 id )  Banking 
tAmendment) 
Decree N o. 3, 
1970.
Keeping o f  
books o f  
account.
662
Delivery of 
returns, etc. to 
Central Hank. 
First Schedule.
Second Schedule
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) of this section, 
proper books of account shall not be deemed to be 
kept with respect to all transactions if such books 
as are necessary to explain such transactions and 
give a true and fair view of the state o f affairs 
of the licensed bank are not kept by the bank.
(3) The books of account shall be kept a t the principal 
administrative office in Nigeria of each licensed 
bank in the English language or any other language 
approved by the Federal Executive Council on the 
recommendation of the Commissioner.
(4) If any person—
(a) being a director or officer o f a licensed bank fails to 
take all reasonable steps to secure compliance with 
any of the provisions o f this section; or
(b) has by his own wilful act been the cause of any 
default by the bank therefor, he shall be guilty of 
an offence under this section and shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months 
or to a fine not exceeding £500 or to both such 
imprisonment and fine.
(5) In any proceedings against a person under sub­
section (4) o f this section, it shall be a defence to 
prove that he has reasonable grounds to believe 
that another person was charged with the duty of 
seeing that any of the requirements was complied 
with and that that person was competent and in a 
position to discharge that duty.
16. (1) Every licensed bank shall submit to the Central 
Bank—
(j) not later than 28 days after the last day of each 
month, a statement in the appropriate form set out 
in the First Schedule to this Decree;
(b) such other periodical returns as may be prescribed 
by the Central Bank; and
(c) on request,'such information as may be required by 
the Central Bank.
(2) Every licensed bank shall submit to the Central 
Bank a statement in the form set out in the Second 
Schedule to this Decree giving an analysis of 
advances and other assets o f its office and branches
in Nigeria within such period following the end of 
each m onth  as the Central Bank may from time 
to time determine.
(3) The Central Bank may require a licensed bank to 
lubm it such further information as the Central Bank may 
deem necessary for the proper understanding of the statement* 
furnished by that bank under subsections (1) and (2) of this 
section, and such information shall be submitted within such a 
reasonable period as the Central Bank may require.
(4) Any licensed bank which maintains branches or 
offices outside Nigeria shall produce to the Central Bank such 
statem ents  relating to its offices or branches outside Nigeria 
in such form and at such times as the Central Bank may 
require.
(5) Any bank which fails to comply with any o f  the 
requirements of subsections (1), (2), (3) and (4) of this section 
shall in respect o f  each such failure be guilty of an offence 
under this Decree, and shall be liable to a fine of £50 for each 
day during which the offence continues.
(b) It shall be the responsibility of the Central Bank to 
prepare and to publish consolidated statements aggregating the 
figures in the statements furnished under subsection (1) of this 
section for each class o f  banks licensed under this Decree.
(7) The statements submitted by each licensed bank 
[ under subsection (1) or (2) o f  this section and any information 
submitted under subsection (3) or (4) thereof shall be regarded 
as secret other than as between tha t bank and the Central Bank.
Provided that the Central Bank—
(a) shall furnish any such information required 
by the Commissioner, and shall inform the C om ­
missioner if at any time in its opinion there is need 
for an examination of any licensed bank ; and
(b) may in support o f  its opinion convey to the 
Commissioner such information as it possesses 
concerning the state of the affairs of that bank.
17.— (1) N ot later than  4 months after the end of any 
financial year of a licensed bank, the licensed bank shall—
(a) cause to be published in a daily newspaper printed 
in and circulating in Nigeria;
(b) exhibit in a conspicuous position in each o f  its 
offices and branches in Nigeria; and
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(c) forward to tHe Commissioner and the Central 
Bank, copies of its balance sheet and profit and 
loss account duly signed and containing the full 
and correct names of the directors of the bank.
(2) The balance sheet and profit and loss account of 
the licensed bank shall bear on their face the report of an 
approved auditor and shall contain statements as to the 
matter mentioned in the Third Schedule to this Decree.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) of this section an 
“approved auditor” is an auditor who is approved for the 
purposes of section 19 of this Decree.
(4) Any licensed bank which fails to comply with any 
of the requirements of this section shall in respect of each 
such failure be guilty of an offence and be liable to a fine of 
£100.
18. (1) Every balance sheet o f every licensed bank shall 
give a true and fair view of the state of affairs as at the end 
of every financial year of such bank and every profit and loss 
account shall give a true and fair view of the profit or loss of 
such bank for the financial year.
(2) Every balance sheet and every profit and loss 
account of every licensed bank forwarded to the Commis­
sioner and the Central Bank in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 17 (1) (c) o f this Decree shall comply with the 
requirements of the Third and Fourth Schedules to this 
Decree.
(2a) Every balance sheet and every profit and loss 
account of every licensed bank shall be published or exhibited in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 17 (1) (a) and (b) 
may be so published or exhibited in abridged form agreed 
with the Central Bank;
(3) Any person being a director of any licensed Bank 
who fails to take all reasonable steps to secure compliance as 
respects any account required under the provisions of this 
section shall in respect of each offence be liable to imprison* 
ment for a term not exceeding 2 years or to a fine of £500 
or to both such imprisonment and fine.
(4) In any proceedings against a person in respect of 
an offence under this section, it shall be a defence to prove 
that he had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that 
another person, who is competent and reliable, was charged 
with the duty of seeing that the said provisions were complied 
with and was in a position to discharge that duty.
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(5) A person shall not be sentenced to imprisonment 
for an offence under this section unless, in the opinion of the 
court, the offence was committed wilfully.
19* (1) Every licensed bank shall appoint annually a 
person approved by the Commissioner, in this section referred 
to as “ the approved auditor** whose duties shall be to make to 
the shareholders a report upon the annual balance sheet 
and profit and loss account of the bank and every such report 
shall contain statement as to the matters mentioned in the 
Third, Fourth and Fifth Schedules to this Decree.
(2) No person—
(a) having an interest in a licensed bank otherwise 
than as a  depositor; or
(b) who is a director, officer or agent of a licensed 
bank; or
(c) which is a firm in which a director of a licensed 
bank is interested as partner or director, shall be 
eligible for appointment as the approved audi­
tor for any licensed bank, and any person 
appointed as such auditor—
(0 who subsequently acquires such interest; or
0*0 becomes a director, officer or agent of that bank; or
(iii) subsequently becomes a partner in a firm in which 
a director o f a licensed bank is interested as partner 
or director, shall cease to be such auditor.
(3) If  any licensed bank—
(a) fails to appoint the approved auditor under sub­
section (1) o f this section; or
00 at* any time fails to fill a vacancy for such person, 
the Commissioner shall after consultation with the 
Central Bank appoint “the approved auditor** and 
shall fix the remuneration to be paid by the bank 
to such auditor.
(4) Every auditor of a licensed bank shall have a 
right of access at all times to the books and accounts and 
vouchers of the bank, and shall be entitled to require from 
the directors and officers o f the bank such information and 
explanation as he thinks necessary for the performance of 
his dudes.
■ (5) The report o f the approved auditor shall be read 
together with the report of the board of management at the 
annual general meeting of the shareholders and two copies 
of each report together with the auditor’s analysis o f doubt­
ful advances on the form provided in the Fifth Schedule
Appointm ent 
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to this Decree shall be sent to the Central Bank who shall 
transmit a copy of such each report to the Commissioner;
(6) For the purposes o f this section, the approved 
auditor shall be an auditor who is a member of one o f the 
professional bodies for the time being declared by the Commis­
sioner by notice in the Federal Gazette to be approved 
for such purposes.
(7) No auditor shall be approved for the purposes of 
this section unless—
(a) he is resident in Nigeria; and
(b) he is carrying on in Nigeria full-time professional 
practice as a public accountant and auditor.
P a r t  III 
P o w e r s  o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  B a n k
20. (1) There shall be an Examiner, who—
(a) shall be an officer o f the Central Bank appointed 
by the Bank with power to examine periodically, 
under conditions o f secrecy, the books and affairs 
of each and every licensed bank;
(b) shall have a right o f access at all times to the books 
and accounts and vouchers o f the bank; and
Cc) shall be entitled to require from the officers and 
directors of the bank such information and 
explanation as he thinks necessary for the perfor­
mance of his duties, 
and the Examiner shall be given and shall have access to 
any accounts, returns or information regarding banks licensed 
under this Decree that are in the possession o f the Federal 
Ministry of Finance.
(2) There may in the same m anner be appointed one or 
more fit persons as Deputy or Assistant Examiner who shall 
have and may exercise the powers o f an Examiner under this 
Decree.
(3) In examining the affairs o f any licensed bank in 
accordance with subsection (1) of this section, it shall be the 
duty' of the Examiner at all times to avoid unreasonable 
hindrance to the daily business of that bank and to confine 
the investigation to matters strictly relevant to the examination.
(4) Every licensed bank shall produce to the examiners 
at such times as the examiners may specify all books, accounts, 
documents and oral information which they may require.
Appointment 
and powers of 
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(5) If any book, account, document or information—
(n) is not produced in accordance with subsection
(4) of this section; or
(£>) is false in any material particular, the licensed bank 
shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable—
(/) in the case of an offence against paragraph (a) 
of this subsection, to a fine o f £50 in respect of 
each day in which the offence continues, or
(ii) in any other case under paragraph (b) thereof, to 
a fine of £500.
(6) The Examiner shall forward a report of his findings 
to the Governor of the Central Bank, who shall forward a 
copy o f the Examiner’s report to the Commissioner and in­
form the Commissioner of any circumstances in which the 
Commissioner may exercise any powers under section 22 
o f this Decree.
21. (1) The Commissioner may at any time require the 
Governor o f the Central Bank to require the Examiner 
appointed in accordance with section 20 of this Decree, or 
one or more other qualified persons whom the Governor 
shall appoint, to make a special examination under conditions 
o f secrecy of the books and affairs of any licensed bank—
(a) where, after consultation with the Central Bank, 
the Commissioner has reason to believe that a 
licensed bank—
(0 may be carrying on its business in a manner detri­
mental to the interest of its depositors and other 
creditors, or
(ii) may have insufficient assets to cover its liabilities 
to the public, or 
(in) may be contravening the provisions of this Decree.
(b) where application is made—
(i) by shareholders holding not less than one- 
third o f the total number of shares for the 
time being issued and paid-up, or
(ii) by depositors holding not less than one-half 
o f the gross am ount of the deposits of the 
bank:
Provided however that the applicants under 
this paragraph submit to the Commissioner such 
evidence as he may consider necessary to justify 
an examination, and provided also that they
Special
examination.
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furnish adequate security for payment of the costs 
of the examination;
(c) where the licensed bank suspends payments or 
informs the Commissioner or the Governor of 
the Central Bank of its intention to do so.
(2) Where a licensed bank considers—
(a) that it is likely to become unable to meet its 
obligations; or
(b) that it is about to suspend payments,
it shall forthwith inform the Central Bank of its 
intention to do so, and any failure to make such 
report shall be an offence under this Decree.
. (3) As soon as may be after the conclusion of an 
examination under this section, the Examiner shall submit a 
full report thereon to the Governor of the Central Bank who 
shall forward a copy of the report together with his comments 
to the Commissioner, and the Commissioner may at his dis­
cretion communicate to the Head Office of the licensed bank 
concerned or to the applicants such information arising from 
the report as the Commissioner deems fit.
(4) The Commissioner shall have power to order that 
all expenses of and incidental to an examination shall be paid 
by the bank examined, and shall also have power in respect of 
examination made under paragraph (h) of subsection (1) 
of this section to order that the expenses shall be defrayed by 
the applicants.
22. If, in the opinion of the Commissioner, an examina­
tion shows that a licensed bank is carrying on its business 
in a manner detrimental to the interests of its depositors and 
other creditors, or has insufficient assets to cover its liabilities 
to the public, or is contravening the provisions of this Decree, 
the Commissioner may take such one or more of the following 
steps from time to time as may seem to him necessary, that is 
to say—
(a) require thafthe licensed bank shall, forthwith,
take such steps as the* Commissioner may consider
necessary to rectify the matter, and these may
include any or all of the following steps, that is—
*
(/)■ require that the bank shall call meeting of 
its directors for the p»wpose of considering 
any matter relating to or-arising out of the 
affairs of the bank, or require that an officer
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of the bank shall discuss any such matter 
with an officer of the Central Bank,
(ii) require that the bank shall make, within 
such time as may be specified, such changes 
in the management as the Commissioner may 
consider necessary,
(iii) appoint a person who’in his opinion has had 
proper training and experience to advise the 
licensed bank in the proper conduct of its 
business and fix the remuneration to be paid 
by the licensed bank to such person; or
(b) report the circumstances to the Federal Executive 
Council which, unless satisfied that the bank is 
taking adequate measures to put its affairs in 
order, may direct the Commissioner to mako 
an order—
(i) revoking the bank’s licence and requiring 
its business to be wound-up, or
(ii) requiring the Central Bank to assume control 
and carry on the business of the licensed 
bank,
except that the Commissioner shall not so report 
the circumstances without giving the bank 
reasonable prior notice of his intention to do so 
and an opportunity of submitting a written 
statement in reply.
23. (1) Where the Central Bank has assumed control 
of the business of a licensed bank in pursuance of paragraph
(b) of section 22 of this Decree, the Central Bank shall, subject 
to subsection (2) of this section, remain in control of, and 
continue to carry on, the business of that bank, in the name 
and on behalf o f the bank until such time as—
(a) the deposits with the bank have been repaid or 
the Central Bank is satisfied that suitable provision 
has been made for their repayment; and
(b) in the opinion of the Central Bank, it is no longer 
necessary for the Central Bank to remain in 
control of the business o f the bank.
(2) Where the Central Bank has assumed control 
of the business of a licensed bank as aforesaid, 
the High Court may—
(a) upon application by the licensed bank; and
(b) if the High Court is satisfied tha it is no longer 
necessary for the protection of depositors of
Control o f  
licensed banks.
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the bank that the Central Bank should remain 
in control of the business of the licensed bank, 
order that the Central Bank shall cease to control 
the business of the bank as from a date specified 
in the order.
(3) Where the Central Bank has assumed control 
o f the business of a licensed bank as aforesaid or ceases to 
control the business of a licensed bank in accordance with this 
section, the Central Bank shall notify that fact in the Federal 
Gazette.
24. (1) Where the Central Bank has assumed control 
o f the business of a licensed bank in pursuance of paragraph
(6) of section 22 of this Decree, the licensed bank shall submit 
its business to the control of the Central Bank and shall 
provide the Central Bank with such facilities as the Central 
Bank requires to carry on the business of that bank.
(2) Any licensed bank winch fails to comply with 
subsection (1) of this section or with any requirements of the 
Central Bank under the said section 22 of this Decree shall 
be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to a fine not exceed­
ing £100 for each day during which such default continues.
25. (1) Where by section 22 of this Decree, the Commis­
sioner makes an order revoking the licence of a bank and 
requiring the business of that bank in Nigeria to be wound up, 
that bank shall within 14 days after the making of the order 
apply to the High Court for an order winding up the affairs 
of that bank under supervision of that court and the court 
shall take up the hearing of the application in priority to 
all other matters.
(2) If  the bank fails to apply to the High Court 
within the time prescribed by subsection (1) of this section, 
the Commissioner may in his discretion—
(а) apply to the High Court for any necessary order; or
(б) without waiting for the expiration of the time 
prescribed, appoint the official receiver (within 
the meaning of section 395 of the Companies 
Decree 1968) or any other fit person to be a 
provisional liquidator, and the provisional liqui­
dator* shall have the powers conferred by and be 
deemed to have been appointed a provisional 
liquidator by the High Court for the purposes of 
that Decree.
(3) The provisions of this section shall have effect, 
and section 209 of the Companies Decree 1968 shall be cons­
trued, as if the making of an order under section 22 of this 
Decree to revoke the licence of a bank had been included as a 
ground for winding-up by the High Court under that section.
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(4) The liquidator o f a licensed bank shall forward 
to the Central Bank copies of all returns which he is required 
to make under the Companies Decree 1968*
(5) The Central Bank may, at any time by notice in 
writing require the liquidator of a licensed bank to furnish, 
within such time as may be specified in the notice or such 
further time as the Central Bank may allow, any statement or 
information relating to or connected with the winding-up 
of the bank, and it shall be the duty of every liquidator to 
comply with such requirements.
P a r t  IV 
G e n e r a l  a n d  S u p p l e m e n t a l
26. (1) Save with the consent of the Commissioner and 
subject to subsection (2) of this section, no person other than 
a licensed commercial bank shall—
(a) use or continue to use the word “bank” or any 
of its derivatives, either in English or in any 
other language, in the description or title under 
which such person is carrying on business in 
Nigeria;
(2) Every licensed commercial bank shall use as 
part of its description or title the word “bank” or some one 
or more of its derivatives, either in English or in some other 
language.
(3) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to 
any association of licensed banks formed for the protection 
of their mutual interests.
(4) Any licensed commercial bank which acts in 
contravention of this section shall be guilty of an offence 
and shall be liable to a fine of £50 for every day during which 
the offence continues.
(5) In this section, the reference to a “ licensed com­
mercial bank” is a reference to a  bank that is licensed as a 
commercial bank within the meaning of this Decree.
27. (1) No person other than a licensed bank shall, 
after the commencement of this Decree, issue any advertise­
ment inviting the public to deposit money with i t
(2) Where any licensed bank proposes, after the 
commencement of this Decree, to issue any advertisement for 
deposits of money with it, then the bank shall deliver to the 
Central Bank the text o f the proposed advertisement and the 
bank’s latest published accounts, and shall thereafter comply 
with such directives and conditions as the Central Bank may 
prescribe, and such texts shall be regarded as confidential 
information.
U se o f  the word 
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(3) Any person who issues an advertisement in 
contravention of any of the foregoing provisions of this 
section shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine not 
exceeding £200.
(4) Any person who in the ordinary course of his 
business issues an advertisement to the order of another 
person, being an advertisement the issue of which by that 
other person constitutes an offence under this section, shall 
not himself be guilty of the offence, if he proves that the matters 
contained in the advertisement were not (wholly or in part) 
devised or selected by him or by any other person under his 
direction or control.
(5) In this Decree “advertisement” includes any form 
of advertising, whether in publication or by the display of 
notices or by means of circulars or other documents or by an 
exhibition of photographs or cinematograph or by way of 
sound broadcasting or television or loudspeakers or other 
public address systems, and references to the issuing of an 
advertisement shall be construed accordingly; and for the 
purposes of this Decree, an advertisement issued by any person 
by way of display or exhibition in a public place shall be 
treated as issued by him on every day on which he causes 
or permits it to be so displayed or exhibited.
(6) For the purposes o f this Decree, an advertisement 
which contains information calculated to lead directly or 
indirectly to the deposit of money by the public shall be 
treated as an advertisement inviting the public to deposit 
money.
(7) For the purposes o f this Decree, an advertise­
ment issued by any person on behalf of or to the order of 
another person shall be treated as an advertisement issued by 
that other person; and for the purposes of any proceedings 
under this Decree, an advertisement inviting the public to 
deposit money with a  person specified in the advertisement 
shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have 
been issued by that person.
28. No licensed bank shall incur any liability to any 
of its customers b /reason only of failure on the part of that 
bank to open for business during a strike: Provided that the 
said bank has, within 24 hours of the continuance of the strike, 
obtained the approval of the Central Bank for any continued 
closure of the bank.
29. Any director, officer or employee of a licensed 
bank or other persons being persons receiving remuneration 
from such licensed bank, who asks for or receives, consents
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or agrees to receive any gift, commission, emolument, service, 
gratuity, money, property or thing of value for his own 
personal benefit o r advantage or for that o f any o f his rela­
tions, from any person other than from the bank—
(a) for procuring or endeavouring to procure for 
any person any advance, loan or credit facility 
from the licensed bank; or
(b) for the purchase or discount of any draft, note, 
cheque, bill of exchange or other obligations by 
that bank; or
(c) for permitting any person to overdraw any account 
with that bank, shall be guilty of an offence and 
shall be liable to imprisonment for a  term not 
exceeding 3 years or to a fine not exceeding £1000 
or to both such imprisonment and fine.
30. (1) Any person who is a Director, Chief of Banking 
Operations, Secretary or other officer concerned in the mana­
gement of a licensed bank shall cease to hold office—
(a) if he becomes bankrupt, suspends payments, or 
compounds with his creditors; or
(b) if he is convicted of an offence involving dis­
honesty or fraud.
(2) No person who has been a director of, or directly 
concerned in the management of, a  licensed bank which has 
been wound up by a High Court shall, without the express 
authority of the Commissioner, act or continue to act as a 
director of, or be directly concerned in the management 
of, any licensed bank.
(3) Any person acting in contravention of subsection
(1) or (2) of this section shall be guilty of an offence and shall 
be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years 
or to a fine not exceeding £1000 or to both such imprison­
ment and fine.
P a r t  V  
M isc e l l a n e o u s
31. (1) Where any offence against any provision of this 
Decree has been committed by a  company, firm, society or 
other body of persons, any person who at the time of the 
commission of the offence was a director, manager, secretary 
or other similar officer thereof or was purporting to act in 
such capacity shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence, 
unless he proves that the offence was committed without 
his consent or connivance and that he exercised all such
Exclusion o f  
certain indivi­
duals from  
management o f  
licensed banks.
Offences by 
com panies, etc. 
and by servants 
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diligence to prevent the commission of the offence as he 
ought to have exercised, having regard to the nature of his 
functions in that capacity and to all the circumstances.
(2) Where any person would be liable under this 
Decree to any punishment or penalty for any act, omission, 
neglect or default, he shall be liable to the same punishment 
or penalty for eveiy such act, omission, neglect or default 
of any clerk, servant or agent, or of the clerk or servant of 
such agent:
Provided that such act, omission, neglect or default was 
committed by such clerk or servant in the course of his employ­
ment, or by such agent when acting in the course of his employ­
ment in such circumstances that had such act, omission, 
neglect or default been committed by the agent his principal 
would have been liable under this section.
32. Any person who, being a director or manager of a 
licensed bank—
(a) fails to take all reasonable steps to secure com­
pliance by the bank with the requirements of 
this Decree; or
(b) fails to take all reasonable steps to secure the 
correctness of any statement submitted under 
the provisions of this Decree,
shall be guilty of an offence under this Decree and shall be 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or 
to a fine of £500 or to both such imprisonment and fine.
33. Any licensed bank which contravenes or fails to 
comply with any of the provisions of this Decree for which 
no offence or penalty is expressly provided shall be guilty 
of an offence and shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £1000.
34. (1) The Governor of the Central Bank may com­
pound any offence punishable under this Decree by accepting 
such sums of money as he thinks fit, not exceeding the amount 
of the maximum fine to which that person would have been 
liable if he had been ^convicted of the offence.
(2) Any monies paid to the Governor pursuant to 
subsection (1) o f this section shall be paid into the Conso­
lidated Revenue Fund of the Federation.
(3) No prosecution in respect of any offence under 
this Decree shall be instituted without the consent in writing 
of the Attorney-General of the Federation.
35. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other JurUdictlo*. 
written law, a  Chief Magistrate's court shall have jurisdiction 
to try any offence against this Decree and to impose the foil 
penalty prescribed.
36. (1) Neither the Government of the Federation nor 
the Central Bank, nor any officer o f that Government or 
body, shall be subject tp any action, claim or demand by or 
liability to any person in respect of anything done or omitted 
to be done in good faith in pursuance or in execution of, or 
ii connection with the execution or intended execution of, 
any power conferred upon that Government, the Central 
Bank or such officer, by this Decree.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a Commissioner 
and any public officer shall be deemed to be an officer of the 
Government of the Federation, and the Governor and the 
Deputy Governor of the Central Bank and any director or 
employee thereof and any person holding any office therein or 
appointed by the Central Bank under paragraph (a) of section 
22 of this Decree shall be deemed to be an officer of the 
Central Bank.
•c -v r .\
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37. Where a  licensed bank becomes unable to meet 
its obligations or suspends payments, the assets of such bank 
in the Federation shall be available to meet all deposit liabi­
lities o f the bank in the Federation, and such deposit liabili­
ties shall have priority over all other liabilities of the bank.
38. (1) The provisions of this Decree shall not apply to—
(a) the Central Bank established under the Central 
Bank of Nigeria Act;
(b) the fund established under the National Provident 
Fund Act 1961;
(c) the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank 
Limited;
(d) the Post Office Savings Bank established under 
the Savings Bank Act.
(e) the Nigeria Housing Development Society Limited.
(2) The list of exceptions in subsection (1) o f this
section may be amended, by such additions or omissions as 
may be deemed necessary, by the Commissioner by order 
published in the Federal Gazette.
39. The provisions of this Decree are without preju­
dice to the provisions of the Companies Decree 1968, inso­
far as they relate to banks and to winding-up by the court:
Priority o f  local 
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: -VTV'' 
:
Exemptions.
Cap. 30.
1961 N o . 20.
Cap. *188. as - 
amended by .f-d. 
Banking Decree . 
Nigeria Housing i  d- 
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Limited. Exemp-d ; 
tion Order 1970 v 
L .N .2 I , 1970
Application: 
1968 N o . 51.
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shall prevail.
40. The Commissioner may in consultation with the 
Central Bank make such regulations as may be required from 
time to time for carrying into effect the object of this Decree, 
and he may by ordeT published in the Federal Gazette amend, 
alter or vary the Schedules to this Decree.
41. (1) In this Decree, unless the context otherwise 
requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby 
assigned to them, respectively, that is—
“ bank” means any person who carries on banking business, 
and includes a commercial bank, an acceptance house, dis­
count house and financial institution; and in this definition—
(a) “commercial bank” means any person who 
transacts banking business in Nigeria and whose
business includes the acceptance of deposits, 
withdrawable by cheque,
(b) “ acceptance house” means any person in Nigeria 
who transacts banking business and whose busi­
ness mainly consists of granting acceptance facili­
ties o r whose operations are, in the opinion of the 
Central Bank, those of an acceptance house,
(e) “discount house” means any person in Nigeria 
who transacts banking business and whose busi­
ness mainly consists of trading in and holding 
commercial bills of exchange, Treasury Bills and 
other securities, or whose operations are, in the 
opinion of the Central Bank, those of a discount 
house, and
(d) “financial institution” means any person in 
Nigeria who transacts banking business but who 
is not a commercial bank, an acceptance house 
or a discount house;
“ banking business”, means the business of receiving monies 
from outside sources as deposits irrespective of the paym ent 
o f interest and the granting of money loans and acceptance 
o f credits or the purchase of bills and cheques or the purchase 
and *sale of securities for account o f others or the incurring 
o f the obligation to acquire claims in respect o f loans prior 
to their m aturity or the assumption of guarantees and other 
warranties for others or the effecting o f transfers and clearings.
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and such other transactions as the Commissioner may, on 
the recommendation o f the Central Bank, by order published 
in the Federal Gazette designate as banking business;
4iCentral Bank” means the Central Bank of Nigeria esta­
blished under the Central Bank of Nigeria Act;
“ Commissioner” means the Federal Commissioner charged 
with responsibility for matters relating to banking;
“ deposits” means monies lodged by the general public 
with any person for safe-keeping or for the purpose o f earning 
interest or dividends whether or not such monies are repay­
able upon demand, upon a given period of notice or upon 
a fixed date ;
“ director” includes any person by whatever name he may 
be referred to, carrying out or empowered to carry out sub­
stantially the same functions of a director in relation to the 
direction of a com pany registered under the Companies 
Decree 1968;
“ licence” means a  licence granted by or under Part I of 
this Decree authorising the carrying on o f banking business 
in Nigeria;
“ licensed bank” means a bank holding a  valid licence by 
or under Part I o f this Decree;
“ prescribed” means prescribed by this Decree or by the 
Central Bank of N igeria Act, or by regulations made under 
this Decree or that Act.
(2) For the purposes o f this Decree, the following 
expressions, namely—
(a) “commercial bank” ;
(b) “ acceptance house” ;
(c) “ discount house” ; and
(d ) “financial institution” ,
have the meanings given respectively in the definition of 
“ bank” in subsection (1) o f this section.
(3) F o r the purposes of this Decree, a person shall 
be deemed to be receiving monies as deposits—
(a) if  tha t person accepts, from the general public 
deposits as a feature o f its business or if it issues 
an advertisement or solicits for such deposits; 
and
(b) notwithstanding that it receives monies as deposit 
which are limited to fixed am ounts or that certi­
ficates or o ther instruments are issued in respect
Cap. 30
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. o f any such amounts providing for the repayment 
to the holder thereof either conditionally or 
unconditionally o f the amount of the deposits at 
specified or unspecified dates or for the payment 
of interest on the amounts deposited a t specified 
intervals or otherwise, or that such certificates 
are transferable.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section 
to the contrary, the receiving o f monies against any issue of 
debentures offered to the public in accordance with any enact­
ment in force within the Federation shall not be deemed to 
constitute receiving of monies as deposits for the purposes 
of this Decree.
42. (1) This Decree may be cited as the Banking Decree 
1969 and shall apply throughout the Federation.
(2) The Banking Act 1958 is hereby repealed, and any 
reference in this Decree to “ the Act repealed by this Decree*' 
shall be construed accordingly. .
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SECO ND SCHEDULE
Section 16 (2)
REPORT ON LOANS AND ADVANCES
(To be submitted in accordance with Section 16 o f  the Banking Decree 1969)
A s a t ____________________day o f__________________________ 19_____
N am e o f  Reporting Bank------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
A ddress________________________________   :___________________________________
S ec tio n  A
Loans and Advances analysed by Sector Borrowers:
C O D E  
M ajor M inor '
0 . A griculture , F orestry, F ishing , etc .
01 Agriculture (including live-stock, poultry, etc.) . . .  £
02  Other . . .  *••• .. .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .
03 Timber ( l o g g i n g ) .....................................................................
04  F ish ing  v . . .  . . .  . . .  ... . . .  . . .  .. .
1. M in in g  a nd  Q uarryino
01 C oal • ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
02  M etallic m ining (tin ore, iron, zinc and l e a d ) ................
03  Crude petroleum and gas ...........................................
04  Other non-m etaliic mining (including quarrying and 
sandpits) . . .  . . .  . . .  .. .  . . .  . . .  . . .
2. M anufacturing
01 F lour m illing and bakeries ...........................................
02  M eat and other food  processing, canning and cold storage
03 Beverages, tobacco and tobacco products .................
04  Textile and apparel (including spinning, weaving,
finishing textiles and tailoring) ...........................
05 Footwear (excluding rubber fo o tw e a r ) ..............................
06  W oodproducts (including furniture) ..............................
07  Paper and paper products ...........................................
08  Printing, publishing, etc............................................................
3. 01 Manufacturing o f  rubber products (including rubber
footw ear).. .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .
02  Soaps, o ils and detergents......................................................
03 Petroleum and coal products ...........................................
04  Building materials, pottery, ceramics and glass
05  Other non-m etallic products ...........................................
06  Basic metal products (including smelting and 
fabricating) ............................. ..  ..............................
07  M iscellaneous manufacturing and p r o c e s s in g .................
4 . Rea l  Estate a n d  C onstruction
01  Owner occupied property............................................................ \
02  Commercial property:
02.1 Residential .............................................. £ -----------------
02.2  N on-Rcsidcntial --------------------------£-----------------
03  Public construction ........................................................
04  Other ..................................................................................
Major Minor
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5 . P u b l i c  U t il i t i e s
01 Electricity, water, harbour, etc................................
G e n e r a l  C o m m erce
A. Exports
01 Cocoa .................................................................
02 G roundnuts and groundnut o i l ............................
03 Palm produce .....................................................
04 C otton .................................................................
0 5  Hides and skins .....................................................
06 R ubber and products ........................................
07 Tim ber and products ........... ............................
08 Other agricultural exports.........................................
09 Non-agricultural e x p o r ts ........................................
B. Imports and Domestic Trade
10 Im ports ..................................................................
11 Domestic Trade .....................................................
01 Wholesale merchant .........................................
02 Retail merchant .....................................................
7 . T r a n s p o r t a t io n  a n d  C o m m u n ic a t io n s
01  Rail transport ...............
02 Road transport .....................................................
03 W ater transport .....................................................
04 A ir transport .....................................................
05 O ther Communications .........................................
8. C r e d it  a n d  F in a n c ia l  I n s t it u t io n s
01 Commercial banks and Acceptance Houses
02 Hire-purchase finance companies ...............
03 Insurance companies ........................................
04 Building societies, finance co-operatives, real estate
com panies................................................................
05 O ther financial institution............. ............................
9 . G o v e r n m e n t
01 Federal Government .........................................
02 State Governments ................ ................
03 Local Governments .........................................
10. G e n e r a l
01 Personal and professional........................................
02 Miscellaneous loans and advances ...............
03 Total Section A ...........................................................
S e c t io n  B
11. M o n e y  a t  C a l l  a n d  B i l l s  D i s c o u n t e d
A. Money at Call
01 Call money scheme .........................
02 Finance companies .........................
03 Commercial banks :
03. 1 In  Nigeria .......................................
03. 2 Abroad ......................................
04 Other ....................................................
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Major Minor
B. Bills Discounted
0 5 Produce paper ........................  £.....
0 6  Other commercial paper:
06.1 Payable in Nigeria ..................................................... £ ................
06.2 Payable abroad .....................................................  £ ............ ....
0 7 Total Section B ...............    £
S e c t i o n  C
L o a n s  a n d  A d v a n c e s  by  T y p e  o f  S e c u r it y
01 Documentary bills ...................................................... £
02 Plant, equipment and other real e s t a t e ............................
03 Time and savings deposits, life insurance policies and
other cash deposits ......................................................
04 Corporate, and government securities and other financial
assets ...............................................................................
05 Personal guarantee ......................................................
06 Otherwise s e c u re d ...................................................................
07 Unsecured ... ................ .........................................
08 Total Section C .................................................................. £
13. L o a n s  a n d  A d v a n c e s  by
S e c t io n  D  
M a t u r it y
01 On Call .........................................
02 Maturing within 3 months
03 Maturing between 3 and 6 months
04 M aturing between 6 and 12 months
05 Maturing between 1 and 5 years ...
06 Maturing after 5 years ................
07 Total Section D  ............................
07.1 * 0 f  which past-due and uncollected £  .
S e c t io n  E
14. L o a n s  a n d  A d v a n c e s  by M e t h o d  o f  R epa y m e n t
01 Overdraft .............................
02 Repayable by specifically agreed instalments ...
03 Repayable in one single paym ent............................
04 Total Section E ......................................................
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M ajor Minor
S ec tio n  F
15. L o a n s  a n d  A d v a n c e s  B y  A m o u n t N u m b er a n d  T y m  o f  B o r r o w e r s
Total
Amount Amount to Total Total No. o f
Indigenous Amount to  Amount Borrowers 
Persons Others £  Indigenous
Others
01 U p to £50 .............................. ...................... ..................... ................................................
02 Over £50 and up to  £100 . . .  ________  __________  ___________ ________
03 Over £100 and up to £500 ________ __________________________ _ ________
04 Over £500 and up to  £1,000 _ ..............       -
05 Over £1,000 and up to  £5,000   - ___________ ________
06 Over £5,000 and up to  £10,000 ........................     —
07 Over £10,000 and up to £50,000 ________  __________  __________  —.______
OS Over £50,000 •a# ••• ■■    ■». ■■ ■■■    '    -- — ...................
09 T o t a l  ••• ••• •*• —............     m. .......... .... ...........
Nam e and address o f  person to  contact i f  questions arise concerning this report: ,
Signature o f  Authorised Officer
Tide__________________________________
Date_________________________ !________
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THIRD SCHEDULE Sections 17,18 and 19 
ACCOUNTS 
Preliminary
1. Paragraphs 2 to . 11 of this Schedule apply to the 
balance sheet and paragraphs 12 to 16 apply to the profit and 
loss account
G e n e r a l  P r o v isio n s  a s  t o  B a l a n c e  S h eet  a n d  P r o fit  a n d
Loss A c c o u n t
Balance Sheet
2. The authorised share capital, issued share capital 
liabilities and assets shall be summarised, with such particu­
lars as are necessary to disclose the general nature of the 
assets and liabilities, and there shall be specified—
(a) any part of the issued capital that consists of 
redeemable preference shares and the earliest 
date on which the person has power to redeem 
those shares;
(b) the amount of the share premium account;
(c) particulars of any redeemed debentures which 
the person has power to re-issue.
3. There shall be stated under separate headings, in­
sofar as they are not written off—
(а) the preliminary expenses;
(б) any expenses incurred in connection with any 
issue of share capital or debentures;
(c) any sums paid by way of commission in respect 
of any shares or debentures;
(d) any sums allowed by way of discount in respect 
of any debentures.
4. (1) The following shall be classified under head­
ings appropriately itemised:
(a) Cash in hand,
(b) Balance due to and from other banks,
(c) Short-term investments falling within the terms 
of section 12 (5) (d) and (e) of this Decree,
(<d) Other Investments,
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(e) Loans and Advances,
( /)  Fixed Assets,
(g) Other Assets,
(h) Deposits,
(i) Borrowings,
O’) Other Liabilities,
(A:) Provisions and Reserves,
(/) Capital,
(m) Liabilities for Acceptances, Guarantees, etc.
(2) The method or methods used to arrive at the 
amount of each item of fixed assets shall be stated.
5. Loans and Advances shall be shown gross less the 
amount of provisions made in respect of debts 
doubtful or recovery. Where no provision is con­
sidered necessary a note to that effect shall appear 
on the balance sheet.
6. In respect of Balances due to and from other banks, 
a distinction shall be made between balances held 
in Nigeria and outside Nigeria.
7 . Demand deposits, savings accounts and time 
deposits shall be itemised under the heading 
“Deposits” .
8. In respect of investments shown under “Other 
Investments” in paragraph 4 (1) (d) above, a 
distinction shall be made between the quoted and 
unquoted investments.
9. (1) The method of arriving at the net amount of any
fixed assets shall be the difference between—
(a) its cost or, if it stands in the person’s books at a 
valuation, the amount of the valuation; and
(&) the aggregate amount provided or written-off since 
the date of acquisition or valuation, as the case 
may be, for depreciation or diminution in value.
For the purposes of this paragraph the net amount at which 
any assets stand in the person’s books at the commencement 
of this Decree (after deduction of the amounts previously 
provided or written-off for depreciation or diminution in value) 
shall, if the figures relating to the period before the commence­
ment of this Decree cannot be obtained without unreasonable 
expense or delay, be treated as if it were the amount of a 
valuation of the said asset made at the commencement of this
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Decree, and, where any of those amount less the assets are sold, 
the said net amount of the sales shall be treated as if it were 
the amount of a valuation so made of the remaining assets.
(2) The foregoing sub-paragraph shall not apply—
(а) to assets for which the figures relating to the 
period beginning with the commencement of this 
Decree cannot be obtained without unreasonable 
expense or delay; or
(б) to assets the replacement of which is provided for 
wholly or partly—
(/) by making provision for renewals and charging 
the cost of replacement against the provision 
so made; or
(ii) by charging the cost of replacement direct to 
revenue.
(3) For the assets under each heading the amount of 
which in each case is arrived at in accordance with 
sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph, there shall be 
shown—
(а) the aggregate of the amounts referred to in para­
graph (a) of that sub-paragraph; and
(б) the aggregate of the amount referred to in para­
graph (b) thereof.
10. The aggregate amounts respectively of statutory 
reserves, capital reserves, revenue reserves and provisions 
(other than provisions for depreciation, renewals or diminution 
in value of assets) shall be stated under separate headings:
Provided that the Central Bank may direct that a separate 
statement of the amount of provisions, shall not be required 
where the Central Bank is satisfied that such a statement is 
not required* in the public interest and would prejudice the 
person, but subject to the condition that any heading stating 
an amount arrived at after taking into account a provision 
(other than as aforesaid) shall be so framed or marked as to 
indicate that fact.
11. The matters referred to in the following sub-paragraphs 
shall be stated by way of note, or in a statement or report 
annexed, if not otherwise shown—
(a) the amount of any arrears of fixed cumulative 
dividends, on the person’s shares and the period 
for which the dividends, or if there are more than
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one class of them, each class of them are in arrears, 
the amount to be stated before deduction of income 
tax, except that in the case of tax free dividends, 
the amount shall be shown free of tax and the 
fact that it is so shown shall also be stated;
(b) the general nature of any other contingent ' liabili­
ties not provided for and, where practicable, the 
aggregate amount or estimated amount of those 
liabilities;
(c) where practicable the aggregate amount or esti­
mated amount of contracts for capital expendi­
ture so far as not provided for;
(d) the basis on which foreign currencies have been 
converted into £N, where the amount of the 
assets or liabilities affected is material;
(e) the basis on which the amount, if any, set aside for 
Income Tax is computed;
( f)  the amount of the net External Assets or Liabilities 
o f the person;
(g) the amount of deposits, if any, held by persons 
not ordinarily resident in Nigeria; ^ •
(h) the total amounts respectively of loans and advances 
secured against real estate, otherwise secured and 
unsecured;
(/) except in the case of the first balance sheet of the 
person after the commencement of this Decree, 
the corresponding amounts at the end of the 
immediately preceding financial year for all items 
shown in the balance sheet;
(/) the market value of the investments.
Profit and Loss Account
12. There shall be shown—
(a) the amount charged to revenue by way of provision 
for depreciation, renewals or diminution in 
value of fixed assets; *
■- * - - ■ * .vi *
(b) the amount charged to revenue by way of provision - 
for debts doubtful of recovery; > . ,
(c) the amount of bad debts written-off where such 
amount is not charged to a provision created as 
in sub-paragraph (b) above ;♦
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(<Q the amount of the interest on the person's bor­
rowings, distinguishing between interest paid in 
respect of borrowings from banks and other 
creditors respectively in Nigeria and that paid in 
respect of j borrowings from banks and other 
creditors respectively outside Nigeria;
(e) the amourft of the charge for Nigerian income tax 
and other Nigerian taxation on profits, including, 
where practicable, as Nigerian income tax any 
taxation imposed elsewhere to the extent of the 
relief, if any, from Nigerian income tax;
( / )  the amount, if any, provided for redemption of 
loans;
(g) the amount set aside or proposed to be set aside to, 
or withdrawn from, reserves;
(h) the aggregate amount of the dividends paid and 
proposed;
(0 the remuneration of the auditors if such remune­
ration is not fixed by the person in general meet­
ing, the amount thereof shall be shown under a 
separate heading, and for the purposes of this 
paragraph, any sums paid by the person in respect 
of the auditors’ expenses shall be deemed to be 
included in the expression “remuneration” ;
O') (0 the aggregate amount of directors’ emolu­
ments;
(//) the aggregate amount of directors’ or past 
directors* pensions; and v
(i/r) the aggregate amount of any compensation 
to directors or past directors in respect of 
loss of office.
For the purposes of this sub-paragraph the 
expression “emoluments”, in relation to a  director 
includes fees and percentages, any sums paid 
by way o f expenses allowance insofar as those 
sums are charged to Nigerian income tax, any 
contribution paid in respect of him under any 
pension scheme and the estimated money value 
o f any other benefits received by him otherwise 
than in cash.
13. The earnings o f the. company shall be classified 
under the headings, “ I n t e r e st s” , “ T r a n sfer  C h a r g e s” , 
“ F o r e ig n  E x c h a n g e ” ,  “ O t h e r  I n c o m e” .
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14. The matters referred to in the following sub-para­
graphs shall be stated by way of note, if not otherwise shown—
(a) the basis on which the charge for Nigerian income 
tax is computed;
(b) except in the case of the first profit and loss account 
laid before the person after the commencement of 
this Decree, the corresponding amounts for the 
immediately preceding financial year for all items 
shown in the profit and loss account;
(c) any material respects in which any items shown 
in the profit and loss account are affected—
(0 by transactions of a sort not usually under­
taken by the person or otherwise by circum­
stances o f any exceptional or non-recurrent 
nature; or
(//) by any change in the basis of accounting.
FOURTH SCHEDULE 
Sections 18 and 19
M a t t e r s  T o  B e E x p r e ssl y  S t a t e d  I n  A u d it o r s ' R epo r t
The auditors’ report shall indicate the following matters—
(a) whether they have obtained all the information 
and explanations which, to the best of their 
knowledge and belief, were necessary for the 
purposes of their audit;
(b) whether, in their opinion, proper books of account 
have been kept by the person licensed under this 
Decree, at Head Office, and at each of the person's 
branches, and in such form as explain, and give a 
true and fair view of, all the transactions of the 
person;
(c) whether they have examined the books of the 
person at Head Office, and at each of the person’s 
branches, and whether proper returns .adequate 
for the purposes of their audit have been received 
from branches not visited; -4\
(d) whether, to the best o f their knowledge and belief, 
there have been any contraventions of the Banking 
Decree 1969 and other related legislation during
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the period covered by the audited accounts and 
whether every such contravention has been repor­
ted to the Central Bank as required by law;
(e) whether, in their opinion, the assets of the person 
have been properly valued, and whether adequate 
provisions have been made for losses and diminu­
tion in the value of the person’s assets;
( / )  whether, in their opinion, and to the best of their 
information, and having regard to the explanations 
given to them, the audited accounts of the person 
are in agreement with the books of account kept 
and give the information required by this Decree 
r in the manner so required, and also give a true 
and fair view—
(/) in the case of the balance sheet, of the state of the 
' person’s affairs as at the end of its financial year;
(//) in the case of the profit and loss accounts, of the 
profit or loss for its financial year.
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ADDENDUM
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (AMENDMENT) 
DECREE 1970
Decree No. 40
(6th August, 1969)
THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT hereby decrees 
as follows:
1. The Central Bank of Nigeria Act (hereinafter in this Decree 
referred to as Mthe principal Act’*) shall be amended as prescribed in 
the following provisions of this Decree.
2. In section 3 of the principal Act (which relates to the power of the 
Board to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property), 
immediately after subsection (2) thereof there shall be inserted a new 
subsection as follows:
“(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (2) above, 
any contract relating to any project of a value of not less th in  fifty thou­
sand pounds shall be referred to the Federal Executive Council for 
approval through the Commissioner before any award of such contract 
is made.”
3. In section 5 of the principal Act (which refers to the location of the 
chief office of the Bank and power to open branches and appoint agents 
and correspondents), immediately after the word “may” there shall be 
Inserted the words “.subject to the approval of the Commissioner,” .
4. In section 8 of the principal Act (which deals with the establishment 
and powers of the Board), in subsection (I) thereof, immediately after the 
words “which shall”, there shall be inserted the words—
“subject to the provisions of section 3 of the Central Bank of Nigeria
Act (Amendment) (No. 3) Decree 1968,”
and in section 3 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act (Amendment) (No. 3) 
Decree 1968, immediately after subsection (3) thereof, there shall be inser­
ted the following—
“(4) The foregoing provisions of this section shall apply in relation to 
any general policy pursued or intended to be pursued on any administra­
tive matter (including staff, pensions, salaries and allowances and other 
simitar matters) as they apply in relation to monetary and banking policy 
pursued or intended to be pursued by the Central Bank” .
A 177
Commence­
ment.
Sundry 
amendments 
o f  the 
principal 
A c t
Cap. 30
Approval 
required 
before 
award o f  
certain 
contracts: 
amendment 
o f  section 3.
Approval 
required 
for certain 
banking 
a c tiv itie s: 
amendment 
o f  section 5.
Issuing o f  
d irectives: 
amendment 
o f  section 8. 
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and section 3 
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Determina­
tion of 
salaries and 
aJkAva'ices: 
amendment 
o f  section 14.
Citation, 
extent and 
commence­
ment
1970 No. 40 Central Bank o f Nigeria (Amendment)
5. In section 14 of the principal Act (which relates to appointments of 
officials and other employees oi the Bank)—
(a) at the end of subsection (1) thereof, there shall be inserted the 
following—
“subject as prescribed by this section or otherwise provided for.**;
(b) immediately after subsection (2) thereof, there shall be inserted 
the following—
“(3) The salaries of the employees of the Bank (other than 
those of the Governor or his deputy shall be as stipulated from 
time to time by the Federal Executive Council, and the board 
shall accordingly be guided in terms of the scales of salary 
provided therefor; and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing the scales of salary set out in the Schedule to the
1968 N o . 59. statutory Corporations (Salaries and Allowances, etc.) Decree
1968 shall apply in relation to the employees of the Bank (subject 
as aforesaid) as they apply in relation to the staffs of statutory 
corporations affected by that Decree and by the Statutory 
Corporations (Salaries and Allowances, etc.) (Extended Applica-
1969 N o . ll.tion) Decree 1969.
(4) The allowances and benefits, other than salaries and 
retiring benefits, as may from time to time be stipulated by the 
Federal Executive Council for members of the public service of 
the Federation shall in like manner apply to the employees of 
the Bank; and the words ‘the public service of the Federa­
tion' shall have the same meaning as in the Constitution
1963 N o . 20. of the Federation 1963”.
6.—(1) This Decree may be cited as the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(Amendment) Decree 1970 and shall apply throughout the Federation.
(2) This Decree shall be deemed to have come into operation on 
6th August, 1969.
Made a t Lagos this 24th day of June, 1970.
APPENDIX IV
REGULATIONS DEFINING THE CONSTITUTION, DUTIES AND 
POWERS OF THE WEST AFRICAN CURRENCY BOARD
1 . The West African Currency Board has been constituted to 
provide for and to control the supply of currency to the 
British West African Colonies and Protectorates and Trust 
Territories (hereinafter referred to as the constituent 
Territories), to ensure that the currency is maintained in 
satisfactory condition and generally to watch over the 
interests of the constituent Territories so far as currency 
is concerned.
2. The members of the Board and the Secretary are appointed 
by the Secretary of State.
3. The Board will have power to appoint officers for the 
discharge of such duties in connection with currency in the 
United Kingdom or in British West Africa and at such rates 
of salary as the Board may think fit, subject in each case 
to the approval of the Secretary of S t ate.
4. The Board is authorised to incur expenditure necessary 
for the due performance of such duties as are now or may 
be hereafter assigned to it.
5. The Board will have authority to make all necessary 
arrangements for the minting of any special coins authorised
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for circulation in the constituent Territories and to 
comply with applications for the supply of any coins at 
the time being legally current in those Territories. Sub­
ject to the provisions of these Regulations any legislation 
from time to time in force in the constituent Territories 
the Board may provide and may issue and re-issue therein 
notes hereinafter referred to as currency notes.
6. The plates from which the currency notes are printed 
shall be of such designs and shall bear such devices as 
the Secretary of State shall approve and shall be prepared 
by a person selected by the Board. The Board shall be 
responsible for their safe custody.
7. The currency notes shall be printed on such paper as 
may be approved by the Board and shall be authenticated by 
facsimiles of the signatures of the members of the Board for 
the time being.
8. The Board shall make such arrangements as it may from 
time to time think necessary or proper for the cancellation 
of notes withdrawn from further use for the destruction of 
such cancelled notes and for recording the issue and 
cancellation of notes.
9. The Board shall issue at its main centres at Accra, 
Bathurst, Freetown and Lagos, in the constituent Territories 
to any person who makes demand in that behalf coin or 
currency notes equivalent to the value (at the rate of 
Twenty shillings West African curreny to One pound sterling) 
of sums in sterling lodged with the Board in London.
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The Board shall pay to any person who makes demand 
in that.'.behalf sterling in London equivalent to the value 
(calculated as aforesaid) of coin or currency notes lodged 
with the Board at its aforesaid centres in the constituent 
Territories.
Provided that:
(i) The Board shall be entitled to levy from any persons
obtaining currency notes, coin or sterling under
these provisions a commission at such rate or rates 
not exceeding three-quarters of one per cent as it 
may determine from time to time.
(ii) The Board may fix such minimum limits of values as 
it may think fit from time to time for the trans­
actions referred to in this regulation.
(iii) No person shall be entitled to receive currency in
the constituent Territories or payment in London
unless the Board is satisfied that payment of sterling 
has been made in London of equivalent currency 
tendered in the constituent Territories as the case 
may be.
10. Proceeds of the sale of coin and currency notes and all 
over revenue of the Board shall, after the necessary deduc­
tions have been made for all expenses and for any contribu­
tions made to the revenues of the British West African 
Governments under section 16 of these Regulations, be 
credited to a fund hereinafter referred to as the Currency 
Reserve Fund. Any losses which may be incurred will be 
debited to the Fund.
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11. The Board may invest its funds in sterling securities 
or the Government of any part of His Majesty's dominions, 
or in such other manner as the Secretary of State may 
approve. The extent to which investments may be made will 
be left to the discretion of the Board, whose duty it will 
be to hold, subject to any directions which may be received 
from the Secretary of State, a proportion of its reserve in 
a liquid form.
12. The Board shall submit half-yearly to the Secretary of 
State a statement of the position of the Currency Reserve 
Fund on the last days of June and December in each year 
including a Statement of Securities.
13. The Board shall cause to be made up half-yearly and 
published in the Government Gazettes of the constituent 
Territories an abstract showing: (a) the whqle amount of 
the West African coinage and note circulations on the last 
days of June and December in each year, (b) the total 
amount of the Currency Reserve Fund on the said days, (c) 
the nominal value of, price paid for and latest known 
market price of the securities forming the investment 
portion of the Reserve Fund.
14. The accounts of all the transactions of the Board will 
be audited by the Colonial Audit Department.
15. The Board will submit annually for the approval of the 
Secretary of State a statement of its transactions during 
the preceding year.
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16. The Board may, with the approval of the Secretary of 
State, pay any sum which it thinks proper out of its income 
by way of contribution to the revenues of the British West 
African Governments.
17. When the Board is satisfied and shall have satisifed 
the Secretary of S t a t e , that its reserves are more than 
sufficient to ensure the convertibility of the notes and 
the coins issue and to provide a reasonable reserve against 
possible depreciation, the Board may pay over the whole or 
part of the surplus amount in aid of the revenues of the 
British West African Government.
18. The Regulations defining the constitution, duties and 
powers of the Board dated 11th July 1924, are hereby 
revoked.
19. These Regulations may be cited as the West African 
Currency Boards Regulations 1949.
2nd September, 194 9
A. CREECH JONES, Secretary of State
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APPENDIX V
REGULATIONS DEFINING THE CONSTITUTION, DUTIES AND POWERS 
OF THE EAST AFRICAN CURRENCY BOARD AS REVISED AND APPROVED 
UNDER THE EAST AFRICAN CURRENCY BOARD REGULATIONS, 1955 AND
1961
1. The East African Currency Board will provide for and 
control the supply of currency to the Kenya Colony and 
Protectorate, the Uganda Protectorate, Tanganyika, the 
Zanzibar Protectorate, Aden Colony and Protectorate, and 
any other Territories which may be added by the Secretary 
of State, to ensure that the currency is maintained in 
satisfactory condition, and generally to watch over the 
interests of the said Territories so far as currency is 
concerned. Such Territories may be referred to as the 
Constituent Territories.
2. The members of the Board and the Secretary are appointed
by the Secretary of State and may be paid such fees as in
each case the Chairman will direct.
3. The Board will have power to appoint officers for the 
discharge of such duties in connection with currency in 
the United Kingdom or in the Constituent Territories and 
at such rates of salary as the Board may think fit.
4. The Board is authorised to incur expenditure necessary
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for the due performance of such duties as are now or may 
be hereafter assigned to them.
5. The Board will have authority to make all necessary 
arrangements for the minting of any special coins authorised 
for circulation in the Constituent Territories and to comply 
with applications for the supply of any coins at the time 
being legally current in those Constituent Territories. 
Subject to the provisions of these Regulations and of any 
legislation from time to time in force in the Constituent 
Territories, they may provide, and may issue and re-issue 
therein, notes hereinafter referred to as currency notes.
6 . The Board shall issue at their main offices in the 
Constituent Territories to any person who makes demand in 
that behalf currency notes or coin equivalent to the value 
(at the rate of Twenty East African shillings to One pound 
sterling) of sums in sterling lodged with the Board'in 
London. The Board shall pay to any person who makes demand 
in that behalf sterling in London equivalent to the value 
(calculated as aforesaid) of currency notes or coin lodged 
with the Board at their main offices in the Constituent 
Territories:
Provided that:-
(i) the Board shall be entitled to charge and levy from
any person obtaining currency notes, coin or sterling
under the provisions of this paragraph a commission 
at such rate or rates not exceeding one half of one 
per cent, as they may determine from time to time.
(ii) the Board may fix such minimum limits of value as
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they may think fit from time to time for the trans­
actions referred to in this paragraph.
(iii) subject to the provisions of the next succeeding 
paragraph of these Regulations no person shall be 
entitled to receive currency in the Constituent 
Territories or payment in London unless the Board is 
satisfied that payment of sterling has been made in 
London or equivalent currency tendered in the Cons­
tituent Territories as the case may be.
7. (1) The Board in their discretion may issue at their 
main offices in the Constituent Territories currency notes 
or coin in exchange for securities of or guaranteed by the 
Government of one of the Constituent Territories or of any 
authority established to administer services common to two 
or more of the Constituent Territories lodged with the 
Board at their main offices in the Constituent Territories, 
as part of such a transaction as is permitted by paragraph 
14 of these Regulations.
(2) As part of such transactions as are permitted by 
paragraph 14 and 14A of these Regulations, the Board in 
their discretion may issue at any one of their offices in 
the Constituent Territories, currency notes or coinage in 
exchange for such securities, bills of exchange, and promi- 
sory notes as are eligible within the terms of those 
paragraphs and are lodged with the Board at such offices in 
the Constituent Territories.
8. Currency notes may be for such denominations as may be 
fixed by the Board.
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9. The plates from which the currency notes are printed 
shall be of such designs and shall bear such devices as 
the Secretary of State shall approve, and shall be prepared 
by a person selected by the Board. The Board shall be 
responsible for their safe custody.
10. The currency notes shall be printed on such paper as 
may be approved by the Board, and shall be authenticated
by facsimiles of the signatures of the members of the Board 
for the time being.
11. The Board shall make such arrangements as they may from 
time to time think necessary or proper for the cancellation 
of notes which have become unfit for use, for the destruc­
tion of such cancelled notes and for recording the issue 
and cancellation of notes.
12. Proceeds of the sale of coin and currency notes and all 
other revenue of the Board shall, after the necessary
<
deductions have been made for all expenses and for any 
contributions made to the revenues of the Constituent Ter­
ritories under paragraph 19 of these Regulations, be 
credited to a fund hereinafter referred to as the Currency 
Reserve Fund. Any losses which may be incurred will be 
debited to the Fund.
13. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 20 of these 
Regulations, the Board may at their discretion invest their 
funds-
(i) in sterling securities of the Government of any part 
of Her Majesty's Dominions or of any territory under
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Her Majesty's protection or of any territory admini­
stered by the Government of any part of Her Majesty's 
Dominions under the trusteeship system of the United 
Nations or in such other manner as the Secretary of 
State may approve;
(ii) in such assets payable in East African shillings as 
are specified in paragraphs 14 and 14A of these 
Regulations and to the extent specified in those 
paragraphs;
Provided that it shall be the Board's duty to hold 
subject to any directions which may be received from the 
Secretary of State a proportion of their reserve in liquid 
form.
14. The Board may subscribe for or buy or sell and may hold 
publicly issued securities of or guaranteed by the Govern­
ment of one of the Constituent Territories or of any 
authority established to administer services common to two 
or more of the Constituent Territories and payable in East 
African shillings in any of the said territories:
Provided that the cost of such securities so held shall 
not except with the approval of the Secretary of State at 
any time exceed an amount in East African shillings 
equivalent at par rate of exchange on London to £20 million 
(twenty million pounds) sterling.
14A. (1) The Board may-
(a) discount bills of exchange and promissory notes pay­
able in East African shillings in any of the 
Constituent Territories bearing two or more good
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signatures, one of which shall be that of a Bank 
licensed to operate in any of the said territories, 
drawn or issued for the purpose of financing bona fide 
commercial transactions arising from processing, or 
marketing of crops, and maturing in not more than 90 
days, exclusive of days of grace, from the date of 
acquisition;
(b) grant advances for periods not exceeding three months 
against promissory notes of banks licensed to operate 
in any of the Constituent Territories secured by 
pledges with the Board of-
(i) such assets payable in said territories as the 
Board is permitted to hold in terms of paragraph
13.
(ii) such sterling securities as the Board is permit­
ted to hold in terms of paragraph 13;
(iii)such bills of exchange or promissory notes as are 
eligible for discount by the Board in terms of 
subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1) of this 
Regulations
Provided that the Board may require such margin of 
security as they may from time to time stipulate over and 
above the value of any advances granted in terms of this 
paragraph.
(2) The total amount of bills and promissory notes discoun 
ted and of advances granted and outstanding shall not 
at any time exceed an amount in East African shillings 
equivalent at par rate of exchange in London to £5 
million (five million pounds) sterling.
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15. The Board shall submit half-yearly to the Secretary of 
State a statement of the position of the Currency Reserve 
Fund on the last day of the half-year, including a state­
ment of securities.
16. The Board shall cause to be published half-yearly in the 
Government Gazettes of the Constituent Territories an 
abstract showing (a) the whole amount of the East African 
coinage and currency notes in circulation on the last day
of the half-year; (b) the total amount of the Currency 
Reserve Fund on the said day; (c) the nominal value of, the 
price paid for, and the latest known market price of the 
securities forming the investment portion of the Reserve 
Fund.
17. The accounts of all the transactions of the Board will 
be audited by the Overseas Audit Department.
18. The Board will submit annually for the approval of the 
Secretary of State a statement of their transactions during 
the preceding year.
19. The Board may, with the approval of the Secretary of 
State, pay any sum which it thinks proper out of its 
income by way of contribution to the revenues of the 
Constituent Territories.
20. When the Board is satisfied that their reserves are more 
than sufficient for all the purposes for which such 
reserves may be required, they may, with the approval of 
the Secretary of State, pay over the whole or any part of 
the surplus amount in aid of the revenues of the Constituent
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Territories.
21. The Regulations defining the constitution, duties and 
powers of the Board dated the 8th August, 1949, are 
hereby revoked:
Provided that the provisions contained in sub-section
(2) of Section 38 of the Interpretation Act, 1899, shall 
apply to the effect of these Regulations as those provi­
sions apply to the effect of an Act of Parliament.
7th December, 1961
R. MAUDLING, 
Secretary of State for the 
Colonies
